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1Svnoasis.
This thesis aims to give an exposition of, and disouss, the 
aesthetics propounded by Uikel Dufrenne, in the Phénoménologie 
de l'expérienoe esthétique , It is not the intention here to 
oover the total aesthetio output of Dufrenne, presented in 
other works suoh as Le poétique , and a number of artioles.
One of the principle features of Dufrenne's work - his 
notion of the a priori in art - is disoussed generally in the 
first two ohapters, leading up to a detailed oritique in the 
third. In Chapter One the main question is of the nature of art, 
and whether it is •quasi-pour-sol', and the distinction of 'work 
of art' and 'aesthetio object'. In Chapter Two I have taken 
Dufrenne's ideas on the status of art - its oreation, peroeption 
and self-suffioienoy. All those topics relate in some nay to 
the a priori, whioh is fully dealt with subsequently - in its 
relation to Kant and aesthetios, in particular the affeotive 
a priori.
In eaoh chapter I have dealt with subjects whioh oan be 
disoussed in their own right. The first three ohapters are 
taken with the idea of the a priori very muoh to the fore - 
although eaoh topio is treated as of value in itself - but the 
fourth and fifth ohapters are less tied to the a priori. Here 
I have taken three of the most important topics in aesthetios, 
tne aesthetio attitude, expression and meaning, and laid more 
emphasis on Dufrenne's ability to note particular objeotive 
features of art. These topios, particularly the former two, 
are not only muoh dioussed in analytic aesthetios, but ure also 
subjeots whioh Dufrenne oonsiders of primary importanoe.
I conclude that Dufrenne is mistaken in his view of 
the a priori in art, but contributes to aesthetics - 
though less than often supposed - especially with regard to 
noting i13 objective features.
2 .
3Introduction.
Ever ainoe its publioation in 1932, Dufrenne'a Phonomonologle da
esthetique1' experience^haa baan aoooptad as tha paradigm of a phenomenol- 
ogioal aooount of aesthetics, and aa a vary valuable contrib­
ution to aesthetics, presenting thoroughly aoherent and 
oonvinoing opinions, and possibly being tha most important work 
on aasthatios sinoa that of Clive Ball.
Unfortunately phenomenology has no sat of olearly defined 
prinoiplas, and its methods and beliefs vary vaatly From parson 
to parson. For instanoa Husserl and Heidegger, although master 
and pupil, and father and son in line of desoent phenomenolog- 
ioally, held few beliefs in oommon. Phenomenology is just a 
ohanging and developing philosophy. So one oannot state a - n 
principles of phenomenology, assume Dufrenne held these, and 
prove that a theory of art either oen or oannot be produoed from 
them. However, there are a number of beliefs and procedures 
which are shared in one way or another among phenomenologists, 
and it is on the basis of his holding various of these that 
Dufrenne may be considered a phsnomenologist.
The principal idea of phenomenology is to unoovor reality - 
i.e., to investigate objeots end events in the world, and from 
a presuppositionless point of view, to peroeive what is really, 
objectively true, to peroeive the essence of any object. This is 
to be oarried out by a process of reduction » reducing the objetft 
to its barest essentials, 'bracketing off' any theories or 
irrelevant details. ('Braoketing off* is Husserl's term for the 
method of reaohing the oore or easenoe of objects.) Of oourae, 
this is not a totally presuppositionlesa philosophy as it olaims 
to be, it presupposes absolute truth, the existence of objeots 
independently of the peroeiver, and essences of thoss objeots, 
among other things. This is not at issue here, hot ever.
3Introduction.
Kver sinoa its publication in 1952, Dufranna's Phanomcnologie da
esthetique11oxperlenocihas baan aeoopted aa tha paradigm of a phenomenol- 
cgioal aooount of aesthetios, and as a very valuable contrib­
ution to aesthatios, presenting thoroughly aoharant and 
oonvinoing opinions, and possibly being tha most important work 
on aesthatioa ainoa that of Clive Ball,
Unfortunately phenomenology has no sat of olaarly defined 
principles, and its methods and beliefs vary vastly from parson 
to person, for inatanoa Husserl and Heidegger, although master 
and pupil, and father and son in line of desoent phenomenolog­
ically, held few beliefs in oommon. Phenomenology is just a 
ohanging and developing philosophy. So one oannot state a - n 
principles of phenomenology, assume Dufrenne held these, and 
prove that a theory of art either oan or oannot be produoed from 
them. However, there are a number of beliefs and jrooedures 
whioh are shared in one way or another among phenomenologists, 
and it is on the basis of his holding various of these that 
Dufrenne may be considered a phenomenologist.
The prinoipal idea of phenomenology is to unoover reality - 
i.e., to investigate objeota and events in the world, and from 
a presuppositionless point of view, to peroeive what is really, 
objeotivdly true, to peroeive the essenoe of any object. This is 
to be oarried out by a prooess of reduotion « reducing the objstft 
to its barest essentials, 'braoketing off* any theories or 
irrelevant details. ('Braoketing off' is Husserl's term for the 
method of reaching the oore or essenoe of objeets.) Of oourse, 
this is not a totally presuppositionlesa philosophy as it claims 
to be, it presupposes absolute truth, the existence of objeots 
independently of the peroeiver, and essences of those objeets, 
among other things. This is net at issue here, hot ever.
4I would agree that Dufrenne's work (the Phdnomenologie that 
is, not everything that he has ever written about aesthetics)• 
hae to be regarded as the paradigm of a phenomenological aooount 
of aesthetiosi
(c) beoause it is the nost developed theory of aesthetios pres­
ented by aooepted phenomenologiats,l*and; (b ) beoause it emphas­
ises various of the shared tenets of phenomenology, for instanoe, 
Dufrenne believes in the importance if direot unbiased ezperianoe 
of an objoot, and holds the view that all objects are immediately 
meaningful, and in partioular le shares the view that every 
objeot (in this ease the aesthetie objeot) has an essential 
struoture which it is the duty of the phenomenologist to unoover. 
As I have noted, in a supposedly presuppoaitionless philosophy 
the belief in essences seems to be a eiseable presupposition.
And it is a belief whioh Dufrenne firmly holds about art • 
i.e., that it is a priori expressive - without involving 
himself in muoh argument.
JL. There are many other phenomenolpgioal works on aesthetioste.g* 
Wilhelm Dilthey's Uesamnelte Sohrifteni (12 \fcla.) pub. Stuttgart,
B. &. Teubner,l91J-1958j but this is restrioted to literatures 
Sartre’s. What is literature?Alit.pub.Llbrarie Uallimard 1943), pub, 
Methuen, University Paperbaoka 1970, whioh is also obviously res^ 
rioted to literature and might be regarded as existentialism not 
phenomenology, though the dividing line is very thin; Sartre's, 
Kaaaya i.n aesthetics.pub. Peter Owen,London 1964 - also existent­
ialist and devoted to speoifio works of art. And there are others, 
as well as various collections on phenomenologioal aesthetios,
•g, Aisti.esls and aesthetlos. ed.T.W,Strauss A K.M.Griffith, pub, 
Duquesne University Press 197°, None of these presents a total 
aeathetio theory, however, in the way Dufrenne'a Phenomenologle
does
5Dufrenne has oertainly made a contribution to aesthetioa, merely 
by discussing it from a phsnomenologloal angle. And the difficulty 
of doing this should not be lightly dismissed. It is not easy to 
produce s theory of mesthetios even working with the most olosely 
ruled philosophical methods, ss e.g., Anglo-Arneriosm analytical 
philosophy. So in a philosophioal tradition where there are no 
striot laws, it is an even greater task to oonstruot a theory on the 
nebulous subjeot of aeathetlos. It oould be oompared with an attempt 
to form a oonstantly ohanging pattern (aesthetios) out of constantly 
changing colours (phenomenology).
Nevertheless, despite the enormity of the task (i.e., taking 
this into aooount), I feel that Oufrenne's oontribution is somewhat 
limited, having a number of serious weaknesses, and that one must be 
very careful if one wishes to uphold it as an example of one of the 
most valuable contributions to the aesthetios of this oentury.
One of the most important dT these weaknesses is the laok of 
argumentation for his beliefs and assertions. This is a typically 
phenomenolcgioal falling but that in no way absolves Dufrenne. One 
of the things whioh will become dear in this thesis is this very 
failure to back up olaims with any deoisive reasoning, and the 
oonsequonoesof this. In brief these are: (1) that Dufrenne lays 
himself wide open to having a horse and oart driven through most of 
his theories by anyone who oan produoe one argument of some sort 
against these, because he has left the enormous gap of not provid­
ing any sound arguments fo r them.-1*
J.. I do not say that Dufrenna never argues for any of his views. 
Indeed he devotes some time to the question of oritioal analysis in 
the aesthetio attitude, for instanoe. Unfortunately, here, ha is 
unoertain of the oorreot line to adopt at the beginning, and wastes 
time having to modify his original hard line as the faots emerge - 
as will be seen in Chapter four.
6Not only that, but (ii) one finds on olose inapeotion (i.e., on 
working out what it is that Dufrenne ia really aaying and its log­
ical oonoluaion), that a lot of what ho says aotually is unaccept­
able • whioh night h<vs boon avoided had he reasoned out his views 
for hinself.
This represents a fundamental flaw in Dufrenne's method. What 
is most unfortunate about it is not that it is theoretioally poss­
ible that someone might produce arguments against the validity of 
what he says, but that one can aotually do this with many of his 
contentions. The problem is further exaoerbated by the extreme 
obscurity of muoh of Dufrenne's language - whioh is a further 
unfortunate oharaoteristio of phenomenology.
The thesis I would like to argue for is that the only oomplete 
phenomenology of aeathetioa whioh we possess (i.e., the Ffainaaenologle) 
does not provide the aooeptable and original^** aooount of aesthot- 
io^whioh it is held to do. That is to say, neither Dufrenne nog 
phenomenology pa presented by Dufrenne, gives a wholly aooeptable 
aooount of aesthetios or makes so valuable a contribution as is 
generally supposed. 1 do not wish to say that what Dufrenne says 
is completely unacceptable, beoause I think he is right about oart- 
ain fairly important points. However, although he is right in 
various areas, what he says is often not wholly original (with one 
useful exoeption), and he does not seen to have broken any apprec­
iable area of new ground in aesthetios or presented any new solutions 
via the phenomenological approaoh - with the aforementioned exception 
whioh will be fully dlaoussed in the oourse of this thesis. X would 
oontend that there is a great deal of ambiguity within what Dufrenne
;L. X would not deny that Dufrenne's work is in many ways original, 
but originality does not entail oorreotness.
7says, «bioh is only fully revealed when one threshes out his stated 
opinions ; and that he expresses himself remarkably carelessly and 
loosely - l.e., «hat he says is not always exaotly «hat he means, 
«hioh is different from, but oontributory to, ambiguity.
The method X intend to adopt is to take the salient points of 
Dufrenne's Phénoménologie, «hioh are also ourrently debated problems 
of British and Amerloan analytio aesthetios, and to illustrate -from 
a fairly analytio point of vie« - ho« Dufrenne's approaoh does not 
solve the problems. In oases «here 1 feel Dufrenne to be «rong, I 
shall as a rule attempt to present a brief alternatlYe viewpoint 
(as well as lndioating how and why I think Dufrenne is mistaken), X 
wish to make it olear from the outset that I am not making a study 
of Dufrenne qua phenomenologist, but disoussing the theory of aesth« 
etios «hioh ho is presenting in the Phénoménologie. Sinoe he is 
giving a phenomenologieal aesthetio, points of phenomenology will 
obviously be raised, but the overall objeot of this thesis is to 
give a critique of the aesthetios of the Phénoménologie.
X shall no« indioate briefly what X take to be Dufrenne's 
basis thesis and the advantages and disadvantages of his viewpoint 
as expressed in the Phénoménologie. The fundamental contention is 
that there is an a priori, objeot of some kind, or work of art, or 
an a priori, «hioh oan be disoovered by the phenomenologioal method 
of looking for the easenoe or eidetio properties of any objeot.
X.e., he believes that the work of art is a priori expressive, that 
there are a priori affeotlve (expressive) oategories. This essent- 
iallsm (a braoketlng off of the existential and reaohlng the essenoe 
or eidos when peroelvlng any objeot), «hioh is traceable book to 
Husserl, is unfortunately also the basio mistake of Dufrenne - or 
so X shall attempt to show.
8And It is a oonaequanoe of the falsehood of the theory that 
In attempting to prove it, Dufrenne haa to invoke Kant - not Kant's 
aesthetic theory but his eonoept of the s priori. And in an att- 
enpt to reeonoile Kant and phenomenology, he tries unaueoessfully 
to sake out a esse for the existential a priori. The problens of 
this will become only too olear in the central ohapter of this 
thesis (Chapter Three). Moreover, not only is Dufrenne foroed to 
new-Kantiaaism on the a priori, but he also has reoourse to the 
Kantian ooneept of sohenas (e.g., the nusloal sohenaa of rhythn 
and melody). It is a further consequence of the vie« that one 
intuits the a priori essenoe of art that there is so little 
argument provided by Dufrenne for any of his views.
This obviously gives rise to a good deal of questioning as 
to the validity of the thesis, for phenomenology does not arise 
out of Kantian views (it is more often traceable back to Oartes- 
ianiam). If one has to abandon the phenomenologioal approaoh as 
a oonsequenoe of one's main thesis (the a priori in art), and 
resort to other philosophies, one is inolined to believe that 
phenomenology oannot be adequate to solving the problems of 
aesthdtios,^' especially when one is presented with so little 
argument to support Dufrenne (even if this is a oonsequenoe of 
the nature of phenomenology).
X* albeit that the outlines of phenomenology are blurred and 
that Dufrenne makes a somewhat abortive attempt to make Kant 
fit into his own beliefs.
9However, there are two important and positive features of tbe 
Phenomenologle. On the dne hand Dufrenne fornulutes the nature of 
the work of art in an original ond valuable way, as a quasi-pour-soi. 
(This will be disoussed initially in the first chapter, but has to 
wait until the final ohapter, when all the possible aspects of art 
as a quasi-pour-a.oi have been diaousaed and a determinate judgment 
oan be made.) And X think that this represents the nost positive 
and thought-provoking idea of the Phenoaenologlo.jL* On the other 
hand, he draws attention to various vbjeotive features of a work 
of art. This cones out aost olearly in the last two chapters 
when the aesthetle attltuds, expression and moaning are disouesed.
And partioular properties not • specifioally disoussed .qug objective 
features of the work, energe throughout this thesis. Xn fact, these 
two positive aspeots of Dufrenne are fairly closely linked, e.g., 
oertuin objective features of art are the grounds for the diaouss- 
ion of the quasl-pour-sol.
Dufrenne approaches his whole subjeot of art fron the poinVb? 
view both of the spectator and of the work of art - a quite legit­
imate approoeh either for phenoaenologiat or non-phenonenologiat - 
and attempts to state and solve the problens whioh ooour in aesth­
etics it terns of the work of art or aesthetle objeot, and its rel­
ationship with other things. This inoludes its relationship with 
ordinary objeots, and with the huaan being as judge, performer or 
ordinary spectator. This in itself is a fairly nornal approach, 
but Dufrenne leys a great deal of emphasis on the self-suffioieney 
of the work of art and its oonpleteness in every way apart from man. 
This is all part of phenomenological beliefs about the meaningful- 
ner.s of an objeot in itself, whioh is diaooverable when one app­
roaches it without bias of any kind - and as will be seen in Chapter 
Two, a work of art is not really like this.
±, This is the exception to the rule which X mentioned.
In the first three chapters I shell introduce and disouss 
the notion of the quasi-pour-soi, and other aspeota of art which 
Dufrenne raises - its nature, the distinction between a work of 
art and an aesthetic objeot, the status of art, its possible 
autonomy and its croation and perception. Uowcwer, it is not 
until the third ohapter that the fundamental question of the 
a priori in art is put to the test.
In the last k»o ohapteis, I have taken issues whioh are 
again central, both to Dufronne's thesis, and to present problems 
of philosophy. They also serve to illustrate my thesis in various 
ways t (a) the way in whioh Dufrenne fails to argue for hie position 
and his oontinual ambiguity - the latter being espeoially pronoun­
ced in Chapter Pour on the aesthetio attitude; (b) the fact that 
when one has worked out an argument for Dufrenne, one finds that 
even if it ia a reasonable viewpoint, it is often one whiou he 
shares with various other aesthetioians, and is therefore not 
wholly original. (The combination of ideas making up a view 
may be original to Dufrenne, but the ideas individually are 
not and he must therefore share any oredit due.) This oan be 
sxen i; the disoussions on both the aesthetio attitude and 
expression, in Chapters Pour and Five; (o) finally they show 
that what he has to say, for instanoe about meaning, is far 
from being fully aooeptable - a faot whioh only beoomes obvious 
as one works out Dufreine's thesis and its implications.
10 .
CHAPTER OWB . THE OP THE ZORK, OF J ± T .
Introduction.
Probably the Boat fitting «ay of beginning is to discuss Dufrenne's 
usage of the terms 'work of art' (l'oeuvre d'art) and 'aesthetio
object1 (l'objet esthetique), as these are the fundamental terms 
for the subjeot of his work. One might expeot there to be some 
indioation of where the essenoe or a priori objective features 
Dufrenne claims for art, lie, end that this might be used to 
indioate the distinction between the two in some way. However, 
there is no suoh disousslon - though he does give an ultimately 
unsatisfactory aooount of the distinotion, and talks of the 
distinction between a work of art and a natural objeot, or an 
ordinary man-made objeot.
The fourth and final seotion launches us into the real 
problem of the work - its essential objective structure - with 
the idea of the work as a quasi-subjeot. Here I shall analyse 
what Dufrenne means when he talks of the work as a quasi-pour- 
soi, and the «g in whioh his conception of the term foroes him 
(even if unoonsoiously) from the 'en-soi' and 'pour-nous', to the 
quasi-pour-soi' image of the work. As X mentioned in the introduct­
ion to this work, Dufrenne would be going some wav to establishing 
the work of art as an a priori objeot if he oould prove it to be a 
quasi-pour-sol - i.e., an objeot with particular qualities analo­
gous to those of man (the pour-soi). However, although X aooept 
the idea conditionally, and it is informative, it does not seem 
to bring out any a priori features of art.
12
As has already been pointed out, Pufrenne is extremely 
unsystematio, and his references to the nature of the work of art 
and the sssthstlo objoot era dispersed throughout the Phenonenologle 
Sinoe ho aooords no priority to any statement or set of statements, 
the ordering will be my own and what Pufrenne saya will not as s 
rule be given in terns of stsgea to a oonolusion, unless the text a 
allows. Otherwise Z shall follow the ordering of the assertions of 
the Phonoaenologle, And in the nsin the same applies throughout 
this thesis,
Sootlon 1,
The distinction between iho work of art and the aesthetic. ofriAflA.
At the beginning of the PI enonenologie, Pufrenne makes a dist-
JL*inotion whioh it often seems might just as well not have been made 
sinoo ihu two terms involved are regularly used interchangeably.
The distinotlon is that between the work of art and the «esthetic 
objeot. Some Justifioetion may be given for the arbitrary use of 
the terms, sinoe there are oooasions when the function may be ful- 
filled by either. However, Pufrenne uoes not restriot himself to 
these oases .
Pufrenne wishes to plaos the anphasis in tho aesthetic object 
as of greater importanoe than the work of art. This obviously 
nakea It neeessary to distinguish 'l'oeuvre', and 'l'objot asthat»
1qua•, from the start, Zn his analysis Pufronne also uses the oun­
cap t of aesthetio perception, whioh is itself treaoheroua ground, 
sinoe it is possible to olain that there is no differenoe between 
an aesthetic, and an ordinary peroeption. However, Z do not think 
that Pufrenne is making the more sweeping olaim that peroeption
itself differs in sons nay aooordlng to its objoot, but rather
J.. That is to a«y , Pufrenne often fails to distinguirii , or put the
distinction to good use, not that titanrar is not a distinction - 
'work of art* and ' aesthetic objeot' are oommonly used distinctly.
13
the lesser one that oer.&lo objects ere peroeived • aesthetically', 
i.e., as being works of art, beautiful objeots, eto. This is 
unoontroversial.
In order to avoid oonfuaion, it is inportant to understand 
that Dufrenne's use of the tern •aesthetic object', is not prim­
arily as a referenee to any objeot seen as aesthetio • as the 
nornal usage of the term suggests. This is Dufrenne's subordinate 
or ssoondary use of the ooneept, and he does at least aoknowladge 
the problen of allowing the term a double application. This will 
be dealt with in the third aeotion of the present ohapter.
Dufrenne regards the work of art B3 present and unquestioned. 
The aesthetio objeot is to be defined in terms of that; and the 
aesthetio perception, or experience, in terms of the aesthetio ob­
jeot. Dufrenne quite rightly realises that to define the aesthetic 
objeot in terms of the aesthetio experience would be to extend the 
realms of its usage to anything whioh was the objeot of an aesth­
etio experience. Sinoe one oan, for example, experienoe nature 
aesthetically, this line of analysis obviously widens the horisons 
of aeathetios beyond the works of man. Not that Dufrenne wishes to 
exclude natural objeots from being seen as aesthetio, but within 
the definition of 'aesthetio objeot', they would oome very muoh 
under the secondary application, and raise problems for the ourr- 
ent distinction.
The aesthetio objeot oan already be seen to be different from 
the v.ork of art, by means of its inevitable oonneotion with the 
idea of perception, or experienoe. It is regarded by Dufrenne as 
the work of art seen in an aesthetio peroeption, and, ¿s a function 
of the work of art, temporally and ontologioally subsequent to it. 
The work itself does not have to be seen aesthetically - it oan be 
grasped (intellectually) just as a physios! objeot.
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An example would be that one oan see a Barbara Hepworth soulpture 
just as § blook of wood (or stone, or whatever it is made from), 
rather than as a soulpture.
The aesthetio objeot arises when it Is seen In an aesthetlo 
peroeptlon, i.e., as a work of art rather than a blook of wood. But 
the aesthetlo objeot oannot exist without the work, wfaeress aooarding 
to Bufrenne, the work oan exist without the aesthetlo objeot. Thus 
it is ontologioally primary. — •
Dufrenne also introduoes an intentional distinotlon between 
the two - using 'intentional* in the phenomenologioal sense in 
whioh Husserl uses it. Noenatioally they are the same - sinoe the 
aesthetio objeot just the work of art peroeived as one, and to 
peroeption they are the sane. Moetioally they differ, beoause 
in faot they differ. 0n* negleot the aesthetio qualities
An example of this would presunably be of, say, a Turner paint» 
ing in a gallery or sonewhero it has been set up as a work of art, 
when no-one is looking at it and therefore it is not an aesthetio 
objeot for anyone.
I.e., an aesthetio objeot is not always identioal to a work of 
art. For an explanation of the terms 'noema' and 'noesis' see 
Husserl) Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology. Trans.
W.K.Boyoe Gibson, pub., Allen A Unwin, London 1958. Also Pivoevlo) 
Husserl and phenomenology, pub. Hutohinson University Library, 1970.
Pivoevlo gives a brief aooountt
"we have to distinguish, for every desorlption used, between 
an intentional apt and its objective geaning-oontaat as oonveysd
in that desoription.... Husserl used the terms'noesis' and
'noena* to designate these two aspeots of an intentional 
experienoe.”
(Chap. 6, p.67, my underlining.)
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of a work of art, but the aesthetio object is tha work of art 
aesthetically perceived;
"tous deux sont des noenoa qui ont la nine contenu, nais qui 
diffèrent an oe qua la noàaa est différantst l'oeuvre d'art an 
tant qu'alla est là dans la monda, peut être saisie dans une 
peroaption qui négligé sa qualité esthétique, oomna lorsqu'au 
speotaola je suis inattantif, ou qui oharoha à la oomprandre et 
a la justifier au lieu de l'éprouver somma peut faire la critique 
d'art. L'objet esthétique est, au aontraire, l'objet esthét­
iquement perçu, o'eat-è-dire perçu an tant qu'esthétique."
(Toi. 1, Part 1, Zntro. p.9j
The 'noematia oontent' refers to the meaning of the exparienee, and 
the 'noetio oontent' to the different possible desoriptions, and 
Dufrenne is oonoerned with the oase where one nay have two different 
references to a perception, where the meaning (sense) of the perc­
eption remains the same. Dufrenne states this, and the preceding 
position, in the Introduction to Volume X. of the Phenonsnologia 
(and unless otherwise stated, references throughout will be to the 
Phénoménologie).
At the end of the first ehapter, Dufrenne gives two further 
aooounts of the distinction. The first may be stated in either of 
two ways;
i) That the work of art is what remains of the aesthetio objeot 
when it is not peroeived; the aesthetio objeot in a state of poss­
ibility,
ii) empir-Loallv the work remains as a permanent possibility for 
sensation.
At this state Dufrenne is very nuoh inclined to the idea that the
work has no -Veal' existence prior to, or apart from, its manif­
estation as an aesthetic object.
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The seoond |«oount involves the speotator (who may ba the 
artiat}.
i) The work ia defined less in wonneetion with the oonteaplation 
of the speotator, and wore with the notion of the artiat or know« 
ledge of the oriti*.
11) The aeathetio objeot only exista properly with the oollabor- 
ation of the apeotator. For x to beoome a atatue rather than a 
atone, it requires the regard of the audienoe to deliver it froa 
being a atone. And, moat importantly, it ia only at the moment et 
whioh x be;guet an aeathetio objeot that it beooaea a work of art. 
"...oeuvre d’art et objet esthétique ae renvoient l'un à 
l'autre et ae oomprennent l'un par l'autre. Car l'exéoutlon, 
qui est la presentation de l'oeuvre, est en none temps le 
moyen par lequel elle devient objet esthétique, et c'est au 
moment où «lie nhi.t a a thé ti eue que l'oauwre d'art
as* irtin tn*  ï u t j i  A'jur.U"
(Vol.l. Part I. ohap.X. p.4 6.)
(Uy underlining.)
Jufrenns then admits to the problem of distinguishing an 
aosthetio objeot from a work of art. He regards it os possible 
theoretioally in terms of psyoholody, where one would subordinate 
the being of tne oesthetio objeot to a oonsoiouaneas, and regard 
the work of art, by contrast, as a thing. However, in praotioe 
thxs distinction foils and oonsequently the aesthetio objeot always 
refers to the work of art, and is inseparable from it.
The only other important references whioh Dufrenne makes are 
(a) in his analysis of the being of the aeathetio objeot (Vvl.I. 
Part Z. ohap.VX), and (b) in the introduction to the seoond part at 
Volume I., on the spatial and temporal arts. In the former he
states that the only difference between the aestnstio objeot and 
the work of art is that consciousness intervenes and makes the 
objeot (neutral term) pass from thing to something peroeived; 
"l'objet esthetique o'est l'oeuvre on tent quo peroue" (p.297). 
There is a reciprocal comprehension of each - the aesthetic objeot 
keepB its being as a work and oan be clarified through it, and the 
work of art has its truth in the aesthetio objeet, and is under­
stood through it.
In the latter, Oufrenne is Justifying speaking of the aesth­
etio objeot rather than the work of art when analysing any art 
form. The reason for not speaking now of the aesthetio objeot, is 
beoause it is the work of art whioh is created, whioh is a thing, 
and whioh 'supports' the aesthetio objeot; and it is that on whioh 
one oan make an objeotive study and whioh diroots analysis and int­
erpretation. Aooording to the argument - the origin of whioh 
Oufrenne does not speoify - one oan 'get at' the work behind the 
objeot by abandoning the aesthetio attitude for an objeotive 
attitude, and instead of considering the work as peroeived, 
consider it as known. Oufrenne's response is that what is said of 
the work applies doubly to what is said of the aesthetio objeot.
A grasp of the aesthetio objeot orientates the analysis of the 
work beoause this analysis oan only be oarried on by referenee to 
the aesthetio ezperienoe, whioh obviously involves referenoe to 
the aesthetio objeot (under Dufrenno's definition).
This is, in essenoe, the sum total of Oufrenne's definition 
of the distinction, and more Importantly, of his use of it. from
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Fron the beginning be usee the terns as if they were equivalent, 
intarohanging then arbitrarily. The main reason that one oan 
see for his preliminary enphasis is his Intention to stress 
perception as a primary factor in aesthetios. However, even 
before defining the two terns, there is a oertain amount of orit- 
ioism to be made of the distinction.
Firstly, if the work of art is seen non-aesthetioally, does 
it remain a work of art?^ -* Or is it just - like a Barbara Hep- 
worth soulpture in wood - a blook of wood? I shall try to show 
that the work of art and the aesthetio object under Dufrenne's 
description arc not distinot.
If one regards the term as subJeot-relative (and hypothesises 
that no-one regards this particular objeot as anything other than 
a pieoe of wood), then the answer will be that it oeeoes to be a 
work of art when people oease to regard it as one. Of oourse, 
one oan ohoose a nore hair-splitting example - simply that A 
peroeives this soulpture as a blook of wood, so that th# intent­
ional object for A is an ordinary pioce of wood, not a work of art) 
whereas B docs see it as a work of art, and the intentional objeot 
for him is therefore a soulpture. Thus, it is both a work of art 
and not one, at the same time. Maintaining a subjeot-relative 
position, however, this is untroublesome. For A the thing is art 
and for B it is not,
A rather fine distinction now has to be drawn between the
two uses of 'perception' - as referring to present perception
of tx- , as opposed to peroeption at some time of o( , In the two
hypotheses Just oited, one is referring to the latter forn,
restricted to oertain groups or within a oertain time
limit. In talking of the distinotion between— the----
1. This question night be asked Bpeoifioally in view of
Dufrenne's seoond distinotion (Vol,1. Part 1, ohap.I.esp p.4-6),
to which 1 have just referred,where he refers to the statue
and the stone.
■
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aesthetic object and the work of art one is referring to the former 
view of perception. However, in either oeee the oonolueion ic the 
same. If perception is a neoessary condition of art, then e sculp­
ture can exist as e physioal object before it is an aesthetio object , 
but it is not a work of art before it is an aesthetio objeet. The 
work of art is therefore not prior to, or different froa, the aesth­
etio objeot.
I think that in two ways Dufrenne olaias perception and exper­
ience of art (reading, hearing, viewing, eto.) as a neoessary cond­
ition of rriethlng's being art. For one thing, in Justifying his 
use of 'aesthetio objeot' instead of 'work of art' when analysing an 
art form, he says analysis of the work of art oan only be oonduoted 
by reference to aesthetic exporlenoo (whioh is similar to aesthetio 
perception). For another, he defines a work of art as beooming art 
under the aesthetlo regard of some person, and has distinguished 
between seeing a work of art purely physioslly and seeing it as art.
In this case, he is using his own criterion for something's 
being an aesthetio object - aesthetic perception or experience 
of a suitable objeot - firstly as olosely related to an art objeot 
qua work of art, and seoondly as a oriterion for something's 
beooming a work of art. Therefore he is undermining, if not dest­
roying, his own distinction between the work of art and aesthetic 
objeot.
Indeed the end of the first ohapter openly admits a good deal 
of this - the most important admissions being his statement that 
perception is required to make a stone a statue) and his allowance
Bearing in mind that he is not using 'aesthetio objeot' in its 
ordinary familiar usage.
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that it is only when something becomes an aesthetio objeot that 
it is properly a wcz’k of art (of. quotation, Vol.1, Part 1, Chap.1 , 
p.4 6) - though 1 think Dufrenn* is indulging in rhetoric hers.
Secondly, the work of art is given the ontologioal priority 
of an unquestioned fact. Tat there is a great deal of debate about 
whet the work of art (so«eelled) is, and about its status. To 
Dufrenne the term appears to imply physioality - yet this is 
attaoked with justified regularity with the question, "Where is 
the work of art in art forms suoh as musio and literature?” And 
espeoially with regard to the performed arts, it is quite plausible 
to olaim that the work is the performanoe and not its phyaioal 
basis, e.g., the aoore or the text. In this oase the work might 
be defined as the 'soore (text) as performed', and as a rule this 
will virtually amount to Dufrenne's definition of the aesthetio 
objeot - of tho work as peroeived, sinoe performances are normally 
peroeived. Thus, under this description the work is equivalent to 
the aesthetio objeot.
Finally. Dufrenne's argument for speaking of the aesthetio 
objeot instead of the work of art, is very Vague.*** In what way 
does what is said of the work apply doubly to the aesthetio objeot? 
It would be ludiorous to say of a oubist painting, for example, 
that the aesthetio objeot was even more 'oubist' than the work. 
However, I think it is suffioient to say that whatever applies to 
ay peroeption of the work of art applies to the aesthetio objeot, 
and Dufrenne is probably indulging in rhetorio again. Zn any event 1
1. See, the beginning of the seoond part of volume 1
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the oritio he invents and sets up against himself is far from 
askite in suggesting one oen aonsider the work as known rather than 
peroived, or abandon the aeethetio attitude in analysing art. For 
works of art are known via peroeption in most oases - even the 
study of literature involves peroeption.A* And if there is aesth- 
etio attitude at all, it is applied in the consideration of art - 
otherwise it beoomes a purely superfluous tern - this is a straight­
forward truism.
1 think this makes it apparent tnat the distinction is at best 
very suspeot, and Dufrenne'e subsequent lack of use of it seems to 
indicate his awareness of this. The initial oritioism makes the 
ground for the praotioal difficulty theorttioal. The distinction 
fails - therefore it is not vital to distinguish between the use of 
either term in the further bourse of this work. However, one 
cannot pass off the failure of tne distinction as unimportant, even 
if its non-existenoe does not make it surprising that Dufrenne does 
not keep up the distinction throughout the Phenomenologie. For it 
has oonsequenoes for the objectivity of the work of art.
For one thing the idea that the work of art has no real
existence apart from its manifestation as an sesthetio objeot, is
not immediately oompatible with the basio view that there is an
essential struoture to the work of art, because it makes the work
1. The element of peroeption is obviously a rather mundane neoess-
ary condition of experiencing literature. Peroeption is an aooept- 
able description of our experience of most art - vre see, hear, touoh 
it, ate. With literature, however, perception is not an adequate 
description. One hears or reads the work, but understanding the 
words is also a necessary precondition of any aesthetic appreciation. 
Although less speoifio it might be preferable were Pufrenne to des- 
oribe literature as experlenoed (which involves being read or heard 
and understood as a linguistio form).
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a rather nebulous entity and gives it no guarantee of oontinued 
existenoe after it has been oreated by the artist. One oan over- 
oome this partioular difficulty, sinoe the possibility that an 
object oan oease at times does not preolude the possibility that 
when it does exist it has an essential structure. But it does oast 
doubt on its a priori nature - the objectivity of its existenoe - 
sinoe Dufrenne is making it dependent on the peroeiver to make 
something art (and honoe expressive cto.)» Zf it were a priori 
art, then it would possess the a priori qualities independently of 
our seeing it as having them.
One may assume that Dufrenne believes that a proper poroeption 
of, e.g., a Kenoir, would be one whioh saw its a priori aesthetio 
features. I.e., not that the peroeiver Rives the work its aesth- 
etio qualities, but that the person who oan grasp the true qualit­
ies of the work nil), see it as having these a priori aosthetio 
features. However, this is not the impression one gains from what 
is said hare of the work of art. Nor is it possible to use this 
view without presenting an aooepteble aocount of the work of art as 
something different from the aesthetio objeot, sinoe the aosthetio 
objeot has only been established as 'x peroaived as a work of art* - 
i.e., us dependent on the peroeiver for its existenoe. Taking a 
relativistio point of view on the oxiatenoe of a work of art does 
not knook down the theory that there are a priori (objeotlve) 
features disooverable in art. Nevertheless, it does make it more 
diffioult to show that there are. And incidentally, it is not a 
phenomenological viewpoint to say that an objeot does not possess 
oertain qualities if one does not see it as possessing them.
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Seotion II.
The nature and general »truetuw of the work of art and aesthetAo
perception.
The value of making the prior diatinotion before giving a eeparate 
definition of either tern seemed dubious, but X think it «as pern- 
issable sines it turned mainly on one dlfferenoe. However, an att­
empt must now be made to define the oentral terns involved. These 
are obviously 'work of art', 'aesthetio objeot', and a subsidiary 
term, 'aesthetio perception', used with the tern'aesthetio exper- 
experienoe'. Dufrenne does disorininate slightly in his use of the 
terms 'work of art', and'aesthetio object', in so far as ho generally 
prefers to apply the ferner when phyaioal nature, looation, or 
oreation of tne work are in question} and the latter when reference 
is speoifioally to the audience's experience of it. (There will also 
be a further use of the discrimination in the third seotion of this 
ohapter, on the distinotion between natural objeots and works of ar1$.
Sinoe one oan say either that there is no suoh thing as aesth­
etio experience without there first being a work of art whioh exists 
independently of anyone's peroeiving it under this description} pr 
that there is no suoh thing as a tork of art until someone exper­
iences sonething as one, aooordlng to whether one holds an absolutist 
or relativist theory, the logioal priority of either remains unsettled. 
The first seotion of this ohapter has shown Dufrenne's position to be 
relativist^* by laying the enphasls on peroeption. X shall there­
fore deal with the aesthetio experienoe/peroeption first, espeoially 
in view of the faot that this is _wh.at_ lh.q_Phepo,,«jaoApgig j.«, .ftb9.aU 
- at least on this point he has made relatlvistio assertions.
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(1) Aeathetlo__P.cgosptioji.
After reoognising the historicity of art, but defying that the 
differenoe in taste over different periods makes it in any wcy 
relative, Oufrenns olaims that art has become only reoently eman­
cipated, through the recognition of speoifioally aesthetlo exper­
ience as something other than ordinary pereeption. This gives ue 
the advantage of being able to eategorise art separately fron, e.g., 
soientifio or skilfull produotions. Thus he adopts a view of art as 
at least potentially an autonomous realn. His definition of aesth­
etic perception is very brief and announoed at the oeginning of the 
introduotion to Yolune 1, Fart X.i it is the oorreot or faithful 
perception of a work of art, and it founds the aesthetio objeot, but 
in an unoreating, non-oreative, or a reoeptive sense. A little later 
he reveals certain assunptions and aimsi firstly, a study of the 
aesthetlo oxperienoe (or perception) will reveal essential features 
of that experience. Secondly, that a knowledge of the essence of 
aesthetio experience will reveal a unity, or structured identity, 
throughout various kinds of art.
In answer to this, there seems no initial difficulty about 
acoepting the oonoept - for although it is defined in terns of true 
and oorreet perceptions of art, it does not nake the controversial 
move (as X stated previously) of regarding perception itself as 
differing when one turns from 'ordinary' to 'art' objeots. Dufrenne 
himself seems to take it for granted that the term is sooeptable.
Unfortunately, there are still two unanswered questions here, 
a%4ell as an hlstorioal point. To take the letter first, he has 
stated that aesthetio experience is only a reoent idea. X have 
taken that to mean that art has only recently been aeoorded recog­
nition on its own.
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This in faot ooourred in the Kantian ere - the separation of 
notions suoh as 'skill* or 'oraft' from 'art*. As far as this 
gives us a more speoifio understanding of «here our subjeot begins 
and ends (if indeed it does sad), this separation Is oertainly 
advantageous.
As to the questions, one wants to knowi i) What oriterlon is there 
for something's being a oorreot perception? 11) If the perception 
does not oreate the art in sons way, is Dufrenne exoluding the aud- 
ienoe from any part in the oreation of s work of art? Is it that 
the speotator has the role of having to peroeive x as art before 
it beoomes art, but that the oreation Itself is solely thut of the 
original artist? Or that the speotator has a creative role in 
respeot of tho aesthetlo objeot, but not that of the work of art?
I think the oorreot poeition is that tho artist is the sole creator 
of the work of art, and the audienoe does not play a part in its 
original oreation, but tnat the audienoe is required to givo the 
work its status as a work of art. 1.9., at least two people are 
required - an artist and an audienoe - os well as the work, in order 
to make it a work of art.
I think Dufrenne would aooept this (of V4.X, Part I, p.?, app­
reciation end oreation as different types of aotivitjr), bis fault 
lies in not speoifioally saying what he means. One oan oompare the 
view roughly with Freud speaking of tendentious jokes,1» exoept 
that the middle person is not required!
"Generally speaking, a tendentious joke oalls for three 
people! in addition to the one who makes tho Joke, there 
must be s sosond who is taken as the objeot of the hostile 
or sexual aggressiveness, and o third in whom the Joke's aim
_____of produolng pleasure is fulfilled, "(op,olt.Parti.-Chap iji.pjQO...^
2. Finally, rather obviously, why assume that there is an essenoe
to aesthetle perception. (Note 1. overlojg£.)
(il)__14». IU\VUf* APA fff. -hhfi W t
Dufrenne states (Vol.I, Part Z, Chap.IT, esp.pp 168-70) that some- 
thins doaa not baa one an aaathatio objeot until aomeone recognises It 
as art - for lnstanoo sonathlng utilitarian or for religious purposes 
la not an aasthstla objaet until aonaone puts It on display , or In 
an art gallary, (l.o., they laplloitly or explicitly put It in tho 
art realm). By this no&na, the objeot undargoaa a metamorphosis - 
aooording to Dufrenne - from the ordinary to the aaathetie realm.
By oontraat, works of modern art are Immediately seen as aesthstie 
objeota. Here Dufrenne ia referring to what he ealle 'pure' visual 
art, by whloh he neana abstraot or non-ropresontational, non-realistlo 
visual art.
This then is the way in which something beoomea an aesthetic 
objeot - whioh corresponds with Dufrenne's statement in the intro­
duction, that works of art offer themselves to ua and wait for us to 
do them justiea. Valuing works for different reasons at different 
times only ahowa that they have various aspeots. Z do not think 
that this is particularly relativistic, Moreover, oulture oert- 
ainly influences our aesthetlo judgments, but it is not these whioh 
reaoh the reality of the aeathetio objeot, beoause taste ia not the 
organ of aesthetic peroeption. (Dufrenne haa by this tine laid olaim 
to both relativist and absolutist views on the sane topio, on whioh I 
shall comment at the end of this section.)
What then are the oriterla for something's being an aesthetie 
objeot, or what merits being an aesthetie objeot for us? Dufrenne 
optiaistloally oonsiders that the opinion of the best informed 
people is adequate - and that this will eoinelde with the general
JL. (From previous page.) See) Sigmund Freudi The oonplote psyoho- 
lpgloal works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strashsy,v*imr. 
(1905)» Jokes and their relation to the unoonaolous, pub. The 
Hogarth Press, Bendon, I960.
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opinion - «hot eaoh oulture reveres, i.e., an enpirioel oriterion. 
Dufrenne here takes a truly phenomenological stand in asserting 
that the reason why well-informed (or general) opinion nay be taken 
as a oriterion for sonothing being a work of art, is beoauso the 
aesthetio object manifests its being or essonso. That is, it ia 
like a living thing which reveals Itself and waits for recognition. 
The aesthetio Judgmont is made more in the object than in us. (of 
esp. p.2 2 ).
Dufrenne rojeots the use of the orlteria for something's being 
beautiful (e.g., a Judgment of taste), as those whioh may be used in 
Judging something to be art. Thus, Dufrenne is dismissing Kant's 
method of aesthetio analysis, of the Critique of judgment, although 
he bases his own aesthetio on the formal ideas expressed in the 
Critique of pure reason, as will be seen in the third chapter. Duf­
renne does, however, make a distinotion between beauty as a feature 
of some art, for example olassioal painting or soulpture, where one 
oan pick out a oertain 'beautiful' oontentj and thei 'Beautiful', as 
an aesthetio oategory (not as precisely definable os 'the Sublime*, 
aooording to what Dufrenne says of Bayer, but similar). He links the 
idea of 'the Beautiful' with that of authenticity - or of the work 
being truly an aesthetio objeot, so that it is said to be the more 
beautiful, the more nearly it perfeots, or epitomises, the notion 
of an aesthetio objeot. This renders the oonoept of beauty useless 
as a defining oharaoteristio of the aesthetio objeot, however, even 
though it beoomes an aesthetic quality. (Cf Vol.I. Part I.esppp 17-22).
I think that in Justifying his olaim that well-informed opinion 
will disoover what is and what is not a work of art, because the 
work manifests its being, Dufrenne is oonfusing Judgment with object­
ivity. It may be that something oan be objectively a work of art 
(this is certainly one view), but it can hardly Judge itself to be
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a work of art, no matter how f&r Dufronne goes on to moke the woric a 
qutsi-pour-soi. (This latter will be dealt with In the last aeotion 
of t.iie chapter.) Judgment is normally a mental aot ^*whioh the 
aesthetic objeot oannot perform, and to be an aeathetio object 
is to be the sub lent of an aeathetio Judgment that x la a work of 
art, not to be the Judgsr,
Before leaving the question it ia neeeasary to take note of what 
Dufrenne aaya of the looation of a work of ert/aeathetio objeot, esp­
ecially ainoo this haa been the aubjeot of muoh current debate. The 
question as to whother or not it ia a phyaioal objeot is least deb­
atable in the visual arta, soulpture and arohiteoture, and moat 
oontentious in the performed arts. Dufrenne acknowledges the prob­
lem, and puts his position in terms of the musioal art form. The 
work itself is neither the soore nor the performanos. However, the 
work is complete when the last note ia put to the soore by the 
composer, but does not exist until it is performed, i.e., the aoore 
is insufficient and the work has to be peroeived to be fulfilled.^* 
This appears to put the musical work into the oategories of both 
physiosl and non-phyaioal, and Dufrenne is applying this to all 
types of art. He draws a parallel between the plaatio arts and the 
performed - for example the aoulpture is equivalent to the aoore of 
the work, since both require an aesthetio peroeption to be oomplete. 
Thus, Bufrenne'a definition of an aeathetio objeot oould briefly
JL* Though not always, A phyaioal oot oan register approval or dis­
approval. (of Wittgensteini heotures and conversations. ed.D.C.BSirett, 
Basil Blaokwell,1966, sap No.13 on aeathetios - wearing a suit as 
approval, however, the eeothetio objeot oannot do this, either.)
'Find its proper form'would be a better phrase for Dufrenne to 
use than 'exist'.
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be said to be a combination of a physioal objeot and some well- 
informed person's perception of it.
If one were looking for a «ingle apeoifio definition for all 
worka of art, in order to Juatify olaaaifying such varying tbinga 
aa a piece of architecture and a aong under one heading, thia would 
aeon prima faeie to be very helpful. And aeathetioiana have been 
searching for cone essentially similar oharaoteriatlo to Justify this 
oategorisatlon. However, in the first plaoe, 1 see no reason to 
worry about the vast dissimilarities within art. There is, for 
instance, Just as much variety with the term 'soienoe• - what has the 
study of the nooturnal habits of the badger, in soology, in common 
with the splitting of the atoa, in physical aoienoes? Nothing that 
I know of, yet few would quibble over regarding them both as scient­
ific enquiries. 1 therefore find little oause for oonoern in in 
olassifying a ohuroh and a song as art.
In the second plaoe, even if one were worried, Dufrenne'a 
answer does not provide an adequate solution. It is obviously 
inexplicit, failing to speoify the relationship between thesoore, 
the performance and the perception, or where logioal priority lies, 
if anywhere. Nor is there a true parallel between the plastio arts 
and the performed. There is a seoond step in the latter, of the 
performance (before the musio/drama can be peroeived aesthetically), 
whioh is laoking in the former* Nor is the performance a minor 
point to be overlooked lightly. £very performance of any work will 
differ as a matter of faet from aqy other, according to its perform­
ers and the complexity of the work. Not that this would be accept­
able to any aesthetioian adopting the viewpoint of Nelson Goodman ^
J.. Sect Nelson Goodmani Languages of art. London, O.D.P., 1969.
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on the grounds that performances of any pieoe of musio, eto., must 
exactly follow tho soore in order to be classified as a performance 
of that piece. A performanoo with any wrong notes may be brilliant, 
but It Is not a performance of that workt
"Slnoe eomplete compliance with the seore Is the only require­
ment for a genuine lnstanoe of a work, tho most miserable 
performance without aotual mistakes does count as an instanoe, 
wills the most brilliant performance with a single wrong note 
does not," (p.186 op elt.)
"If we allow the least deviation, all assuranoe of work-pres­
ervation and soore-preservation is lost , , , " (p,186-7 ibid.) 
However, if one does wish to make dear exactly where the work of 
art lies, espeolally in the performed arts, Dufrenne's dietinotion 
between the aesthetio objeot and the work of art oannot be the 
solution - despite the faot that 'work of art* seemed intended to 
refer to physioal objeots, and 'aesthetic objeot' to the objeot as 
perceived. The obvious classification would then be to regard the 
work of art as, e.g., the soore or painting, and the aesthetio 
objeot as the performance or peroeption. This would still be prob­
lematic, but may be ruled out on aocount of the demonstrated failure 
of the distinction (of, Seotion I.)*
Various arguments show that the woxk is neither the soore on 
its own, nor the performance. JS.g., if the soore is destroyed, 
the work remains as long os there is one soore, or the work is 
remembered. Nor is any one oopy of the soore favoured. Nor does the 
work osass to exist if It is not performed. Therefore, Dufrenne's 
present proposal that the work is both soore and performance also
J., All soores and the manuscript oopy, that is.
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fails, sino« it gives these as neoessary conditions, and it seems 
from what 1 have said that n ither is a necessary, but either a 
sufficient, condition for the existence of a work. Dufrenne affirms 
this when referring to the destruotibility of works of art. He says 
that as long as a seore/oopy of t. e work remains, or it is rememb- 
ared, jrk is not destroyed. (Vol.Z, Parti, Chap.V, pp.214-6.)
Z think one might reasonably say that in the performed arts, 
the work was incomplete or unfulfilled without a performance, but 
not that it did not exist. The most acceptable is for art
forma such as literature and the performed arts, is to take up a 
kind of type-token distinction between the work and its 'oopies', 
and give two senses to *work of art'. One then says that it is a 
olass term when applied, for example, to the fifth symphony of 
kahler, and a term for an instanoe when applied to a oopy of the 
eoore, or a performance. With regard to the performance, I think 
it is not unreasonable to move to Dufrenne's viewpoint (or towards 
it), and regard the soore as an unaccomplished instanoe of the work 
(unless, as Dufrenne suggests, one reads musio and oan 'perform' 
the work in one's head), and a performance as an aooomplished 
instanoe of the wozk. The quality of the performance, and whether 
one allows a very bod rendering of Mahler's fifth as an instanoe of 
it, remains a separate issue,
■U.UJ__SW-M ral Structure.
The final analysis of the present sootion is in the broader terms 
of the general structure of the work of art. Dufrenne spends the 
whole of the final diopter of Volume I. on this issue. As Z have 
already stated, I am doubtful as to either the existence or value 
of an overall similarity in the work of art. Z shall therefore not 
elaborate on what the Phenomenologie has ts say - whioh is in any 
ease often rhetorleal and oouohed in phenomenological terminology.
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Dufrenne spends the first three of four ohepters of the eeoond 
part of Volune Z. in a study of painting and musio. That is, 
examples of what he oalla the'apatial' and 'temporal' arte. Both 
hare been analysed in tarns of harmony, rhythm and melody, and on 
the strength of seeing oertain affinities between the two, he feels 
authorised to look for general oonditions of art, under whioh the 
work can, (a) assume formal determinations, and (b) show its aptit­
ude to express explioit meanings. The three aspeets under which 
these oonditions nay be found, are matter, subjeot and expression.
As representative of what Dufrenne has to say, the most oomprehens- 
ible aspeot, and that in which he bears structure in mind, I shall 
disouss the first - matter. (Vol.Z. Part II, Chap.IV, Seotion I, 
osp. pp.3 7 7-8.)
Were Dufrenne able to substantiate his olalms for oommon 
features in art, one might begin to aooept his phenomenological 
viewpoint of an object whioh is a work of art, with oommon features. 
However, these three are far too general to provide any worthwhile 
grip on the work of art. Nor are they individuating — a lot of 
things whioh are not art oan have matter, subjeot or expression.
For example, 'matter' is ambiguous, and if one inoludes in it sound, 
as Dufrenne does, then praotioally everything has matter of one sort 
or another.
hatter is defined as the sensible aspeot of any work, suoh as 
the sound of the instruments) it is the way in whioh the material 
(e.g., the instruments) appears, or what it reveals itself as. In 
some art forms, sueh as soulpture, matter and material are insepar­
able - i.e., the sensible qualities and the material of whioh it is 
produoed, are not physloally differentiable. Aesthetically, the 
material exists as a support for the sensible. In the arts using, 
e.g., stone, sueh as soulpture and architecture, differentiation of
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the sensible qualities of the atone was sometimes only achieved by 
lavish styles, such as the rooooo, whioh drew attention away from the 
objeot qua stone,1* In these two arts only continuous affirmation of 
the sensible qualities (matter), maintains their distinetion from 
geometry. This is aehieved by sueh things as the fantasy of the art­
ist, perspeotive overthrowing regularity, geometrio proportions, ate.
In all arts, the sensible qualities must be oomposed so as to be 
peroeived unequivocally. The argument here is that matter (sensible 
qualities), is one of the structural elements of art. Dufrenne reo- 
ognises that tne two above arts (and I should imagine the same would 
apply to the other plastio arts - ceramics, eto.), present problems, 
and thus oonoentrates on separating matter from material.
Dufrenne goes on to say that the work is above all of rhythmic 
and harmonio schemes, whioh assume a double function:
(i) To define and olassify the elements of aesthetio language, in 
terms of scales - scales of oolour for painting, vocabulary in the 
literary arts, sound in musio, line in arohioteoture, eto. Aooording 
to the uae made of the scale and his emphasis on oertain aspeots of 
it, the language of the artist appears.
(li) The second funotion - whioh Dufrenne specifies as being of 
harmonio structures, is to establish the tone whioh gives the work 
its particular allure, e.g., tonio and dominant in the musioal soale, 
particular principle tones naking up a painting, or dominant words in 
a play. That is to say, eaoh work has a foundation, and a dominant 
part to whioh it contrasts.
Thus, the work of art now has a first basic structure of a
'sensible matter', which is divided into rhythmio and harmonio
sohemes. having a double function.-----------------------------------
1 « It would also draw attention away from the sensuous qualities of
the stone. Tor instance, in a rooooo deooration the feel or sensual­
ity of the stuooo - its stuoooness - is not obvious beoause of the 
formalism of the deooration.
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This is problematic, howcTcr. In the overall plan Dufrenne 
gives no reason for relating sensible matter to rhythmio and harmonio 
sohemes, or for referring to their double funotion as being that of 
rhythm or harmony. Regarding the latter relation, I think one oan 
deduce the connection, though it is certainly not spelled out by 
Dufrenne. For instanoe, in musio, .tonal quality comes under the head­
ing of harmony (of,, funotion (ii)) ; and though it is true that soale 
belongs more to melody, end only emphasis - a sub-division of funotion 
(i) - to rhythm (of., 'funotion (i)),in Dufrenne's analysis emphasis 
and aeleotion from the scale are of as muoh importance as the exist­
ence of the soale itself. This is a matter of conventional musical 
terminology, yet in the examples just oited, which Dufrenne provides, 
one oan see that it seems prime faoie applicable to the other art 
forms. It remains to be seen whether it is true that the double 
funotion given borne out by then.
With regard to the primary analysis of matter, one oan immed­
iately see why Dufrenne ohose painting and musio as his examples - 
because they fit his theory of sensible qualities best - at least 
to the extent that the sound of an instrument oan easily be distingu­
ished from the instrument itself, and in representational painting at 
least, the sensible qualities of the representation from the canvas 
and paints.
More positively, 'sensible qualities' is insufficient to present 
a differentiation of 0rt works from non-art. The idea that nil art 
projeots a sensible nature (expressive or whatever), over and above 
that of ita ordinary natter (in the Aristotelian sense of matter as 
the basis of form), is fairly unoontentious. For example, that a 
oarved stone qua soulpture has a sensible nature over end above that 
of its being as a stone qua stone. It derives from the idea that
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art makes use of a particular type of material - sound, language, 
stone, pigment, wood, eto., and forms something to be seen as poss­
essing different qualities from the original material.
Though this would seem to be one way of distinguishing art from 
natural objeots, I am not sure that it distinguishes art from ordin­
ary utilitarian man-made objeots - suoh as kitohen tables - at least 
not without a further argument. For these also projeot a nature 
different from that of their material. If the table is wood, it is 
not seen as a pieoe of wood when being used as a table, but as a 
kitohen table. If I said it was 'Just a pieoe of wood', I should 
be aoouaed of making a oategory mistake.
Thus in all things fashioned by man there is a distinction bet­
ween their original and their finished states. The further argumeit 
required is to show that aesthetic objeots are not only seen as 
something distinot from the original material, but have oertain 
distinct sensible qualities of being - for instance, expression.
This would at least serve to distinguish them from kitohen tables.
There is also a more oomplioated argument needed for the perf­
ormed arts - sinoe, for example, the sensible qualities of sound do 
not stand in the same relation to the instruments whioh produce them,| 
as the painting to the oanvas and paint, or soulpture to the stone 
out of whioh it is fashioned. The proper relation would bo of the 
musio to tne notes produoing it.
as to the double funotion of the rhythmio and harmonio schemes - 
the first of these two is the more credible, and the faot that 
aesthetio language appears classifiable indicates that it has a 
oommunal general struoture. My only doubt regards its generality} 
and when one analyses further, the olassifioation and struoture seem 
different for all types of art. All that the argument oomes down to 
in the end, is that out of a given material - whioh Dufrenne refers 
to as being a soale (and most sense experience ig as a matter of fao1 
on a aoale or speotrun) - the artist selects and emphasises oertain
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elements. Moreover, this in no way distinguishes art from any other 
activity of man - for even in ordinary peroeption one seleots and 
emphasises«
The seoond function Is also prims facie applicable, but there are 
two questions to be asked. The first is - is it just or oorreot to 
draw a line a priori in this fashion between what Dufrenne ia in 
effeot sailing 'important', and 'subordinate', aapeots of the work? 
Or, if one builds up to a olimax in Tristan und Isolde, then at what 
stage does the secondary give way to the primary aspeot of the work? 
The build-up is an integral part of the olimax, and it seems that the 
possibility of dividing a work in this way only indicates that we are 
oonfronted with an inferior work. The seoond question is, 'is this 
aotually borne out by art?', i.e., empirically, and the answer seems 
to be ’no'. X think Dufrenne is arguing from convention, rather than 
essential struoture. Xt is oonventional to have elimaotio moments in 
s work of art, or more important features, but (a) in a work suoh es
e
'Lessness' I do not think that this ooours, and (b) X see no reason 
why any one or more feature(s) of an abstraot painting, pieoe of 
sculpture, eto., should take priority over the rest.
The further argumentation for this sense of matter as a struot­
ure of the work of art is not provided by Uie seoond part of Duf— 
renne's thesis on matter. Kven the oonneotion ia very tenuous, and 
unfortunately the general struoture given appears too general where 
eorreot, so that it fails to provide a distinguishing general struot­
ure for art.
To oonolude with Dufrenns's relativist/absolutist position, sinoe 
he takes both attitudes to the same question. As X noted, he states 
that the work of art/aesthetio objeot, only beoomes one when it is 
se n  as one, or perceived by someone as one. This would entail th«.i 
there is no suoh thing as a work of art in an objeotive, non-relative 
sense, that nothing oould exist os a work unless someone saw it as one.
A oonsonsuo of opinion amont best-informed poo.Xe determines whet 
shell or shell not oount. Although Dufronne does not say so, pres­
umably tho objeot would also oease to be e work of art if no-one,or 
none of tho right people, perooived or oonsidered it to be ono.J>*
However, he has also oleimed that the work waits for us to do 
it justice) that variations in tests over oortain periods does not 
alter the faot that something is art) that it is not our aesthetio 
evaluative judgments whioh finally grasp the reality of the aesthetio 
object; and that t e work of art has a quasi-subJeet nature (some­
thing whioh I shall discuss in the lost soetion of this ohapter).
This last involves amongst other things, that tho work is expressive 
and has a speoifia autonomous being* This would involve its remain­
ing a work of art even if nobody sees it us one, and thus, an 
absolutist view on the part of Sufrenne.
Thie makes his position apparently inoonuistent* since his 
view of the work of art as a quasi-pour-soi, autonomous, eto., 
figures prominently throughout the Phénoménologie, and sinoe he 
specifically attacks relativism whenever it arises, 1  suall assume 
that Dufronne would doolaro himself on tho side of absolutism, if 
pressed.
In order to mako sense of the relativist statements about the 
work of art, one might suggest that it does not requlie tho percept­
ion of the sudlenee in order to become art qua work of art, hut it 
la a quoal-pour-aol, and awaits cur recognition of it as ert| whereas 
the aeathatlo object is distinguished from the work of art by 
requiring perception to make it an aesthetio objoot«£*
X* I.e • , if everyone osasse to peroelvo it.
Ü» l.o., tho (physloel or other) objoot beoomes an aesthstlo 
objeot by being looked at in a certain way) or, it is the objeot 
of an object's being perceived la a oertain way*
That la. pluoe the former in the absolute-art category, and the latter 
In the relative-art oategory (in the aenae of relative in whioh a work j 
of art ia dependent on being regarded aa art by aome eat of people, 
before it beoomes art). Nonetheleas, I think thia ia only a very 
unsatisfactory attempt to aid Dufrenne, and I do not think it makes 
muoh aenae.
It ahould be pointed out, anyway, that Dufrenne says nothing of 
this, and aa I have said before, usea the two terms as if they were 
equivalent. In addition, the distinotion has been seen to fail, and 
it would therefore not seem permissable to use it to help olarify 
Dufrenne.
A relativist position here is in any oase not properly oompat- 
ible with Dufrenne's idea of there being an object or work of art, 
whioh he oan reveal by a phenomenological process. I.e., this form of 
relativism makes the existenoe of the work dependent on the subjeot 
regarding it as art - whioh does not comply with the idea that the 
work exists a priori.
Seotion 1X1.
The Work of ¿».rt and the ♦Ordinary* Objeot.
The distinotion between works of art or aesthetio objecte, and ordin­
ary objeota, either natural or man-made, requires some analysis here; 
beoause this ohapter is oonoerned with definitions and diatinotions 
of whioh Dufrenne makes use, and beoause he says a great deal about 
the relationship.
At tho beginning of the Phénoménologie, as I noted, Dufrenne 
takes 'assthetlo objeot' to have a different meaning from its ordin­
ary language usage - i,e», it is not a term to refer to any sort of 
being (spatial, temporal or both), whioh is seen as art.Nevertheless
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That la, plaoe the former in the absolute-art oategury, and the latter 
in the relative-art oategory (in the aenae of relative in whioh a work 
of art ia dependent on being regarded aa art by lone set of people, 
before it beoomes art). Nonetheless. 1 think this is only a very 
unsatisfactory attempt to aid Dufrenne, and I do not think it makes 
muoh sense.
It should be pointed out, anyway, that Dufrenne says nothing of 
this, and as I have said before, uaes the two terms as if they were 
equivalent. In addition, the distinction has been seen to fail, and 
it would therefore not seem permissable to use it to help clarify 
Dufrenne.
A relativist position here is in any oase not properly compat­
ible with Dufrenne's idea uf there being an object or work of art, 
whioh he oan reveal by a phenomenological process. I.e., this form of 
relativism makes the existence of the work dependent on the subjeot 
regarding it as art - whioh does not oomply with the idea that the 
work exists a priori.
Seotlon ill.
The y.ork of art and the 'Ordinary' Objeot.
The distinction between works of art or aesthetic objects, and Ordin­
ary objeots, either natural or man-made, requires some analysis here) 
because this chapter is oonoerned with definitions and distinctions 
of whioh Dufrenne makes use, and beoause he says a great deal about 
the relationship.
At the beginning of the Phenomenologie, as I noted, Dufrenne 
takes 'aesthctio objeot' to have a different meaning from its ordin­
ary language usage - i,e,, it is not a term to refer to any sort of 
being (spatial, temporal or both), which is seen as art.Nevertheless
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he doea reoognise at the same time that natural objeots tan be 
aesthetic, i.e., one oan aee a aunaet or telegraph pole aepthetioally 
- not just aa sunsets, but as beautiful phenomena of various hues, 
eto. In various chapters - on the aeathetlo object In the world,
Its relationship to the public and amongst others, Dufrenne uaea the 
term in hia own aanae • whloh, as has been seen - comes down to the 
same thing aa work of art.
There is at least one seotion, where he is discussing the aestb- 
etio objeot in oontraat to ordinary objeota, when he reoognises the 
possibility of oonfusion, ainoa literally the term oan apply to any, 
or almost any, objeot. (This is at the beginning of chapter IV. of 
Volume I. part I. pp.112 ff.) Here Oufrenne prefers to allow para» 
digm and peripheral oases of aesthetio objeots • the paradigm being 
works of art in the normal sense (Goya, Degas, Mozart, eto.), the 
peripheral ones being ordinary objeots whioh oan be seen as aesthetic, 
but remain ordinary objeots underneath being seen as, or intention­
ally aesthetio. What he actually says is that it has been agreed 
that the work of art is the aesthetic objeot 'par excellence*, so 
that if we identify the aesthetic objeot with the work of art, we 
oan oppose it to other obj ots whloh are only really peripherally or 
additionally aesthetio. One oan only gain a meaning of the word 
'aesthetio', by taking the work of art as a privileged examplet
"Hais nous avons oonvenu aussi tue l'oeuvre d'art est l'objet 
esthétique par exoellenoe, en sorte que si nous identifions 
l'objst esthétique à l'oeuvre d'art, nous avons le droit de 
l'opposer à d'autres objets que ne sont esthétiques qu'en 
puissanoe et par surorclt." (p. 1 1 2  ibid.)
Dufrenne is more assured as to his position at the beginning than at 
the end of the disoussion. Here (Vol.I. Part I. ohap IV. intro, 
and seotions1 -2 ), he would say that the possibility of seeing what
j9.
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ha would oall an ordinary objeot, a tree or bottla of ink, oto.t as 
aaathetlo, does not make It an aesthetio objeot proper. Here he 
nakes the distlnotlin In order to oppose aesthetio objeots to man« 
made and natural objoots, and to what he sails the living' (vivant), 
which usually ranges froa plant to huaan life..!*
Yet it Is also required later on in ohapter T. of Volume Z. 
part I., in the opposition of the aesthetio objeot to the ordinary 
world, and the distinction of various worlds within tnat. This is 
beoause he wishes to make out a oase for the work of art as hawing 
a world of its own « whioh would obviously be equivalent to regard­
ing it as sutonoaous. And the use of this notion of the world of 
art is used to make a further distinction between the aesthetio 
objeot and the ordinary objeot, namely that the ordinary objeot 
has to be understood in terms of the world of external objeots, 
while the aesthetia objeot does not, being self-suffioient and 
constituting a world. (Vol.IZ. Part 3. ohap.ll. sootion ill.pp.430-1.)
In talking of the living (Vol.Z. Part I, ohap.IV. seotion I), 
Dufrenne makes three points, (i) That perceiving objeots as aesth­
etic does not ohange them, but they are metamorpho3ised in then- 
selves (this is of ordinary objeots, p,111). (ii) One has no diffic­
ulty in distinguishing something living from an aesthetio objeot.
The suggestion that one might, arises from the faet that (a)
Dufrenne regards both the living and art as expressive, and (b) 
persons enaoting a ballet night be oonfused with the aotual work of 
art whioh requires, but is not, these persons (pp.1 1 5 -6)» The 
expressiveness of the work of art does not efface the distinction
with the living (p.1 1 3 )> (Hi) A landsoaped garden oan be an
aesthetic
JL« Although he defines it originally as animated and having a 
reflective oonsolousness, thus excluding the vegetable world - 
of. bottoa page 1 1 2 *
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object • the ordinary garden is like an unexecuted work, but it is the 
structuring, not the lire of the garden whioh Bakes it an aesthetio 
objeot (p.119).l* In oonneotion with this, the aesthetio objeot neither 
jars with, nor disavows, nature, and it is difficult to say whan nafcire, 
altered by art, beoomes art - or even if it does. Kven when natural 
is oombined with art, it ratains its natural character (pp.1 2 5-6 ). 
(Vol.I. Part I. ohap.XV. seo.ii. - on the aesthetio objeot among 
natural objeota.)
In discussing the categories of paradigm oases of art, periph­
eral oases of art and non-art, Dufrenne's poaition is somewhat ambiv- 
alent. 1 think the main point of contention is around the middle of 
the road oases, about whioh one is not sure as to whether or not to 
oeli them art. Oufrenne is using aesthetio objeot mainly to refer to 
works of art, but allowing its extension over the realm of all objects 
in oases of aesthetio peroeption of these objeots. That is, he is 
really aooepting the normal usage of the term, but modifying it a 
little. This seens to obviate somewhat the previous distinction of 
the work of art and aesthetio objeot, disoussed in the first section 
of this chapter. He does not make olear whether or not the peri­
pheral oases (Wedgwood ooffee pots, lieissen ware, eto.) beoome 
aesthetio objeots or not.
He speoifioally allows suoh things as landsoaped gardens to be 
aesthetio objeots - when these are regarded as designed works of 
art, and oontrasted with an ordinary garden -2 * as the unexeouted 
work. Yet, only seven pages aftor (p.1 2 6 ), he is pussling over 1
1 . There is no argument to support this rather odd assertion.
2. In the sense of things like plants and gardens gone wild, eto.
3. g.g„, a pleoe of ground not professionally landsoaped, or an 
untended gardon, eto.
when nature ohanges to art — whioh seems to indioats that nature 
(i.e., the ordinary field or garden), is not in the relation of the 
potential to the aotual work, whioh he suggested earlier, but is in 
a rather different olass, i.e., nature is nature and it would be a 
oategory mistake to oell it potential art. In view of this latter 
part of his third point, landaoape gardens must be peripheral art.
In this oase, into what oategory would the kind of things whioh 
are normally olassed as non-paradigmatlo oases of art oome? That is, 
a skilfully made pieoe of furniture or a Wedgwood ooffee pot. Pres­
umably both these, and suoh things as a sunset viewed aesthetioally, 
and struotured natural objoots, are additionally aesthetio. Thus, 
for Dufrenne, their primary nature is, e.g., utilitarian (ohair or 
ooffee pot), and they oan be seen as aesthetio, but are at most 
seoondarily so.
As it happens, there are three oategories of objeot here - the 
utilitarian/art, the natural seen as aesthetio, and the natural/art 
(that avowed by Dufrenne as non-paradigmatioally art). That is, the 
Wedgwood ooffee pot, the sunset and the landsoape garden. Only one 
of these three is brought up by Dufrenne as on the periphery of art. 
He does not say whether suoh different oases of the aesthetio are 
equivalent in their aesthetio oharaoter or not. He merely states 
that it is difficult to say when nature beoomes art, if at all - 
whioh indioates some unoertainty as to what he would deoide if 
pressed.
He is obviously dubious about allowing too muoh into the realm 
of art, sinoe he wants a olear-out world of art (as he states in 
Vol.I. Part I. ohap.V.), whose effeots aot like the rays of the sun 
on the ordinary objeots around them, and aesthetioise then. Unfort­
unately, the whole realm of ordinary objeots is in a kind of semi- 
light in whioh they oan be seen as aesthetio under oertain oiroun-
4 2 .
stanees
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What ia possibly of most oonsequenoe is that the psriphsrsl 
oases of art are unlimited! not oiroumsoribed, »s Dufrenne would like 
The faot that anything oan be seen as aesthetio may not be too imp­
ortant! sinoe being aesthetio does not make something art. X think 
he is right in saying that there are oentral oases of art objeots 
and non-oentral ones» but that the field is not as limited as he 
would wish, nor of one type, for the latter oategory. Nor is it 
the oase that there is a olear-out distinotion between what is art 
and what is not. And this look of an ability to produoe a olear-out 
distinotion within the world of art and aesthetic objects, onoe more 
goes against Dufrenne's idea of the work of art as an objective 
struoture with a given essenoe, or z, y and s qualities. For if 
this were the nature of art, would it not begin to reveal itself 
under Dufrenne's sorutiny?
Finally there are some minor points. Firstly, the main point 
of the seotion on the living and art seems oorreot. That is to say, 
the distinotion between a work of art (paradigm oase), and a living 
oreature, is not effaoed by the faot that they are both expressive. 
For, always supposing that art i_s expressive, it is possible for 
'expressive' to be instantiated differently in two different things.
A person's expression of an emotion involves feelings, behaviour 
and oonsoiousnessj while a work of art's exprsssiveness mignt be 
Instantiated in various ways - having an emotive effeot, being 
affeotlve as Dufrenne says, or by expressing oertain qualities by 
symbolio/oonventional methods, or using methods whioh, for some 
psyohologioal or oultural reason, do usually produoe in us the 
effeot of, e.g.. sadness or sublimity
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Secondly (and these further points art in oritlaism of Dufrenne),
I aaa no raason for tha oonolusion that a metamorphosis takas plaoa in 
in something peroeived as aesthetio, and it ohanges. Possibly it
A*arisas from Dufrenne's claim that art is autonomous and self-auffioisnt. 
It would seam a more reasonable hypothesis to say that one's attitude 
towards tha objaot ohangad whan one saw it as aasthatio.
Thirdly, sinoe he is using tha ordinary language neaning of 
aesthetio objaot whan talking of tha living and tha aesthetio, would 
not something like a graoaful panther oount as both?
Fourthly, it is rather sweeping to say that the aasthatio objeot 
neither jars with, nor disavows nature (p.125). Even if one ware 
restricting this to natural objeots arranged by man, the formality of 
an eighteenth century landscaped garden might easily jar with its 
surroundings, supposing them to be rough pasture or woodland. And 
muoh modern arohiteoture may be art in itself, but in the oontext of 
natural surroundings would seem to jar, and might well he said to lose 
some of its aesthetio value for that reason.
But 1 think it might be fairer to interpret Dufrenne as meaning
that if the work of art is to complete its aesthetio funotion fully,
it will not jar with its surroundings. One oould say that the work is
oontext free as far as its evaluation goes, but it would be fairly
simple to show that this is false, either by (a) demonstration, or
(b) theory. Regarding (a), if one plaoed Liverpool Cathedral in
3t. Peter's Square, most people would agree that it was aesthetically
inappropriate, and that t » modern and olassioal detraoted from one
another here. Regarding (b), theoretically. To state that the work
of art is oontext free, one must have strlotly ueflned limits for .the 
My use of those terms is intended to denote a oapaoity whioh Duf-
renne believes art has, to be fairly detaohed from the rest of the wor
It nay also appear different,i.e., some aspects may benore prominent.
Dufrenne's inclination to distinguish the living from the aesthetls 
objeot would seem to indioate that no one thing oan be both.
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work. For example, is the frame part of, or relevant to, the aesth— 
etio evaluation of the painting? John Cage disallows that one may 
put strict Units to the musioal work, and feels that any part of tho 
production - off-stage or audienoe noise, eto., is part of the work of 
art. (Silenoe. pub. M.I.T.). &£, one night take the theory to the
extreme of stating that eaoh passage of a pieoe of musio, eaoh shape 
in a pioturs, eto., should be evaluated on its own merit, irresp­
ective of ihc rest of the work - so that in the end one has a set of 
elements of the work, and no work as a whole.
N.B.. With regard to the former point, one should distinguish between 
the inappropriateness of placing, e.g., a work of architecture, in a 
situation whioh is in itself aesthetically evaluable (e.g., St. Pcter's| 
Square, fine woodlands), and one whioh is not (e.g., the ruins of 
Uunioh after the war). It is debatable as to whether plaoing a work 
of art in surroundings whioh arc at present non-aesthetio and there­
fore possibly neutral, ooula be said to set off or aooentuete the 
eesthetio value of the work, rather than detract from it. This is 
probably settled by a study of the individual oase.
Seotion XY.
The Work of Art as a tuasi-oour-soi.
One of Pufrenne's most frequently used and important definitions of 
the work of art is as a Quasi-subJeot.JL* This is a notion whose 
terminology is taken from Sartre. It is therefore important to 
understand the original meanings, especially sinoe these terms arc 
not used by Sartre to refer to the work of art.
1. This is used interchangeably as quasi-pour-aoi. There are also 
several variations - Dufrenne oalls the work of art a pour-nous, an 
en-sol, or a combination of these two, and a quasi-pour-soi.
In the simplest term», the on-soi (or iri-itself) is a non* 
consoioua, statlo, non-refleotlve object; whereas the pour-soi (or 
for-iteelf} is nan • a oonaoious being hawing relationships with 
others and whose nature develops, eto. Of the former, Sartre sayst 
"the in-itself is full of itself, and no aore total plenitude 
can be imagined, no more perfeot equivalence of oontent to 
oontainer. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, 
not the tiniest orack through whioh nothingness aight slip in,”
(Being and Nothingness.
Trans,Hasel Barnes, Methuen.
Part II, ohap.I, p.74.)
Of the latter, he sayat
"The for-itself is the being whioh determines itself inasmuch 
as it oannot ooinoidc with itself . . .  The Being of conscious­
ness qua oonsoiousness is to exist at a distanoe from itself 
as a presenoe to itself."
(ibid, p.78.)
(Not coinciding means hawing oonsoiousness.) Simplistioclly it is 
a distinction between men and objects — including man-made or natural 
(wegetablo or mineral). The pour-nous is muoh more Heideggerian, 
where objeots axe 'for us* in either of two ways - suhanden or 
worhanden - either x’cady-to-hand or present-at-hand, dependent 
upon their immediate readiness for our use, Dufrenne does not 
regard the work of art as fully 'pour-nous' or 'en-soi' - they aay 
be so in oertain reapeots and to a oertain degree only. He is cost 
at home with the notion of the work as a quasi-pour-sol, and as such 
it forwards his wiew of the autonomy of art| whereas the idea of c 
work of art as slaply an object (en-eoi), or there for our purposes 
(pour-nous) cakes it incapable of, and not designed for, noting or 
existing self-sufficiently.
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Dufrenne mostly refers to the pour-nous and on-soi, when he Is 
not regarding the work as a quasi-subjeot, and only onoe does he refer 
to it solely as an en-sol. This is still linked in definition to the 
pour-nous. He says "(l'objet ssthetique) est en-eoi paroe qu'il 
s'oppose a nous." (Vol.Z. Part Z. ohap.VZ p.287.) The first nention 
of art as pour-nous/en sei is in referenoe to the relationship of the 
work to the publio (Vol.Z Part Z. ohap.ZIZ. p.110). Here Dufrenne says 
that the aesthetic objeot brings no less to the publio than it reo- 
eives from it, and mention of the publio makes us more aware of the 
ambiguity of the status of the aesthetio objeot, which is at onoe 
pour-nous and en-soi. Other important references are in Volume Z.
Part I. ohap.VZ.
firstly, from the ideas (a) that the aesthetio objeot is essent­
ially peroeived - or at least requires a publio to see it as aesthetio, 
and (b) an anti-idealism - that the work is not just a subjective 
being; there emerge two propositions about the aesthetio objeot, dev­
eloping the idea of the *en-soi-pour-nous•. On the one hand, the 
uesthetio objeot has a being whioh oannot be reduoed to the being of 
a perception, and on the other, this being is suspended at the 
peroeptual level and completed there. Furthermore, a gauge of the 
strength of 'being' of the aesthetio objeot, is tne demand it ezer- 
oises over us - especially our peroeption. Zn so far as it oan make 
demands of us, far from being for us. it is we who are for it) and it 
is en-soi beoause it opposes itself to us. (p.287, of., my referenoe 
to the en—soi, above.)
lastly (this is the third important referenoe, a little later in 
the ohapter), in speaking of the in-itself of the aesthetio objeot, 
we oppose it to the for-us, rather than the for-itself. And the form 
of the aesthetio objeot forbids us to disqualify the in-itoelf, in 
favour of the for-us. This is beoause the aesthetio objeot has tho 
initiative, and one is only the oooasion for its appearanoe, despite
the faot that it needa one ia order to appear. He also refers to the 
in-itself aa the essence of the aesthetlo object.
The meaning of ail this is not immediately obvious. At first 
Dufrenne emphasises the aspect of the work as pour-nous. The pres- 
enoe of a publio to a work is neoessary, therefore the work must be 
'perceived' in order to be fully realised.3." This emphasises the 
relationship between 'us' and the work, and the idea that a work of 
art is oreated in order to be peroeived, or for a publio, i.e., for us. 
This is obviously oorreot. The artist does not just create a work, 
irrespective of its publio, or potential publio. Zn this respeot it 
resembles a 'tool' (Heideggerian term), or any objeot whioh is manuf­
actured in order to be used in some way, rather than a tree for inst- j 
anoe, whioh does not grow for our benefit. Other points whioh 
Dufrenne has made - suoh as that the work awaits our recognition of it,| 
(of., Vol.I, Part Z. ohap.Z. seot.i) imply its being for us.£* *1
1 . Z allow all works of art os being peroeived, for the present. This 
faotor will be oontended nonetheless. Dufrenne takes it for granted 
that all art is peroeived.
2. On reflection, I am not oertain of the relationship between, and 
neoessity for, a publio (qua normal audienoe) for a work. All the earned
1 think: (a) certainly artists usually expect their work to be seen, 
heard or read - though they may or nay not know exaotly who the aud­
ienoe will bej (b) a creation will only oount as art if it is,amongst 
other things, the sort of thing whioh eould have an audienoe (i.e.,it 
is not a private language), and] (o) if one wishes to see the audienoe 
in terms of their eausal status in oreation, then they may be the final 
cause if they commissioned the work, but the artist will be the eff­
icient oause. The final eause is not a necessary oondition of oreation 
however - for inotanoe llosart is reputed often simply to have 'heard' 
musio in his head, and written it down. Zn this oase then the audienoe 
as final oause would not be relevant to the oreation (though they nay 
still be there).
All the same, this Is not a sufficient description of the woric .
It does not only exist for us, but also in-itself, as an en-soi. 
Dufrenne's usage of this tern deviates somewhat from dartre's. For one 
thing, he does not regard the for-itself-in-itself as an impossible 
(contradictory) oonoept, as Sartre does. The in-itself of Sartre is 
more restrictive than that of Dufrenne - it is the idea of an object 
complete in itself, about whioh everything oan bo known, and whioh 
cannot- enter into any sort of relationship with another thing. It also 
implies a lack as well os a limitation. But when Dufrenne refers to 
the work of art as an en-coi, he has already allowed that it has a 
relationship with its audience - of giving and receiving. And tlie 
fact that he oalls the work an en-soi because it opposes itself to us, 
implies an active rather than a passive en-soi (as Sartre had in mind). 
The en-soi of Sartre oould be aote«l on by, but oould not act on, a 
subject.
However, this latter also implies, as Dufrenne says, that the 
work of art is not simply pour-nous. The idea of the work os en-soi 
is principally the idea of it as being in its own right. It not only 
needs, it demands, our perception. It is also en-soi in that it 
oanr.ot, as I said, be reduced to the being of a perception - by whioh 
he means it is not a subjective or ideal phenomenon. It is an object 
(in the broad sense) whioh sets itself up against us and has the 
initiative in its relationship with its audience, whioh Dufrenne has 
ended up as oalling only the oocasion for its appearanoe.
This implies a great deal of independence on the part of the 
aesthetio objeot, and a very aotive role, whioh does not make it 
surprising that not only is it insufficient for Dufrenne to say that 
it is pour-nous, it is also insufficient to say tnat it is en-soi.
The aesthetio object is by now assuming very muoh the part of the 
subjeot, or pour-soi.
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Possibly Dufrenne is stretohing the point a little In saying that
the suaienoe la only the oooaalon for the appoarenoo of the work,^ 
sinou he haa previously apaolfiad a high degree of reoiproolty between
the work and lta publio. lor example, he aayai
"Si l’objot esthetique attend du publio non aeulemant an
consecration, mai aon aocomplissement, lnversement le publio
attend do l'oeuvre am promotion a l'humanlte. L'objoot
eathetique n'apporte dono paa molna au publio qu'll ne
reooit da lul . « . . .>
•Vol.I. Part X. ohap III.pp.109-110) 
There are in faot two waya in whioh one oan aee the relationship 
between the terms in Dufrenne's analysis pour-nous/en-soi/quasi-pour- 
sol. dither (a) that in saying the work is an en-aol, he is opposing 
the work as a thing complete in Itself, to the idea of it as depend­
ent in some way upon us^.e., a pour-nous. On this aooount the work 
of art oan be a quasi-pour-soi without bringing up any incompat­
ibility between en-aol and pour-soi oan incorporate most of the qual- 
itiea/attributos of a pour-sol. Or (b) that his thesis develops as it 
goes along, and from the idea of the work as a pour—nous, and from 
there to an en-soi (in the Sertrion sense of an objoot oomplete in 
itself yet immobile), he arrives eventually at the notion of it as a 
quasi-pour-soi, beoause it is capable of, e.g., expressing, demanding 
things of its audience, being affootlve, eto.
In the light of what has Just emurgod of the desoription of the 
work of art as an on-sol — that it will not oomfortably oontain what 
Dufrenne wishes to asoribe to the work of art, one must toko the 
latter view. Xn this way one oan traoe the progression to Dufrenne's 
classification of the work as a quasi-pour-soi - though he himself 1
1 , At least ne is, to assert it himself, although in faot it is a 
perfeotly plausible hypothesis.
makes no mention of the olassifioetion os the oonoluaion of a train 
of thought, nor does he present any systematic approaoh to the notion. 
The work of art as a quasi-pour-aoi.
As I stated in the introduction, this idea of Dufrenne's is one 
of his most original notions. And as will be seen from the nature of 
the quasi-pour-soi, it is one of the oonoepts most capable of forward­
ing Dufrenne's basio idea of the work as an objeot, of there being an 
a priori. Basioally this is beoause one oan foraalate a fairly aoo ví­
rate objective a priori notion of the oonoept 'man1 (or pour-soi).
And if one oan show that art is like man - a quasi-pour-soi as 
Dufrenne oalls it - in the relevant raspeóte, one nay say that it is 
also a priori. Also, the comparison of art and man suggests an 
objeotivity in terms of independence for the work of art. I.a., man 
does not depend on being seen as a man in order to be one, and if 
the work of art is oomparable, then its exiatenoe is not subjeotive 
either. This latter is not a strong oase, sinos one requires sub­
stantial evidenoe that art is oomparable to man in this way, and one 
oannot make the assumption just from the (possible) faot that it is 
oomparable in other ways. (An ash trey and a horse trough are sim­
ilar in that they are both oontainers - but it does not follow froa 
this that one oan oarry a horse trough about, as one oould an ash 
tray, eto.).
And, as it happens, 1 do not think the former oomparison of art 
and man is satisfactory in proving that art is a priori, beoause I 
do not think it shows similarities in the relevant rasp sots, for 
example, Dufrenne does not disouss the neoessary and suffioient 
oonditiona of being a man, nor go on to consider what might be the 
neoessary and suffioient oonditions of being art - he bases his idea 
of the quasi-pour-sol on various other aspeóte. Along with this, he
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does not seem to ooneidor that it is a neoessary oondition of any 
oonoept that it haa oartain qualities whioh apply aoroas tho board 
before one oan even oonsider its having an a priori nature.
Nevertheless, Dufrenne does provide a valuable souroe of disouas- 
ion. He gives various reasons for calling the work of art n quasi- 
pour-soi. He oontinues to refer to it under this desoription through­
out the Phenoaenologie, and X shall attenpt to eluoidate the reasons 
that he has in mind for some of theee referenoes. The primary under­
lying ones (and others will emerge in the oourse of the analysis) 
are Dufrenne's view that the work is (a) expressive, (b) meaningful, 
(o) self-suffloient, (d) haa profundity.
(a) The work is expressive in the same way that a person oan be, 
although more consistently, i.e, its expressivity arises from its own 
oapaoity to express, not from an anthropomorphio imposition - as one 
might say that a forest at night was expressive, but in the sense 
that one w0a transferring one's own moods to the forest, or using 
one's imagination. An objeot's being expressive in this way - in 
its own right - is one reason for calling it a pour-sol (beoause it 
oan transoend its own being Just as an objeot, and afTeot other 
things - oonvey meanings and have relationships with them). This 
leuds on to s
(b) That anything whioh oau express oan also be said to have 
meaning, or that its existence has some signifioanoe. Dufrenne 
obviously does not restriot tho idea of meaning to statements or 
propositions} it implies value or signifioanoe. And this is another 
reason for referring to the work of art as a quasi-subJeot, sinoe one 
attributes meaning primarily to subjeots, who in turn give meaning to 
objects.
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(o) Self-suffioienoy in a work of art is also analogous to ths 
pour-soi, in that a pour—soi doss not depend on anything also for 
ths oontinnstion of its existenoe as it is - nor is it the means to 
an end external to it, as objeots are means to our ends.
(u) One of the main reasons for oalling the work a quasl- 
subjeot is in crder to attribute to it the profundity of a oonsoious 
being - whioh Is finally indefinable and irreduoiblo (neoessarily, 
not just in the way that an ordinary objeot nry be indefinable beo- 
ause it has not so far been fully defined). For Dufrenne therefore 
the aesthetic object has a neoessary indefinability, whereas that of 
an ordinary objeot, or en-soi, is a contingent, empirioal indefin­
ability, whore one oannot take in every aspect at a glance.1 *
This is a brief aooount of what Dufrenne says. His emphasis on 
meaning and expression in partioular, is apparent espeoially in six 
of the nine examples I shall give.
Firstly (Vol.I. Part I. ohap V. p.22f9), he states that the work is 
a thing whioh goes beyond itself in meaning, and is in this wey a 
quasi-subjeot. This oonolusion derives from two things. A comp­
arison of expression and representation in the aesthetio objeot - 
the expressive quality takes primaoy because it gives atmosphere 
and transfigures what is represented, and; B. A comparison between 
Dasein and expression - Dasein has a transoendent quality whioh makes 
it possible for Being to reslise itself in the world, and to express 
is to transoend onself towards a meaning,i.,e., expression gives the 
aesthetuo objeot some of the transoendent quality of Dasein. Thus
tho expressive and meaningful qualities of an aesthetio objeot 
1 . This reason is rather tjie inverse of the others - oalling the work
a quasi-subjeot in order to oall it profound, instead of e.g., oalling
it expressive in order to oall it a quasi- subject.
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oombine in giving it Attributes of a pour-sol.
Secondly. (Vol.I Part X. ohap.IV. p.197.)^* Ha states that the work of 
art is like a for-itself since it does not rely on otbar things to give 
it meaning, and it oan tharafora ba called a quasi-subjeot.ii Ha la 
hara oomparing the aeathatio with tha ordinary objeot, and oonoludss 
that it is unlike tha latter in tha sense that it is animated by mean­
ing whioh is interior to it.
Thirdly. (Vol.X. Part XX. Xntro. asp. pp.301-2.) Xn terms of tha 
supposed structure of the work of art, it has an expression whioh 
gives it a unity apart from its material ooheaion, and whioh gives it 
a temporality, i.e., a pour-sol. Aooordlng to Dufrsnne, the various 
aspeots of a work nay ba distinguished, but do not exist in isolation, 
and all the elements of a work move towards the unity of a quasi- 
pour-soi.
fourthly. (Vol.X. Part XX. ohap XV. ceot.XIIb. pp.408-9J The work of I 
art la endowed with an interior!ty whioh makes it capable of exp­
ression, end the ability to express confers a ipasi-subJeotlvity on 
the work. Dufrenne adds (mainly as a loader into the seoond volume 
of the work, on peroeption) that the aesthetio object is only a quasi- | 
subjeot for the authentic subjeot,l.e., tha paroeptive spectator. 
fifthly. (Vol IX. Part X. ohap. IV sect.XV pp.525-6.) This ohapter is 
eonoerned with tha profundity of the aesthetic objeot, and tha aeotlon 
with reflection end faallng in aesthotio perception. Here Dufrenne 
States that the perfeotlon of the aesthetio objeot is to be quasl- 
subJeot, but it oan only attain this ex.reaaive subjeotivity by the
rigour and surety of its objective being.
The first and seoond points have been inadvertently transposed,
whioh simply results in their not following Dufrenne's ordering.
Xt is a straightforward phenomenologioal assertion to say that the
work is meaningful, and rather dubious, as is the view that the latter
state follows the former.
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Sixthly. (Tol.XI. Part I. ohap.lll. aeot.IXI, esp.p.473.) Dufrenno 
adds to the first two points on meaning and expression when naklng e 
distinotion between objeet and subjeot. The forner is, whereas the 
latter makes. a sign. A thing oannot make a sign (eyen signposts 
do not signal, or hays meaning, of their gooord), beoause it is only 
what it is, and everything about it ean be known, is unhidden. Duf- 
renne is here olasaifying the aesthetio object in the oategory of 
subject, as quasi-subjeot.
While emphasising expression and meaning as reasons for referr­
ing to the aesthetio objeot as a quasi-pour-soi, these six examples 
have brought up four related points) (i) temporality, (ii) interior- 
ity, (iii) unity, and (iv) that the work of art is only a quasi sub- 
jest for the perceptive spectator. In three further references to the 
aesthetic objeot as a quasi-pour-soi, Dufrenne elaborates on the notion 
of temporality as a definitive attribute, and oontradiots both Sartre 
(fairly radically), and hinself (more mildly).
Seventhly. (Vol X. Part X. ohap. VI, seot.XXb, esp. p.292^ He takes 
an Anti-Sartrian point of view in saying that the oharaoter of the 
for-itself in the aesthetio objeot does not exolude the in-itself 
any more than it does in a human person. This oontradiots Sartre, 
for whom the in-itself-for-itself was an impossible oonoept, and 
appears to oontradiot the point that Cufrenne has just made, plaoing 
the quasi-aubjeet in the oategory of the subject, as oapable of 
making a sign, going beyond itself. All the same, X do not think 
he is oontradioting himself, sinee he is not saying that the aesth­
etic objeot is both in-itself and for-itself at the same time. Xt 
seems to be more of a distinetion between the perfeot and imperfeot 
realisation of the aesthetio objeot. There oan be an imperfeot or 
potential realisation, where the aesthetic objeot either has no 
audience, or is in a sooiety where art as a oategory is not reoog- 
nised, and the aesthetio objeot as suoh disappears. Xn this oase 
what remains is an in-itself or ordinary objeot, Tho aesthetic
objeot is only perfeotly realised when it enters into a relationship 
with another, and is peroeived as an aesthetic objeot. This is perf- 
eotly analogous to the in-itaalf and the for-itself as designated by 
Sartre. (The only real oontradiotion of Sartre by Dufrenne is in 
saying that this combination is perfeotly possible in the human beiig.) 
■Blghthiy. (Vol.Z. Part II. ohsp.I. esp.pp.3°5-7.) Spaoe and time as 
oentral oonoepts in art are important for two reasons, the seoond of 
whioh is that they oan olarify tne quasi-subJeot part played by the 
eesthetio objeot. Dufrenne really simply makes a comparison between 
the aesthetio objeot as he sees it, and a living being as Kant oono- 
eptualises that, in terms of internal temporality. I!e different­
iates between objective time and a subjeetive time-structure. Kant 
regards the time whioh is proper to a living thing as expressing the 
interiority of a life, whioh he mails its internal finality. Dufrenne 
regards tie aesthetio objeot as also having this internal finality - 
it is living, both in entering into history and being animated by a 
form of internal movement.
Ninthly. (Vol.II. Part I. ohap.IV. sect.I. esp.pp.l9?-3.) Finally, in 
relation to the profundity and ultimate indefinability of the work of 
art, Dufrenne refers to two aspects of the work whioh he thinks make 
it a quasi-subjeot. These are that it has (¿) organlo ooherenoe, and 
(&) proximity to oonsoiousness.
From these nine analyses of the role of the y^esthetio objeot as 
a quasi-pour-soi, it is obvious that Dufrenne has oonorete reasons 
for defining it as such, rather than the negative one that it over­
steps the limits of the en-soi and the pour-nous, when one tries to 
oategorise it as either one or both of these.
The point raised in the fourth aocount of the work of art as a 
quasi-subJeot - that it is only one for the peroeptlve reader, is 
similar to part of the seventh mooount, that the aesthetio objeet is 
only a quxsl-pour-sol if it is seen 9s one, peroeived by someone as 
one. It is no more radioal than this, sinoe the seventh aeoount
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also requires that one enter Into a relationship with the work, as 
opposed to aooepting passively that it is one.
The two notions of, (i) unity, and (il) interiority, oan be 
explained quite briefly. Unity means simply that the elements of 
the work of art are designed in order to form a meaningful whole, 
both in terms of form and oontent. Zt is the idea of a designed, 
purposive struoture, as opposed to the ordinary objeot whioh Just 
is as it is. Interiority seems to be intended to oonvey the idea 
that a work has the power to do something, e.g., express, rather 
than its expression being gained vicariously or anthropomorphioally 
from someone's seeing it as if it expressed.
One's aooeptanoe of the work of art as a quasi-subjeot natur­
ally depends upon one's prior aooeptenoe of the qualities that 
Dufrenne attributes to the work, sinee these are the bases for def­
ining it as a quasi-pour-aoi. They are now no& only, (a) expression, 
(b) meaning, (o) self-suffioienoy, and (d) profundity; but also 
(a) temporality, (f) having a relationship with its audienoe,(g) unity 
(h) interiority (whioh oan be plaoed under the heading of expression), 
and (i) proximity to oonsoiousneso.
Sinoo (a) - and henee (h) -, (b), (o) and (d) will be disoussed 
at greater length, espooially in Chapter Five— * the final deoiaion 
as to whether or not to aooept Dufrenne's olassifioation of ths work 
as a quasi-subJeet must be deferred until then. Nevertheless, one 
may oome to a provisional deoision from a discussion of (e), (f), (g) 
and (i), conditionally allowing that the work of art is expressive, 
meaningful and solf-sufflolent. 1
1. (o) is disouBsed in Chapter 2, and (f) also indireotly disoussed
in Chapter 4.
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All the same, X think that it is neoessary to point out that 
Oufrenne's assertions hara about why art is meaningful are, at tha 
aost, questionable. Tor iastanaa, tha second statement ha makes 
(Vol.X, Part 1, ohap IT, p.197)# inoludes two assertions whieh are, 
as I noted, dubious. Tirstlr. that the work doss not rely on other 
things to give it meaning. This is a phanoaanologioal ooanonplaoe, 
but that doas not make it oorreet. Tor example, there is tha artist 
to be oonsiderod.
Seoondly. that it follows, from the fast just disputed, that tha 
work doas not rely on anything else to give it meaning; that it oan 
be oalled a quasi-subjeot. In tha first plaoa, tha phenomenologioal 
theory is that everything is meaningful of its own aooord, in whieh 
oaso it would follow that everything oan be oallad a quasi-subjoot.
In the second plaoa, those «ho are not phenoaenologists would say that 
ordinary objects of any kind do not roly on anything aora than that on 
whioh the work of art doas, to give than meaning (nan's purpose for 
thea, ate.), in which oase the same oonolusion follows as before. 
Everything is let in.
All the same, it should be noted that this does not militate 
against art as meaningful, and being a quasi-pour-soi partly on that 
aaoount.
To return to the points at hand, there is first of all (a), temp­
orality. This is tha least easy quality to justify, espeoially sines 
Dufrenne simply transfers Seat's notion of internal finality from man, 
to works of art. Dufrenne seeas to think that entering into history 
and having some form of internal movement is sufficient Justification. 
However, the former may be dismissed quickly, sinoe it is by no means 
the prerogative of nan or works of art to be historically looatable. 
The latter is more promising - that the time-structure of a work of 
art is not simply part of the objeotlve tiae-struoture. This seeas 
oorreot in ma y  ways. Tor example, a representational work may depiot
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an aotion talcing a Oortain length of tine, to whioh the 'objeotivs' 
tine spent studying the work bears no relation. One reoognisee that a 
depiotion of Tantalus represents an eternity quite unrelated to objeot- 
ire time; or that a symphony has its own internal time-atrueture,whioh 
is worked out in terms of the relationship between passages and move­
ments, and phraseology, e.g., the feat passage»ef time in the gallop­
ing horse of Sohubert's 'Erlkönig', set against the apparent dragging 
of time of 'Oer Neugierige' (from 'Die aohöne Müllerin'). Both take 
about the same objeotive length of time, but there is a feeling - or 
subjeotive tir.a structure - of speed in one, and hanging in the other. 
Additional examples are the usage of objective time to organise the 
time taken by a dramatio work, whioh may stretoh ever minutes or years, 
whilst objeotively lasting an hour) a iothio tower stretohing 'to 
infinity', without actually taking any length of time, simply occupy­
ing a oertain area of spaoe. Only the performed arts are temporal as 
well as spatial, and of these only musio ('pure* musio, that is), ia 
purely temporal.
It would therefore appear that Dufronne was right in attributing 
this quality to the work of art, and that it has a temporal power of 
its own, whioh is oomparablo with man's internal time struoture (though 
not his oonsoiousneso of it), and whioh hos no parallel in ordinary 
objeots, i.e., the work has analogies with the pour-soi hero.
That the work has a relationship v/ith its audlenoe (f). Here, I 
think that this is intended to oonwey a more one-way idea of relation­
ship than that between persona. Obviously not legal, blood, spatial 
or temporal, it is rather a personal, immediate oonneotlon resulting 
from the worlffc besoming fully realised as a result of A'a poroeiving 
it as a work of art. If one aooepts that the term is subjoot-relative, 
and honorlflo, and like many other terms, as, for example, ink bottle, 
an x is not an x unless designated by somebody as one, then one is 
aooepting Dufrenne 's position. This appears reasonable enough in the
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o*a« of the torn 'work of art', since its meaning seems to involve 
'an object seen by someone in a oertain light and evaluated according 
to oertain criteria', whioh entails that the thing in question be 
studied by someone and olassified as a work of mrt before it beoomes 
one.
Henoe perceiving x as a work of art oauses it to be fully real­
ised and enter into a relationship with its audience - that of pero- 
eiver with peroeived. This is not exaotly the oapaoity for a relat­
ionship whioh Sartre invoked as part of his definition of the pour-soi 
- whioh involves a muoh more aotive role than simply being the objeot 
perceived. Nevertheless, Dufrenne is not oommitted to draw any exaot 
parallels between the oonoept of a work of art and the oonoept of a 
person, and, so far as it goes, the idea put forward by Dufrenne is 
aooeptable. But it needs reinforoing, sinoe one Oan have a similar 
relationship simply of peroeiver and peroeived, with any objeot - 
whioh entails that the peroeived objoot need be no more then an en-sol 
(a tree, a box, eto.). Again the question oan only be resolved in 
terms of the qualities of the peroeived work of art - in partioular 
whether it is expressive, meaningful , or affeotive. So this point 
also oannot be properly resolved before the latter question is.
Uhlty (g)l‘ is a fairly oonmon and unoontroversial oriterion of 
evaluation in a work of art. But the outline whioh 1 have given is 
not sufficient for Dufrenne's purposes, firstly, one must establish 
whether a work of art has unity in the sense he gives, and seoondly. 
if it does, whether that is a oriterion for oalling it a quasi­
sub jeot. 1
1. whioh may be taken as equivalent to or/tanio ooherenoe. of., ninth 
point.
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Firstly (and again unity depends an expression, at least Dufrenne 
thinks that it does). Certainly, if a work is said to be expressive» 
then if it Is determined that the various thoughts, moods, feelings, 
sensations, eta.,, expressed, form a ooherent unity, it is said to be 
a good work of art. There are, of oourse, other feetors involved in 
judging the unity of a work of art - that of its form, oontent and 
subjeot matter. It is unolear whether Dufrenne is relying on the 
faotor of expression giving the work of art unity (and thus ultim­
ately again on expression) to designate the work as a quasi-subJeot, 
or on the eonoept of unity tielf as the criterion. If the latter, 
and I think it is this, then he would appear to be on fairly safe 
ground.
Seoondly (as I said), unity of its elements is a general oriterion 
of evaluation of a work of art. This does not mean that works of 
art must be harmonious, but that tneir elements should form a logio- 
ally ooherent whole. The question is - whether this is the sort of 
unity whioh is analogous to what one might oall the unity of a pour- 
soi-Oor whether unity has anything to do with the oonoept of a sub- 
je ot.
It would be useless to credit nan with unity of design and 
structure,i.e., to invoke teleology , since if this applies at all, 
it applies also to things not in the pour-soi bracket. Thus unity 
in this sense would not align the work of art solely with the pour- 
soi. But one can take the oonoept in terms of unity of aotion, 
purpose, or being. In this sense, the work of art is an intentional, 
designed oreation, and the aotions of mensem purposive, designed and 
intentional. Unity oan therefore be attributed to both, and the 
work of art oan be said to be a quasi-subJeot.
Proximity to oonsolousness (i) presumably refers to three points}
1) Dufrenne*s pre'ious olaim that the author is one with the work
in its construction, and in thinking of him, we think ot him as 
part of it.
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2) The faot that works of art are constructed for oonsoiousness 
(oonaoioua subjeots).
}) What ia metaphorically termed 'Ufa' in a work of art, aa for 
axamplo, whan a orltio a ay a good worka of art oome alive, eto.
This alao refara retrospectively to tha othar aapaota of?work whioh 
make it a quosi-aubjeot, which by definition givea it a proximity to 
oonaoiousnaaa•
But these three oriteria attribute tha pour-sol to a work of art 
only vicariously and metaphorically. The proximity to oonaoiousness 
is not qualitative, whioh ia what is roquired to use this aa a baaia 
reason for oalllng the work of art a quaai-aubJeot. This particular 
point oan only be used to give support to the notion, but not aa 
sufficient - even Jointly with the other features.
To arrive at this Justification of Dufrenno, one has to move 
some way from his original standpoint (a), sinoa tha latter features 
are basio oritaria for something's being a work of art at all, while 
the former (unity of expression, eto.), are rather second order 
oriteria for something's being a good work of art A* and (b) because 
when Dufrenna refers to the unity of a quooi-pour-soi, he is talking 
in terms of these seoond order oriteria - nbloh apply only to art.
Z think, therefore, that unity as a oriterion for art ia quite 
unoontroverslal, but aa a oriterion for art aa a quaai-aubJeot, it la 
rathnr dubious. Of the four oriteria with whioh it is possible to 
deal at present, temporality definitely promotes the idea of sat as 
quasi-pour-sol; as does proximity to oonsoiousness, os a support; 
unity requires a good deal of Juggling with - and is still dubious| 1
1. Even if the term is honorlflo, one oan still distinguish between 
degrees of value of works of art.
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and the oonoept of the work as having o relationship with its audienoe 
remains unresolved, until the exaot nature of the woxfc of art (as 
expressive, eto.)» is resolved.
Finally. Dufrenne oan oall the aesthetio objeot only a quasi-oour-soi, 
rather than a pour-soi, for several reasons, (a) Beoause no natter 
how many of the qualities of a subject an aesthetio objeot possesses, 
it is still dependent on the subjeet for its existence, (b) Beoause 
it is dependent on the subjcot for being seen asan aesthetio objeot. 
(o) Beoause it does not possess the vital quality of the pour-soi, 
its oonsolouaness, either of itself or others. Thus, it oannot 
peroeive its freedom, or lack of it, nor its failures or achieve­
ments or ambitions. Zn faot it oan have none of these things bec­
ause they are restricted to eonsoious and rational beings - and 
Dufrenne is not olalaing that the aesthetio objeot is rational.^*
It therefore lies between the realms of the in-itself and the 
for-itself. On the grounds whioh have just been disoussed for 
calling art quasi-pour-epoi, 1 think one oan allow that Dufrenne 
has an important and original hold on the oonoept of a work of art, 
even if it requires further baoklng (as it would seen to do). 1
1. I think one might sa„ that the use of the tens quaoi-pour-soi 
indicated that Dufrenne is applying the idea of the pour-sci 
metaphorically to tho work of art.
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CBMlMloa.
The most positive, and (fortunately) the most inportent part of thia 
ohapter is the final seation. Before this, Oufrenna has failai^to 
próvida a satisfaotory distinotion batwaan the work of art and the 
aasthotia object - although ona may allow tho minor points thatt 
(a) hie discussion rather tortuously illustrates that paroaption 
(qua listening, reading, viewing) is of major importance to art) 
and (b) there remains the ordinary language distinotion. But it is 
no thanks to Dufrenne that this distinotion does remain, sinoe it is 
almost the oonverse of the one which he propounds, i.e., making tha 
olass of aesthetic objects greater than that of works of art.
The lack of a satisfactory distinction unfortunately fogs tha 
issue on the a priori. It makes it difficult to see where tha 
features Dufrenne regards as the essanoa of art lie, and whether 
they - and therefore the work of art - exist objeotively, or are 
dependent on the subjeot for their existence. For the work of art 
qua aesthetic object ¿s dependent on the subject for its existenoe, 
and if the essential features belong to the work qua eesthetio objeot 
then they are subjeot relative to that extent.
The section on the nature and general struotuz'e of ert has also 
been shown to have severe weaknesses - especially with regard to tha 
latter part. And his ideas of the distinotion between the aesthetic 
and the ordinary objeot are both bisarre end rather vague. One never 
finds out exaotly what counts as a clear oase of oaoh olass, nor 
exaotly what belongs to the list of borderline oases and how these 
would eventually be classed. This and the third sootion therefore 
encounter similar problems of ambiguity and a failure to clarify 
concepts in order to come to any determinóte conclusion.
Clf.
Conclusion.
The most positive, and (fortunately) the most important part of this 
ohapter is the final aeotion. Before this, Dufrenne has faile<Vto 
proride a satisfactory distinction between the work of art and the 
aesthetic objeot - although one may allow the minor points thati 
(a) his diseussion rather tortuously illustrates that perception 
(qua listening, reading, Tiewing) is of najor importanoe to art) 
and (b) there remains the ordinary language distinction. But it is 
no thanks to Dufrenne that this distinction does remain, since it is 
almost the oonverse of the one whioh he propounds, i.e., making the 
olass of aesthetic objects greater than that of works of art.
The lack of a satisfactory distinction unfortunately fogs the 
issue on the a priori. It makes it difficult to see where the 
features Dufrenne regards as the essence of art lie, and whether 
they - and therefore the work of art - exist obJeotiYely, or are 
dependent on the subjeot for their existence. For the work of art 
qua aesthetic objeot ¿a dependent on the subject for its existence, 
and if the essential features belong to the work qua eesthetio object 
then they are subjeot relative to that extent.
The aeotion on the nature and general structure of ert has also 
been shown to have severe weaknesses - especially with regard to the 
latter part. And his ideas of the distinction between the aesthetic 
and the ordinary objeot are both bicarre and rather vague. One never 
finds out exactly what counts as a clear oase of eaoh class, nor 
exaotly what belongs to the list of borderline oases and how these 
would eventually be classed. This and the third sootion therefore 
encounter similar problems Cf ambiguity and a failure to clarify 
ooncepts in order to come to any determinate conclusion.
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The ide0 of the quaax-pour-sol is muoh moro promising though« 
It provides a genuinely original idea about the work, nhioh will 
find ita oompletion only by the end of the fifth ohapter, ainoe the 
oonoepta involved continue to be diaeuaaed and norked out through 
ohaptera two, three, four and five* And it ia not only extremely 
intereating, but it alao demonatratea auffloient similarities 
between the work of art and the pour-aol, to warrant the work’s 
being provisionally noninated a quasi-pour-sol. However, this is 
not for the reasons whloh make the ooneept 'nan* an a priori 
oonoept« The ooneepta with which it deals * unity, meaning, eto., 
ore not the uniquely individuating neoessary and suffiolent cond­
itions which aake x a nan - or altogether whloh nake x art.
(a) They are points of similarity between art ond man} (b) they 
are not dlsousaed in sufficient detail to be individuating of art) 
(o) bufronne does not enter into any dlsoussion on whether they 
are either necessary or sufficient or both.
Zt la important to bear in mind that although he has brought 
to proninenoe various important aapeots of art, by the end of 
this ohapter, Dufrenno has not provided an a priori nature of 
art whioh one oould go on to use as a guide rule for something's 
being art.
CHAPTER TWO, THE STATUS OF THE WORK OF ART: ITS CRKATIOH.
PERCEPTION AND AUTONOMY.
Introduction.
In this onapter, I intend to disouss something of the creation of s 
work of art, its performers (if any) and audienoe, its perception, 
and finally the way in which Dufrenne regards it as independent of 
any of these - i.e., autonomous or self-sufficient. Dufrenne does 
not make muoh use of the term 'autonomous', but I use it os a 
'blanket' term for various things Dufrenne soys about the work 
which amount to a view of it as autonomous.^*
There has been muoh debate over the actual creation of a work of 
art — where it is oreated and when, and whether an idea in the mind 
of the artist oounts us a oreation. Croce— 'and Collingwood^* 
discussed this (amongst others), and aroused muoh oritioism in so 
doing. Dufrenne unfortunately reveals a great laok of clarity on 
the topio, and one must interpret him as best one can, This is also 
the case with a sub-seotiou of Seotion I. which deals with the idea 
thot all works of art are in some way performed.
The question of perception iB leas familiar, but requires some 
discussion, sinoe Dufrenne makes the unusual claim that all art is 
perceived, and often makes use of the term in ways which require 
some explanation - usually in relation to feeling and aesthetic 
experience.
1_. This topio is disoussed when he talks of the aosthetio object and 
the world (Vol.I, Part I, Ch&p.V.), and representation and imagin­
ation (Vol.ll, Part I, Chap.II.).
See £. Crooej Aesthetlo as soienoe of expression and general 
linguiatio. trsns. D. Ainslie, London, 1922.
See Collingwoou: The principles of art. O.U.P. 1970. (First 
published Clarendon Press, 193&*)
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The final topio of the self-suffioienoy or autonomy of art has 
been dealt with by others, intermittently and rather indireotly, e.gJ 
in disoussions on the relevance of historical oontexts, moral view­
points, the possibility that the work may bm informative, eto.A 
Dufrenne wishes to sever, mil connection between the work and the 
rest of the world, but 1 think that in the end it beoomes clear 
that it is not possible to do this.
As far as the interpretation of his views on the oreation of 
art goes, one has some foreknowledge of the tenor of Dufrenne's 
views. For his belief that there is an a priori object which is the 
work of art would be incompatible with any sueh thesis as that the 
work is an idea in the artist's mind, or some suoh similar nebulbus 
entity. Obviously one oan attribute an a priori nature and qualit­
ies to an idea, but both the idea and the existence of its qualities 
is questionable and unverifiable. This is an example of one of the 
fortunate oonsequenoes of the belief in the a priori nature of are 
- e.f., the belief that the work possesses oertain objective feat­
ures, not least of whioh is an objective existence (external to the 
mind of the artist). The only dubious faotor here is that Dufrenne 
is onoe again fruatrutingly hesitant about taking the appropriate 
stanoe. ho hedges, and suggests ways in whioh the work pre-exists 
its sensible emanation - although he deolares a belief that the 
work is not a true work of art until it is an objeotive existent.
1» The idea of tackling this ospeot of Dufrenne's work wns given 
to me by Cyril Barrett, and I must acknowledge at leas« a method­
ological influence, and probably an influence on the general tenor 
of my thoughts.
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It is worth noting that what ha say« is parfaotly oonaiatant 
with tha thaaia of tha a priori, as will be ssan in ohaptar thras.
The idea of tha work of art as independent of all external influences 
lands credibility to ths idea that it has a natural signlfioanoe or 
imaediate meaningfulness. And being a priori (if, that is, ha oould 
prove that it was) it would be natural for art to have no need of 
externally experienced features in order to explain itself.
The points raised in this chapter bring out some interesting 
questions for the status *f art, in terms of oreation, performance, 
independence, eto.
(l) Creation. Section I.
Dufrenne's views here are concerned with the relationship bstween 
the artist, the woric, its performers.and performance, and its aud- 
ienoe. He purports to be anti-iuealist, and views the work as having 
mastery over its oreator, rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, 
intuitionism brings him close to an idealism which he would deny. It 
is apparent that he regards the work of art os being in many ways 
autonomous of its oreator.
Despite rejecting idealism, i.e., suoh views as Crooe and 
Colllngwood propound - of the existenos of the work as an idea in 
the artist's imagination - Dufrenne does not aocept that the work 
of art exists only when it has e sensible emanation. According to 
him, there is a sense in whioh it does exist prior to its oreation.£ 
It is not an idea of an aesthetic object, because this Is too subject* 
ive, and 'the idea of an aesthetio object* exists only for the artist.
J.. Though this is not, as I suggested in the introduction, a very 
sensible line.for him to take.
The nature of the pre-senaible object ie (a), a oertainty in the 
artist of being equal to a task, responding to a oall (b), an exist­
ent thing, but not a blue print for the artist, whioh he can see and 
imitate (o), a oertain internal logioal form. Thus, what is prod­
uced by the artist is the expression of this internal logioal fora, 
that of a oertain teohnloal development. Before the work is created 
in a sensible form it is only a demand for exietenoo. Zt is an idea, 
but not a oonoeptualisable one (by the artist or anyone else - the 
'being' of the work is just as inaooesslble to the artist as to the 
publio, before its external emanation). When it is oreated, intuit­
ion tells the artist whether or not the work agrees with the idea.^ >*
Thera are also two sorts of artist - he who is not aware exact­
ly of what he is doing, and in this case the work seom6 to be in
oommand, and he who knows that, and what, he is creating, and uses 
the produota of extremely oonsoious work to produoe the work of art, 
i.e., work by means of whioh he has eoquired a metier, taste, and 
oonsoiousness of aesthetio problems) the tools of aesthetio creation 
as Dufrenne oalls them. However, the work of art is not oompletely 
in the control even of the latter artist - there is a sense in whioh 
he is the vehicle for its production, (Cf. Vol.I. Part I. Chap.II. 
seotion II. esp. pp.63-6.)
Despite a oertain amount of ambiguity in what Dufrenne says, X
think thet what he is olaiming is (a) that there is a sense in whioh
a work of art pre-exists its sensible emanation (b) this is not the
work itself, as idealists would olaim (o.f., his statement that before
tiia work is externally nanifeste^ "il se peut qua 1'artiste entende
un appel . . .  aais oela attests enoore mieux qu'a oe atade l'oeuvrs 
1. This is obviously very unolear - e.g., saying that the work of
art oan be an idea seems to oontradiot what he has just said. I shall
oomment on this shortly.
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n'oat qu'exlgenoe . . . Tout reste a fairs, at l'exeoution aat Trainant 
oriation." p.65.) And his reason for regarding the work as pre- 
existing in sons way, derives from the faot that the work often appears 
to ba independent of the artist, and it would therefore seen logioal 
to assume that the artist was not the sole efficient oause of its 
existenoe.
Seoondly, there is the role of the perforaer, i.e., when the work 
is distinet from its exeoution, e.g., drama, ballet, ausio (c.f,Vol.I. 
Part I. Chap.II, seotion I). He inoludes arohiteoture in this olass - 
and as that whioh exemplifies the greatest distinction between artist 
and performer.
Aooording to Dufrenne, the performer has a fairly heavy task - 
that of bringing the work to life and interpreting it* Zn this he 
speoifies that he disagrees with Aristotle* view of the performer as a 
slave to the wishes of the work. Conventionally enough, he feels that 
the work is incomplete without its performance, since its funotion is 
to be performed. The work is not inert however} it demands a great 
deal of its performers, and one may measure the depth or greatness of 
the work by the degree to whioh it is performable with apparent felic­
ity. Graoe, apparent spontaneity and ease are essential to a performer. 
He must also be faithful to the work - it demands his obedience (p.60), 
Virtuoaity, intelligence, initiative, and subjugation of his own self 
in the work. The performer therefore has a range of possibilities, 
but must stay within the limits of these - otherwise what Cautier oalls
As a matter of faot, this does not seem to be a very gCod example, 
sinoe the arohiteet leaves little or no initiative to the builder. So 
the builder is hardly a performer - though oertainly in arohiteoture 
the artist is very muok distinct from the builder.
'heresies', oocur.
This also raises the question of the Xooation of the work, 
Xiufrenne rightly says that as judge an interpretation in terns of 
the work, but that it is less neoesssry to know what the work is., 
prior to its exeoution, than to know that the interpretation oomplies 
with the work. Thus it is a question of truth,(or fidelity), and the 
true being of the work, rather than one of its reality. This is handy, 
beoouse reality presupposes a work pre-existent to its performance, 
whereas truth does not (p.54). We see the truth of the work through 
the exeoution, and this orients our judgment. Dufrenne advises oaut- 
ion here though, sines different interpretations alter our judgment, 
and a supposedly brilliant interpretation is lisble to bias us tow­
ards regarding that as the exemplification of the work. We should not 
allow such performances to oause us to anticipate how a work should 
be. liaay interpretations are legitimate, and thus the nature of the 
work is not pre-ordained (p.55)»
Supposing himself to be faced with relativism, Dufrenne asserts 
a relative-absolutist viewpoint, whioh is that a work has a trans- 
hiatorieal existence. It is differently interpreted by different 
cultures, and ignored by oertain others. The work retains its value 
nonetheless, and its status as a work of art.A*
Dufrunr.e mentions intentionality with regard to interpretation, 
but makes short work of it. Consistently with his belief that ths 
work of art is self-suffloient, and should be understood without 
referenoe to historioal looation, author, style, eto., he foels that 1
1. This viewpoint is another indicator of his belief iu ths a priori 
in art - that a work remains art, i.e., retains its givon aesthotio 
qualities, even whsrs no-one oonsiders it to be art, despite publlo 
opinion.
whatover intontione tne author had, and whioh are relevant, will be 
diaoernable in tbe work. I.e., if faure'e Kequlen was Intended to 
sound religious, this faotor is only dlaoerned by referanoe to the 
work - e.g., if it "sounds wrong" given e non-religious interpret­
ation. This view ia supported by various people, notably Professor 
Kenp (B.J.A., •64)-V
Having spoken of those works where oreation and ezeoution are 
obviously distinot, Sufrenne makes the more unoonvrntionel move of 
ssying that all works of art are perforned in a one way, and where 
oxeoutlon and oreation are not distinot, the artist is the performer 
(p.62). However, he also says that striotly speaking the speotator 
is o performer (p.8u). To exist properly the work needs the spect­
ator.^*
Though various people also rejeot the idea, or have other inter­
pretations Qs to the relevanoo of the artist's intentions] e.g.,Ked- 
path; 'The meaning of a poem', and Ckffe; 'Intention and interpret­
ation in orltioism', both in; Collected uauera in aesthetloj,. ed., 
D.C.Barrett, pub. Basil Blaokwe'.l, Oxford, 1963
2. Presumably this is only a slightly different way of saying that 
the work needs to be performed in order to oomplete its function, and 
assuming a performance will have an audienoe, in view of the faot that 
he goes on to say that the reality of the work exists only in the sen 
ible. This also supports the case for saying he does not believe the 
work exists until it has an ofcjeotive, external, being. Dufrenne 
expresses himself rather oonfusedly though. It would be olearer if 
ho atated explicitly that striotly speaking, everyone is e performer.
7 2  .
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With regard to the idea of the speotator as a performer, ho states 
that this is unquestionably true in the so-oalled performed arts, and 
even in the arts (e.g., literature) where the work is not separately 
exeouted, the audienee (reader) still has the task of bringing the worl 
out of ita abstraot existence as written words, to a concrete exist* 
«nos. (C.f,, asp. pp.87-91.) Thus the apeotator is a performer. Duf- 
renne states that the spectator co-operates in the execution of the 
work - and if the work is of the nature of a religious prooession,then 
the spectator is an aotor at the same tiae.JL* But he is cautious later 
that as a speotator one is forbidden to add anything to the work, 
though one can interpret in the effort to understand, (p.96.)
bufrenne refers also to the public of a work of art. The public 
is held to be en bloc rather than a number of individuals. Its extens­
ion is indeterminate but is often somewhat elitist - a sect. By pub­
lic, bufrenne presumably means that set of people who supposedly under­
stand ert, and does not regard it as objeotionable that there should 
be such a set. The public, he says, is different from the mass - it 
is the public of a work of art, not the public as a whole. In front 
of a work of art, man is held tc transcend his singularity, and be 
part of an aesthetic community - this refers back to the oonoept of 
the publio as being sn bloo. As the work ages, its publio extends in 
two directions, (i) vertically - gaining a new audience with eaoh new 
generation, and (ii) horizontally - sinoe time gives the work prestige
and more people oome to aooapj in each generation (o.f., a sp.e p . 103-91^ - 
1■ Dufrenne's description of the prooession where everyone joins in
does not sound very muoh like anything aesthetic, and I rather doubt 
that a religious prooasaion oould be callod art unless it was very 
well organised, with a high degree of conventional ceremony, though 
presumably he intends it to be taken as aesthetio (o.f. p.8V ibid.).
. .  . «
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As to the performance itself (where it is separate from the 
oreation of the work), Dufrenne oalls it a mote from demand to aoo- 
omplishment, or from abatraot to oonorste. The work qua score or 
text, already has form (p.7l)«^>*
Reproductions.
for some reason Dufrenne says that the existence of a reproduction 
is somewhere between the abstraot and oonorete existenoe of the 
original. This is oonfusing beoauae he has Just used abstraot and 
concrete to refer to the transition from soore or text to performed 
work. It is always of less value than the original - for one thing, 
not being an aesthetio object, it oan only give a diminished pres­
ence of the original, except in the case of e.g., ceramics, where 
the reproduction actually is a work of art.
I do not have much criticism to make of the majority of this. 
The only points of contention seem to be about the pre-existenoc of 
the work, performers and reproductions (and this is questionable 
mainly because it is confused). 1
1. It is probably less ambiguous to omit the idea of the unperform­
ed work as a demand - since Dufrenne has used this term previously 
to refer to the nature of the unoreated work.
Thsre art two difficulties with the olsim for b sense in whloh 
the work of art pre-exists its objective manifestation, (i) Regarding 
(a), the certainty of being equal to a task. This oertainty in no 
way guarantees either the existence of the task, or the equality of 
the artist to performing it. Wittgenstein demonstrates this adequate­
ly when he talks of our understanding something — that it is not the 
feeling of. "Ah( now I know” • but for one thing the demonstration 
that one does, by oarrying on a sequence oorrectly, for example.^»
The ability to onrry on the sequence is not the only criterion of 
knowing the technique, bux the feeling of knowing how is no crit­
erion at all. sinoe one nay think one has understood, and yet not 
have done. Thus, the inner state of the artist is as unreliable 
as the idealist statement that the work exists in his mind - without 
the subsequent external appearance of a work.^* (ii) What Dufrenne 
says of the work as an 'idea* is very unolear and inconsistent. He 
says on the one hand that it is not an * idoa of an aosthetio object’, 
not something whioh oan be imitated by the artist, and on the other 
hand that it a w ‘idea', but not oonsoptualisable, and finally that
on oompletion of the work the artist knows intuitively whether the 
work agrees with the 'idea*. To make this coherent one must appeal 
to his view of the artist as inspired to oreate something whioh is 
nevertheless independent of him once it is oreated. The work may
75-»
J.. See, Wittgenstein; Philosophical investigations.§ 15i-7, 179, 
esp. also 321, 396, p.182, published Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968. 
Trans. 5. K. M. Ansoombo.
And any supposed a priori features are in the same position, 
as indicated earlier.
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than bo referred to as an 'idea' qua independent object rather than 
qua ideal object.^**
It soena as ±f the problem really is that if the work is supp­
osed to correspond to an idea, than prior to its creation, there la 
only one way in whioh e.g., the Verdi Requiem, nay turn out, whloh 
«ill be oorreot (i.e., correspond to the idea). And one may well 
know that Verdi originally had something very different in mind from 
the finished product. However, this is not problematic, sinoe it ie 
oonfusing Verdi's original intention or vision, with the idea as 
something independent of Verdi. But the problem is for more simple. 
It is that there is no independent verification for suggesting an 
'idea' of the latter type, nor any neoessity for suggesting it.
Apart fr m this, I think Dufrenne is oorreot to divide artists 
into two sorts - those who are aware of exactly what they ore doing, 
and thoco who are not. As examples one night oite Dylan Xhonos in 
toe first category, sinoe ho is reputed to havo said that he uld not 
know what hie poetry meant, he left it to the oritios to say) and 
Leonardo da Vine! in the other. Rot that the distinction mokes any 
real aesthetic difference. It has no particular affect on the 
resulting work « so there is really no good reason why Dufrenne 
should divide artists into these two categories.
nith regard to perfornanoes it seems as if Dufrenne is right 
in regarding the psrformer's task as muoh more then someone executing 
oortain dictates. David Earner's version of Hamlet is quite differ­
ent from that of Cllvier) Solti's Xriatan is quite different from 
Furtwängler, and both fron von Bulow.
iievertheless, I th-’ nk that Pufrenne cannot escape the aoousation 
of being either very oareless or vory unclear as to exaotly when 
he thinks the work of srt is orested, and what senso we should give 
to the idea of the work of art.
77
The idea that felioity of* performance is neoessary is alto 
unoontantioua If ona bears in mind the diotum that a measure of an 
artist's greatname is the degree to whxoh he oan make his performenoe 
appear offortless (though -he question usually arises with regard to 
the performer's rather than the work's greatness)* The distinction 
between truth and reality, to avoid the irritating question of the 
location of the work, Is quits ingenious. Zt refers one baok to the 
work's performance as that which is definitive. The argument Is in 
3ne nay ciroular, since it reduces to saying one refers to the 
execution of the work (the truth of a work being found in an exec­
ution of it). In order to Judgo sono exeoution/por:orcanoe, Moreover, 
he debars a prior ideal aa to how tho work ouiiht to b e But 1 
think it is perfectly legitimate to say that one should Judgo ono's 
interpretation in relation to other Interpretations, and to aooept 
differing performanoes. This is normal practise. I would ;grtc 
also that a work is illuminated rather than oonfuaed, by the various 
trons-hiatorioal interpretations it reoeives.
The idee of a trans-hietorioal existonoe for a work of art might 
suggest it exists separately from ito interpretations, as X, var­
iously interpreted. In faot X do not think that bufrenne would wish 
to deny that there was some point of referonoo for a play or o pieoo 
of nusio, apart from its psrformanoes, i.e., the soore or text. Tha 
existence of the soore or text deals with both 'bod porformanows' 
and the possibility of there being as many works of art as there are 
performances. I.e., one has only to say that one must not deviate 
too far from the text or soore, otherwise one either he3 a bad perf­
ormance or something which is not a performance at all. (1 roadily
admit tuat m e  degree to whi.oh .one nay deviatt.w Hi. by. ----
1. c.f.. Kanti Critique of jud/isont. published Hafner, 1972, first
and third moments. That la, ha debars idsals as to tho partioulsrs
of performance in a work.
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arbitrary - a matter of general oonianaua - and mill differ from 
work to work«) But although this may be the basio form of exiatenoe 
for the work, for Dufrsnne it is not the important form - and here 
again 1 am inolined to agree with him. It ia not n suffioient cond­
ition for the fulfilment of the work.
The idea that all worka are in aome way performed ia illumin­
ating to the extent that it demonstrates that painting, soulpture, 
literature, etc., laok some part of their nature if they are left 
unread or unaeen - sinoe it la their funetion (or part of it) to 
hare an audience. To aay that the audience acta aa a performer 
seems to be a little extreme though, is audience, one's role aeema 
to be mainly receptive, and possibly analytic, and even if one's 
action fulfills the purpose of the work (or oonfera the atatua of a 
work of art on it), it hardly seems to assume the proportions of a 
performer - it seems more passive than that. X do not. therefore, 
agree with Dufrenne that the faot that am audienoe is necessary to 
tha work, entails that he has the aotive role of performer.
I think also that one has to make some distinction between the 
audienoe's performanoes of works not normally regarded as performed, 
e.g., painting, and those whioh are normally regarded as performed, 
e.g., music. Possibly it is not so muoh that in the former cases 
the audience is passive - in looking at a painting for instanoe - 
as that one oannot see something different A* or do anything 
diffcrentjCaeh time one looks at it, or alter the work - whereas 
with that are usually oalled the performed arts, each performance 
oan and will be different.
nevertheless, one must be oareful not to oonfuse the ordinary 
audience of performed arts, and the characters normally seen as the
By which X mean the same faotors are there to be seen, not that 
one always sees the same ones.
i V'
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performers,i.e., aotors or musicians. The former will hear or see 
a different performance each tine, os I said, but that does not 
neoessarily make his role any more active than that of someone look- 
ins at a painting - and it is he, not the musioian or aotor, who 
oorresponds to the person looking at the painting.
Having made these distinctions, one is still left with the 
faot that there does not seem to be any good reason for saying that 
the audienoe of a work performs it in any way. Certainly he eonfers 
upon it the status of art, and is neoessary for its existenoei and 
the artist oreates the woxk, but I think that in the end one is 
justified only in regarding those people normally seen as performers 
(musioians, aotors, etc.), as, performers, for, to perform a work 
one must have a quasi—oreative role - not in the original oreation, 
but in being instrumental in taking a score, say a score of a pieoe 
of musio and transforming it and transmitting it to a publio in 
its ultimate intended aesthetio form of sound patterns. The 
performer is the mediator who brings the work as he aees it before 
the publio.
The idea of the work as always performed is one of Dufrenne's 
fairly original views, though there is also John Cage, who oounta 
everything whioh takes plaoe during the performance as part of the 
work, whioh is a similar view to that of Dufrenne, although not 
identioal. Dufrenne doee not argue from the faot that all works 
are performed by their eudienoe, to the view that all tha audienoa'a 
aotione oount aa part of tha parformanoa. Howevar, I think Dufranne 
is oorraot in tha raat of what ho says of the publio of a work.Zt la 
a oontingent faot that art is not oomprahanaible to tha publio in 
toto - evan if this ia only due to their not being in possession of 
the relevant faota. This ia not to say that this is a good or bad 
thing. TolatoyJL*regarded it aa bad. However under this theory
J.. op. oit
79
performers,i.e., aotors or musicians. The former will hear or see 
a different performance each tine, as I said, but that does not 
neoessarily make bis role shy more aotive than that of someone look­
ing at e painting - and it is he, not the musioian or aotor, who 
corresponds to the person looking at the painting.
Hawing made these distinotions, one is still left with the 
fact that there does not seen to be any good reason for saying that 
the audienoe of a work performs it in any way. Certainly he oonfers 
upon it the status of art, and is neoessary for its existenoe; and 
the artist oreates the work, but Z think that in the end one is 
justified only in regarding those people normally seen as performers 
(musioians, aotora, etc.), as. performers, for, to perform a work 
one must have a quasi-oreative role - not in the original creation, 
but in being instrumental in taking a score, say a soore of a pieoe 
of muBio and transforming it and transmitting it to e publio in 
its ultimate intended aesthetio form of sound patterns. The 
perform er is the mediator who brings the work as he sees it before 
the publio.
The idea of the work as always performed is one of Dufrenne’s 
fairly original views, though there is also John Cage, who oounts 
everything whioh takes place during the performance as j>art of the 
work, whioh is a similar view to that of Dufrenne, although not 
identical. Dufrenne does not argue from the fact that all works 
are performed by their audienoe, to the view that all the audienoe's 
actions oount as part of the performanoe. However, Z think Dufrenne 
is oorreot in the rest of what ho says of the publio of a work.Zt is 
a contingent faot that art is not comprehensible to the publio in 
toto — even if this is only due to their not being in possession of 
the relevant faots. This is not to say that this is a good or bad 
thing. Tolstoyl»regarded it as bad. However under this theory
J,. op. oit
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Beethoven and Shakespeare are loss good art t an folic musio, whioh 
is highly contentious. In 'transcending hia singularity* when 
contemplating a w#rk, man puts aside hia egoistio 'ovorydayness*, 
and distances himsolf from himself - thus beooming part of an 
aeathetio community. As to the dimension of tne publio, it is a 
simple psyoholegioal fact that the less on« is contemporaneous with 
the oroation of a work, tha more reverenoe one is likely to feel 
for It - or the more likely one is to aocord it the status of art.
ouf anno has made short work of intentionallty. Ho is h u - n g 
self-consostont as 1 pointed out, and 1 see no necessity to go all 
over the relevanoe or deolsiveneas of the intentions of the artist. 
The ground has been well ploughed, but toe results are inoonolusiva 
Tiimsatt and BeardsleyJL* affect to disallow intentions, but effect­
ively bring them in under cover of what they regard os legitimate 
material for interpretation - auoh as biographioal information, 
undor the heading of additional notoe. Ciofflal*regarda intentions 
as relovunt but not deolslve, but has no definitive oritarion for 
when they ore relevant - his suggested criterion for ignoring the 
artist's stated intention being ;
"when on important, deep-meaning, long-lasting of eat or 
meaning seems to result from the work, and tho artist Just 
denies that he means tale" (p.1 7 3 )<
1t Wimsett«Beardsley, The Verbal loon, pub. Bonington* University 
of Kentuoky Press, 1954»
2. Cioffi,'Intention and Interpretation in Criticism,* Collectionad.
C. Barrett. Pub. Basil Blaokwell, Oxford. gaJLlpqt^. PftP.OTP Ifl
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But how does one judge when Cioffi's oriterion is satisfied? It 
would seem to be a fairly arbitrary deoision. RedpethJL* ia generally 
against taking the artist's intentions into aooount, and suggests, 
with regard to poetry;
"Perhaps the meaning of a poem is a olass of similar experiences, 
one or other of whioh those words in that order and arranged in 
that fora, ought to awoke in a reader faailiar with ^he lang­
uage in whioh the poen is written*” (p.154.)
This is again too general, and none of the aooounts takes into 
oonsideration original and ultimate intentions, whioh may differ 
radically* Moreover, what the artist says is notoriously unreliable, 
and what he intends, equally inaooessible; and there is again the 
distinction between what the author intended a work to mean, and 
whether he intended to put a oertain word or brush stroke, where he 
did - i.e., between an intentional meaning and an intentional aotion, 
a distinction whioh is often unnotioed.
It seems altogether safer to take t-.e work itself as authorit­
ative, as Dufrenne does. There is only one drawback to what he says 
- namely that it is somewhat subjeotive to say that one has to 
judge a work in terms of whether it 'feels right*. I think that 
one should bear in mind the period in whioh the artist lived, in 
order to know whether a oortain effeot oould have been intended.
For instanoe Mosart would not have intended his musio to sound 
atonal, not his resolutions unrosolved. Nevertheless, important aw 
this may be, it is also true tnat Dufrenne is keeping to the right 
lines in stressing referenoe to the aotual performance, whereas what 
the author says he intended is a biographioal faot, and not neoess-
arllv an aesthetic one.£*----------------------------------------
£. Redpath, 'The Meaning of a Poem.' Colleoted papers in aesthetiOA.
¿. By this I mean the author's notes on the meaning of his works, or
what he tells someone he intended, not what is gained from the work
and its spatio-temporal oontext. And the former oan always be called
*
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To taka up Dufrenne's point again) X nay know that Mahler's 
symphonies should not sound tranquil, not bsoauss I ha to aooess to 
what ho said, but bsoauss thsy will 'sound wrong' if they sound 
tranquil. Admittedly a lot more detail is needed about 'sounding 
wrong'. 1 might sey that given a tranquil rendering by Colin Davis, 
Mahler sounchd formless and oonfused, its themes looked unity and 
eoherenoe) it was meaningless and aohieved no expressive power.
Given oertain things, I think that one might aooept this oritioism. 
tor one thing, that X was not oonfusing Mahler with Sohoenberg) for 
another, that other people who were also not oonfusing Mahler with 
Sohoenberg, or anyone else for that matter, agreed with me, and 
finally, I would need reasons for the suggested elaboration on 
'sounding wrong', whioh did not inolude anything about the artist's 
supposed intentions. One oould easily end where one began, by 
saying that the musio 'sounded wrong' - formless and oonfused, eto., 
beoause one thought one knew that the author intended it to sound 
other than it did . (in this oase one might not hear it as it act­
ually sounded, beoause of one's psychological bias.) Maybe one
(oontinued) biographical data about the author, but may well be 
not aesthetioally important data - for the simple reason that what 
the author says he intended X to mean does not entail that this is 
what X means. This is not to say that what the author says he int­
ended is never of any aosthotio value. It na.v well throw a great 
deal of light on the work in question - for instanoe if a poet has 
used some symbolism private to himself, then only he oan explain 
what the symbols stand for, and 'deoode' the posm.
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oould say that them* theme a, harmonies, rhythms, key signatures, 
tempo markings, ate., in this order, as a matter of faot hare suoh 
and auoh an expression and form If played In a particular way, and 
that this partioular expression, form, unity, eto., is aooeptable.
A different interpretation might also be aooeptable, but the relev- 
ant point is that one does not have reoourse to the artist's intent­
ions. -1*
In this oase, 1 think one oan aooept Dufrenne's viewpoint that 
a work may often be judged without referenee to the externally known 
(i.e., from something other than the work) intentions of the artist. 
All the same, it ie fairly obvious that without a good deal of elab­
oration, what Dufrenne says about the work 'sounding right' is 
insuffioient.
The final brief mention whioh Dufrenne gives to reproductions 
represents the least eoherent part of the section, for one thing, 
it seems to give the reproduction the status of a work of art, half 
way to oonorete realisation. This probably stems from the idea that 
the audienee is neoessary to bring a work to its full realisation - 
and reproduotiors, in the sense of the film of the opera, or some­
thing analogous, do not have the factor of 'audienoe presence'. 
However, this does not apply to a reproduction of a painting for 
instance, beeause this oan have an audienoe just as muoh as the 
original.
Unfortunately, Dufronne does not make it olear whether or not 
he is inoluding oopies, forgeries, fakes, eto., in the meaning of 
'reproduction'• His usage is unolear, with the result that his 
meaning is unolear. He seens mainly to be referring to different 
ways of presenting a work other than in its original fora, rather
At least, not those external to the work.
than to oopiaa. If ha la including oopiea us of laaa value than 
tha original, than I think ha la mlatakan. It la parfaotly poaslbla 
that, e.g, , Cbsanne, ahould oopy a a till Ufa by aona othar artlat, 
and produoa a work aa aesthetically valuable as, if not nora val­
uable than, tha original. . Tha aame thing appliaa to a forgary o.r 
fake or a oopy by an artlat of ona of hia own worka. Thaaa thinga
oan be as good worka of art aa (or battar than) tha orlginala, always
provided that tha artiat is auffloiant to the task* A forgery nay 
have less market value but not neoassarlly leas aeathatlo value, nor
do I think the aoral ovartonaa of an attempt to deceive impinges on
tha aesthetio Value of a work.
It seems rather aa if fiufrenna is misled by linguistics into 
olaasifying oaramios and works made from oasts, in the same categ­
ory, as reproduced. Thaaa latter seam more analogous to arohitaot— 
ura - where tha plan seems anelogous to tha oast for pottery. I.a., 
this sort of raproduotion is not a reproduction at all. This again 
oan apply to a replloa of an arohiteotural work depending on how 
skilful ita produotion is. It is anotuer production of a work, aa 
are oeramioa and works from oaats, rather than a reproduction.
finally, there are things like prints whloh do seem to fall 
into hufranne's grouping and present a 'diminished presence of the 
original'. But as I have said above (print a e.g., a reproduction 
of a painting), it is not any less a work of art for laok of 
'audienoe presence', far more people see prints of maaterpieoes 
than see the aotual uasterpieoe. I would oonoluda by reversing 
tha status of raproduotlons qua film of ttie opera, and those qua 
print of a palhting. I think the former has far more opportunity 
to retain the oharaoterlatios whioh make tha objeot art - ita 
expressive features, its formal power and balanoe, eto., -
8 4.
whereas
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a print will inevitably blur and misrepresent to sons degree, pres­
enting a work as flat, two dimensional and laoking the detail of 
brushwork and sense of immediaoy given in the original.
One way in whioh Dufrenne oould possibly prove that reproduct­
ions were less works of art than the originals - at least to his 
own satisfaotiom - would be if be oould show that for some reason 
they laoked the a priori nature whioh he thinks belongs to art. He 
does not, however, attempt or suggest this.
Scotion 11.
M e  fJ*r.oj£fb.ion of. the wg.yk of. art.
When Dufrenne talks of the aesthetio experienoe, he always talks of 
it in terms of perception. The aesthetio object is neoessarily a 
perceived objeot - the work of art under an aesthetio peroeption. 
This may be queried prime faoie - we do not, it is said, peroeive 
literature) we read it aid understand it, we do not sit book and 
contemplate a book. However, there are three answers, to this - 
the first is that Dufrenne is not referring purely to sense-exper­
ience, in referring to peroeption - he inoludes intellectual action. 
Nor is it oven the case that sense-experienoe is omitted from the 
aesthetio experienoe of literature - it is a pre-oondition at least. 
We see the printed page, and possibly have an inner aural experienoe 
of the words, as if someone were reading or speaking to us. The 
third fact is that if aesthetio judgment is performed in retrospeot, 
then it may be a contemplative Judgment on the sense-experienees 
we have enoountered in reading the work. The third point is not of 
interest to Dufrenne in tne oase of aesthetio peroeption, sinoe for 
him it is oonoerned with the immediate experienoe of the aesthetio 
objeot, not the delayed Judgment.
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What is of importanoe is that Dufrenne uses tus taro 'poroept- 
ion', to rsfor to tho factor of diroot oontaot with the aesthetio 
objeot, whioh ho regards os noosssary to its fulfilaont as an 
aesthotio objeot.
Ho gives various reasons for the use of tho oonoept of perc­
eption, and for its neeessity as an explanatory feature of oesth- 
otios.
A. Ho says (Vol.l. Part Z. Chap.VZ. soot.XX. pp.261-3)» for phen- 
ononology tho aosthotio objoot is ossontiaXly perceived - it 
requires a witness or pubiio, and is not oompXeto without perception.
B. Tho idea of perception is important because it suggests some­
thing about the nature of its object and he who psrooives. Xt 
suggests that the object ia not the produot of a constituting 
aotivity, i.e., it is not an imaginary or subjeotive thing, and yet 
it aXoo exists onXy for a oonsoiousness oapabla of rooognising and 
understanding it.
C. Further, the necessity for peroeption can be used to emphasise 
the non-ideaX nature of tho aosthotio objoot. (p.?87,op olt.)
I). The uesthetio oLjeot oan only he reaXised by a true peroeption 
of it - uniike ordinary objects whioh are Indifferent to being well 
or badly peroeived (though the aesthetio objeot is not reducible 
to its appearanoes). By this Dufrenne is ref-.-ring to the faot 
that if one sees a table under bad lighting, one does not oomplain, 
but a painting has to be seen under the oorreot lighting, beoause 
the peroeption of the latter is very important, whereas the pero­
eption of the former is of only minimal importance (so that one may 
know what it is, avoid tripling over it, eto.).
g. The aesthetic merit of an objeot oan be measured by how muoh 
it oan exalt the perceiving aspect. A monument whioh talks Instead 
of singing is aesthetlodlly imperfect (p.TSO op oit). By this
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Dufrenne means that the greater and more impressive is our percept­
ion of the aesthetic objeot, the greateri'will be the objeot Itself. 
Ihe illustration of talking instead of singing say appear strange 
taken at faoe value, but is used on the esausption that an aesthetic 
objeot oan express certain s priori qualities, and therefore oommun- 
ioate with its audience, and singing is a sore exalted and impressive 
sods of perceptual oot unioatlon than talking.^*
As to the status of this peroeived object, Dufrenne ssys that it 
is ambiguous.
(i) Zt is an objeet 1 peroeive beoause it is before me.
(ii) It is a rjality whioh cannot be fully enoospassed by peroeptiom 
"Ainsi l'objet perou a un statut ambigu: il est oet objet que
je peroois paroe qu'il m'est présent, mais en meïme temps il 
est autre ohosej il est cette réalité etrangers que la perc­
eption n'épuise pas qui fait appel a un savoir qui voudrait 
ne rien devoir qla perception."
(Vol.I. Part 1. Chap TI. sect.ii.jC85. ] 
It is worth noting that Dufrenne is aware that in a striot sene 
one does not peroeive all works of art. He mentions this onoe, in 
passing, in respeot of literature:
"Jin m'ose temps qu'il perçoit, ou a la rigeur, pour le roman, 
au'il imagine, le témoin pénètre dans le monde de l'oeuvre..."
(Tol.I. Part I. Chap HZ. p.9 6, my underlining.) 
This is not absolutely aoourate, beoause one understands, rather 
than imaginée, a literary work. Nevertheless, I think this is suff­
icient to show that Dufrenne has reason for speek ing of the aesth­
etic experience in terms of perception, and that he does not mean 
just sense-data experience when he talks of perception. 1
1 . greater • better work of art.
2. The terms are possibly too florid, however.
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The question of asathstio psrosption and the aesthetic attit­
ude will be dealt with in Chapter four, for the present there are 
only two other inportant renarks on aesthetio perception, made by 
Sufrenne. These arei
(a) that the highest forn of aesthetio perception is the feeling 
whioh reveals the expression of the work. This is to be found in 
one forn, aooording to hufrenne, in the sort of human emotion df 
a theatre audience, (p.84.)
(b) thtt in the relationship of work and speotator, the wodc has 
the initiative rather thah the speotator. The meaning of the woik 
varies sligi-tly aaoording to the perspective of e&oh speotator - 
indicating that there are an infinite number of possible points of 
view on the work (pp. 96-7 ).
X oan see very little that is remarkable in what Dufrenna 
says on perception. Xt is, however, wholly consistent with his 
views on pxpreeblon, and the variety of a work of art.A* Three 
examples make this fairly plain.
firstly. Dufrenne'r last reason for the use of the term peroeption 
involves him in saying that the aesthetio merit of an objeot oan 
be measured by how muoh it oan exalt the peroeiving aspect. This 
amounts to saying that aeathetio Judgments are based on the abil­
ity of the work to oomnunioate - to sing rather than speak - l.e., 1
1. Also it suggests a solid, objeotively grounded existenoe for 
the art work as a priori - as a peroeivable structure of some 
unspeoified fora.
to bo expressive. This is therefore oonsistent with the import of 
the next ohepter on the e priori affeotive categories - that the 
affeotive qualities in a work are its neoessary/essential features. 
Seoondly. X sse no ambiguity in the status of the peroeivod objeot. 
Rather that what he says is oonsistent with, and iXXuminated by, 
his finaX point (b), in this seotion - that there are an infinite 
number of possibXe points of view on a work. That is, it may be 
the oase that the o~jeot is present for our perception, but it 
does not foXXow from this that we oan eomprehend every aspeot,at 
any one historioaX/temporaX point. The state of knowXedge, the 
attitudes of sooiety, their sensitivity to different things at 
different t~mea, and their whoie moraX, poXitioaX, psyohoXogioaX 
and sooiaX state, orientates what they wiXX see, and how they wiXX 
judge what they see, at any one time. The same th^ng applies 
horisontally as weXl as vertioaXXy « i.e., aorosa a number of 
people at ono time as weXX as across a number of peopXe at differ» 
ent times. PeopXe see what they (a), want to see (b), are trained 
to see, or (o), anticipate they wiXl see, eto. There is suffici­
ent Xeok of uniformity in attitudes to art, to make it whoXXy 
unsurprising that (i),perception copes differently with a work at 
different times (ii), perception oannot fully enoompass the work 
beoause there are too many aspeota of it, affording an infinite 
number of points of view.
What Dufronne claims to find strange is that the work of art 
is perceived and yet perception oannot fully oope with it - one 
needs to look further, e.g,, to a oertain sort of knowledge, to 
understand the work. X.e., the emphasis is on the work being 
pereeived rather than on its being fully encompassed. However, it 
seems hardly surprising that it is not simply something X peroeiss
t
but also something oonstruoted, reel, whioh requires knowXedge of 
a certain kind, and understanding and thought.
89.
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Thirdly, ha says in the penultimate point (a), that tha highest 
fora of aaathatio perception is the feeling which reveals the
expression of the work. This is eertainly consistent, but one has 
fo be very oareful as to how one oan relate peroeiving and feeling^
In order to asks sense of the ides that a feeling reveals an express 
ion of, e.g., sadness, one must take it that by 'feeling' Dufrenne 
■eans either (i) an 'immediate comprehension'^* whioh involves 
(a) the senses (sense <ii) of 'feeling', see note ) end (b) our 
oonoept of 'sensing*, whioh is a form of intuition - i.e., sense* 
perception and intuition; or (ii) 'emotional experienoe'. If it is 
the latter, then Dufrenne must think that one experiences (person* 
ally) every expressive quality of a work. But, he nowhere states 
that he believes this, and if he does then he cannot cover the ran« 
of things expressed by art * since art oan express thoughts, and 
one oannot feel a thought (at least not in the emotional sense of 
feeling). Therefore I take it he does not mean that one feels * 
emotionally - what is expressed by the work. 3o he must mean 
something like (i). 1
1. There are three possible senses of 'feeling', striotly speaking,
(i) emotional (ii)* concerned with all the senses (iii), oonoerned 
with one of the senses (ta0tile). The last two aro also related
to peroeption, and are therefore the most likely candidates for uss 
in Dufrenne's sense of 'feeling'. Of these, the third eense is too 
restrictive and oan be discounted, and the second is that whioh is 
closest to the Trenoh 'sentlr', whioh Dufrenne uses. In this sens* 
one oan perceive that someone feels something (o.f.. Chap.3. seot.1 ). 
In the present instanoe one may take sense (ii) and also admit an 
extended sense of 'feeling', in order to make sense of what Duf* 
renne says.
2. Dufrenne•• strong oonoern with feeling, immediate comprehension
and moaning, will oome to the fore in Chaptere four and floe, |
regarding the aesthetio attitude and meaning.
1
In this oase the highest fora of aeathetlo peroeption la a 
•artala type of ooaprehenalon by mean# of whleh one oan grasp «bat 
la expressed by a work. This Is a aort of 'having a aanae o f  the 
work, whloh la dlaouaaad In Chapter four. This is probably oorreot, 
but what Dufrenne aotually says la highly ambiguous, and 'feeling' 
might aean anything from a sudden flash of intuition to the feeling 
of an enotlon.
Seotj.oft m .
The autonomy of a work of art.
It would require a book in itself to disouss this topic fully. In 
order to do so one would have to take separately eaoh topio with 
whioh art dealt, and diaousa whether it oould work outside the 
ordinary fields of referonoe. It would involve the purpose of art - 
wnether it was a means to an end - informative, prescriptive, moral­
istic, ideological, psyohologioal, eto., or an end in itself) 
whether a painting was intrlnsioally different from a bottle of ink) 
whether it was legitimate to ask for information about, say, the 
human oonditlon, and if so, what differenoe there was between e 
Henry James' novel, and a work on psychiatry by R. D. being. And 
so on.
As it is, I shall restriot this seotion to dealing with what 
Dufrenne has to say about the autonomy of the work of art. This 
will involve his idea# (whioh he mentions rather briefly), about 
whether, e.g., a work of art should moralise, the distinotlon 
between ordinary and aesthetlo objects, and the self-suffienoy of 
the work of art, and its relationship to its surroundings.
firstly, there are two aspeots of his theory whioh are 
relevant to what he says. (Z) He regards the wurk as a quasi- 
aubjeot, as has been seen in the first ehapter. This view is not 
sufficiently proved, but even assuming its truth (a), it does not 
follow that the work of art is autonomous, and (b) the idea of the
9 1
92
autonomy of art is used to establish that the work is o quasi-subjeot, 
therefore one oannot uss the idea that the work is a quasi-subJeot, 
to establish that it is autononous. One requires soma independent 
verification of one of the two, otherwise the argument is hop&easly 
oiroular.
The quasi-subjeot nature of art is of little use to the idea of 
art as an autononous realn. Shis is immediately apparent if one 
oonsiders the nature of a 'subjeot' or 'pour-soi'. Persons are in no 
way distinct or separated from, the real world of ordinary objects 
and other living things. If anything they are the oore, the nucleus 
or the epitomy of being and reality. This is enphasised if one 
thinks of Heidegger's term for man - 'Dasein', Being-there, Being-in- 
the-world, and that around whioh other things revolved, for whioh 
objects were.4-*
Thus a subjeot is self-suffioient to the extent that he ia not 
dependent on others for his existenoe, that he gives meaning to 
objeots, eto. - but he is in no way autonomous to the extent of 
being on a different logioal level, or oomprehensible apart from 
and without referring to, the ordinary goings-on of the world, i.e., 
in the sense of being distinct from reality. Therefore the quasi- 
subjeot will not help Dufrenne to establish that a work of art has 
an independsnoe of ordinary exietenoe, in the latter sense.
(1Z.) As will be seen in the third ohapter, Dufrenne regards 
works of art as affective, and thus expressive. This sense of exp­
ressive is not the narrow one of expressing emotions - i.e., the 
sense in whioh it is normally taken, but the wider one of expressing 
qualities suoh as 'the beautiful', or 'the heroio'. Presumably 
Dufrenne would also allow that the affeotive categories oould include 1
1. Seo, Heidegger) Spin und &oit. pub. Tubingen, K. Nieneyer, 
I960. Passim.
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thoughts and ideas as well as moods and qualities of spatio-temporal 
existence. In this oase the work is not restricted to sxprssslng 
amotions - it oan express human thoughts and ideologies. At least, 
there is no smplrioal barrier to its doing so, even if Dufrenne 
would dismiss the work as art if it did express thoughts or ideas, 
eto.
Thus, Dufrenne oannot dismiss an infoxmatlve work as non-art 
on the grounds that it does not oonform to the notion of a priori 
affeotlv* oategories. Just before going on to what Dufrenne says,
X think it is important to be olear that the realms of art may be 
dlstlnot fron oortaln other oategories - e.g., nature or soienoe, 
without its being autonomous. i.e., independent. And X think some 
definition of art as independent is required here.
If art is self-suffioient, then, striotly speaking, it does
not draw material from ordinary life. That is to say, it may take
the material from life, but onoe this is plaoed in the context of
art, it oeases to have any oonneotion with its ordinary being.
(£.g., a drawing of my oat, Caesar, is not related to the real life
Caesar.) Also, it does not give ideas or oonolusions of any sort
about ordinary life. Xt does not give us information about human
nature, psyonology, the human oondition, nor make truth-funotlonsl
statements about the world, its history or its inhabitants. And it
does not require any information external to the work - as, s.g.,
the artist's stated intention or the aesthetio or historical oont-
ext of a work - in order to be properly intelligible.^*_____________
1. And, striotly speaking, if a work is autonomous and treated as
««»t. it will have no overflow Onto its audienoe - i.e., no effeoton 
them for good or evil. This, incidentally, oan also be true of art 
without its being totally independent of the ordinary world - f o r ( 
instanoe if one makes the simple assumption that the purpose of 'art 
is not to make judgments or influenos action.
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This ■••ns that on* treats, for example, the painting totally 
differently from the way In whioh one would treat an ordinary objeot- 
not just taking the sort of aeethetio attitude to be diaouaaed In 
Chapter four, but taking an attitude whioh is as unrelated to the 
ordinary world as it is possible to be. Dufrenne would add that one 
need bring no knowledge of spatio-temporal atruoturing, and that art 
has a eertaln independence of ordinary oonoepts - but this would be 
impossible, as will be seen, finally, art would not draw oonolusions 
or make moral judgments, nor would it express an ideology approved by 
an author or eondemn one whioh he disapproves.^*
Dufrenne diaousses certain of these points, in partioular one's 
attitude to the object, its relation to the ordinary world, the pose» 
ibility of its being informative, its relation to its spatio-temporal 
and historioal oontext, and in general whether it oan be regarded as 
independent of the reet of the world - especially in terms of spaoe 
and time. And X think he suggests ways in which art is a distinct 
oategory, and is 'suffioient unto itself' in some ways, but that he 
does not show that it is independent (autonomous), as he thinks it is. 1
1 . If oertain of these oonditions obtain, taken individually, this 
does not entail that the work is autonomous . for example, if the 
work is truth-funotional or gives information on the human condit­
ion. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, they provide suffioient oond­
itions for saying that the work of art is gutohomoua, self-suffioient, 
or self-oontained. This does not provide an exhaustive definition, 
however.
t
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U )  lb* aeathetlo obieot and the ordinary okJegt.
In th* oontext of discussing the world as a m  ole, and tl a 'world 
for Bt'| l.s., my Weltanschauung, Dufronne dooldos that In tho aamo 
way ^a* no oan ref or to our own world as dlstinot from tho world 
(Woltansohuung V. Wait), we oan refor to tho world of the aeathetlo 
object. So one soas that tho aesthetlo objaot is not in the world 
like other objoots.i.* Tho aosthotio objeot stands out against tho 
ordinary world and refuses to lot itself bo integrated with it. (\bo 
(Vol. I. Part 1. ohap.V. pp.200-2.) This is reposted a little later 
in terms of the fundamental project.^* The fundamental project 
reveals o world - the singular world of the subjest. Thus, accord­
ing to Dufrenne, one oan talk of the world of a aubjeot and the 
world of the aesthetio objoot a), boouuse the work is a quasi­
sub Jeot and therefore capable of expression , and b), beoause it is 
the work of an author.
This world of the aesthetio objoot is emphasised in our attit­
ude to art. Visual art is housed in galleries, poetry is not read on 
the railway, eto.^’There is a sons of spaoe or time, and of silence* 
e.g., the ailenoe before a oonoert, in libraries and museums. All 1
1 . It is fairly obvious that Dufrenne has oome to this oonolusion 
very rapidly. It is also not obvious that there is any parallel bet^ 
ween 'my world' - whioh is like a Woltansohauung - and the'world of 
the aestnetio objeot'- whioh is not like a ffeltansohauung. It is a 
realm, not a world-view, if anything.
2. See Sartre Balmt and nothingness.Pub.Methuen.trans.Hasel fi.Bnrnea.
1 . This is a somewhat Germania attitude. The Snglish might not find 
it out of plaoe to read poetry on a train, but the Germans would boo - 
ord it the more sombre prlvelege of having its own proper setting. 
Dufrenne seems to be taking this Teutonia attitude.
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this is required by the aesthetic objeot (pp.2 0 1 & j). Furthermore, 
the work aesthetieises its environment, end in integrating its public 
into its world, brings them under its oontrol. The relationship bet* 
ween tho aesthetic object and its environment is reoiprooal. The 
aesthetio objeot aesthetieises the environment and makes the aesthetic 
objeot part of the natural world. Sxaotly how far these aesthetic 
frontiers go is difficult to say, because they arenot objeotifiable, 
according to Dufrenne. As examples, he cites tho Chateau of Vers­
ailles as giving the park, sky and town around it an aesthetio qual­
ity, and a painting affecting the wall upon which it is hung. The 
aesthetioising influence stops where one's glanoo or 'regard' stopaj 
the aesthetic objeot goes as far as, and no farther than, that.
hufrenne regards this exercise of aesthetio supremacy over its 
surroundings as one of the best ways of affirming the autonomy of the 
work of art.
(ii) The autonomy of tae aesthetio object.
Dufrenne later turne from the previous broad view of the effeot of 
the aesthetio object on its surroundings, to tne supposed self- 
suffioienoy of tho aesthetio objeot Itself (Vol.II. Part I. ohap.ll. 
seotion IX. pp. 433-67 esp.). He maintains (a), the purity of our 
attitude to works of art, i.e., in attending to a work of art, we 
attend to the work of art alone (b); the non-neoessity to relate the 
work to actual events (c); the non-neoesslty to 'add' anything to the 
work, i.e., to fill in outlines where a painting presents a blurred 
iaage (d); the acceptability of the artist's re-arrangement of the 
ordinary spaoe-time struoture, and (e), that the ordinary temporal 
oourse is Irrelevant to the temporal struoture of a work - e.g,, the 
time it takee objectively to watoh Hamlet is aesthetically irrelevant. 
His general idea is that the aesthetio objeot (e.g., a painting) is 
in the world as a painting, but is separated as designating another 
world (o.f., above). The nature of that world, and the attitude we 
take to it, demonstrate its autonomy. Some of what Dufrenne says is
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oorreot, and I shall no« go on to alaborata on pointa (a) - (a).
Regarding (a): aesthatio perceptions are totally pure m  the 
sense that the spectator does not use the art object ae he «ould an 
ordinary object - if he enters the Sistine Chapel to worship, ha 
oeases to hare aeethetie perceptions of it, because it is ne longer an 
art objeot for hin « rather a place of worship.
Regarding (b)i the actual events of the world need not impinge on 
a work, for example, Dufrenne oitea a portrait of Charles VIZI, and 
-égards it as unnecessary that this portrait should possess any of 
Charles' oharaoteriatios, i.e., it need not resemble him in the least. 
as far as hufrenne is concerned a representation of any historiool
o..erector is not an allusion to that oharaotor. Here it is unclear 
as to whether iufror.no would sooept anv painting entitled 'Charles VIZ 
ai a painting of the king. He does regard it as necessary for under­
standing the portrait that it is known to bo of Charles, therefore he 
must regard the work as being in some sort of relationship to the 
historical character.
Regarding (0 )1 art is seen differently from the ordinary objeots 
in the world. (This follows fairly olosely from (b)). fo^examgle^ 
given an impressionist painting, one doss not attempt to work out ond 
fix the outlines of blurred figures, as one night with an ordinary 
landsoape. for instanoe, one night soy that* one does not regard an 
impressionist landsoape as having the purpose of infozming one about 
where to find a oertaln footpath, as one might use the ordnance survey 
nap. One regards it as oomplete in Itself, as the artist designates 
it as complete!
" . . .  l'oeuvre d'art véritable nous épargne des frais 
d'imagination paros qu'il suffit, pour comprendre et suivre, 
de l'avoir présente à l'esprit et aux sens sans qu'il soit 
nécessaire de la compléter comme nous complétons une perc­
eption obsoure ou ambiguë." (p.457.)
To the objection that this may make a work diffioult to oomprshend, ha 
anawors :
"soit, mais noua n'avons paa alora à le (un tableau) 
déohiffrer, o-est-a-dire à oharohar la représentation 
axaota an lui d'un objet eomme noua oharohona le mouton 
ou la bergère dana une devinette) . . . .  noua n'avons 
à peroevolr que oa que noua percevoir." (p.458.)
Regarding (d)x the ordinary spaoe-timo atruotura oan ba manip* 
ulated by the artlat aooordlng to the demanda of his art. Thua if an 
author omita parloda of tine and anploya rapid ohangea of looatlon - 
as with the oinama, or if one hears breaks in some abrupt modulations 
in musio, one does not oomplain - at least not on the grounds that this 
is impossible in the normal spatio-temporal aouraa of events.
To the objeotion against elllptioal works whloh leave things to 
the imagination, be replies that all art requires saorifioe, but art is 
oonoernod with the essential, not trivial details:
”h ' essential, o'eat qua l'artlate veut dire, at o'eat oela
qui juge du détail et l'exolut . . .  Kala oes aaorifioes ne
/ /nous imposent auoun saorifioe oar oe qui est éliminé no nous 
est d'auoun secours. Et l'on ne peut regretter oes aaorifioes 
que si l'on prétend faire de l'art le prooès-verbal de la 
réalité, comme ai la valeur du portrait ae mesurait à la 
fidélité aveo laquelle il reproduit les rides ou les poils d'un 
visage, ou la valeur danse la multlplioité des gestes humaines.
Ce que l'artiste saorifie n'est pas le réel, oe sont les 
parasites qui encombrent sa vision et altèrent la pureté 
de sa oréation." (p.459.)
Dufrenne is, however, oaroful to distinguish between those works in 
whioh it is necessary to know what ooours during the periods of time
98.
it oT
nt.au
3X0
no
.s-iiu
, oieu i at 
 ^ oqjt si
.laami unit 
ii-i»onoo
ti rtctdw
whioh art omitted^*and these in whioh it is not« But in the latter 
works the necessary information is provided within what is given«
There is also the distinction between works in whioh onmisslons are 
neoesacry sinoe the author wishes to present the nost iaportant and 
interesting faetors and is bound by the necessity to keep the work 
novingi and those in which the onissions are voluntary but justified 
stylistically - if for instance the author is using t .an to express a 
particular vision of the world. So he rejects Sartre's aoousation of 
lasiness against Vaulkner, but would allow the objection if it were 
made against a deteotive novel, where the breaks were used to bait or 
confuse the reader. (C.f«. esp. pp.459-461.)
Regarding (e)s as to the relation of the temporal structure of 
a work and the oontinuing temporal suooesaion, Dufrenne'a position is 
fairly unoontentious. The time involved in studying a painting, 
watohing a play, listening to a symphony, eto., has only to be int­
ernally coherent and structured. Objeotlve time has no relevanoe to 
it. This is sound enough, What hufrenne means is that one is 
unoonoernod with the 'olook time' if one is absorbed by the art. One 
disoounts the passage of time - one does not time the duration spont 
studying the painting« Thus with Hamlet, one oonoorns oneself with 
the time lag. and with musio, with the partiouler tempi ohosen by the 
eonduotor. and the overall sense of duration given by the musie itself** | 
« « en muslque nous no ooaprenons et ne goutons telle 
phrase que si son oontexte lui est immanent « .(he) temps, 
name s'll doit etre logiquemont ordonne, nbat pas pleineaent
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reel et n'Interfax* iono Jklifl.w wh< Mitt. tlBBJLi » 1°. .IgfflRB-1 . S.g., we do not need to kno at ooours in the fifteen years 
omitted in Sentimental eduoation.
¿« The question of time in musio is actually more complicated than 
this, involving both retention and remembrance of what has passed, and 
antlolpation of what is to oome.(See, The phenomenology of internal 
time—aonaeiouaneaa.B.Husserl« passim, for an elaborate aooount of 
thie theory of retention and anticipation.)
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objeotif s'évanouit i.veo le monde objeotif; je suie à l'oeuvre." 
"SI l 'imagination transporte le oontenu de l'oeuvre dans l'univers 
et le temps communs, au lieu de rester fidèle au monde et au 
temps propre de l'oeuvre, nous manquons l'objet esthétique,”
(pp.456-7,) (îhia applies to all arts.)
( i i i .).Xfag. * «* iB.no.iVf <lf. <jh» jlp object taJaUfttiUg»
Oufrenno's only other point on the autonomy of the work of art returns 
to the dlstlnotlon between the ordinary and the aesthetlo objeot, this 
time In referenoe to their respective oonprahenslbllity. He states 
at the beginning of the eeotlon just expounded (Yol.il. Part I.Chap.2X. 
pp.450- 1 ), that the ordinary object has to be understood in terms of 
the external noria, whi^.t the aesthetio objeot does not, being aelf- 
suffioioni / nd constituting a world. The previous pages have dealt 
with t. J dii’fer«noo in nature between art acd ordinary objeots, but 
Dufrenne also holds the broader view that the aesthetio objeot Is 
relatively independent of history. He aooepts that it is situated in 
history - by what man perooives in it, and reads into it - by what 
it says of men, and man of it. It oan be hated, and historians often 
attempt to explain it in relation to its epooh, in the some way that 
people try to expiam  a work in relation to its author. But Dufrenne 
believes that this explanation is external, meaningless, and does not 
get to grips with the real aesthetio objeot. The historical looation 
of the work is important in ter^s of external features about the work, 
and for its existenoe, but not for explaining its meaning.
Thus, the hlatorioal looation governs the fortunes of the work, 
the attitude towards it (contemporaneous with its creation), and the 
ability of its audienoe to understand it. Aooording to civilisations 
the work dies or is reborn, and the publlo oan enrich or impoverish 
the work (presumably through their oomprehension or look of it).
/
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However, aooording to Dufranne, the woric has to free it-elf of 
its auooessive guardians', ainos they oannot always be faithful to 1 $. 
And within its history the aesthetio objeot suooeeds in leading a 
relatively autonomous life. Its creation oannot be explained by the 
oiroumstanees surrounding it, bj W  psychology of the author, nor by 
its historical context. (The first and last differ in that the first 
refers to the aesthetic, and the last to the historical oontext.) 
(C.f., Vo hi Part I, ohap.V. pp.207-SL)
"il convient d'observer que dans oette histoire qui l'emporte, 
l'objet eathétique parvient du moins à mener une vie relative» 
ment autonome: pas plus que sa oroation ne s'explique entière­
ment par les oiroonstanoes qui l'entourent (ni même par la 
psychologie de son auteur), son avenir ne s'explique entière­
ment par le oontexte historique." (p.20? ibid.)
Dufrenne finally turns qutonomy on its head by stating that the 
work of art is historical beoause it expresses history - although the 
variety of aesthetic productions in any one era means that a civilis­
ation oannot be reliably Judged by its great works of art. Aooording 
to Dufrenne the woxk tells us of its time in the ways it tells of its 
author • in generalised terms (pp.2 10-1 ).
All this would be most convenient for the idea of art as a priori 
immediately meaningful and comprehended, were it all acceptable. For 
(to elaborate on what Z said in the introduction) it would mean that 
we oould have intuitive knowledge of works of art (a): irrespective 
of any further knowledge of, e.g., history, or the ordinary events of 
the world (b); by extraordinary manipulations of our spatio-temporal 
intuition, and (o), that aesthetio perception is disoonnooted from 
other forms of peroeption - and similarly tthat aesthetic perception 
is pure (not a part of any other mode of perception).
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And «11 thia would indioate that the works of art oould bo known 
and undoratood almost In a waouua. So, just as ono oan know that 
2 ♦ 2 ■ 4 is an a priori truth without rsforonoo to a.tty furthor 
knowledge, ono would be ablo to say whothor "X Is a work of art”, 
was a priori truo without roforonos to any furthor knowledge - othor 
than tho nature of X of oourso.
Dufronno is oontinually pushing furthor and furthor along tho 
lino to isolating art as a priori, though until tho subjeot of tho 
a priori is aotually dlsouasod (o.f., tho following ohapter) ho aakos 
little spooifio reforenoe to his lino of thought. There is simply 
tho oontinual sotting up of art as a dlstinst oategory, o.g., as tho 
quasi-subJest, the entity demanding performanoo and so on. However, 
hufrenne does not suffioientl> distinguish tho ordinary and the aestb- 
etio objeot, nor does ho suffioiontly prove hir, eytse for the autonomy 
of art, for ono to say either that tho a priori mature of art dist­
inguishes it from othor entities or that its independence lends 
support to the view that it is a priori.
With regard to (l) - on ordinary and aesthetio objeots (a}, 
Dufrenne makes tho first mows far too quiokly, and (b) he has not 
distinguished the ordinary from the aesthetic objoot, beoauso ho says 
that certain ordinary objects also detach themselves and lay olad.m to 
autonomy (p.20l) and that living things as well as aesthetic objeots 
refuse to be integrated with the ordinary world (p.202)« Moreover, 
he has not speoified that what he says applies only to aesthetic 
objects qua works of art — and this is neoessary, since he has himself 
allowed that anything oan be aesthetic and therefore all he may be 
saying is that objeots seen aesthetloally are different from those 
seen non-aesthotloally. I.e., he has not separated anything off. Nor 
has he provideA any reason in the first plaoe, for aooepting that the 
aesthetio object has a world of its own and is in the world in a 
different way from ordinary objeots.
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Tuen what Dufre.ne says of the aesthetioising of t • ordinary 
end aasthatio objeot shows mainly that tho work of art ia influential 
unique anu a diatinot apl.are - aa a natural objeot ia diatinot from an 
artefaot. But it does not show that it is self-suffioient. It seems 
that Dufrenne often fails to distinguish between demonstrating that the
//Vo«
work of art is distinot from the ordinary objeot, and demonstrates its 
autonomy.
This seotion is most interesting for the idea of art aesthetiois­
ing its environment, although it is somewhat impreoise.
(i) One has to be oareful to make the distinction between what is per­
ceived as aesthetio, and what is jus t non-aesthetio as a matter of fast.
(ii) Dufrenne has not made it olear enough that the surroundings of a 
work of art whioh beoomes aesthetio under our gase, depend on our
glanoe, or regard, to a greater extent than does the work of art, for 
onoe the pioture has been given the status of a work of art, it remains 
so until it ceases to be oalled one, irrespective of being peroeived.J.* 
However, the surrroundings of a work of a work of art are only aesth­
etio fur the period that they are regarded as suoh, and in the pres­
ence of the work of art, whioh is ti.e other neoessary condition for 
making ordinary objects aesthetio in this sense. I.l.( there are two 
neoessary conditions, 1 ) the presence of a work of art, and ii) our 
regard - and we have to see it as aesthetio - it is no good seeing the 
wall around the painting as if the painting was not tuere.
(iii) The limits of making the surroundings aesthetio are unolear - 
but as far as the minimum extension of the aesthetio objeot goes, this 
dues not depend on my regard here and now. Only the maximum extension 
does.
1. Dufrenne would go further ti an this (of., his view, noted previously, 
that the objeot remains art even if no-one regards it as art - see the 
beginning of Section X. on the oreation of the work). This does not 
alter the position here, however.
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(It) Do t s  this apply to the rest of the arts, for example, literature? 
One ean aee it applying to the theatre and the visual arts, hut does 
one aeathetioiee one's surroundings in reading a novel? I think not. 
Musio night also be problematic - for it is tenporal - do we there« 
fore eount other eonourrent events as being seathetioised, or do we 
extend the allowanee only to the spatial features of the non-nusioal 
events? for inatanoe, is the duration of the hun of the ventilating 
systen aeathetleised? And if so, is the systen Itself also aesthetio- 
ided? If Dufrenne thinks so, he is in agreenent with John Cag»!* but 
with very few others.
The seeond set of oomments (ii), (a)-(e), and his final renarks
(iii), lead one to more interesting ideas on the autonomy of art, 
eaoh taking it from a slightly different viewpoint.
The first two renarks (a) and (b), are generally lnoonolusive. 
With regard to the first, I have indioated before that 1 oan agree 
only partially with Dufrenne. Obviously, in oo ntenplating the 
oeiling of the Sistine Chapel, X an doing something different from 
praying and oontemplatlng the glory of God. But I think that the tn 
oases oould oombine if X felt that the greatness of God was exenp- 
llfied or revealed to me by the work of Hiohelangelo. X.e., X do not 
oonsider the two aotivities incompatible, nor that they oannot take 
plaoe oonourrently, nor that the oontonplation of the work of art 
oOuld not bring mo to a greater understanding of God,
And it is also the ease that although oontenplating art and 
eontenplating the glory of God are (intentionally) different, they 
are not different in kind or logioally different - at le*st they are 
no different than praying in the Sistine Chapel is from kneeling to *1
polish the floor.
1 , See, John Cage; Silenoe pub.M.I.T.,1969• (First published The Wes­
leyan University Press, 1961.)
Tit on« would not »ay that th« aotiTity of oleanlng th« ohapel waa 
• autonomous •. Thus Z ••» no riuon to say that of contemplating th« 
work is autononous (or that the work is. at any rat«) - both for th« 
latter reason, and th« former on«, that eentenplatlng th« «oiling of 
tho Slstino Chapol as art, oould reveal tho groatnosa of Sod, or bring 
on« to a b«tt«r understanding of Bin - i.e., that tho aesthetic and 
th« religious aotlvlties aro intorrolatod, and in this oaso not aepar- 
abl«.
The sooond comment (b) is too anbiguous to bo of any groat aid, 
though it indioat«» Dufrenne's total dissoolation of art and Ufa. 
Cortainly ho is oorroot in saying that wo do ntt regard a painting of 
Charles Till as really Charlos, but h« appears to b« adopting th« view 
that hlstorioal works haw« no oonnootion with th« oharaoters of whoa 
th«y purport to toll. (Thus on« «annot make any truth-funotional state-] 
cent about, say, oharaot«rs in novels, unless one's remark was prof- 
aood by a qualification sueh as, "In this novol . . .") H« appears 
also to bo saying that a piotur« of Chari«» Till requires no portrayal 
of any of th« eharaoteristies of th« hlstorioal figure, and that in 
thinking of tho pioturo, wo ought not to bring in any external know­
ledge of th« king. Zt follows that one oannot regard works of art 
whloh make refer«noe to historioal oharaoters or events, as providing 
information on these oharaotors and ov«nts - it would bo a total i
misuse of these works to regard than in this light.
As this leads to th« large area of truth in art, Z shall restrict 
myself to on« suggestion whloh might prove awkward to Dufrenne. Zt 
is that of a doouasntary or an historioal work whleh rsfors say to 
Charles VZZZ, and his whole ootorls, and aoouratoly to th« «vents of I 
his tin«, and develops a oonpl«t«ly plausible theory purporting to bo 
of Charles' psychology. Dufrenne might s«y that this is oompl«t«ly 
fictitious • lnoludlng the oharaoters - whose names just happen to
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agree with those of lose historical period. But aa historian (all 
historians. In fast) night agree that the work throw a completely now 
light on the period. Unless ono says that by definition this work Is 
not art unless It Is regarded as flotltlous - whleh seens unreasonable« 
then one eannot rule the work out as being possibly historically inf­
ormative. In this ease, art and history would be inseparable and we 
would have a seeond way in whleh art was not autononous. 1*
The tenor of Duf re line's justifloation of onlsslons and rearrange- 
aents la sinilar in both (o) and (d). It Is that a work of art is 
not intended, nor Is it supposed, to be an laltatlon or photograph 
of the ordinary spatio-tenporal struoture. It is not an historioal 
narrative intended as an exaot or one-one oorrelate of aotual events. 1
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1 . Dufrenne eould possible esoape the problen of the work's being 
hlstorioally/psyohologloally aoourato by saying that viewing it fron 
the historian's standpoint was not viewing It aesthetloally - though 
even this is open to question, sines the historioo-psyohologioal 
points are inevitably a part of the work - they represent a major 
part of its content. However, this esoaps would not obviate the 
point that the work was not autononous, precisely beoause the hist- 
orioo-psyohologioal aspects are appparantly inextricable parts of 
the work, and because one oan oonslder the work froa the angle ef 
its aeouraoy to the period with whloh it deals - and if it were 
independent of 'reality' in the way Dufroute suggests, this would 
not be possible. And simply to deny that it is possible, or to say, 
"but qua art it is autonomous", is insufficient. Shat is aeraly to 
state an opinion, not to give evidenee for it.
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This is perfeotly oorreot, and whst hs says is illuminating ss to 
ths nature, purpose and methods of art. It is true that we do not 
regard an iapresaionist painting as requiring detailed outline - «a 
do not neke use of it to discern exaot shapes. Moreover, we allow 
'peetie lieenoe' and raspeet the idea of, or necessity for, 'susp- 
ension of disbelief' - whioh takes ue into the realas of ooourrenoes 
and actions which would be regarded as inplausibla if net with in the 
ordinary course of events (a factor which Dufrenne oaits in this 
disoussion).
This does not prove the autonomy of art (provide a suffioient 
oondition for regarding art as independent ) . It distinguishes a 
work of art, a.g., an impressionist painting, from an ordinary objeo^ 
e.g., a nap - at least it does so in aaay eases. But it patently 
fails to show that art does not make use of the material of ordinary 
ovants, landaoapes, thoughts, actions, etc. If anything, it makes it 
aore olear than art does. For instance, if there were not an orig- 
inal landsoape, building, eto., from whioh an impressionist painting 
resulted, the question about its validity if undetailed, would not 
arise. At least, the painting must bo in some sort of relation to 
ordinary objeots for one to query its worth if dissimilar from then, 
in its representation. I.e., there has to be some ordinary objeot 
sot up against the impressionist work, in order for the possibility 
of a oontrast and question to arise.
Nor has Dufrenne shown that one oannot legitimately make use of 
a work of art to gain information of any sort, about, for exapple, 
the human condition.
As it happens, Dufrenne would probably not dispute the foraer
point - that art aakes use of the ordinary events etc., - he would 1
aarco that such things were the basis, of works .foil
1 . But this is no gain for Dufrenne - it merely means that hs is
tacitly aaaaptlna the dependence of art om 'reality'.
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certainly disagrees with the latter viewpoint. He would not eooept 
that one eould use a work of art to gain information - for one thing 
beoause he etates that we do not use a painting as we would an ordln* 
ary perception of sonethlng represented (I take 'representation' to 
oowor abstract works, since even here something is represented, no 
natter how formal - shape and colours are presented to us in a sort* 
ala fora). We should not fill in teaporal gaps in a work, imagin­
atively.
But it seeas to ae that an iapressionist painting can inform on 
about visual perception, for one thing. For example, whereas init­
ially we see the Houses of Parliament as an ordinary three-dimension 
al fora, the building in which acts are passes, and eminent nen 
quarrel like schoolchildren, Monet oan ohenge or enlarge our visual 
range and show how the building oan be seen in terns of the play of 
light and oolour, and oan be seen differently from one hour to the 
next. And in defending authors who admit temporal gaps in their works 
on the grounds that they may be adopting this prooedure in order to 
express a certain vision of the world, or T/eltansohauung, is he not 
himself putting forward a reason whioh suggests that works of art ar 
not autonomous? - l.e., the Weltansohauung whioh the author exp­
resses is informative about the ways in whioh one oan see the world, 
Ceaus 8nd Sartre express existentialist viewpoints in A happy death 
The stranger and Nausea • These are ways of seeing the world wMel 
night not oeour to a German, for exaaple, who takes a different out­
look. It is Irrelevant whether or not he aeoepts this view. It is 
the faot that he disoovera a different attitude - one which it is 
possible to apply to the world. Is he not thereby informed? Z think 
the answer is obviously 'Yes'.
The world of art nay take leave of actual spatio-temporal strue 
urea, but it returns to being part df the ordinary world in its
results
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There is a further point whioh is raised by what Dufrenne says, 
and it ia more basis than the objeotion that playing with spatio- 
temporal struotures does not remove art to an isolated position, and 
oan in fast be illuminating. It is an objeotion whioh ia onoountered 
also by Clive Bell's theory of Signifioant Form.i.e., that although 
art may not bo restricted to an ordinarily spatio-temoporally struct­
ured world, our understanding of it is parasitio upon, and therefore 
not independent of, our understanding of the ordinary world and its 
spatio-temporal struoturea. Dufrenne has a lot in oommon with dire 
Bell, in that both regard art as being an autonomous realm, though 
Bell is inolined to go further in diasooiating the emotions of life, 
from the 'aesthetic emotion' of art. He Say*<«L*
"tor, to appreoiate a work of art, we need bring 
with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its 
ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions."
(f.36 op.oit.)
Andt
"To appreoiato a work of art we need bring with 
us nothing but a sense of form and oolour, and 
a knowledge of three-dimensional spaoe.”
(p.37 ibid.)
These are fairly familiar sayings of Bell.£*
The two are saying something different, but whioh is refutable
in the same wav. While Bell olalm_e_ t_hn.t no knowledge
See Bell, Arrow books, 1961.
This latter olaim - that a knowledge of three diminslonal spaoeis 
neeessary to an understanding of art - is not baoked up, whereas Bell 
continually stresses the non-neoessity for a knowledge of the ideas of 
life. It is probable, therefore, that Bell reoognises the truth of the 
former slain and adds it to prevent objections, but mentions it no 
further, sinoe it does nothing to further ths dissoeiation of art and
life
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of tbo id«*«, «to., of Ilfo to our understanding of art, Sufrenne 
olaims that it la not constructed In ttaa «an« regular spatio-temp­
oral scheme, quite oftan. Their oonoluslon is that it is therefore 
different. However, the trouble with these ideas is that one eould 
not aake sense of art and its ideaa and foras, if one was not famil- 
lar with the ordinary emotions, teaporal and three-dimensional 
structures of life. One would not understand the rearrangeaents and 
alterations, both temporal and spatial, made by artists sueh as 
faulkner and Muriel Spark (temporal) and the surrealist painters, 
sush as Salvador Dali, and Magritte (spatial). One would not under­
stand that saoh praotioes were non-normal if one did not bring the 
normal coneepta of life and its spatio-temporal atruoture, to one's 
recognition and understanding of art. And it is an important factor 
in suoh art, to recognise the difference between what is the nor« 
and what is not, used for stylistio reasons, emphasis, eto.
Thus, even if it is tho oase that art has radically different 
qualities from ordinary events or objeots, it is not the oase that 
one oan dissociate oneself and one's knowledge of ordinary life. So 
art is not independent in the sense of being intelligible regard­
less of one's ordinary understanding, (The understanding of art is 
parasitic upon this latter.)
Oufrenne'e last point (e), adds little to the idea of autonomy. 
Certainly, the ordinary oourse of time is forgotten in lletenlng to 
muslo or watohlng a drama, eto. These things have their own internal 
time-structure, and as Z said, one is oonoerned with the time-lag in 
Hamlet or the apparent swift movement or slow dragging of a symphony 
However, the same thing may ooour in reading a history book, or 
watehing a non-art doeumentary. I.e., any book or programme may 
Involve its own tiae-struoture. A programme may involve one in its 
own tlae-struoture, fCr example, a programme simply presenting films
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I of events ooourring throughout World War II, oan take one fro«
u i  £.&‘io I 1939*1945 in three hours, but it is not a work of art because it does 
] so. nor is it detaohed from reality. A file of the bombing of Hunioh
¿1 J &t j  u n | is only baek-dated news - and in the sense that it aotually took plaoe
*1*1
. j  y  u ' l  -T o
I it is as elose to reality as it is possible to get. Therefore, to be 
1 removed from the oonsoiousness of the objective passage of time is not 
| to be removed from the ordinary world, out of reality and into some*
| thing else labelled 'art*.
i finally, regarding (ill), Dufrenne has recognised that the work
1 % s ¡y *
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I of art oan legitimately be disoussed in terms of its historleal oont- 
[ ext, but not that its creation oan be entirely explained in this way,
I and most oertainly that it oannot give a meaningful explanation of the 
I real essanoe of the aesthetlo objeot. Most originally, he olaima 
I that history is not Independent of its art, whioh oan at least give a 
1 generaliaed view of its period. The latter point is probably true,
| but not relevant to this disoussion. I think that he is oorreot in 
f (1) his theory that the historioal location and suooessive periods 
8 have a certain authority over the work, in the way he desoribes, and 
1 (ii) in the view that the historioal and aesthetic looatlon oannot 
| entirely explain the oreation of the work - l.e., one oan explain 
1 partially how a work originates by means of an analysis of the dev- 
1 elopmenta and progression of aesthetie techniques and teohnioal know- 
3 ledge up to, and in, the ora of the work. However, it does not neo- 
1 essarlly follow that, for example, Beethoven would compose his late 
1 quartets, from the faot that Haydn (and Kosart to some extent) and he 
1 himself, had developed the form to the stage at whioh he could. Nor 
| from that, plus the technical developments of the instruments (vlollxu 
| viola, 'cello and bass) so that they had the oapaoity to play what he 1 
1 eempesed. Aa a natter of fast, Beethoven composed piano music whioh 1 
j could not be rendered completely and sucoessfully on the pianofortes 1 
i of his time. |
^  y i « v m
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However, «Tan if on* oooepts the validity of this, end 1 aoa no 
raaaon why one should not, Dufrenne is really lotting his argument 
00 horo. for ha simply says that history oannot fully explain a work 
of art and oannot give a meaningful explanation of the real ossanse of 
the aaa thetie object. And sinos I do not think one would wish to olain 
that art was fully explainable in terms of its historical context, one 
would probably be satisfied with what Uufrenne allows without aotually 
say in0 so - that it oan be partially explained in t;iis way. It is worth 
noting that obviously he is not being completely consistent here - boo- 
ause he is admitting that the work of art is not autonomous in at least 
this one aspeot. And if the work is dependent on some external faotora 
(in tills oase the historloal oontoxt) then Z do not think one can leg­
itimately claim that it is self-sufficient at all - because this is the 
sort of claim which does not allow of exoeptions and qualifications. 
dither the work is or is not an independent entity, and Pufrenne shoulg 
admit that it is not, because he has admitted this in one instanoe 
(and also beoause X think he is disproved in muoh of the rest that he 
olsims - as will be summarised in the oonolusiod).
¿ftflQlm.lftB.
So it seems to be the Oase that, J.. The aesthetic attitude or sotivlty | 
is not autonomous (from (a)} ¿.An historloal work of art may proi
lde information of an historloal nature, and is therefore not autonom-l 
ous of either history or ordinary knowledge (from b)). A work may olso| 
give information about any amount of other things, e.g., perception, 
the human oondltion, a oertain Weltanschauung, etc. (from (o) A (d)).
Hoarranging the spatio-temporal
structure does not make the work of art autonomous of this sohene. Zt 
rather emphasises that our understanding of art is parasitic upon our 
understanding of this structure (from (d)).
to
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¿t. Involvement In the subjeotive time-atruoture of art doaa 
not aaka it autonomous, ainoo this involvement is not restricted to 
aosthstio ooourronoos (from (e)).
Tho work of art is not autonomous of its historioal 
oontext (fron iii)).
Thors aro two rolovant questions loft, Dufrsnno doss not disouss 
oithor mush, but I shall giro than a briof mention hero in order to 
suggest that and how, they should not affoot the above oonslusion on 
the autonomy of art.
(i) Whether a work whioh is, as a matter of faot, informative, moral* 
istio, ideologioal, arotio, eto., is a work of art value in virtue of 
these faots, or in spite of them,
(ii) Ihethor a work or art should or oan, be oreated with the explieit 
intention of being informative, erotio, oto. Dufrenne thinks not. He 
states eatogorioally that a putative work fails to be art if it seeks . 
a oortain offeot, or to impress, or to put forward some oaso - as with 
orotim or moralising paintings. (C f., Vol.I. Chap ZZX. p.100, where 
he is referring to the ability to distinguish betwsen what is art and 
what is not.)
Z think that if the sole intention of some putative work ia to
be erotio or informative, eto., then (a) suooess in oarrying out the
intention does not ontail that the thing in question will be art, and
(b), in spite of oarrying out the intention, the work will fall to be
art unless it has various other qualities - for example, making use of
oertain stylistio methods (oonoise form, balanoe, eto.)) and/or
oontains oertain expressive qualities (expresses beauty, graoo, subli
ity, Joy, oto.)| and/or oxprosses original thoughts .............
This is moving dangerously closely to the non-autonomous realm.
114
Whether it does this by design or aooident ia probably irrelevant, 
einoe one judges X as art in virtue of the resultant product, not the 
intention, (Za any oase, anyone oan intend to produce a work of art, 
without sueoeeding. The intention does not produoe the work as cause 
and effect.)
So the seeond question does not really seen to be troublesome, 
but it throws one bade on the first. And it is more difficult to 
deeide whether the informative, erotio, etc., oontent of a work is 
part of the reason for oalling it art or not. I should not be so 
foolish as to be dognatio on this point, but it is probably the oase 
that a work is art neither in virtue nor in spite of, non-autononous 
features| that they are neither neeesaary nor suffioient oonditions 
of something's being art.
Of then all, the feature of 'being informative' scans to be the 
least oontentious. I should say that if a work had oertain of the 
qualities mentioned above, and was informative, then it would be a 
better work than if it were not infoznstive. However, it would dep- 
end entirely on one's partioular point of view as to whether one 
regarded other non-autonomous qualities as either neoessary or 
sufficient oonditions of art (the erotio, the moralistic, the ideo- 
logloal, sto.). dartrei • and many Soviet writers would regard it as 
a neoessary, if not a suffioient, oondition of something being liter­
ature, that it was ldeologioal. Others would sqy that the ideology 
was a non-aesthetio feature and oapable of distraoting one fron the 
aesthetio features, and therefore ideology in a work made it less 
good art.£* The nore powerfully a quality oan act upon one's oonso- 
lousness, the more plausible it is to say this. Thus, it is said 
most of the erotio.
J*. See, What is literature? pub. Methuen, U.P.
Dufrenne would probably agree - he doee say (p.10 0) that putting 
forward a osse (ideology) oauses an object to fall to be art.
In spit* of the aabivalenoe on this point, of subjsot matter, it 
is olaar that aa long aa it is true that an srtsfaot whioh is inf cre­
ative, sta., oan bs oalled a work of art, than the raalm of art ia 
not an autononons one. Thia ia partly booauae ona aannot dissooiate 
thoaa faatora whioh are relevant to life, from the work of art. Also, 
even if one doea not regard Z aa art beoanse. for example, it prov- 
idea inforaiation, this faster obviously oannot be removed from the 
work without altering it greatly, and slnoe this element, i.e., that 
whieh prevents the autonomy of Z, is an essential part of the work, 
then one must oonelude that works of art are not autonomous. (The 
rest of the reason is sunned up in points 4 , and ¿. It is to do
with (a) the oonatruetion of the work - that no matter how one ozeates 
a work of art, one eannot diasooiate it from life (in its formal arr­
angement (o.f., 3-5 )), and (b) the aesthetio attitude being non- 
autonomous (e.f . , j_.)
general Conolualon.
The general oonoluaion from all this is fairly simple. The work of art 
proper is an externally manifested objeot or ooourrenoe (in the ease 
of temporal arts) about whose exaot nature Dufrenne is imprecise. A 
part of it in some way pre-exists its external manifestation, aooord- 
ing to him. This idea seems to be the result of some uneonsoious 
disinolination to regard the external manifestation as the work in 
toto rather than the result of any speoifio idea about the nature of 
this pre-sensible objeot. Sinoe Dufrenne speoifioslly rejeots ideal­
ism, there does not seem to be any reason to see him as setting up 
some sort of Colllngwoodian thesis.
The work is also performed in some way, no natter to what art 
form it belongs. Dufrenne has speoified various unoontentlous 
qualities appropriate to an 'exeoutantf in the 'performed arts', 
whereas the idea of the other arts being performed has been seen to 
be somewhat dubious. However, his views on the relevanoe of a
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knowledge of the intentions of the artist seen perfeotly coooptable 
under tho interpretation of then whioh X have given* when not exp- 
ended upon* they renain stubbornly inoonoluslve.
In the third place, the work is always pereelved. What Dufrenne 
says is largely unoontentlous. However, this idea, und the opinion 
that all works of art are perforned, shows the underlying desire on the 
part of Dufrenne for unlfornlty among both the arts theaselvos, and in 
our attitude to then, wbioh is all related to his belief in essenoes 
in art, and its a priori nature. The fact that despite his reasons, 
the idee of one oo neept to cover our reoeption of all works of art, end 
the ides that they are all perfoxned, seen superfluous, inolines me to 
be very dubious about the idea of uniformity among the arts. Xt also 
seens artifielal and forced, in the latter oeae. If all works are 
performed, this aotivity is very different in the oosu of whet are 
normally oalled the 'performed arts', from what it is in that of, for 
example, the visual arts.^*
Xt is not the objeot of Dufronne's thesis on peroeption to point 
this out, and apart fron this, whet he does say has been seen to be 
relatively aooeptablej but the idea that there is a groat deal of 
uniformity within the arts, suoh that they are ell seen in the same 
way - all 'peroeived', ard all performed, is in itself another reason 
for regarding art os autonomous.
And it is this seotion of his theory, on the autonomy of the work, 
which is not aeoeptable. 1
1 . Nor do X think it legitimate to objeot that even among the so-oaUed 
'perforned arts', the mode of performance is very different, therefore 
why should it not be different again in what are normally regarded as 
non-perforned artsT The relevant point is that what ore usually oallad 
performances all have some aotive role, whioh is missing in a 
'performance' of, soy, visual art.
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Slnoe I h m  pointed this out at aoae length already, 1 shall not 
labour the point. Zt is, however, worth noting finally that Dufrenae
in not alone in this view of art as independent. Zt is one whioh is/
most eloquently hold by Osoar Wilde-^ -; A. C. Bradley^* and Gautier.2» , 
among others. Wilde eays suoh things as that, "to art's subject 
natter we should be more or less Indifferent”, that art expresses 
Itself rather than the temper, moral or sooial oondltions of its age, 
"the highest art rejects the burden of the human spirit" (D.of D.p.94. 
Previous quote, O.of L. pp.299-500)j that "art finds her own perfect­
ion within and not outside of, herself. She is not to be judged by 
any external standards of resemblanoe. She is a wail rather than a 
mirror” (O.of I<. p.306). Also, "through art and through art only, we 
oan shield ourselves from the sordid perils of aotual existenoe"
(C. as A. p.380). And so on. So Oufrenne finds support among the 
aesthetes - who were on the whole reaoting against a oertain air of 
Puritanism in eesthetlss.
The ideas expressed by Dufrenne, and disoussed in this ohapter, 
on autonomy, perception and performance, are all oonsistent with his 
fundamental thesis, with whioh Z shall deal in the following ohapter. 
All three would afford some degree of similarity in the nature of the 
work of art, whioh would in turn make it easier to talk of gg a priori 
for art - as would the view that the oreation of a work of art is the 
oreation ef something objective. Zt is strange, therefore, that Duf­
renne is so ambivalent on the objeotivity of the oreated work. And as 
Z stated in the introduction and elaborated slightly in the third 1
1. See Intentions» 'The deoay of lying', and The oritio as artist' la 
The artist as oritlo» oritloal writings of Osoar Wilde. W.H. Allen,1970 
ed. 8. fillman.Also, Prefaoe to. The pioture of Dorian Gray,in Sllman.
2. See 'Poetry for Poetry's sake', in Oxford leoturoa on poetry. 
Maomillan, 1963.
it See, Prefaoe to Mademoiselle de Mauoln. ed.Georges Motors,Peris, 
1946.
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seetion, the id*« of the work as self-suffioient would provide further 
h*u*fita for the id*« of a total objectivity in art.
Zt i* unfortunate that Dufrenne fails to provide any very conv­
incing arguments for many of the points whieh have been dlsoussed in 
in this and the preceding ohapter. for they are both inportant aesth- 
• tie notions in their own right, and oosipris* a good part of the whole 
'notion of the a priori'. X.e., they do not serve merely to back up 
the theory, but would give it oontent and meaning. As it is, only the 
idea of the quasl-pour-soi seems to have been given suffioient credib­
ility by Dufrenn* - and eertain aspeots of that remain to be diseussed 
at greater length later to substantiate the notion properly.
I shall now disousa the theory of the affeotiv* a priori cat­
egories in art, in which Dufrenne believes so strongly.
1» See ehapters four and five.
119
g f l i m i  a m .  a u j .m s i i .- o f  a ¿wwnv*
*ntr.9ftug\l9a.
Dufrenne waits until half-way through ths itoand volume of ths 
Phenomenologie before he announoes the view that there are affeotive 
oategories in art, and that these are a priori. This would seem to 
imply either that he assumes this is psrfeotly olear iaplloitly in 
the preoeding parts of the work, or that it is not of any great 
iaportanoe, or that it has not so far been required sinoe the aesth­
etics with whloh he has been dealing hao not been oonoerned with the 
formal nature of the qualities possessed by a work of art.
The most reasonable explanation is this latter, mainly beoause 
the idea of a priori oategories is not olear from what preoedes) and 
if it is of no great importanoe there seems no reason to mention it 
at all - eepeoially sinoe it radloelly alters the normally aooepted 
Kantian notion of the ft priori. Also, he must regard it as import­
ant (a), beoauso he devotes a whole book to the subJeokL* - applying 
the notion oooasionally to aesthetlos, and (b) beoause the theory of 
affoctive a prioris is all part of Dufrenne'a essentialiam. In faot 
it is the kingpin of his aesthetios, and the notion on whloh every­
thing else is based. And if a quality suoh as the 'sublime' or the 
'tragio' is a priori in a work of art, then he has suooeeded in 
finding an essenoe - sinoe the material a priori (to whioh the 
affootive oategories belong) is held to be the essenoe of that in 
whioh it inheres. Unfortunately problems arise for essentioliam 
with the notion of the affeotive oategories as general, os will be 
seen. One has to be extremely explloit as to what one means by 
essentialism in order to make it oompatible with the generality of
tho affeotive sstegorles. ___________
1. Dufrenne. la notion d' a priori'» Presses Universitairea de France,
•ad The notion of the s priori, trane. K.Casey, H.U.P., to whioh 
version 1 shall be referring.
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Aa this chapter will show, Dufrenne makes aoma radical novaa. 
firstly, ha ia compelled to uaa Kantian theory, whioh makes one 
suspioious, ooming in the work of a phenomenologist. But he oould 
hardly start anywhere else, if he wanta to prove art ia a priori - it 
ia a oonsequenoe of the fundanental viewpoint. Secondly, he goes 
beyond Kant, and eventually oombined Kant'a a priori with Sartre'a 
eziatentialian, oombining rationaliat philosophy with existentialism 
and thereby making a Vast hlstorloal and philosophioal Jump. JL*
He does, however, have another reason for going baok to Kant, 
than that he wishes to use the notion of the a priori. It ia that he 
regarda phenomenology aa Involved in similar problems to those of 
Kant - of avoiding psychology - and that its task is, like Kant's, to 
distinguish, "the transcendental from the psychological, the self- 
principle from the self-phenomenon" (intro, p.21. op.oit. X.e., The 
notion of the a priori). The major difference between Kant and the *1
phenomenologist is that Kant did not oonsider the phenomenological 
reduction - i.e., the idea of 'braoketing off', getting away from the 
ordinary attitude to the world, or some theory laden attitude, and 
attempting to see it as it is. (C f ., p.25. op olt.).
Dufrenne reaffirms the view of affeotlve oategories as neoessary 
conditions of art in I»e poétique^*(published in 1963), when he refers 
to them as aesthetic oategories (he poétique, Book 111. Chap.Ill,
pp.162-194). He also makes it plain here that the affootlJ_e_ (scathe tic
1. Though his view of the a priori brings it dangerously dose to the
a posteriori, Dufrenne's expressed reason for not rejeotlng the conc­
ept and adopting empiricism is that empiricism cannot explain the tr 
soendal (o.f., The notion of the a priori. Chap.I.p.49),and the method 
is to contend that perception requires the notion of the a priori to 
explain its meaning (o.f., ibid.). (He states that he aooepts the 
(restait theory that perception is a form of knowledge,o f.,p.51 ibid.)
2 . See, M. Dufrenne; Le ooetiaue. pub. Presses Universitaires de 
tranoe, Paris, 1963»
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categories »p« not to bo confused with the oleasifloation of ort into 
different styles - i.e., ’the tragic' is not equivalent to 'tragedy', 
nor the 'poetry' as a olassifioatiom
"les oatégories esthétiques ne se distribuent pas exactement 
selon la olassifioation des artst la tragédie peut etre tragi« 
oomique, et le gracieux ou le grotesque peuvent etre évoques 
par n'importe quel art.”
(Book IXI. Chap.111. p.182. op. oit.)
In this ohapter one «ones face to faee with what 1 maintain to be 
the underlying essential aspeot of Dufrenne's aesthetio « the idea of 
the work of art as an objeot, as a priori and as having immediate mean* 
ingfulness. In Chapters 1 * 2, it was olear that in partiOular inst­
ances this theory does not work out, and I think that in this ohapter 
it will beoome fairly transparent that the theory runs into suoh serious 
difficulties as to be brought to a halt. So eithout further Tery sub­
stantial evidenoe one oannot regard art as a priori.
999U9.B It
Pufrenne's t-.eory of the aansots of the a priori - in particular the 
affeotlve a priori: Kants theory as developed upon by Dufrenne.
The majority of Dufrenne's theory is to be found in la notion d'a priori 
and what is disoussed here will be mainly taken fssn this work. It was 
written after the Phénoménologie (the latter being first published in 
1953, and being Dufrenne's dootoral tnesis. The former was published 
in 1959«), but is neeessary for a proper understanding of what Dufrenne 
means when he talks of the a priori affeotive oategories and qualities, 
and represents an expansion of what is meant in the Phénoménologie, sot 
a differing opinion.
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Dufrtnn« interpreta Kant aa seeing the a priori aa anterior to 
experienee and e oondition of it, and not aomething experienoed. What 
is e priori abo ut objeots is not to be sean (experientially)) and the 
forn of thinga preauppoaea a fonal intuition nhieh makea thea poaU*
- i.e., our intuitiona of spaoe end tino. Dufrenne1a objeotion lioa 
mainly in the Kantian idea of a diohotomy between the a priori and 
experionoe. He wishes to put forvard an empirieal t í o« of the a 
priori beeauae if Kant allowa (as he does) that experienee has to be 
referred to, then Dufrenne feels that he should alio« that it is a 
souroe (o f.. The notion of the a priori, trans. Casey, intro.gw6-10} 
He thlnks that Kant presupposes or uses experionoe, in his notion of 
the a priorii
"Does not aiaing at experionoe (eren if the a priori grounds 
the a poateriori it ains at or intends the latter), eren if 
it be to ground it, preauppose experienee? . •. . * . Muat «e 
not adnit that the a priori, the prinoiplo of experionoe, has 
its prineiple ¿A experionoe sinoo it is giren by it?"
(C f.p.7 ibidj
"Bren if the a priori is anterior to experionoe - sinoe it 
is oniy valid in relation to it - nay one not say that it 
is diseerned in it?"
(C f. p.10 ibid.)
So, «hile alloving the a priori to be a oondition of experienee, 
Dufrenne «ishes to apply a reeripooal relation between the two; i.e., 
eppose Kant'a riews that the a priori is not grounded in experionoe, 
and that it is linited to grounding it.
The ultinate intention is to bring the empirioal te the a priori'.
- to involve sub¿eotivity, experienee and existentialisn in it. 
Dufrenne's rio« as expressed in The notion of tha a priori really 
entails aeouslng Kant of naking a fundasental error in the Critiqio 
of puro roaaon , in regard to his understanding of the tora 'a priori*
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tlud To substantiate this would taka many volumes, and h o t s far from 
aasthetioa. X shall therefore rastrlot this saatlon to outlining
t> i *x q s, ai 
’ . o i
Dufrenne's own notion of ths a priori, and tha rslevanoe of this whola 
body of thought to his aasthatlas.
Aooording to Dufrenne, tha a priori oannet detach ltsalf fron
.j
glj,; •£ ' *T ^ ' ■ •■.•■ ,:-
subjectivity for tha furthar raason that tha a priori "azprassas tha 
natura of tha subject" (of., p.15 ibid). And by aubjaat ha presum- 
ably means tha universal natura of tha nlnd, not tha individual subject. 
After repeating Hagalian and Huaserllan views of Kant's a priori.
• .' u9'lU«« Dufronne raises a question whioh oreatas tha form ot tha a priori 
whiah ha thinks is found in aesthetios, i.e., the existential a priori.
c i ? Xi j*
i A
Ha says, "will thara be soma way to understand the psyohologioal as 
determined by tha transeendental, . . .  will it be possible to inter­
pret the psyohologioal as itself a priori » os an existential a priori 
. . .  (o f., intro, p.42 op,ait.). To this his own answer is 
"yas*.
His position on tha a priori now is that it is, "given in exp- 
erieneO' rather than imposed by tha mind on axparlenoa" (o f. ohap.I. 
p.46. op.oit.). Tha a priori oaasas to be restrioted to the formal 
conditions of objeotlvityi
"As a presupposition from now on, we shall say that values, 
affeotlve qualities and mythic«! aaanings - understood as 
oatagorias of fooling and imagination - aro Just as mueh 
a priori as forms of sensibility and oategorles of under-
« toqqo standing.”
v*vit on 3 a
Mfui Oj -
(of., p.46 ibid.)
And ha suggests a definition for tha a priori ast
"Tha immediate for whioh thara is no empirical genesis
©a/it-vu/G 
t & I ¿nine
or learning prooess. . . .  tho a priori is revealed as 
a neeessary struaturo of tha objoat perceivedj an lmmod-
: 1® laoy already loglaal . . .  and this immediacy implies that
1 », .. -¿ - r 1? ' . i a j H H f f f l »
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To substantiate this would taka many volume», and move far from 
aesthetics. X ahall tharefora raatriot tbla aaatlon to outlining 
Dufranna'a own notion of the a priori, and tba rslevanse of thia wbola 
body of thought to bia aaathatioa.
Aooording to Dufranno, tho a priori oannot dataoh itaalf from 
subjectivity for tha furtbar raaaon that tba a priori "azproaaaa tba 
natura of tha subject" (of., p.15 ibid). And by subjeot ha presum- 
ably moans tha universal natura of tho mind, not tha individual subject.
After rejaoting Hegelian and Husaerlian views of Kant's a priori, 
Dufranne raiaas a question whioh oraatoa tha font of tha a priori 
whieh ha thinka ia found in aaathatioa, i.a., tha existential a priori. 
Ho aaye, "will there bo soma way to understand tho psyohologioal as 
dotorninad by tha transcendental, . . .  will it be possible to inter* 
prat the psyohologioal aa itself a priori - os an existential a priori 
• • • ■?" (o f., intro, p.42 op.oit.). To this his own answer ia 
"yea".
His position on tha a priori now is that it is, "given in exp- 
erienoO' rather than imposed by tho mind on axporianoa” (o f. ohap.I. 
p.46. op.oit.). Tha a priori oaases to be restrioted to tho formal 
conditions of objaotivityi
"As a presupposition from now on, we shall say that values, 
affeotive qualities and mythlod meanings - understood as 
oatagorias of feeling and imagination - are Just as muah 
a priori as forms of asnsibility and oatogories of under­
standing."
(of., p .46 ibid.)
And ho suggests a definition for tha a priori aa 1
"Tha immediate for whioh there ia no empirioal genesis 
or learning prooess. . . .  the a priori is revealed as 
a neaessary structure of the object perocivedj an immed­
iacy already logical . . .  and thia immediacy implies that
-
1 2 4
2 previously possess an immediate comprehension of the 
a priori".
(e f. Chap.I. p53 op.oit.)
As ezaaples of his ease he oites things whioh he thinks one experiences 
as neoessarily the ease before one learns that, and hoe, they are - 
spatiality before one learns of geometry and the tragio before one 
develops a theory of affective qualities (o f.. Chap.2 p.59 op.oit.)«
The affeotive a priori now needs to be put into oontezt. Dufrenne 
differentiates between three forms of neoessity, and the affeotive 
a priori belongs to that of material neoeaaity. This is the form of 
neoessity oonoerned with the essenoe of things, and is also oontingent 
in a oortain sensei
"It is quite possible that certain a priori are imposed 
only with reservations and sometimes without gaining 
unanimity, for example, if one admits that aesthetio 
values or oategories are a priori, one must also admit 
that those a priori are not universally reoognised and 
that their appearanoe is historically bound".
(o f, Chap.II. p.63 ibid.)
Dufrenne is here allowing that his version of the a priori extends 
beyond that of Kant. He would seem to be applying a twentieth 
century metaphysical view - that the world is differently divided by 
people with different forms of life - to the Kantian a priori.
He admits to a difficulty in distinguishing between the empirioal 
and the a priori naterial essenoes of a substanoe - even admitting 
that they tend to overlap. Briefly, however, the empirioal essenoe 
is that whioh, "proceeds from observation and intuition", whereas the 
a priori material essence is reaohed "when it manifests itself as the 
essence of something as neither general nor formal. Then the essenoe
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identifiable with tha a priori la the idoa immanent In the thins* the 
•idea." (o.f., Chap*IX. Ibid.)
Tha thaory of tha aatarial a priori baoomaa loss contingent and more 
Kantian at timaa, regarding tha a priorls aa pre-given aaaaneaai 
"Whan I diaaarn . . * graoa in a danoer'a uovenent * * . I 
immediately diaoover the eaaenoe of tha graaloua. Thaaa a aa- 
anoaa do not aerve aa examplea but aa notion» by whloh ay 
lmplioit knowledge la awakened or re-animated. Suoh aaaanoaa 
are a priori beopuae they are inaedlately given jjj experience 
and not learned froa axparlanoe. I already poaaaaa them in a - 
oertain aenae."
(C f.* Chap III* pp.81-2. op.oit*) J.*
hufrenne now attributea the further quality of generality to the 
a priori — whioh will allow ita application to the affootlwo quail t- 
laa of aaathetioa and neana that a priori eonoopta belong to the 
faaily reaemblanoe oategoryt
"The a priori poaaoaaaa the generality of a moaning 
whioh may belong to very dlaalmilar objeeta* and whloh 
lntroduoea a apeolal relationahip between then * * * .
The diversity of exanploa * * * e.g.* graoo « . . .  
atteata that theao oxaaploa are not apeolea of § genua 
• . * . l.e.* objeota aubauaable under one and the aaae 
definition. They are rather objeota animated by the
aame meaning.* ^  Chap IY< op.oit.)_____________________
1. There la alao a formal a priori oloaely related to the material. 
The dlfferenoe ia one of degree - the material a priori ia moro 
oonerote and oloaoly related to partioular objeota. and therefore 
more diwaralfled.
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4k* id*» of generality 1» developed in ohapter four where Dufrenne is 
talking of th# universality of tho a priori. Ho makes the point tha< 
tha aatorial a priori is in soma way distinot from tha objaats in 
whioh it is found, sinsa widely Varying things ara held to express 
the same thing. Sxaaples given ara of suoh differing things as 
Tan ftogh's olive trees and a particular Beethoven soherso both exp­
ressing the 'tragic'• This naans - aooording to Dufrenne - the 
a priori affective qualities are not simply generalisations of 
Common properties in different works. Dufrenne's oonolusion is that 
the m  priori is a universal. (C f ., p.113 asp.)
Throughout JThe notion of the a priori , Dufrenne reiterates 
the view that one experienoes the a priori. One may fail to grasp 
it in something, however, in whioh oase the objeot in question will 
not be understood. Dufrenne puts his oase in an irrefutable way by 
presupposing the eorreotness of his own theory that there are a pri*■ 
oris in any meaningful objeot. for instanoe, he olaias that one nay 
fail to grasp the a priori in a piece of nusio. Zf one does, it 
remains formless and confused - in faot the faot that it does renaln 
formless and oonfused indioates that one has not peroeived what is 
a priori in it (its affeotive qualities or quality). In listening to 
a oonoort, even if one understands the nusio, it is firstly on an 
a posteriori level, "although I may be in oontaet with a forn, what 
is given to ne is the forn of a oontent” (o f. Chap ZT. p.102 ibld)l’
1. His distinotion between the a priori and a posteriori is, a) bet­
ween form and oontent/natter, "The matter is the a posteriori Anneal* 
(o f.Chap.ZV.p.101 ibid.) and, b) between neaningfulness and meaning - 
lessness, "The a posteriori is the neaningless natters the sensory 
whioh calls for and iamediately finds, meaning.” (C f. ibid.)
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Also, on« may never understand the musio, "the world of the Incoher­
ent into whieh 1 sometimes drift is not the world of Mosart" (o f. 
ibid;. If one does disoover the a priori, one has suooeeded in disc­
overing (i.e, understanding, or beginning to understand) the object 
itself; and discovering is achieved through understanding and habit.
treasonably enough, Dufrenne does not elaborate on the latter - 
the method - sinoe it is not the business of The notion of the 
a priori to exjialn the aesthetio. What he does expand upon is the 
nature of the a priori as constitutive - which applies to the affect­
ive categories. Here he diverges from Kant, in regarding t e a  priori 
as constitutive in the sense of being the objeot of knowledge rather 
than of being the instrument of thought, or a condition of knowledge. 
This is mentioned in the Phénoménologie (pp.5>43ff , but here is says; 
"thus Joyfulness constitutes a Bach fugue, and the tregio pervades 
Van Gogh*s paintings." These thincs are what are aotually expressed, 
and, "the spectator fails to peroeive the real aesthetio objeot if he 
is insensitive to this expression." The material a priori is constit­
utive in a different way from the formal. The material a priori 
constitutes the meaning whioh animates an objeot. "The formal 
a priori represents a matter only in the formal order. And, oonversely 
the material a priori represents a higher form; it is meaning whioh is 
more authentic" (e f., p.107 ibid). At first Dufrenne holds the latt» 
to be uniquely individuating - material signifies the essenoe or 
uniqueness of e thing (of., beginning of section) - though he 
retreates from this position two pages later (p.1 0 9) to the weaker 
and more uninformative view that the material a priori "determines 
the objeot more speoifioally than th6 formal a priori".
There is also a distinction between those essenoes whioh are 
a priori and those whieh are not, though this is rather uneenviaeimf 
It is that oertain essenoes are simply abstraot truths about an objeot
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e.g., equinity of a horse, and othors ( a priori asaonoaa) art 
constitutive - they rapreaent tho truth £f an objeot.
His position on whothor there may be more than ono a priori 
affeotive quality ia left ambivalent in The notion of the a priori. 
The question ia only raised indireotly whan he says "everything 
is subordinated to a oertain effeot in a work of art" (of.. Chap.
V. p.112 op. ait.) and refers to a dominant trait in things. All 
the same this question does arise, and is only partially solved 
by hufrenne's statement (of., p. 1 1 5  ibid.) that no one a priori 
oan define the meaning of an objeot sufficiently to monopolise or 
forbid others. This does not provide a full solution beoause Duf- 
renne is here speoifioally referring to meaning. He may wish to 
say that one a priori oan dominate in general, but in terms of 
understanding the meaning of the work of art all a prioris are of 
equal importance.
1 shall comment on the theory of the a priori just given, before 
going on to the expansion of the view of the afi'eotive categories, 
given in the Phenomenologie.
firstly. the reason whioh Hufronne gives that "the a priori always 
refers to experienoe in order to ground it" ( Chap. IV. p. 89 op. 
oit. ) does not prove it is always experienced, or is itself mat­
erial oybxistential. What he says is correct, but a) that does not 
mean that aotual experienoe is presupposed by the a priori - i.e., 
what is said is that the a priori oategories refer to experience, 
and thus if there are a priori oategories, then there is possible 
experienoe. b) Also, there is the distinction between the faot that 
one must experienoe in order to talk of anything, even something 
non-experiential, and the faot that the idea of the a priori
involves the idea of exparienoe. The former nay bo disregarded - 
on# aooapts that on* is la a world In talking of anything, but thia 
dooa not mean that the argument for tha a priori oatagorios involves 
or prosupposos (the idea of) aotual experience• It seems that either 
Dufrenno is wrong in saying that the a priori refers to experience in 
grounding it - it refers to the idea of experience} or if it does 
refer to experience, that this is not a good reason for saying it is 
itself experiental/eapirioal.
It is true that one experienoes a priori oategories - unity, 
quantity, the oomio, eto., but Dufronne does not want merely to say 
this - he wants to say that one's knowledge of the a priori is gained 
from experience, not from the understanding alone, ('¿his further step 
is required for the view that one has immediate knowledge of the 
material a priori categories. This is a point of view which phenom­
enology has in common with Aristotle - that all knowledge is gained 
from sense-experience.) And Dufrenne wishes to take hia oase a step 
further, and to say that the a priori oan itself be existential.
And it is this in particular whioh does not seem to bo proved, 
particularly in view of the faot that referring to experience docs 
not make the a priori Itself existential.
Aa has been stated (cf., b) above), one thing which presumably 
encourages Dufrenna is the idea that perception ia required even when 
discovering what Kant would regard as non-enplrioal analytic truths, 
i.e., one is in the world, it provides ideag, the truths appiy in and 
to the world. But it ia wrong to oonflate being in the world, etc., 
whioh la a necessary condition of discerning an a priori truth, and 
the idea that pereeption is the mode of recognition of the truth of 
the a priori statement. It goes entirely against the whole idea of 
the a priori to say it is experienced sinoc its aim is to show (at 
least for Kant) that we oan have knowledge and understanding of
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certain foots about tho world (the oategories) purely by means of 
rational tnought.l.*
Secondly (and this Is one of the most Important and fundamental 
questions, sinoe it queries the possibility of the affeotiws categ­
ories being a priori), there is nothing wrong in asserting that one 
intuits and/or imnedlately oomprehends the a priori, sinos It is 
probably true that one intuits what is a priori true of something, 
hufrenne assorts this several times (of., Chap.Ill, pp.81-2, quoted - 
and says the a priori is the object of, " a pure and immediate exp­
erience". (Chap.III. p.73 op.oit.) I think that one has to aooept 
intuition and self-evldonoo for some things, as there has to be sons 
point at whioh one stops giving reasons for things, and just sees 
that, e.g., "it is the oase that X". This seems to be so not only in 
the oase of analytio truths like, *2 +2a4 ', but also with basio fund­
amental ideas like negation, possibility, unity, eto., - the Kantian 
oategories.
As a matter of foot, I think it may be the oase that one intuits 
the'somlo', 'tragio', 'grotesque', eto. (the affective oategories) 
in art - but at a fairly low level, and not in suoh a way as to make 
them a priori. That is to say, if one oan oall the final stage of 
recognition that something is X, intuition, then one probably int­
uits the 'tragio' (and other affeotive categories). But this allows 
for a great deal of experienoe of other works as 'tragio', and know — 
lng what features to expeot - or what sort of features - and then 
regarding the final stage of recognition of the work as 'tragio' as 
intuitive. The affeotive qualities may be intuited at this level, 
but this does not make them neoessarily a priori, as I wish to 
emphasise, as it is not sufficiently striot.
1. See, Kanti Critique of pure reason, esp. paragraph 10, pp.1 1 2 - 4  
(1105, a80 B106).
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Both jJosor.rtos und Leibnia ga vo similar oooounta to Kant's 
a priori, of our potential puro understanulng of oortaln faotors, 
when talking about innate ideas. Fron Coplostonl* 1 Give two 
examples of this. Of Sesoartes' innate ideas, he sayst
"the mind produoes then, as it were, out of its own 
potentialities on the oooasion of experienoe of sons 
sort. It does not derive them from sense-exporionoe."
(p.93 op.oit.)
And of Leibnis, that ideas ere derived from the nind rather than 
external senses!
"They ore, moreovor, presupposed (and here Leibnis 
approaches the position of Kant)b. sense-knowledge."
(p.3 ? 1 op.oit.)
However, they both allow muo more into tho ldeo of innate 
ideas than Kant into that of the a priori, and therefore nuke it 
problematlo - Pesoartes eventually thinks that all ideas ere innate, 
and Leibnis allows suoh things as oause roason, squareness, olroul- 
urity end substanoe. And this is tas problom with whloh Dufronne 
prosonts us. To wit, whether tho uffeotive qualities aro the sorts 
of things ono intuits or iumediately oosprehends, and Oan bo said to 
be a priori or let into t>.e olass of the a priori.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to ue any logiool (or in 
the ond any empirical) necessity that they shoulu be a priori. For, 
in Kant's favour, one might agree that tho ootugorlea (those things 
which are understood a priori) are conditions of tho possibility of 
oonoeptuallsing as we do; but the '-»raclo' or bomio' are not cond­
itions of oonoeptuallsing about art. tloroovor, if one aooepts that
J.. bee| Copleston: History of Philosophy. Imago books, Garden City, 
how York, 1963, Vol.4, Pesoartes to Leibnis.
i
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say 'quantity* aximts in tba world prior to our uaing the oonoept 
•quantity' (it need not exist qua 'quantity* but qua, e.g., 1 +1 + 1 ,ato. 
X think that ona oan argua against t..e affective qualities as a priori 
for terms auoh as 'tragio', 'oomlo', (the) 'novel', eto., oome into 
existanoa gradually, for example whan one wishes to olassify a number 
of works. The work oan be acknowledged as art and thus exist before 
its olassifioation as 'tragio', and it is not 'tragio' or 'a novel’ 
until someone olassifias it as suoh. This seems to indicate that it 
is not the afi'eotive qualities in a work whioh oonstitute it as art, 
or nhioh are properly a priori features,!.*
And, taking a priori in a fairly striot sense, they are not 
a priori in being part of the world's make-up whioh we oan get to 
via the understanding before we oan understand the world. They are 
conventional terms for qualities whioh often differ totally from 
work to work, as Dufrenne himself allows. So it seems to be very 
difficult to find any way in nhioh the term 'a priori' is applicable 
to the affective categories. It is all very well for Dufrenne to 
allow such things as the total variability of the nature of the 
qualities from work to work and still olaim them as a priori, but in 
reality eaoh suoh allowance weakens his right to talk of the categ­
ories as a priori. Posaibly the foot that a set of aeathetlo terms 
now exista encouraged Dufrenne to think it is the qualities whioh 
these designate whioh are the esaenoa of the work.
X am quite prepared to admit that this does make up e water­
tight case against affeotive qualities as neoeeaarily a priori, For 
one oan argue against my view in two ways - either saying that the 1
1 . l'he idea of this oame out of a discussion with Cyril Barrett, 
whom 1 should like to acknowledge.
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qualities the categories designate only oame into existenoe when 
they were designated as tney weru, and therefore the affeotive oat» 
egories are .just as muoh or as little a priori as they; or one oan 
say that the terms 'tragic', eto, may not have oome into being with 
the work, but the tragio quality did, and therefore only awaited a 
suitable denotation, just as quantity (or the quality 'quantity') 
pre-existed the term 'quantity' and only awaited suitable denotat­
ion. That is, Kant's a prioris ore Just as non-existent before, or 
pre-existent to, their designation as, s.g., 'unity', 'quantity', 
eto.
however, 1 oan only repeat that I do not think Dufrenne has 
presented anything like a sound oase for rogarding the offeetive 
oategories as a priori (or for regarding the a priori as being os he 
olaims), and add a few points, first repoating: (a) that the affeot- 
ive qualito.es do not seem to be in any way conditions of the possib­
ility of oonoeptualising about art. It is also true that: (b) the 
the olassifioation of works into oortain groups ~s fairly arbitrary, 
for example, those works oalled 'tragio'now, might wso. 1 have teen 
classified under different names if one oonoontrafed on different 
qualities or interpreted them differently. (Thus immediately comp­
rehending suoh a work as 'tragic' j.s more like a happy ooincidenoe 
than intuition.) (o) One oould not immediately comprehend a work as 
'tragio' if the idea of the trnf?io had not been oonoeived - and sinoe 
'being immediately comprehensible as X' is a necessary oondition (for 
Dufrenne) of 1 being the a priori essenoe of a woxk , it seems as if 
X oannot be that, lastly (d) recognising the affective quality in 
something is nut a noooesary oondition of recognising it as art - one 
oan reoognise 'Hamlet* as art without reoognising its various 'tragio,' 
'sublime', 'grotesque', 'oomio', eto., affeotive qualities. Therefore,
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the affective qualities do not seem to be a priori in this way.
Thus, under a slightly stricter notion of the a priori than 
Dufrenne had in Bind, it would seem that the affeotive categories 
are not very promising osndidates for being a priori or immediately 
comprehensible in any striot sense. N.B. Incidentally, Dufrenne 
assumes a similar position to that of Desoartes and heibnis on know* 
ledge, when he sayst
"for one can, and must, grant the a priori the privilège 
of always bsing already known - thus the privilege of always 
being related to subjectivity and of appearing as an immed­
iately comprehensible meaning." (Chap.IV p .8 5 op.oit.)
For, both Desoartes and Leibni* - especially Leibniz - regard the 
innate ideas one has as potential knowledge, whioh will be made 
ezplioit only when one's need for the knowledge arises. I think 
that Dufrenne is not saying anything more controversial than this - 
(a) that the potential knowledge is there, and (b) possibly that one 
may know quite a lot without knowing that one knows it (paoe Haesrehl), 
whioh is oorrsot, I think.
However, there are further points to disouss - several bearing 
on the liberality of Dufrenne's notion of the a priori.
Thirdly, one reason for Dufrenne's saying that the a priori is imm­
ediately given in experienoe/peroeptxon, is that it enables him to 
avoid saying that the aubjeot constitutes the world - or more Kant- 
ially - that the aubjeot has to impose formJLen matter. Dufrenne 
considers that this metaphysls would be proposing subjectivity, 
whereas, as a phsnomenologist, he regards the world as the objeot 
for all subjeots, and objectively the same for all subjeots. (of., 
pp.99-100 op.oit.) The subject builds upon what is given, either in 
the oonstruotion of s pure a priori or an a posteriori soienoe. He 
reiterates the givenness and meaningfulness of the world for the
±. or unity
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subjeot - peroeptual meaning ia "given and not oreated”, it ia "for 
me and not made by me", (of., Chap.IV. p.100 op.oit.)
Aa it atanda thia ia not inoompatible with the tendenoy towards 
allowing different waya of oonoaptualiaing or breaking up the world, 
whioh will be pointed out next. It becomes so only if one regards 
the world aa objectively constituted in suoh a determinate way that 
only one conceptualisation is oorreot, and Oufrenne does not assert 
this.
fourthly. Dufrenne takes a nuoh more fluid metaphysioal view than 
Kant, regarding the world aa constituted as it ia - in the phenomen- 
ologioal tradition that one oan diaoern the objective nature of things 
if one oleara one'a mind of theory - but leaning also towards current 
Anglo-Amerioan (and guinian) views that there is not just one way of 
oonoeptualiaing, common to all persons and by means of whioh we agree 
and oommunioate. Thia is apparent from his statement that oertain 
a prioris"are not universally recognised and that their appearanoe is 
historically bound" (of., Chap.II. p.43 op.oit.).
The only problem is that it is not entirely consistent with what 
hufrenne says about the a priori being "immediately comprehended”. If 
<y- is a priori X at time t1 •, is it possible for it to be the oase 
either: that it is not universally recognised as a priori X, or 
(regarding its being historically bound): that it is not a priori X 
at time t2*?
The latter oonftingenoy seems to be possible, and one may Ulus» 
trate this in terms of art. If one ohanged one's oonoept of what 
it was for a play to be a tragedy , then oi. oould be, for example, 
'grotesque' (■ a priori X)at t1», and for example, •melodramatio' 
or 'tragio' (■ a priori T or Z) at t2>. This is also compatible
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with being immediately comprehended.i* The former oontingenoy ie also 
compatible, sinoe to say that <K la immediately comprehended as a priori 
l is not to say that everyone docs reoognisc it as a priori. It is 
difficult to be decisive, sinoe Dufrenne does say the thing oan be 
immediately comprehended, and also that the a priori is already known, 
but one can reconcile this with its not being universally reoognised, 
by appeal either; to differences in oultures caking art not under» 
stood by all, i.e., orosa-oulturally, or; the view that at least a 
oertain amount of general art knowledge is required before one under­
stands art.iL*
J_. for this to bo properly oonaistent with what Dufrenne says in the 
Phenomenologie - that ohanges in attitudes to art over different 
historioal periods indicates that the nature of a work of art is 
fairly broad and open to different interpretations (rather than 
implying relativism) - one would say that the work is both 'grotesque' 
and 1tragic'/'melodramatio' at the same time, but seen differently 
according to temporally differing aesthetio attitudes and theories.
(I shall disouss the problem of oontradiotory interpretations in the 
next section.)
This depends upon Dufrenne's meaning that the a priori is not 
neoessarily immediately oomprehensible/aooessible to anyone (of what* 
ever culture) who is oognisant with the oonoept 'art', rather than 
restricting it to one culture and/or the set of people familiar with 
the type of art in question. I do not think he is limiting what he 
says to one eulture or elite, however, and therefore I think one oan 
allow both the appeal to cross-oultural lack of understanding (seeing 
what is not there, missing what is there, etc.) and to the necessity 
for a oertain amount of knowledge.
- . y
In this oasa, one has a deferred immediate comprehension - consequent 
upon one's knowledge or eduoation in aesthetios in one's own oulture. 
(riven this, Dufrenne oan be said to be being oonsistent. 
fifthly. Dufrenne aeems to have made out a plausible oase for the 
universality of the a priori - at least with regard to those of art. 
Yet what he says of how one knows, e.g., how to apply any a priori 
ooneept, is uninformativet
"The word has a content that we experienoe quite vividly 
and olearly; even if we oannot make this oontent explioit, 
we do know it in some sense."
This is not problematic in theory (of. seoond oomment above), but 
in praotioe makes the faot that X iB a priori somewhat unhelpful if 
it means that although I may know that there are oertain a priori 
affeotive qualities in Hamlet, I am not aided by the faot that they 
are a priori, in knowing what they are. This oasts some doubt on 
what praotioal aesthetio problem oould be solved by asserting a prlopi 
affeotive categories. It is true, however, that the assertion does 
at least reject the theories of subjectivity and relativism.
This leads on to the sixth point, on the faot that one may fail 
to grasp what is a priori in something - for instance a pieoe of music, 
and the praotioal problems to whioh this gives rise. Since Dufrenne 
does not elaborate on this in the Phénoménologie, and it does oonoern 
the conoept of the a priori, I shall illustrate the problem here, and 
suggest how Dufrenne might settle it.
(i) He is presupposing his own oonolusion - that there is an a priori 
in any objeot or work of art. If one does not assume this, then the 
faot that the work remains formless and oonfused in some instanoe 
might be attributed to one's failing to disoern some other key
' I
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foot-ors whioh would make the work ooherent to its audienoe, e.g., 
Significant Form -1*  or the Aesthetio Emotion.
(ii) The statement that a work may remain formless and confused (if 
one fails to disoern the a priori in it) makes it impossible to dist­
inguish on these grounds alone, between pieoes of musio whioh aotually 
have form and meaning, i.e., are good musio, but whioh one has not 
yet oome to understand, and thoso whioh i do not, i.e., are bad 
musio (if musio at all) - sinoo for both types one may find them 
formless and oonfused, and oontinue to do so. One oannot tell whether 
the fault is in the woxk or one's comprehension of it.
(iii) Related to (ii), one may think that a pieoe is meaningful, and 
therefore that one has diaoovered what is a priori in it, when oho 
has in faot misunderstood it, and it is either a poor work, or good, 
but a work to whioh one has attributed some other meaning from that 
whioh it has.
Presumably Dufrenne's answer to this would be that (a) one will 
not see the work as meaningful unless one has discovered the a priori 
qualities of it, and(b) that since one immediately comprehends the 
a priori by intuition, then one will neoeBsarily be right if one 
finds the work meaningful, sinoe one oannot have a false intuition. 
However, this is not good enough, (a) is unsubstantiated, and (b) 
depends upon his being oorreot about intuition • maybe one oan have 
a false intuition (mistakenly think one has intuited something).
(iv) One must therefore know before one listens to a work, whether
it is good or bad - whioh a) preoludes one's own valuation of it, and 
b) is not a solution, sinoe everyone is initially in the same position
1» ¿» See, Clive Bell» Art, published Arrow books, 1961. 
j,, See also, Susanne hanger; Feeling and form, published Routlodge
* Kegan Paul, 1953» and.Philosophy in a new key, published Mentor, 
1951» for other possible key faotors.
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with regard to a non work of art, and there are no other oriterla than 
aotually listening, reading, eto., for evaluation. (One may disouse a 
pieoe of muslo ad infinltua, but unless one hears it in some form or 
another, onal*dannot properly evaluato it.) Most oertainly one oannot 
say, "beoause this is by A it is good, and because that is by B it 
will be bad", l.e., prejudge on the basis of the artist. This is the 
method of those who refuse to form their own Judgments. Zn any oasc, 
it presupposes what Dufrenne fails to allow for - the possibility of 
someone else's prior judgment of the artist ( which will be through the 
work).
The only apparent solution would be to provide for learning and 
instruotion in the subjeot in question - here art - in order for the 
a priori affeotive categories to be only one criterion in Judging the 
work. As it stands, Dufrenne has not allowed for thls/by. presupposing 
a necessary connection between knowledge of toe a priori, and under­
standing of the form and meaning (in a pieoe of musio - of. above and 
Chap.IV. p.102 op.oit.).
There ere throe final more minor points.
Jeventnlv. dufrenne regards objeots as having immediate meaning. This 
is a phenomenologioal viewpoint, but not a very definite one. He saysi 
"The a priori would then (under the right viewpoint) be 
soon as the immediate meaning grasped in experience and 
instantly reoognised. . . . . .  The a priori constitutes 
the object as meaningful and it lies in our pre-given 
comprehension of the meaning given in the objeot."
(Chap.Z. p.59. op.oit.)
Meaning is not at issue here, but the idea requires some comment as 
it underpins muoh phenomenology and in any oese it seems strange (at 
the least) to say that an objeot has meaning Independently of pereone. 1
1 . l.e., by hearing it performed or 'hearing* it mentally if one oen
read nusio sufficiently well (e.g.,'hear' the musio as one reads the 
score).
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(a) The meaning of 'meaning' requires olarifioation, sinoe normally 
one would not say that, e.g., a tree, had any speoifio meaning per se. 
(It might have slgnifioanoe in being where it is, or it might be a sign, 
but in tnia oase the meaning is given it by someone's using it for e 
oertain purpose.)
(b) It is usually regarded as the oase that meaning is imposed upon 
things by persons, and that in a striot sense, only statements or human 
interoourse of some kind - verbal or otherwise - had meaning.
(o) furthermore, an objeot oan mean different things in different 
oontaxts, or aooordlng to the attitude one takes to it. for example, a 
tree may mean water to someone in a desert, or a souroe of fire to 
someone oamping, or a souroe of beauty to someone simply walking in the 
country. Some of these things it may never have occasion to mean, and 
1 do not tiling it means them in abstraoto, sinoe:
(d) A tree oan hardly mean, e. g .,'beatty' without there being a subjeot 
to predicate beauty of it.
1 do not think objeots have meaning unless someone gives them 
meaning. And if it oan, how does one deoide whioh of all the possible 
meanings that an objeot oan have (regarding (b)) are part of its 
immediate meaningfulness? The list of possible meanings oould go on 
for pages - but surely no objeot oan have that amount of immediate 
meaningfulness? It will mean only one thing, aooording to oontext, 
otherwise total oonfusion would reign. So are all the other potential 
meanings held in abeyanoe, or what?
I think it fairly obvious that the idea of immediate meaningful­
ness is fraught with problems, and also important to note this, beoause 
if it were a reliable support, one oould move from the idea of objeots 
being meaningful of their own aooord, to the idea that objeota have 
a priori affeotive qualities, for example, one oould say that any 
part of the objeot's meaning is its affeotive quality, whioh must 
therefore be a priori sinoe the objeot possesses it prior to our
t ¥
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experiencing it, or giving it meaning - i.e., immediate meaning being 
a priori.
Kixhthlv. regarding esienoee, 1* the faet that a term euoh as 'heroio' 
oan have an entirely different eapirioal description for a pieoe of 
musio from that whioh it has for a pieoe of poetry might indioate 
that Dufrenne is right in saying the esaenoe is immediately grasped, 
or intuited. Z.e.- one might oonolude that sinoe there was nothing 
Common this is the only way one oan aeoount for giving two things the 
same affective quality. But the laok of oommon properties would mean 
that the essenoe is non-material, therefore it must be formal in some 
sense, as, for example, the way the features are oombined. Nor does 
this in any way prove the existence of an essenoe - one might just as 
well oonolude from the lack of oommon features that oertain differing 
qualities - whioh one oould enumerate - go to make up a particular 
affeotive quality, in eaoh type of art.
Ninth - and finally (Ch^> .IV, pp.94-5 op.oit.) Dufrenne is hardly 
very oonvinoing in his attempt to show that the affedtive qualities 
are perceived, wnen he says that the affeotive oategories are categ­
ories of feeling, and feeling is part of peroeiving. For feeling is 
not part of peroeiving* One does not peroeive a feeling, one feels a 
feeling. One may peroeive that someone is feeling X, but one does 
not peroeive the feeling. Moreover, the affeotive categories extend 
over far more than feeling, or emotive qualities. For example, the 
'beautiful' is an affeotive quality, but it is not a feeling.
N.B. Not that Dufrenne's argument in any way goes to show that the 
affeotive oategories are a priori, even if it had shown that they 
were peroeived.
This oovers at least the six key faotors Dufrenne attributes to 
the a priori whioh are relevant herei (1) that the a priori oan be 
experienced.
JL* Cf. Chap. IV. pp.82-83 op.oit
(ii) that the affective categories are immediately comprehended 
or a priori.
(iii) that material a priorie are not universally reoognised.
(iv) as regards meaning, the a priori is a general oonoept.
(v) that one may fail to disoover the a priori.
(vi) that it is constitutive in the reverse sense to the 
Kantian.
Of these, the first and fifth are not adequately demonstrated, 
and rather dubious, and the third, fourth and sixth are less cont­
roversial, but rely upon one's aooeptanoe of Dufrenne's very extended 
and liberal ooneept of the a priori.1* The second is one of the most 
important, sinoe it makes a straightforward attaok on the possibility 
of the affective qualities being a priori in any striot sense of the 
term. It is probably the oase that one oould allow the affeotive 
categories to be a priori if one aooepted the generality of the 
a priori, the faot that it is not universally reoognised, that it is 
experiential, and that one may fail to disoover it, eto. However, by 
adding these oharaoteristios to it Dufrenne has made the oonoept so 
extended as to make one dubious about its usefulness for any praot- 
ioal application. Vie have to aocept that the oase for a priori 
categories remains unproven, and move on to Oufrenne's use of the 
idea in the Phénoménologie.
Seotion II. The a priori and aesthetics.
X shall non disouss Dufrenne's oonoept of the affeotive oategories, 
dividing this into three parts:
(i) The demonstration of the affeotive a priori.
The a priori affective oategories are now defined (of.Phénoménologie 
de 1'experience esthetlque, Vol.II. Part XV. intro.p.539) as the 1
1 . An understanding of the first five is neoessary also for an 
understanding and judgment of what Dufrenne says of the affeotive 
a priori oategories in the Phénoménologie.
1 4 2 .
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conditions under whioh a world may be felt » juat aa Kant*a a priori 
categories are tie oonditiona under whioh an obJeot is given or thought 
However, there ia an inportant qualification to be made aesthetically 
namely that not all affective qualities are aeathetio (of. p.541 ibid) 
and only those whioh are aeathetie oonstitute the objeot. That is to 
say, the affeotive qualities only oonstitute the objeot when used in 
an aesthetic oontext.j£* This is repeated (of. Vol.lZ. Part ZZ. 
Chap.Z. seo.ZZ. p.549 op.oit.) when Dufrenne sayst
"Nous dirons d'un qualité affeotive qu'elle est un a 
priori lorsque, exprimée par un oeuvre, elle est 
oonstituante du monde de l'objet esthétique , . .." 
though this adds the world of the aeathetio objeot, whereas previously 
he spoke of the a priori as constitutive of the aesthetio objeot. 1
1. The affective categories are to the affeotive qualities as the 
class is to an instance of it. Z.e., there are affeotive oategorles 
such as the 'tragic', whioh are individually instantiated in works 
of art. Dufrenne actually saysi
"las oategories effectives . . . . . .  sont aux
quality's affeotives oe qua le general est au 
singulier, et aussi oe que la oonnaissanoe de 
l'a priori est a l'a priori'.
(Yol.ZZ. Part ZZ. Chap.ZZ. p.572.)
2jl This restriotion on the affective qualities as constitutive
is not mentioned in The notion of the a priori
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What Dufrenne la saying about the aesthetio nature of the 
affeotive qualities is ambiguous. He oould mean that one oan dam* 
aroate those whieh are aasthatio from those whioh are not, or that 
affeotive qualities. San hare a non-aesthetio application (are not 
nesessarily aesthetio). In view of his statement that they are only 
constitutive in an aesthetio oontexti
"oepandant, pas plus q»e tout objet ns porte un 
monde, touts quallte affeotive no peut avoir (la)
S.vertu oonstituantet o'est enoore un privelege de
l'eathetique." 1»
(Vol II. Part II. Chap.I. p.541.)
and the faot that arfeutive qualities, for example, the 'tragio' the 
'beautiful', ete,, are applicable beyond the realm of art (even if it 
is debatable whether they are applicable beyond that of the aesthetio), 
I think that one should assume he is making the latter point.il«
J_. Though this is still ambiguous, since "1'esthetique" might be an 
adjective qualifying "qualite affeotive'', or a noun, and in the 
former oase this would mean only the aesthetio affeotive qualities 
are constitutive, and in the latter oase, it wodd mean the affeot-
ive qualities are constitutive only in an aeathetio context.
2. To complicate matters, Dufrenne makes a different subdivision
in The notion of the a priori• (p.114). This is a distinction 
between artistio a priorls, subdivided into affeotive categories, 
for example, 'joy'} and values, • example, 'beauty'. These are 
apparently distinguished "by the knowledge which isolates them'*. 
This is unhelpful, and Dufrenne makes no attempt to enlighten us - 
whloh seems strange in view of the faots, a) that in the Phenomen- 
ologie, 'beauty' is used as an affeotive oetegory, i.e.. the re is
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no such distinction made, and b) this introduces a new notion that 
affeotive categories ore not the only a prioris in art, (The only 
thing Dufrenne adds is that one knows an a priori, and which it is, 
"by experiencing a meaning" (The notion of the a priori. Chap.V. 
p.114).
Wittgenstein agrees that one oan experience a meaning, and 
elucidates matters somewhat. He says (Philosophical invostigations, 
trans. (r.E.ll.Anaoombe, published Basil Blaokwell, Oxford, 1968): 
"Jixperieneing a meaning and experiencing a mental 
image. 'In both oases', we should like to say, 'we are 
experiencing something, only something different . . . .  *
What is the oontent of the experience of imagination?
The answer is a pioture, or a description. And what is 
the oontent of the experience of meaning? X don't know
what 1 am supposed to say to this."
(Part II. ii. pp.175-6. op.cit.)
and1
" . . . . ,  there is a close kinship with 'experiencing 
the meaning of a word.' "
in, for example, feeling the seriousness of e tune, or in 
seeing an arbitrary oipher as a letter of some foreign alphabet 
or a faultily written letter,
"And I can see it in various aspects aooording 
to the fiotion I surround it ¿th."
(Part II, xl, p.210 op.oit.)
This is not, however, particularly conclusive.
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by'constitutive', Dufrenne means 'eastnoi* and that the affective 
quality ia the a priori constituting feature of aesthetio objects, 
but not of other objeots.
He then goes on to state that what is a priori in art is by 
nature (neoessarily) affeotive, just os the a priori of understand­
ing is by nature rational. Afffotivity is the structure of the 
objeot, but it also designates an attitude of the subject, (of. Vol.ZI. 
Part 11. ohap.l. pp54$-4.) Thus, structure and attitude are complem­
entary A* (of. Vol.ll. Part 11. ohap 1. pp544-9).
Taking Kant as his basis, Dufrenne now undertakes to show how 
the affeotive is a priori. firstly. Kant's a prioris are logical 
and anterior to experient . Thus, transcendental knowledge is what 
is a priori for Kant. But seoondly. Dufrenne suggests one oan say 
that the object to whioh this knowledge pertains is itself a priori 
in so far as it founds the possibility of the empirioal object.
'A priori1 means'constituting', in so far as it is at the basis of 
reality or is the principle of reality. He backs up the seoond 
point by the claim that Kant understood the a priori in the same 
way • as a) determining our relation to objeots, and b) determ­
ining the nature of this objeot as an objeot of possible experience. 
Thirdly, aooording to Dufrenne, for Kant the subjeot constitutes what 
is constitutive in the object.
Dufrenne then suggests a combination of the second move (his 
own), and the first (Kant's), taking the a priori as a character­
istic of the objeot of knowledge, rather than of knowledge itself, 
from whioh he deduces a three part meaning for the a priori, 
i) It is constituting - of the objeot.
il) it ia existential • in the subjeot, as a way of constituting
the eubjeot as subjeot. _______________________________________
1. This leads on to our knowledge of the affeotive qualities, whioh 
will be dealt with in the third part of this seotion.
I
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ill) It can become the object of knowledge (a knowledge whioh 
is itself a priori)» Further to this, since t e a  priori qualifies 
both aubjeot and objeot, it oan bo determined from throe aspects of 
the relation of tho two, (i) presenee, (li) representation, and
(iii), feeling. Baoh of these corresponds to one aspeot of the 
objeot and to one attitude of the subjeot: to the
1) lived, 2) represented, and 5), felt (in the objeot), and to the 
1) living, 2) thinking, and 3), feeling (in the subjootjl 
Dufronne reoognlses that he Is going beyond Kant non, since Kant 
rostrioted the a priori to being constitutive of the object (of. 
Prolegomena p.91). Dufrenne wants to define the a priori as 
constituting in a wider sense - to include the subjective without 
ceasing to be objective.
One reason for this wish is that judgments about work3 of art 
could be said to be subjeotive. However, there is a great differ­
ence (as he says) between a Judgmentlof the sort, "this room is 
hot", and cf the sort "the musie of Sooh is serene". The differ­
ence is that whereas my judgment about the room may be totally 
subjeotive, if, for instance, 1 have been out in the cold for 
some time, the judgment about Baoh is not. It may be truo not 
only for me. In faot aesthetic Judgments are of this nature, they 
are refutable, and objectively true to the extent that if the musio 
of Baoh is serene, it is said to be b o  beoauae of agreement by a 
number of people, not onlj myself.1*
Another related reason is that Dufrenne is presumably trying 
to justify making an a priori category out of feellng/affeotlvlty, 
whioh seems prime facie very muoh subjeotive. 1
1 . At least, this is true for the normal nonsu of 'work of art* - 
what oould be called he asquiesoent sense. Actually Dufrenne is
148
Feeling is obviously the most important of the three aspeots 
of the relation of subjeot and objettt whioh the a priori oan qualify, 
aooordlng to Dufrenne'a theory, beoauae of its relation to the 
affeotive. His oonoluuion is that the subjeot is constituting on the 
third level, of feeling, by means of the affsotive a prioris, "qui 
ouvrent un monde veou et senti en premiere peraonne par Is moi profond1 , 
(p.548 ibid.), and that «hat is a priori in the objeot oomes out in 
the affeotive a priori and is revaaled by aesthstio experienoe.
This is toe sum total of Oufrenne's demonstration of t. e 
possibility and existenoe of affsotive a prioris.
Continuation of note 1. on previous page.
using tie two statements uifferently. ("This room is hot", and "The 
musio of Baoh is siren*”,} The seoond oan be just as subjeotive as 
the first, and the first as ebjeotive as the seoond. Bath's musio 
could ju81 seem serene to me if I hud been listening to something 
very energetio, when in fact the pueoe was not at ull serene, just 
as the room oould seem hot when the thermometer registered o fairly 
low temperature. Conversely the judgment about tne room oould be 
perfectly objeotive.
One woulu be using the statements similarly if, for example, 
one looked at a thermometer and said, "this room is hot" if it 
registered that the room was 90° and if one took a piece by Baoh
with moderate metronome markings, no sudden variation of tempo or 
key, and an even rtythm, and said, "this pieoe of musio of Baoh is 
serene". X.e., if one made use of objeotive external faotors in 
one's judgment.
However, it is a good idea for Dufronne to point out that 
aesthetio Judgments oan be objeotive, to save them from sliding 
into, or being aooused of subJeotivity.
1 4 9
Thar« are four rather dubious points in Oufronne's argument, and 
one nor* attractive feature.
firstly. hufrenne refers somewhat ambiguously to the aesthetio nature 
of affootive categories. It is debatable, as a matter of faot, as to 
wheti.or somo afi'eotive qualities oan be used non-aesthetioally.
Taking as examples, the 'sad', the 'beautiful* and the 'heroio', 
when one talks of a beautiful day, one is making an aesthetio eval­
uation - when one talks of anything as beautiful, it is still an 
aesthetio evaluation, us long os one is not using the tons metaph- 
orioally. However, if one says of someone that he performed an 
heroio aotion, one is making a moral rather than an aesthetio judg­
ment, just as 'sad' may be a judgment of someone's mood, not an 
aesthotlo judgment.
Maybe it is tie oase that the use of certain affootive terms 
always results in an aeothetio statement or evaluation, whereas the 
use of others does not.A* The oonoluslon with regard to the
constitutive nature of affeotlve qualities would bo that the affect­
ive quality would be oonstitutive only when the use of ary one 
resulted in an aesthetio statement or evaluation. It would of oourse 
bo easier if one oould divide the affeotive qualities into aesthetio 
and non-aesthetio, but it does not seem to affeot his oase about 
their being constitutive - it simply means that instead of saying I
I think it is the oase that some aesthetio terms suoh as 'boaut- 
iful' ('tragio'?) and 'oomio' are purely uosthetio and oannot be used 
without some aesthetio oonnotatlon, or when they are not being used 
straightforwordly aesthetically they are being used metaphorically. X 
also think there are other terms whioh belong to the affeotive group - 
suoh os 'sad' or 'heroio' whioh oan be used both aesthetioally and 
non-aesthetioally.
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only the aesthetio affective qualities are constitutive of the 
objeot, one oust say that the affective qualities are constitutive 
of the objeot only when used in an aesthetio context. Thus, it 
depends upon the oontext as well as the affeotive quality as to who* 
ther it is constitutive.
Secondly, on a similar line» why should the affeotive quality be 
oonstitutlve of an aesthetio objeot and not of an ordinary objeot? 
There are at least two possible answersi
i) A sad person oan beoome happy and it is therefore not an a priori 
feature of the person to be sad, but a sad poen cannot beoome a happy 
poem.
11) Because Vufrenne holds it to be a criterion, or one neoessary 
condition of A being art, that it 'contains' some affeotive quality, 
and not a neoessary condition of anything non-aesthetio that it is 
affeotive.l.* These seom to be valid answers, but the latter has the 
disadvantage of presupposing affeotivity as a neoossary condition of 
A boing art - which has yet to be proved.
Thirdly, with regard to the comparison with Kant and the under­
standing, it has yet to bo proved that there is anything in the 
nature of art whioh makes it affeotive. This will not stand up 
without some further baoking to the effeot that the two are analogous. 
However, the point made direotly after this - that affeotivity 
designates an attitude of the subjeot - would seem to be appealing 
to the fairly oommon and aooeptable view that the work is not 
affeotive (and therefore under the present terms, not a work of art, 
sinoe affeotivity is being used as a neoessary condition) unless it
JL# Though there is no reason why ai^thing should not have affective 
qualities and it might well be a criterion for being Aohilles that 
one had the affeotive quality 'heroism', or of religion, that it 
involvod the 'sublime'.
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ia sean as sueb by some subjeot or audience. Ha does not speoify 
what sort of audianoa aan oonfer the statua on a work. This also 
raises the question of where affaotivity lies and how far it extends 
- i.e., whether a work oan be a priori affective if no one finds it 
so, and various expressionist views, whioh will be dealt with fully 
in ohapter five.
fourthly, the argument to show how the affeotive oategories are a 
priori, is not eonvinoing - and this is the most important factor 
in this part of the seotion. If the argument is not satisfactory, 
one has to rely on self-evidenoo, and the thesis that there are a 
priori affeotive qualities, is most certainly not self-evident, 
i) Dufrenne's second point that an object oan be a priori beoause it 
founds the possibility of the empirical objeot comes down to saying 
that the objeet to whioh knowledge pertains is a priori, either! 
beoause it is the essence of the empirioal objeot end therefore 
a priori, ori beoause this objeot is the idea of the empirioal objeot 
and thirefore a priori.
Either way, he is distinguishing between what he terms the 
a priori obJeet^*and the empirioal objeot, and determining whether 
i*. is part of the empirioal objeot - as in the former alternative, 
or distinot from it, as in the latter:
"Mais en peut dire en eeoonù lieu que l'objet sur lequel 
porte oette oonnaissanoe . . . .  est lui-meme a priori, 
en tant qu'il fonde la possibilité de l'objet empirique."
(Vol.II. Part II, Chap.I. p .^ 4 5 ibid.)
It is unolear whioh he wishes to state. However, it would seem
to be the former alternative since he baoks up his olalm by saying. 
Kant understood the a priori in two ways - the second of whioh was
1 . The term 'objeot' is used by Dufrenno, though I assume that he 
is using it as equivalent to 'oonoept', sinoe objeets are not 
actually a priori.
m m
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that it determined the nature of an objeot ae an objeot of poaeible 
experience - nature suggests to one a quality or essenoe, rather 
than some sort of pre-determined or Platonie idea. In any oase, 
since he wishes to make qualities and not ideas, a priori, 1 take 
It that he meant the former.
But this is to equate being an essence with being a priori, and 
although one nay have a priori knowledge of the essenoe of X., this 
does not make the essenoe of X a priori. He seems to be transferring 
the a priori from the truth about something, to its being an empir- 
ioal faotor in that objeot.Moreover, his appeal to Kant is 
invalid - ainoe, 'determining the nature of an objeot .... . '
(of. above) does not involve the objeot in being a priori.
11) As to the deduotion of a three part meaning of the a priori, 
the first and second points have been disoassed in the comments on 
The notion of the a priori (of. the final part of the exposition 
on the a priori ac oonstitutive, and comment X. seotion I. of the 
present ohapter, on existentialism in the a priori). However, it 
is important to remember that they have not been proved - the oomment 
on the existential nature of the a priori is intended rather to 
refute the assertion - and are assertions oontra Kohl*
The first is a phenomenologioal viewpoint - that the objeots 
in the world are already oonstituted (and meaningful) prior to our
He does refer to what Kant meant by an 'idea' in this oontext 
(p.545 ibid), but this is very different from a Platonic idea.
2. Dufrenne is being oonslstent with what he says in The notion of 
the a priori (cf.present ohapter, Seotion X, end of exposition), 
though he does net distinguish between the two types of essenoes hsre 
- those which he regards as a priori, and those whieh he does not.
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conceptualisation, and Dufrenne develops this to the idea that the 
a priori aapeot constitutes the o b j e o t . T h e  second is spelled out 
in two quite different ways - the first arising here and in The 
notion of the a priori, as the a priori being existential beoause 
it is a quality of an object, and the seoond arising when Dufrenne 
refers to the oosmologioal and existential (Vol.II. Part II. Chap.1. 
seot.lZ. passim, of the Phinomenologie) where the a priori is held 
to be existential somewhat vicariously through the artist. These 
two reasons bear no relation to one a n o t h e r . T h e  third point is 
the assertion referred to above (present comment, four (i) ), and 
whish does not appear to be satisfaotorily proved.
Lastly, Dufrenne has olaimed that the a priori may be determ« 
ined in three aspeots of the relation between subject and objeot.
The important one of these with regard to the aesthetio objeot, is 
feeling, and X think Dufrenne has made out some oase for not reg­
arding feeling and the affective Qs subjective, at least in reapeot 
of art.
However, owing to the fact that Dufrenne not yet proved either 
that essence is equivalent to a priori, or that affeotive qualities 
are either of the two (or one if they are equivalent), affeotive 
qualities emerge as respectable non-subjeotive candidates for 1
1. Though it would seem that one oould oonstrue the phenomenological 
attitude differently - if objeots in the world ore already constituted 
and meaningful, they are therefore all a priori in the sense of hav­
ing meaning and being, prior or anterior to our experience of them.
In this oase anything would oount as a priori, and essences would 
have no speoial claim.
The second will be discussed in the following part of this section.
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aesthetic evaluation, but not (nooeasarily) a priori.JL» 
iul— Ska 114.tura. pX thy, afiegtj,vt 
Cosoolg^loal an4 e ^ y ^ a * .
Dufrenne refers to the relation of the oosmologioal and existential 
to the affeotive qualities (Vol.ll. Part ZZ. Chap.Z. seot.IZ.passim, 
op.ait.), seeing them os aspeots of the affeotive a priori. Briefly, 
the oosmologioal aspect is the world of the work, and the existential 
aspect is the author or spectator. Prina faoie, those are relational 
qualities, not inheront in tho affeotive a priori, but Dufrenne 
broadens tho soope of the aesthetio objeot to include them as part of 
it.
The existential. Dufrenne thinks tnot in order to Justify talking 
of the a priori of an objeot whioh is indefinitely diverse, the 
a priori of a work of art :.as to be assigned to something oonorete • 
a subjeot, but not an impersonal Kantian one, one who is related to 
his own world. This subjeot is the artist. However, it is not Just 
a question of the artist's world, but of tho speotator and his affin­
ity to toe work. The affeotive a priori constitutes a consistent 
ooheront world, and t ere is a sense in whioh the work only exists 
through the audienoe, and the audienoe through it. 1
1 . This should be qualified slightly. Tihat Dufrenne has not demon­
strated so far is that tne a priori io as he states: but it is neo- 
essary to redefine the term on something like Dufronne's lines, if one 
is to allow a priori offeotive categories, sinoo Kent's categories are 
neoesaary oonditions for oonoeptualisation, whioh is not true of aff­
eotive categories, l.e., one has to modify the oonoept greatly (though 
a3 1 have said, Z am dubious about Dufrenne's oonoept of the a priori).
"qua (la apeotateur) aoit requis par l'oeuvre ............
otla signifie qu'en sens l'oeuvre n’existe qua par la publlo 
qul la oonoretlsa at la reoonnait, mala ausai qu'alla a'impoaa 
a. la perception, at qua la publlo n'axiste qua par alia. Da 
mama qua la raoinian oree Raoina , J
da nSaa 1'oeuvre da Raoine, o'eat-a-dire anoore la raoinian, 
oraa son public".
(of. p.5 5 9. ibid.)
quits unoontroveraially, Dufranna naans by this that tha work oan 
only ba oallad a work of art If it la given this status by a publio, 
and oonversely, one oannot have a publio for a work, without there 
being soma work of art.^* 1 think that ha is being slightly rhetor- 
ioal in saying that tha work of Raoina oreates its publlo.
Tha Cosnoloaioal. This has bean referred to briefly above, and not a 
lot more needs to bs added. Dufranne holds that eaoh artist oreates 
his own world. Tha affaotive quality, as for example, the 'oomio* in 
Hollars, is an atnosphara which gives meaning to what we see and hear. 
It is a singular world oreated by Uoliere. Tha artist express*» his
Weltansohauung by tha profundity of the qualities of his work.£*
Dufranna regards tha oosmologioal and axistantial aspeots of tha
affeotive qualities as of squal significance, and thinks one must grasp 
tha affeotive quality as anterior to the speoifioation of either - it 
has immediate meaning.-i* (of. pp.560-1 ibid.)
JL, It would ba more aoouratu, therefore, though less grandiose, if 
Dufranne said that the work was given status only by the publio, rather 
than saying it existed through it - sinoe it exists as something, if 
not a work of art, irrespective of its being seen as a work of art.
¿, This will ba dealt with further in tha ohaptsr on expression.
J[. This has bean oommented on with regard to The notion of the a priori, 
(of. oomment seven.)
a»*»rmX and singular-(Tol.II. Part XX. Chap.II. INt.XX. P U l U . )  
Qufrannt takea up thè probi«* «blob «ri««« la Tho notlon of tho 
a priori of th# • priori «aA «rt in torna of «onorai and «incular. 
However, ho lo not boro oonoornod to provo tbat tho a priori io a 
«onorai torà, bui tbat tho notion of «onorali!/ io applloablo to 
art. Soaorallty ari««« booauoo tha «otogorioo aro «onorai (aa 
Cufroano poiatod «ut la Tho aotloa of tho a priori, «f. noi«« oa 
tbio, previoua aootloa). Ho rooo«aio«a tho individuai naturo and 
unlquonoss of a work of art, and «tato« tbat tho relation of «onorai 
to «incular 1« no problon nomali/, bui thl« la not tho «§■« wlth 
tho aoathotlo objoot, whoro tho individuai 1« not «ubaunablo under 
a gonro. A «ork of art 1« uniquo and ha« no rolatod univoroal, or 
«onorai «ot. Ho a«r«es that thero io a «onro or «onorai torà by 
«bloh ono oaa rofer to tho vork, but oonsidors that it la not thl« 
to «hioh ho io roforrlng. What ho nonni lo that thoro lo, for 
onanplo, tho 'tracio' in Beethoven and in Mahler, but th««o qual» 
iti«« aro not tho «ano in «aob. Tho problon lina la «laooif/in« 
thaa both a« 'tracio'. (Pari of tho unlquonoas of tho «ork realdes 
in tho faot that it la tho exprosaion of tho artici, aocordine to 
Dufranno.)
Ho thlnka that ono nuat «ook tho «onorality in tho «incular - 
tho ain«ular boia« tho known quallty, tho aoothotlo objoot. An 
oxanplr «f thla io aookla« Joy in a singular «ork of Mosart. But it 
la net only by nonna of tho quallty of Joy that «« Alaoovor tho 
■incular, but booauao Mosart «xprossoa alao tho quallty of huaanltyf'
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1. Aooordln« to Onfronno hunaaity la tho o«««n«o of aaa. Ho hold« 
that hunaaity and art hava nuoh in «omnon. Tho universal 'huaanlty' 
1« hold to ho in tho «ano rolotion to nan individuali/, «• tho 
nnivoraal 'art* 1« to oaoh «ork of art.
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Pour further assertions nhioh Dufrenne makes are:
(i) that the indeterminacy of the categories makes them applicable 
to the singular. (Presumably by singular he means individual 
instances of the use of the oategory.)
(ii) the work is that singular essenoe which attains universality.
(iii) that individual works of art and the spectator are linked by 
the general oategory of humanity.
(iv) the affeotive oategory is a capacity to disoern values through 
the apprehension - this presupposes in us a oertain sense of these 
values.-3( of. Vol.il. Part 11. Chap.111.)
What exaotly are affeotive qualities?
Aooordlng to Dufrenne the categories go under different names - 
essences, categories, aesthetio values, etc. As regards values, he 
only allows the 'beautiful' to qualify as a value, and defines value 
as the essenoe of being in so far as being is reciprocal to an eval- 
uating subJuot. Examples of affeotive qualities are, the 'beautiful' 
the 'sublime', the 'graoious', ete. The’etcetera' is intended to 
indioate tne difficulty of enumerating all the afx'eotive qualities. 
The soale whioh Souriau gives, and Dufrenne quotes, is regarded as 
good but not adequate.it* It has the merit of not placing the 'beaut?* 
iful at the top of a coale of qualities - whioh others normally do.
(of. Vol.lX. Part i::. Chap.II. pp.573-60
This difficulty in enumerating is turned into an impossibility 
(Vol.IX.Part IX. Chap.II. soot.III. pp594-8) when Dufrenne talks of 
the possibility of a pure aesthetio. The reasons he giv.s are that 
the eategories are not easily obJeotifiable - while one oan specify
the sero point of Quality, one oannot know if there is a ¿oro point
1. This is vague and highly uninformative.
2. This is irrelevant beoause it it has nothing t> do with the affbottw oateeprias.
3. This is reminiaoait of the leibnld.cn ChrtarUn tme adopted stone stage hi The notion 
of the a priori, (of. Present ohapter, eeotion I. oomment 2.)
i,. a* table cf 'reflexive essences ' from Souriai (p«575) 1» taken ftom L’hrenir de 
n«. ♦■hi««.» p . 106, and is also to be fbund In the article j At at Write, Revue.
Philosophioue. March, 1933.
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of quality, one oannot know if there ia a aero point of passion', 
and so on. They are also of indefinite number and are not listed 
beoause they are given in non-limitable modes of feeling. This is 
re-stated in le Poétique , when Dufrenne seysi
"(les) catégories ne peuvent pas faire l'objet d'une 
esthétique pure aussi rigoureuse que la métaphysique 
ou la physique pure. Étant justioiables du sentiment, 
elles ne peuvent etre conceptualisées - qu'approximativementj 
étant manifestées par des oeuvres dont la oréation est 
imp révisable^ «’.lies ne peuvent etre définitivement 
recensées." (of. Part 111. Chap.III. p.182 op.oit.)
Also, they are human categories, and sinoe one oannot give a determ­
inate a priori of man booause he is not determined according to 
elementary dimensions, but a multiplicity of situations, it follows 
tuat this applies to art as well. In apy oase, Dufrenne thinks that 
if one lookd at a priori knowledge one is dissuaded from attempting 
to sort out a definitive table.
He al>o holds that subjectivity and historicity get in‘the way 
of giving a list of the a priori affootive oategories. He puts 
relativity under the heading of subjectivity, and attaoks it. 
(Relativity in the sense of historical relativity, i.e., the view 
that sinoe different oulturea adopt different things as works of art, 
and abandon things previously held to be art, something's being art 
must be dependent on, or relative to, its hiatorioal/oultural, etc., 
looation.) According to Dufrenne, relativity is a warped viewpoint 
deriving from the limits of the audience's social, oultural and
personal horisons, from which he should break away. It restricts
«
understanding, and precludes objectivity, beoause either consciously 
or unoonsoiously, the audienoe ignores some aspects of the art. 
Historicity, or the plaolng of art in an historical oontext in order 
to understand it, is prohibited by Dufrenne, since it plaoes limits 
on the art, and surrounds it with a certain period,
(C.f. Vol.IZ. Chap.II. pp.600-7, «»P* Phénoménologie.)
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This part of Seotion II will be oommented on in the three divis­
ions into whioh it has fallen. (I.) There are only two points I 
have to make about the oosmologioal and existential in the a priori. 
For one thing, there is no obvious reason to assign the a priori to 
a oonorete subject - for the a priori is not neoesBarily diverse 
simply beoause those things in whioh it inheres are diverse. In any 
oaso, Dufrenne oould explain the a priori in terms of generality as 
he does in The notion of the a priori, and subsequently in the Phén­
oménologie. Otherwise he would seem to be removing the quasi-subjeot 
nature from the work of art, if he assigns its essenoe to its author. 
Moreover, he has given an explanation of the existential nature of 
the a priori, to his own satisfaction, in both The notion of the 
a priori, and the Phénoménologie (Vol.II. Part II. Chap.I. seot.I.), 
and to remove the existential from the work is to abandon much of 
what he has said of the a priori.
I think it should be assumed that Dufrenna is overstating his 
Oase in saying he assigns the a priori to the artist, or else that 
he means that the a priori nature of the work is derived in some 
unspecified way from the artist (and possibly even from the audienoel 
I.e., the affeotive quality of the • orrifio' in Bosoh only exists 
beoause the artist made the work ’horrific', and/or the audienoe 
sees it as horrifie.
In the second plaoe, the oosmologioal/existential notion of the 
work of art does not appear to further the view that a work of art 
is a priori affeotive. It may be true that Mollere oreates a *oanio • 
world, but this means only that his work is affeotive. I think that 
if anything were needed, Dufrenne*s disoussion of the oosmologioal/ 
existential, and general/singular, are ideal examples of aspeots of 
the affective oategories whioh seem to have very little to do with 
being a priori. The former oertainly does not seem to forward the 
idea of art as a priori, andprima faoie, neither does the latter.
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However (II), there doea seem to be a problem about the general» 
ity of the affeotive oategories - or ao Dufrenne lmaglnea. Hia aolut- 
lon la perfectly acceptable apart from the invocation of humanity, 
but Z think that when the problem ia apelled out, it disappeara.
(a) With regard to art alone, the whole work ia oertainly unique, 
and in thia aenae ia not aubaumable under any genre. However, Duf­
renne ia talking of affective qualitiea within eaoh work, and aurely 
the 'traglo' in eaoh or any individual work oan have the aame relat- 
ionahip to the 'tragio' aa a general oategory? I.e«, the 'tragio'
in Beethoven and that in Mahler have the atatua of individual inat- 
anoea of the'tragio', aubaumable under the apeolea or oategory 
'tragio'. Indeed, it ia preoiaely beoauae the affeotive oategory ia 
general, that it allowa of auohdiverae examples. And ainoe worka of 
art are ao oompletely different (not only, for example, literature 
from muaio, olaaa from olaas, but inatanoos within a oleas), it ia 
neeeasary to uae general terma to define them - otherwise one oould 
never make comparisons or oategoriae works together,
(b) If one takes Kantian theories, these alao are general, for
example, 'shape' in a square is oompletely different from that in
#
a rhomboid (even though the generality may derive from emptiness of 
oontent). Thus, a difference in content or description of inatanoea 
of a category, does not in any way prevent there being oategories, 
certainly not aesthetic ones, with possibly a formal definition.
To take up Dufrenne'a reference t® humanity as analogous to any 
affeotive quality (of. p .588 op.oit.), he has said that there is 
something within eaoh individual whioh ia humanity. Thia is where 
the problem ooours for Dufrenne, because if he holds humanity to be 
analogous to an affeotive quality, then the question arises of what 
it ia within each e.g., 'tragio* work, whioh is the aame in all. It 
saema that he might solve the problem by adopting a position some­
thing akin to that of Abelard on universale - that an affective 
category ia a ooneept whioh nevertheless haa or ¿1 an easenee. The
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difference would be that this essenoe was not a single faotor oomcon 
to all those things sharing in the affective oategory. The osssnos 
of the 'tragis' oould therefore differ between works of art - the 
important thing being that the easenoe of the work was ths 'tragio'. 
Thus, a general oategory oan serve ac an essenoe or a priori feat­
ure albeit that its description differs between works.
It would have been simpler had Dufrenne not invoked humanity.lt 
is olearer to explain the relation of general a prioria to indiv­
idual works of art in terms of the affeotive qualities rather than 
other universals suoh as humanity.
(1X1) lYhat is said of 'value' sounds oonfusing. However, it is 
understandable why Dufrenne regards the 'beautiful' as the only 
Value, sinoe (a), the'beautiful' is sometimes equated with 'work of 
art', (of.Kant, Critique of Judgment^- )j (b) it oould therefore be 
called tiio essence of a work, wh~oh is defined by Dufrenne as value] 
and, (o) to suj something is beautiful is in any case to make a 
value judgment, as a rule&* (whilst some other aesthetio terms/ 
affootive qualities, are non-evaluativaX <2 *
The attack he makes on relativistio Judgments is itself perf­
ectly sound, but provides no real reason for not boing able to 
spooify the affootive oatogories. 1
1. Pub. Hafner, New York, 197?, possim, and esp. seoond and third 
Moments.
p. it oould be used purely desoriptively - if for example one were 
being taught to differentiate qualities of oertain periods one 
might be told that Neo-Classioist . ainting was beautiful rather 
than reallstie. However, it is normally an evaluative term.
3t At least, no further than assigning the status of art to some­
thing
Finally, Dufrenne's conclusion tiiat there is a pure aesthetlo, 
whioh oan never be aotualiaed fully would not be so problematic If 
it were not for the fact that he refers to it as a pure aesthetic, 
i.e., if it were Just stated that there is sn indefinite nunber of 
affective categories which - possibly beoause they are added to all 
t-.e time by new forms of art - oan never be fully enumerated (just 
contingently, not as a logioal necessity). However, it is oontent- 
ious to state boldly that there is a pure aesthetic that oan never be 
aotualised. This will be explained further in the following and 
final part of the seotion,
(iil) Our knowledge of the affective a priori#.
Dufrenne outlines this in terms of (a) feelingl*, and (b) intuition, 
feeling, aooording to him is only a disinterested way of getting to 
know an affective quality as the struoture of an objeet. This state* 
ment, whioh oomes at the beginning of the seotion on the a priori 
affeotive qualities, sounds strange - sinoe feeling is obviously not 
sometning disinterested. However, what Dufrenne seems actually to be 
saying is tnat (i) the feeling of an affeotive quality is distinot
from that quality in any work (ii) seme work may possess a certain affective
quality, but our recognition of the quality does not entail our 
feeling it.
What he says is the more confused beoause he uses the example of 
desirability in a woman - and does not make it olear whether he takes 
'desirable* in the sense of 'the sort of thing which oould be the 
objeot of desire', or, 'actually desired by someone', (of. Vol.IZ. 
Part 11. Chsp.Z. pp.543*4.)
Dufrenne later turns to our immediate, or intuitive knowledge of 
the affeotive eategories (Vol.il. Part 11. ohap 1Z. pp.571584 cap.). 
Pure intuition (in the sense of being the possibility of intuition) 
is ungraspable. He compares the aot of understanding * whioh is the 1
1 . The French term used by Dufrenne is 'sentiment'.
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'desirable' in the sense of 'the sort of thing whioh oould be the 
objeot of desire', or, 'actually desired by someone', (of. Vol.ll. 
Fart XI. Chsp.I. pp.543-4.)
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1 . The French term used by Dufrenne is 'sentiment'.
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foundation of all judgment - with the affeotive a prioria. We have 
a knowledge of them even before feeling reveala them to ua, Thia ia 
a knowledge of the affeetive categories « whioh, ua I said (of.notei 
page 1 of aeotion I, present ehapter) - are to the affeotive qualit­
ies as olaas to inatanoe. Aa an example, he atatea that if one oan 
feel the 'tragi*' in a work of Kaoine, or the 'serenity' in a work 
by Each, we have some idea of 'tragedy' or 'serenity' anterior to 
all feeling, i.e., of what one must oall (according to Dufrenne) the 
affeotive categories :
"Si nous pouvons sentir le tragique de Racine ou le 
pathétique de Beethoven ou la sérénité de Bach, c'est 
que nous avons quelque idée, anterieure à tout sentiment, 
du tragique, du* pathétique ou du saroin, c'est -a-dire 
de oe qu'il nous faut appeler désormais les categories 
affectives . . . . .  .. ."
Vol.II.Part II. Chap.II.pp.571-2.)
He specifies a differenoe in the affeotive categories and then 
adds three points to substantiate the rather bold olaim just made. 
Firstly, the categories in aesthetios cannot give a pure aesthetio 
as rigorous as, for instanoe, physios. Seoondly, however, though 
it may be difficult to disoover what is a priori in aesthetios, 
this empirioal problem does not preolude the a priori, Just as 
one's ignoranoe of geometry, does not preolude its having a priori 
qualities. Thirdly, our knowledge of neoessity in any field may be 
ia^lioit, but it is none the lass present. Fourthly (and here he 
aoknowledges that he is going beyond Kant), one may never have ooqp- 
lete knowledge of any a priori science. The implioation of the last 
point ia that if thia is the oase, then a lack of ooaplete knowledge 
of the affeotive categories of aesthetics is no evldenoo against 
their existono*.
1 6U-
The conclusion Dufrenne makes from this is that we are 
authorised to think that there is pure aesthetio to whloh we 
implicitly refer, but whioh oan never be definitively aotualised. 
According to him, our knowledge of the affective qualities 1* is a 
recognition or recoileotion. Just as one only knows that an object 
is spatio-temporal if spaoe and time are given a priori, one oan 
only know an expression if one's knowledge is a priori!
"fit en effet, la oonnaissanoe de le qualité affective 
que livre le sentiment est toujours une reconnaissance.
Devant ce monde ... il me semble que Je sais déjà ce 
que Je lis dans 1{exprèssion; si le signe est immédiate­
ment signifi ant, o'est que la signification est connue 
avant d'avoir été apprise an sorte que tout apprentissage.
✓ Ane fait que confirmer un savoir préalable. Le fait meme 
que nous puissions expliciter le sentiment, ... atteste la 
présence de oe savoir."
and:
"Car oomment puia-Je exprimer la. qualité affeotive 3ans 
recourir à une catégorie affeotive, et si oette catégorie 
affeotive ne »'est pas déjà oonnuo de quelque faoon? .g.» 
comment peroevrais-Je do3 objets spatio-teraporols, dit 
Kant ... si 1 espace et la temps n'etaient données a priori?"
(Vol.II ibid pp.577-3)
He us 0 3 
referring to
the word 'quality* here, presumably because ha is
.. .*4. of the specific work,our aeatnetic experience *
The oti.er relevant assertions Jufronne makes (pp.57&-9d4f jbid.), are > 
firstly that knowledge of the Effective category cioes not ada anything 
to it, and being genexal oannot specify the unique quality of any pert 
iouiar expression. J-* Zt gives tne fundamental note of the feeling. 
Seoondly, the categories eaoh express a oertain meaning nhioh one oan 
give to the world, for exaaple, 'tragi«' quality. The feelings exp­
ressing the effective categories are a priori existeutials in the 
sense that t ay are known a priori and designate fundamental human 
attitudes.
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There are several ninor points to be made initially before talcing 
Uufreane's argument that one has foreknowledge, dr immediate knowledge 
of the categories.(
think that he is importantly oorreot in making the dist­
inction between feeling as it exists in us, and as it exists (as an 
affective quality), in a work of art. It is essential to be oloar 
that Dufrenne s not making the simplistic (though true) point, that 
an audience is affeoted by works of art. It is not a matter of emot­
ional reaotiun on the part of the audienoe, but of a oertain type of 
quality waioh Dufrenne wishes to attribute to V  Sso «orr.s - namely 
an affeotive quality. Of oourse, since it is an affective quality, 
it is entailed that there is an effeot on the audienoe, but Dufronne 
is not concerned to explain this here. His theory bears a marked 
reoemblanoe to one of three possible expressionist theories, i.e., 
that the wane of ert expresses some quality (rather t;;an (a) the 
artist expresses himself through the work, of.Y.ordsworth or Tolstoy .?•, 
or (b) the audienoe has some emotional reaction to a work, where the 
work is the efficient oause of tuis of., also empathy theories, where
the quality is anthropomorthioall.v attributed to the_wo rk ._by
11 This has been dealt with in the previous section on the general
end singular in th# effective outogorios.
2. See, What is art, pub. The World's Classics, (isr pib.18 9 8.) 1969.
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transference from the human emotion felt). Thie will be developed 
further in ohepter five.
Saoondlv. it ie a dubious enterpretation of Kant to aay that we have 
knowledge of the a prioria prior to experience. 1 should prefer to aay 
that Kant regarda them aa conditions of oonoeptuallsation. Nor do 1 
think Dufrenne would normally read Kant in this way« especially sinoe 
he says (p.6 58 op. oit.)«
"sans doute oea a priori n'ont pas sur l'experienoe une
antériorité ohronologique; mais ils en sont la oondition ..." 
Thirdly. there are thr e points in the quotation ci ted, whioh are 
suspeot.
(a) the presupposition that given a work, one oan define t. e feeling or
affeotive quality in it (of,, "le fait meme que nous puissions 
explioiter le sentiment and that this oonfirms one's fore­
knowledge of the affeotive quality. It is not the oase that one can do 
this, and Dufrenne provides no svidenoe to suppose that one oan.
(b) He makes the inoorreot presupposition that unless one already 
knows tne answer to one's question, one will not recognise the answer 
when one finds it. (Cf. "Co ment puis-Je exprimer le qualité affeotive
s / \ .. . .  . . si (la) categorie ne m'est pas déjà oonnue . . .  •"•)
(o) It is not legitimate to use spaoe and time as analogous to 
affeotive a priori», sinoe tnese are Kant's two internal forms of 
intuition - oonditions of any oonoeptualisation and pre-given, accord­
ing to Kant, rather than the ordinary Kantian oategories. 
fourthly. Dufrenne is taking his usual essentialist line in saying 
that tie affective category provides the fundamental note of the fe&ing 
in a work. This is not in itself obJeotionable, merely uninformatife - 
sinoe it does not help one to discover whether Dufrenne thinks there 
is some essenoe of, e.g., the 'tragio', whioh ia tuo same in all 
tragio works, or whether it may differ between works. (Cf,present 
ohepter, section TI (i) oomment (ii).)
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Flftnly. the explanation of the a priori aa axiatential — beoauao It 
designates fundamental human attitudes • is not the same as that 
given in The notion of the a priori. where it is regarded aa exist­
ential beoouae it ia experienced (supposedly)• The present explan« 
ation ia less controversial. It gives •existential' the sense of 
•referring to existents'- namely human attitudes, snd there is e very 
wide gap between something referring to an existent and its being on«J 
This makes far more sense, sinoe 'a priori' is by definition prior to 
experieee, and if one takes 'existential' in the sense of 'being 
experienced', one ends up with tne existential a priori &e a contra­
diction in terms (th<* experienoed prior to experienoe). (Cf.present 
ohepter, seotion 1 , oomment 1 .)
There are two fundamental problems with what Dufronne suya, however. 
Theue return ua to the problem of immediate recognition of the 
a priori, disouased in the first seotion of this ohapter (oomment
A. It is simply dogma to say that one has an idee of any affeotive 
quality or feeling, prior to feeling it. This view is derived 
partly from the presupposition I have Just oritioised, that a thing 
(here a feeling) oould not be Identified if one was unaware what it 
would be like before feeling it. On the whole it io the idea of
j
immediate recognition or reoolleotlon, using this inourroot idea to 
support it.
One way to solve the problem of reeog.-ising a quality in a work 
of art la to say that one does have an idea of tie oonoept, but in 
the sense that one knows its non-eesthetlo use by virtue of exper­
ienoe and inetruetlon and language, and applies It then to aesthotioe. 
There is of course no necessity to learn the non-aesthetlo usage 
first - one could just as well learn the meaning of 'serenity* from
certain music, and then apply it to pjiaons sooonu&riiy. JSither way, 
however; expsrionoo, instruction, repetition, etc., provide the means 
of learning the meaning of the offeotive categories, and there is no 
need to olaim the knowledge as innate or anterior to experience*
The trouble with this explanation, from Dufre no’s point of view, 
is that it weakens the ease for oalllng offeotive qualities, a priori 
oategoriee, slnoe they now beoome ordinarily learnt terms and no longer 
oonditions of understanding »oiks of art.i* However, I see no reason 
to aooept Jufreune's case, nines (a) there is no reason to suppose one 
has foreknowledge or immediate recognition of tne oategories Ob), his 
oleins booking tnia have been seen to be invalid (of. oomuent above 
(third) (a), (b) and (o) ); and (o), one oan give a porfaotly good 
explanation for understanding what ae oells the effective qualities, 
in terms of learning • at 2 nave outlined above.
E. The argument seems to rest on a presupposition that one oan never 
reaoh or speolfy a pure eesthetlo, and then saying there ¿g neverthe­
less an impliolt, pure aesthetio - which la one wey of avoiding the 
question of w..y it is never aotuliat . hut tals does not explain why 
one should aooept the existence of a pure aesthetio, or aesthetic 
categories us a priori. tiufrenne has mads no firm attempt to give a 
oomplets speoifioction of the aestiotio oategories. that ho h§s done 
is to give various reasons w y it oam.ot bo done • fron the nature of 
aesthetio categories (of. Chapter 3, seotx.n XX. (II) final part) whioh 
only inolines ona to auppoao that there really is no pure aesthetie. If 
Dufrenne ware to make an attempt at a positive spsoifioation, it would 
boost tne olaim for the pure aesthetie, aino« ae well as presenting one 
with the felt aooompllt, he oould go on to argue that any one or eat of 
tne affeetive oategories was a neoesaary oondition for X being a work of *1
Jk£ii_____________________________________________________ __
1. tin reflection, 1 see no reaBon w y being learnt should be i< oompatthk
with being n oondition of understanding art, but it is incompatible with
being an a priori oatsgoiy - by d^inition if one means "soquirsd" by
"learnt"*
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certain tasic, and then apply it to p-mona seoonuarily. ¿¡ither way, 
however; experience, inatruotion, repetition, eto., provide the aeons 
of learning the meaning of the affootive categories, and there ie no 
need to olein the knowledge us innote or anterior to experience*
'¿'ho trouble with t«is explanation, from Dufrei.no'a point of view, 
is thot it weakens the ease for oalllng effeotlTe qualities, a priori 
categories, slnoe they now beoome ordinarily learnt terms and no longer 
conditions of understanding works of art.A" However, X see no reason 
to aooept Oufrenne's oi.se, sines (a) there is no reason to suppose one 
has foreknowledge or immediate recognition of the categories (*b), his 
oleims backing tnis haws been seen to be invalid (of. oomt.ent above 
(third) (a), (b) and (o) )j and (o), one can givo o perfectly good 
explanation for understanding what he oulls the offeotive qualities, 
in teres of learning - as I uovo outlined above.
The argument seems to rest on a presupposition that one oan never 
roao.i or speoify a pure aesthetic, and then saying there neverthe­
less an impliolt, pure aesthetic - which la one wry of avoiding the 
question of w .y it is never aotulis* , hut tnis does not explain why 
one should aooept t lie existence of a pure aesthetlo, or aesthetic 
categories as a priori. hufrenno has ¿.ado no firm attempt to give a 
oomplete speoifioetion of the aest.ietio oatcgorles. that he hgc done 
is to give various reasons w..y it oanuot bu done • fron the nature of 
aesthetic categories (of. Chapter 3, sootiun IX. (11) final part) which 
only inclines one to suppose that there really is no pure aesthetic. If 
Oufrcnnc were to make an attempt at a positive Specification, it Would 
boost the olalm for the pure aesthetic, si no« as well as presenting one 
with the fait aoooapllt, ha oould go on to argue that any one or aet of 
tne affective oategories was a neoeasary oondition for X being a work of
............................................................................................- ........................- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---
1 . Un refleotlon, 1 sue no roason w y beine learnt ehould be i ooc.poti.bte •
with boing n oondition of understendine art, but it io inoonpstible with
being an a priori Oategory - by d^*inition if one moans "eoquired" by
*learnt".
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One oan see why Dufrenne requires this theory of immediately end 
intuitively reoognising en expression or effective quality in a work. 
If it «ore valid he would dispense with all the analysis and art theory 
.to., whioh is normally considered nedessary to one's understanding of 
a work of art. Then the aesthetio experienee oould be the p rely 
contemplative, non-analytic, no-theory laden experienoe whiah Dufrenne 
sometimos supposes it to be, as will be aeei^ in the fourth ohapter. One 
eould contemplate a work of art and understand it immediately. Unfort­
unately, one oannot just aooept what he says without further argmment- 
ation.
tffIMM.
The Affeotive Categories and Expression.
Dufrenne often refers to expressiveness in assood.ation with the aff­
eotive categories. Basically his view is that the affeotive categories 
are expressive. Not every a priori is expressive, the more formal it 
is, the less expressive. But the material a prioris (and the affective 
Oategoriea fall intc this class) are. He says that the a priori "is 
to be found above all in what is expressed". (Cf. Notion of the a 
priori. Part 1. Chap.V. p.111.) This is supposedly derived from the 
assertion that the object expresses the a priori meaning.JL* And from 
the idea that the objeot expresses itself, he goes on to the »<11^ 111^  
that "what expresses itself is worthy of being termed a self) it 
expresses itself because it is a self . . , . " (p.112 ibid.) Whether 
the work is a quasi-subjeot, self, or not, is not at question here.
The importance of t-ls is that it places expression in the work of art. 
1 . In an aesthetio context the objeet is the work of art,which is exp-
resslee, and the affective quality is the t ing which makes the work
expressive, l.e., it is the expression itself (Phénoménologie p.5 4 9,
that the affeotive quality is a priori when, expressed by a work, it is
constitutive of the worh of the aesthetic object.
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However, xn the Phenonenologie he broadens the idea to extend to 
both artist and spectator - the e priori effectives are the conditions 
under wiiioh a world nay be felt, either by the artist expressing hinseLf 
by his own world, or the speetator who associates himself with the 
artist by reading the expression (of. Vol.lZ. Part IV. Intro, p.539).
This iaplles a different idea of expression in a work of art - i.e., 
that the artist expresses himself, not the work whioh is expressive.
This is similar either to the view of Tolstoyl* whereby the artist 
oommunloates feelings vis the work, making art the means to this 
ooamunleatlve end, or that of Wordsworth, whereby the artist simply 
expresses himself in his work ("emotion reeolleoted in tranquillity"). 
The intention here is not neoessarily to communloate, simply to be 
self-expressive.
Nevertheless, sinoe Dufrenne immediately returns to referring to 
the work of art as the expressive objeot (p.54-0 ibid.) X think it is 
safe to assume that be regards tie work as expressive, and that when he 
refere to the artist expressing himself he is equating the artist with 
his work. This is totally different from either Tolstoy or Wordsworth, 
for whom the work is always dlstinot from the artist, and provides the 
medium for the artist's self-expression.
This leaves the olaim that the work of art is self-expressive (and 
thus a quasi-subJeot), intact. It is a presupposition throughout the 
theory of affeotlve categories that they are expressive, and that it is 
a funotion of a work of art to express. Z shall deal with the question 
of whether art is neoessarily expressive, in Chapter five.
All tnat remains to be asked here is whether every affeotive Cat­
egory is expressive. Sinoe Dufrenne denies the possibility of provid­
ing a oonplete set of affeotlve categories one oan either deal with 
these rather sweepingly by stipulating that if is not oppressive it 
is. by definition, not m  effective category, or by taking any of th* 
la Op.olt.
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fkffeotlve categories which ha doas aooept (those of Souriau, of.Vol.il. 
P.575 ibid), and querying whether it is expressive! or by analysing the 
meaning of 'affective category'. The first possibility rules out the 
problem by definition. The seoonu. leaves the view intact, sinoe any 
of Souriau’s values or aesthetio categories can be exprossive, e.g., 
'heroism','sublimity', 'spirituality', eto. The third settles the 
issue fairly effectively. Whatever is effective must express aomething 
otherwise it could not 'affeot'. (To be linguistically exaot, the 
affeotive quality in a work is the quality which expresses, e.g., the 
'graoious', and it is the work itself which is expressive, beoause it 
expresses graoe/graeiousness. This is grammatical pedantry, however.)
Thus it is safe to aooept that the affeotive categories are 
equivalent to expressive oategories.
Conoluslon.
iiven if it were the oase that Dufrenne had suooessfully established 
the affeotive oategories as a priori, there would still remain quest« 
ions to be answered. fortunately at least the seoond of these can be 
countered.
firstly, if there are objectively in any work of art, certain affeotive 
a priori qualities whioh are intuitable, immediately known, and recog­
nisable, then why are there disagreements as to the qualities any work 
possesses? Presumably beoause X intuits oorreotly, and Y does not.
But intuitionist theories are unverifiable, so that ono oannot deoide 
on tneir grounds, who is oorrsot. Here 1 think the arguments of this 
chapter, section 1 , oouent six, effectively show w at problems are 
raised when one leaves so much to the intuition.
Secondly. different eras ohange in their assessment of styles of art. 
Thus, a certain work may be regarded as 'art* (and possessing, e.g., 
the affective quality of the 'heroio') nt t1* and not art at t?*
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Is it the osae that the work loses its a priori affeotive category 
when it oeasea to be regarded as art? Dufrenne oould try to answer 
this relativist viewpoint, by saying the question of losing and 
regaining a priori oategories does not arise for him, sinoe he does 
not agree with this relativism, Unfortinately, he does believe in at 
least this fora of relativism - that a work can be art at tl» and not 
at tP* beoause it requires the pereeption of someone of xt as art, 
before it beoomes art properly.
As a matter of fast, this partioular inatanoe is not really a 
problem for Dufrenne. If X is a priori«! at t1j but oeases to be X at 
t^* then it may also oease to be<^, But to be a priori«! does not 
entail that Z oannot oease to be a priori oc , as long as X oeases te 
be X. I,e., a table is an a priori spatial body, but if it is burnt 
and thus «eases to be a table, then what was a priori true of it 
oeases to have any sianifioanoe. Prime faoie the oooasion on whieh a 
problem would arise would be that on whioh X remained X but oeased t* 
be a priori <5!. . I.a., if a work of art remains one, but instead of
being regarded as ’tragic', is regarded as possessing some affeotive 
quality incompatible with being 'tragio' - e,g., being 'oomio'.ii*
It is of eourse open to someone to reply that although there ia 
only one 'work' as sueh, e.g., hamlet, the different interpretations 
resulting in oontrary evaluations entail that there are two works of 
art* The problem with this is knowing where to draw the line regard­
ing the nuaber of works of art one play, for instanae, «an provide.
And it ia not usual to assert that there is anything like a one-one_ 
j_. This is one of his more unstable positions sinoe he also believes
that a work awaits our peroeption or reoognition of it as art, and
therefore that it is In some way art prior to our peroeption of it as
sueh, (And not just a 'potential work of art, either*)
In order to be problematio the affeotive oategories must be inoomp-
atible otherwise Dufrenne oan, and will, reply that the work remaine
•tragio*, but it is also.e.g,, 'heroio', and the wide-reneing set of
affeotive oategories predioable of the work only serve to demonstrate
its seope
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oorrelation between interpretation« ana work« of art. Nor is it a 
etep whioh Dufrenne ever takes - he regards it as true that there is 
one work open to a number of interpretations.
This brings us back to the problem of incompatible a priori 
affective qualities. And sinos it is self-eontradiotory to say that 
something is (p.^p)» the only solution seems to be to say that 
though the a priori affective qualities of a work may be added to,or 
seen differently, within a certain range la degree, they oannot be 
different in kind - as are the 'tragic' and the 'oomie'.
There is of oourse no logioal impossibility in a work being 
regarded as 'oomle' at t1*, and 'tragic' at t2* ■» but the letter 
point would entail one's ooneept of the 'tragio' and t o  'oomio' 
changing, if the same qualities ore to oonstitute both, in one woilc. 
If one does not stipulate that the same qualities, viewed in the sa 
way, are held to oonstitute the work aa a priori both 'tragio' and 
'oosio', Dufrenne oan get around the problem. That is, he can say 
one is taking different aspects of the work into account in oalllng 
it 'tragic' and 'oomio', and it is porfeotly compatible for aspeots 
a-h to be 'trsgio' and n-r to be 'oomio'. The work is thus both 
'tragio' and 'oomio' without oontradiotion.
with regard to the a priori as Dufrenne oonoexves it, it may not 
be essential for Dufrenne's theory of affective a prloris that one 
mames as radical a ohange in the oonoept as he proposes in The notion 
of the a priori. To aooopt the idea of affeotlve oategorles as 
a priori one needs firstly to aooept the materiel a priori (sinos the 
affeotive categories ooms into this oíase), and eeoondly that there 
are at least some e priori# that one experiences, namely those whioh 
Seme under the heeding of affeotlve oetegoriee. But this latter does 
not go towards proving that these oategorles ere e priori (in Dufreme 
or anyone alee'a asnee of the term) l.e, immediately comprehended and 
intuited* And if one weakens the notion to the extent of saying that 
there is an existential e priori wi;ioh may not be universally
174
recognised (in the case of the material a priori), which one ma$ fail to 
disoover - than even allowing for ita being knowable via the understand» 
ing alone (whioh one should not, beoause this has not been proved) it 
loses muoh of its foroe. And it does so without gaining anything, as it 
remains to be ¡and that the aesthetie oategories are a priori (as 1  
have just noted).
The whole of this ohapter shows that in his attempt to show that 
art is a priori, fiufrenne is invariably struggling, and usually treading 
a rather dubious path. He wants to alter Kant's notion in order to be 
able to start showing that art oan be a priori, but I think Seotlon I 
shows that this is net a simple procedure. Xn his inolinstion to make 
the a priori a^  workable aesthetie cot^ept, he overloads it to a great 
extent. He also lets so many possibilities enter that the notion may 
easily beeome so vague as to be meaningless for ull practical purposes.
The first seotion of this ohapter has illustrated both Dufrenne's 
eonoept of the a priori, and various drawbacks whioh this has, and whieh 
may apply to the eoneept of the 9 priori affeotive categories. The 
fundamental problem in the notion of affeotive oatagories is that 
Dufrenne has not proved them to be a priori (and thus neoessary cond­
itions of X being art) of. Seotion I. Comment ii and Seotion IX (i), 
of this ohapter. Nor has he satisfactorily explained our knowledge of 
them - of. Seotion IX (ii); and rather than attempting to outline the 
pure aesthetio whioh he olaims to exist, he has given reasons for the 
impossibility of doing so, whioh rather easts doubt on its existenoe - 
of. Seotion XI (il), final part. X.e., suoh a weak oase for a pure 
aesthetie tends to undermind rather than uphbld it.
His opinion Is also undermined by the faot that disoussions of the 
effective oategories and the eosmologioal/exiatential or general/sing- 
ular, seem to have very little bearing on the question ef whether art 
is or is not a priori. Dufrenne gives us examples of qualities pred- 
ioable of various works of art (some of which seem oleeeifioatory -
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e. g., the 'tragio' - but are not intended to be eeen aa denoting art 
types). But these terma are prevalent in any praotioal aesthetio 
work, and the proof that he wants aid whioh is lacking, is that these 
qualities, and works of art ss a whole, oan oonolusively be regarded 
as a priori.
The present chapter does show tha£ there is no legioal barrier 
to the theory, i.e., the idea of the a priori affeotive categories is 
not oontradietoxy. However, this is patently insufficient and negat­
ive. What is required is sons firm reason for accepting then. The 
only positive oonolusions that seem to have been regohed are (i) that 
the affective categories are not subjeotive, and (ii) that the categ­
ories oan be general, i.e., that although aesthetio oonoepts suoh as 
'joy' have completely different instantiations, there is no barrier 
to classifying them under the same aesthetic - priori category. 
Unfortunately, it is only too obvious thqt tnie is a rather lane 
oonolusion.
I think this whole ohapter makes it fairly plain that it is 
virtually impossible to accord art a priori status. It is a result 
of Uufrenne's mistekenbelief that art is a priori that he finds he is 
oompelled to invoke Kant to demonstrate his point. Yet he has to 
rejeot muon of the Kantian view in order to apply the a priori to 
art. And when one cnalyses this, one realises the magnitude of the 
task he is setting himself - namely making Kent a phenomenologist in 
order to clothe art in something it will not wear - the a priori.
Thus, this ohapter is inevitably the moat negative. Nevertheless 
1 nave attempted to disouss any points of interest whioh have arisen, 
and in the following ohapters - feur and five - X shall discuss 
aspeots of uesthetio theory where I oan agree more with what Dufrenne 
has to eey.
176
S a A E m  yoyR. IHK aesthetic a t v i t u d b.
Introduction.
Sufficient attention has now bssn given to the e priori per se. I 
think it is now tine to take three major topios of Dufrenne's work - 
(i) the aesthetie attitude (il), expression and (iii) meaning - and 
see how they work out in his system, for it is in these fields that 
mush of his positive and valuable work lies, and where Bufrenne oan 
be said to have made a contribution to aesthetios in his disoussion 
of the objeotive features both of the work and our attitude toward it. 
But, before beginning, I should point out that I am not drawing a line 
between what has been diaoussed in the previous ohapters, und what is 
about to be disoussed, and aooounting the former negative, and the 
latter positive. It should have been fairly olear in the last three 
ohapters that mush of what Dufrenne said on the quasi-pour-aol, the 
status of art, and the a priori was positive; und that, espeoially 
with regard to the first ohapter, he oorreotly oited various objeetive 
features of the work. In part, the two following ohapters are elab­
orations on the quaai-pour-soi notion (espeoially the fifth). In part, 
they are self-oontained disouasions - and they should be regarded as 
suoh until it oomea to tying up the loose ends on the quasl-pourasol 
at the end of ohapter five. At present I shall deal with the 
aesthetlo attitude.
As Morris Welts points outi* dissuasions about the aeathetio 
attitude often fail to distinguish between the descriptive and the 
normative. I shall attempt to avoid this, or point it out as it 
ooeurs, in order to prevent oonfusion. Ti'eits presents one of the most 
oomprehensive coverages of the aesthetio attitude, and oonoludes that 
the oonteaplative is the oorreot one (though oontemplation is a loose 1
1. see, Morris Weitsj Philosophy of the arts,. Russell & Russell, Mew 
York, 196R, Chapter 9, p.153.
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word and requires strioter definition than it normally reoeivea).
Thia ia alao the oonoluaion of Hoapers Ik* and Bullough ¿»i and that 
of Dufrenne, although he reaahea hia oonoluaion independently of any 
other views.
The idea of an aeathetie attitude la ill-defined, and it ia 
often used without the user eonaidering what he meana. The oampa 
can be roughly divided into two - thoae who regard it aa contemplat­
ive in (oae way, and thoae who do not, Bullough is one of the few 
who gives a specific attitude to be adopted to art, whereas most 
other views see the question as one of experiencing something - 
partaking of the emotions of the work, wish-fulfilment, eto.
In an unpublished paper entitled "The oritie and the lover of 
art", fc. K. Elliot disousses the aeathetio attitude in terms of 
aesthetio evaluation. But the evaluative attitude concerns itself 
with what oriteria one uses in deciding whether or not something is 
art, and makes a final judgment, whereas the aesthetic attitude is 
more ooneernbd with the way in whioh one does (desoriptive), or 
snould (normative), look at the work and its aesthetio properties.
It involves evaluation but not, I think, the final judgment (see 
Seotion III (i) re. understanding a work). Thus, there is a fair 
possibility of oonfusion over the oontent of the oonoept,'aesthetio 
attitude'. Nor should one be misled by Elliot's request for freedom 
of evaluation (as opposed to the acceptance of some aesthetic norm, 
as, for example, Significant Fornwi*), into thinking that there oan be 
no single aesthetio attitude. Nor does the aooeptanoe of this latter 
preclude its having different instantiations - e.g., that it is 
1* See, John Hospersj Meaning and truthjm the arte, Chapel Hill,1946.
2. See, Edward Bullough; Aesthetios. ed. E.U.Wilkinson,Bowes A Bowes,
1957.
3. See, Clive Bell, op.oit.
contemplative, but varying in degree according to the type of work 
in question. I do not know whether Elliot would aooept this, but it 
seems plausible enough. Indeed Bullough aotually deals with this, 
going over what he oonsiders to be the normal degree of distance 
provided by any art olass.^»*
I think it fairly dear, or will beoome so, that it is not nec­
essary for Dufrenne'a theory that art is a priori to be oorreot, in 
order for it to be possible for him to be oorreot about the aesthet­
ic attitude. Obviously the aesthetio attitude is in some relation 
to its objeot and the nature of that objeot. However, Just as one 
may have an aesthetio attitude to something pure aural and.»*omething 
purely visual, alike, one may take the same attitude to something 
a priori or not a priori. And whether or not the affeotive categ­
ories are a priori or not, on may assume an aesthetio attitude to 
them - simply as expressive qualities in the work, e.g., sublimity, 
sadness, eto. It is fortunate that this is so sinoe it allows one 
to take a totally unprejudioed view of Dufrenne'a theory. If it 
were not the ease, one would have always to bear in mind that Duf- 
renne has not given any satisfactory evidence for art as a priori.
Nevertheless, the faot that this topio is not dependent on the 
basio thesis does not mean that it is not neoessary to discuss it. 
for it is (a)s ourrently muoh argued (b); one of the oonoepts whioh 
Dufrenne uses and diaoQsaes most. He spends a great deal of time 
attempting to work out what he oonsiders to be its nature, and is 
in faot rather oonfused in his opinion; and (o), as his work sets 
out to deal with the aesthetio experienoe, i.e., the subjeots view­
point of the work, it is obviously essential to disouss the kind of 
attitude the subjeot takes to the aesthetio objeot. Also, although 
he is rather ennfuaed, one oan eventually deduoe a definite opinion. 1
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1 . see Section V. of this ohapter, on Bullough.
Unfortunately, as 1 mentioned In the introduction, in connection with| 
the whole work, this theory is not wholly original. One oan discover 
it in the combination of theories of certain other aesthetloians.
But I do not think this detracts seriously from the value of Dufrenns's | 
work, especially sinoe no one person has previously presented the 
same theory.
Z shall take Bufrenne's theory before examining any others and 
drawing a conclusion. X should make it plain at the outset that Z 
believe that there is suoh a thing as the aesthetio attitude, which 
is different from the ordinary attitude to entities in the world - 
desplts its being elusive and ill-defined. Z hope that the follow­
ing ohapter will help to make plain the nature and existence of this 
oonoept.
N.B. Descriptive theories have the disadvantage of being unable to 
olaim correctness or exolusiveness, unless one holds that the mean­
ing of 'aesthetic attitude' is, 'that attidude whioh anyone perc­
eiving a work of art takes to it, and is right in taking to it'.
Ihey allow also of other theories, sinoe not everyone automatically 
takes the same attitude.
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Seotlon It
The nature of the aesthetic object and aesthetic -P.tti.tude.
Aocording to Dufrenne (Vol.IX, Part III, ohap.XV. sect.3. pp.504-5), 
the aesthetio objeot is profound, though not in the sense of being 
distant (lointaln) in time, or of being hidden in some w«y.l* The 
work may be antique, but this in Itself is no reason for regarding 
it as profound, l.e., evaluating it highly and aaauaing an attitude 
of reverenoc to it. The historicity of the objeot is Important only 
for purposes of strictly oritioal reflection - not for the aesthetic
um diaiti
1 . The latter is held to follow from the former - i.e., sinoe the 
distant (A), is only one stage from the hidden (B), then if the pro­
found aesthetic objeot is not A, it is not B either.
t
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Seotion It
The nature of the aeathetio object and qeattiotio attitude.
According to Dufrenne (Vol.ll, Part 111, ohap.IV. scot.3. pp.504-5), 
the aesthetio objeot is profound, though not in the sense of being 
distant (lointain) in time, or of being hidden in some way.— * The 
work nay be antique, but this in itself is no reason for regarding 
it as profound, l.e., evaluating it highly and assuming an attitude 
of reverense to it. The historioity of the objeot is important only 
for purposes of strictly oritioal refleotion - not for the aesthetio
exneitnoi.----------------- — ----- ----------------------------------
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This givos an indication of Dufrenne's initial position, which 
is to separate oritioal reflection and the aesthetlo attitude as far 
as possible. The aesthetic attitude is oontenplative. This is 
consistent eith «hat he has already said, as «ill be seen shortly. 
Here, oritioal analysis and in particular historical analysis, are 
seen as non-aesthetio.
He goes on to invoke disinterestedness in the audienoe (though 
not in speoifloelly Kantian senses of disinterest). This enters in 
the first stags of authentlo art, «hloh is the «ill to surprise (op. 
oit. p.507). The «ill to surprise is indispensiblo in purging perc­
eption and gaining a disinterested attitude in us. The aesthetio 
eleaent in the surprise is that it proVokes reflootion in order to 
disnias it. I.e., it does not arouse the problem-solving reflection 
«hloh explains the question a*ay as part of the ordinary world. Art 
is not tho sort of problem «hioh can bo dealt with in this way. Nor 
is aosthetio surprise effeoed so long as ns retain the aesthetio 
attitude.
The dichotomy between oritioal reflection and the (supposed) 
true aosthetio attitude is further illustrated as Dufrenno goes 
dooper into the idea of the strangeness or 'diffloulty' of the 
aesthetio object. This element adds to the profundity of tho nork. 
But identification and rational oomprehension of the subject are not 
tho true end of aosthetio experience.JL* We should not assume the 
kinu of analytlo attitude of demanding literal meanings, or objeo^lve 
significance, but one whose end It  understanding via reeling! in g - 
way we should suooumb to a kind of enohantment by the work. This 
does not entail an ucdlstanoed attitude (though Dufrenne does not 
make that olear here), finally, he says that in esBenov* w# confront
all art in the way we confront ausio # music arouses feeling without 
Here he adas that because of this we should cease to be so fussy
about the semantic problems in the literary arts. The aesthetio usage 
of language goes beyond purely utilitarian usages, (p.509 op.oit.)
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provoking reflection. In some way, whioh will be explained later,—* 
Dufrenne claims that feeling oan 'know* the object expressed.
This is a very brief introduction to what Dufrenne has to say 
about the aeathetio attitude, and can be misleading beoause of the 
emphasis on a dissociation between oritioal reflection and the 
aesthetio attitude. It requires a oertain amount of elucidation 
before going on to a fuller explanation of his theory.
firstly, it is typical of Dufrenne to say that to understand 
art is not to explain it, but to feel, but this requires expansion, 
for one thing, we do ask the question "what exaotly does X mean?” _ 
whereas Dufrenne says we do not, with the qualification, "while we 
are in the poetio state". In order to Justify this, one has to say 
that being in the poetio state ■=. adopting an aesthetic attitude of 
simply listening to, a . g., the poem, and that as a matter of faot 
it is only after we have oeased to adopt this attitude that we become 
oritioal and analyse the moaning.¿*
However, I do not think Dufrenne oan esoape criticism on this 
oount. What he is doing in saying we understand the most diffioult 
literary work by aooeding to feeling, and do not ask what exaotly it
explanation seems to be that Just given, that during the work our 
attitude may be one of semi-absorption in the work such that our 
comprehension is not oonoeptualised. This is not to say that it is 
not oonoeptualisable, or that we oun 10 ¡itimately olaim to have 
understood a work, unless we oan give some rational interpretation
means, is stating his own View without any argument for it. The best
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Nor do I boliove, or think Dufronne oventua ly believes, that wo 
have an unooneeptualised comprehension of an aoathotio object when wo 
adopt tho aasthetio attitudo. This will bo developed in Seotion XIZ 
of this ohaptor. Z think that tho fault lies mainly in that Dufrenne 
is involving criticism, interpretation, and evaluation in tho oonoept 
of oritioal reflootion, and while tho latter two nay very wall bo 
omitted from the aoathotio attitudo, tho former beoomes an important 
part of hi8 theory of the aeathotio attitude,
Alao, understanding via feeling require# explanation. 1 would 
suggest that what Dufronno moans hero is that understanding tho work 
of art ia not a matter of rational oomprehenaion but one of psyohol- 
ogioal attuning to its expressive power, i.e., of feeling; and thus 
one has a kind of intuitive knowledge that one unuerstanus, on the 
occasion of experiencing this typo of feeling. Experiencing tho 
fooling would therefore be sufficient evidence of having understood. 
As noted, these ideas will be developed later.
A minor point to note is Dufrenne's idea of tho will to wurpris 
Z think that this is really only a rather rather extravagant ..ay of 
saying tru-t he believes that there is always something now to be 
found in a work of art. Nor does this idea of surprise arise in any­
thing also Dufrenne soya of the aesthetic attitude, Tho idea that 
music arouses feeling without provoking reflection is refuted by 
Dufrenne himself, for example when he mentions questions we ask in 
relation to Franok's symphony (see p.49l).
Tho general criticism is that what Dufrenne says is very an})-5 , 
uous. hind although it may not seem so fron what has boon said, it 
will become a. parent that Dufrenne does not wish to a. vocate a tot*- 
ally non-analytio, unoonooptualiaod aesthetio attitude.
Tho following seotions subdivide aspects of Duffeme's theory 
of the aoathotio attitude, but are highly interacted. Dufrenne 
himself provides no suoh subdivision.
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Seotlq^ IJi
Dufrenne states throughout, wherever oontemplation is In question, 
that ths assthstio attitude is oontemplative. I shall mention six 
referenees whioh he makes to aesthetio oontemplation, and it will he 
seen that he makes no attempt here to explain his own definition of 
•Ontemplation, This will he deoided in terms of analytio refleotion 
as against aesthotlo feeling, in the following seotlon.
(1) In a preliminary to a comparison of the ordinary (usual), and 
the ¿¿dthetio object, Dufrenne states (Vol.I, Part 1, a hap. III.pp.134-5) 
that the. aeithetie oannot he completely identified with the ordinary 
man-made ohjeot, because it does not appeal to bo used, but for a 
peroeption X* whioh oontemplates it. This is all it demands. In 
relation to ordinary needs it appears superfluous, to add nothing)it 
simply exeroises a certain attraction over me:
n II n'en appelle pas au geste qui l'utilise, mais à la 
peroeption qui le oontemple," (p. 134.)
When art was the preserve of the leisure classes, the idea was: 
"Voir, entendre, lire, deviennent par lui des conduites 
iresintéressées qui semblent vouées à la plus grand gbire 
de la peroeption, sens qu'auoun résultat ne suive." (p.135 ibid) 
Dufrenne retains this attitude to a large extent, without aooeeding 
to the idea of art as the domain of the leisure olasses.
(2) Later, when Dufrenne is talking about 'presenoe' (Vol.XZ, Part 
III, ohap.I. pp.419-431) - that is to say, our presenoe in front of 
the work, he distinguishes between bodily and spiritual attitudes to 
a work of art. This is more or less parallel to distinguishing 
between ©motionsl and oognitive-oum-oo ntemplative. He states that 
one of the dangers of art is for it to beoome Ah« Q0çaai_9.A.fÆE the 
1 . Por the present 'peroeption' will be taken as equivalent in 
meaning to 'attitude'«
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Dufrenne states throughout, wherever contemplation is in question, 
that the aesthetio attitude is oontemplatire. 1 shall mention six 
referenoes which he makes to aesthetio contemplation, and it will be 
seen that he makes no attempt here to explain his own definition of 
contemplation. This will be deoided in terms of analytic reflection 
as against aesthetio feeling, in the following seotion.
(1) In a preliminary to a comparison of the ordinary (usual), and 
the apathetic object, Dufrenne states (Vol.l, Part I, ohap.III.pp.134-5) 
that the. aesthetic cannot be oompletely identified with the ordinary 
man-mado objeot, because it does not appeal to bo used, but for a 
perception X* whioh contemplates it. This is all it demands. In 
relation to ordinary needs it appears superfluous, to add nothingjit 
simply exeroises a certain attraction over mei
" Il n'en appelle pas au geste qui l'utilise, mais a la 
perception qui le oontemple." (p. 134«)
When art was the preserve of the leisure olasses, the idea wasi 
"Voir, entendre, lire, deviennent par lui des conduites 
f'esintéressées qui semblent vouées à la plus grand gbire 
de la perception, seas qu'auoun résultat ne suive." (p. 1 3 5  ibidj 
Dufrenne retains this attitude to a large extent, without aooeeding 
to the idea of art as the domain of the leisure classes.
(2) Later, when Dufrenne is talking about ’presence' (Vol.IZ, Part 
III, ohap.I. pp.419-431) - that is to say, our presenoe in front of 
the work, he distinguishes between bodily and spiritual attitudes to 
a woifc of art. This is more or lees parallel to distinguishing 
between emotional and cognitive—oum-oo ntemplatlve. He states that
one of the dangers of art la eojp^to J>«e°m«-lhe oocaqi.^ ./ja .tfre. 
1 . for the present 'perception' will be taken as equivalent in
meaning to 'attitude *.
»
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arousal of some emotion. Kuaio in particular can OTor-involve the 
emotions.JL* But one should be oapable of disosrnment and objeot- 
ifioation, so that the spirit responds to the work rather tnan, or as 
well as, the body (emotions). Dufrenne thinks that the reason one 
may adopt the wrong attitude to an aesthetio objeot is because it is 
different from that whioh we adopt to ordinary objeota. One sees the 
latter es useful or else unrelated to one's own activities, and 
probably categorises them as either one or the other. Ao s the tie objects 
are different, and the appropriate attitude is one of contemplation. 
But this is nbt the natural attitude to adopt to anything, aooording 
to Dufrenne, and beoauss of this, and the fant that we are more 
aooustomed to working and utilising than to contemplating, we often 
fail to grasp the aesthetio experience. The aesthetio attitude is 
not indispensible - as various other attitudes in our everyday work 
may be. This explains way, even if works of art are made by man for 
man, they may appear oonfusing at first, and why one has to be eduosfc 
ed to 'give oneself' to the aesthetio experienoe - it is not the 
result of an instinctive, or an everyday attitude.
One oan see in what Dufrenne is saying, the often repeated 
oritioiem of man, that he refuses to take time to study objects for 
themselves alone, pausing .only long enough to question an object's 
utility, and moving swiftly past the beauty whioh surrounds him.
(3) The only other unadorned statement of the aesthetic attitude as 
contemplative is given at the beginning of the ohapter specifically 
devoted to the aeethetio attitude (Vol.ll. Part 111. ohap.V. 
p.527)» Dufrenne asserts \rather peremptorily, since he considers
He is here oonoerned to disouss possible variations in attitude to 
the aesthetic objeot.
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to the aeathetio objeot la oontemplative, as oppoaad to the attitude 
to ordinary objeots. As it happens, the proposition ia aaaumed 
rather than asserted:
"h'oppoaition dea ÿttitudes devant l'objet esthétique et 
devunt l'objet usuel, nous ne 1 'évoquerons pas: nos analyaea 
ont aasos opposé la oonteaplation à la praxie. (p.5 2 7 Ibid.)
He also makes a few slightly more speoifie renarka about aspeoto of 
aesthetie oonteaplation.
(4) The first of these is with regard to modern art - by which he 
means principally abatraot or non-representational painting (Vol.Z. 
Part 1. ohap IV. p.<69). This type of art ia immediately seen as in 
the olass of aesthetio objeots, without having first to oapture the 
attention by representation, and primarily beoauae it demands pure 
oonteaplation, " . . . , . mais en sollioitant aussitôt une oont- 
emplation pure" (p.169 ibid). It ia a 'pure art' - not bound by 
religious or any other strioturest
"Au môme moment que la perception déoouvre l'objet esthet-
X V / /ique la ou il n'avait pas enoore ete perou, l'Art Moderne 
. . .  s'applique a produire des oeuvres qui se proposant 
immédiatement oorame objets esthetic, uos, . . .  en sollioitant 
aussitôt une contemplation pure." JL* (p.169 ibid.)
______________________      i i i- i i ■ ■ i i
Ji_. Pure contemplation is not explained. However, the faot that its 
objeot is non-representational, non-symbolio art, and 'pure', suggest 
that there is some other possible sort) some attitude to art, in which 
the aspeots of the work are more fully artioulated, i.e., some degr? 
of conceptualisation is involved. The objeot of the attitude oonnjis 
that 'pure' is closely related to 'unoenceptuallsecF. Hufrenne's r.ir.> 
seems to be moving on lines analogous to, "given a pure red paten, 
there is little about it to oonoeptuallse, therefore pure contemp­
lation is possible." 81noe he makes no further olslms about the 
pure and the less pure, I would hesitate to speculate that he means 
anything more than this.
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(5 ) while disousaing the ;ime-struoture of aeathotlo poroeption 
(Vol.IX. Part 1X1. ohap.il), ho roforo to tho tino token In pero- 
airing tha aeathatio cbjeot ua Xika a proaont of contemplation, "la 
proaont do la oonteaplatlon" (p.457 ibid). Tho temporal aspeot of 
aeathatio ¿/oroeption haa already baen diaouaaed i" . It ia auffioiant 
to aay that Dufrenns ouat moan elthor i a) that oeathetio perception 
la oarrled on in a continuous present sinoe it la oontcmplatlve) and 
beoauoe contemplation, like meditation, la not diraotly related to 
an objeotive time-structure, so aoutnotio porooption is in tho 
oontenplative present, or more simply, b) that aosthotlo peroeptlon 
is not objectively timod, and it la contemplative. I.o., he ia either 
assuming (regarding a) ), or stating (regarding b) ), that the 
aesthetic attitude ia oontanplative, Tho former ia the more prob­
able.
(6) finally, bufrenne mokes a referenoe to the aesthetic attitude, 
whloh is both obsoure and illuminating (Vol.Z. Part Z. ohap.V.p.199).| 
He is here disousslng aesthetio peroeptiun in a nay analogous to 
that in whioh Bullough*»* would refer to t o work of art. He aaaerta 
that the world ia the measure of reality, but that the world of 
aesthetio perception is neither physloal nor imaginary. Aosthetio 
contemplation is neither involvement in a real^*sltuation, nor la it 
imagination or a dreamt
"ha contemplation esthétique n'est pas exaotnment la peroeptlon 
par laquelle le corps pense ae lanoer dans quelque aventurai 
mais elle n'est pas non plus imagination ou reverie, et son 
objet exige d'etre perçu." (p.199 Ibid.) 1
1. 3»o previous chapter, motion XXX, on autonomy.
2. See, Uullough, op.oit.
In referring to reality# 2 do not mean to suggest that, e.g., the
play Itself is not real or part of our experience, but that within 
the context, the aotora are pretending.
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This is the only time that Dufrenne mentions the work-audienos 
relation when discussing aesthetio contemplation simplicités*. (As I 
have said, above, he has asserted that the attitude to works of art 
is different from that to ordinary objeots, but so far this has not 
been explained further than by saying it is oontomplative.) The idea] 
is further developed when he refers to the aesthetio attitude as 
distanoed. This will be dealt with in Seotion IT. However, he is 
here olaiming that the attitude to a work of art is different from 
that either to ordinary objeots or events, or to something imaginary. 
This sounds obsoure beoause it appears to be exoludlng both of two 
mutually exolusive possibilities - the real and the unreal. In faot, 
what ho is saying is perfeotly legitimate. A work of art is real in 
the sense that it exists as an entity in the world and an objeot of 
our sense-peroeption, but it is also non-real (using 'non-real' 
beoause 'unreal' implies that what is denoted does not exist), in 
that a painting of my dog is not my dog, and a play abour former 
President Nixon dous not inolude this man, and portrays events which 
are not happening to him in this spatio-temporal loontion. (That 
they may be happening somewhere else, or may have taken plaoe is not 
relevant to the reality of those events in the play.) If Nixon is 
being threatened in the play, republioans do.not rush to save him.!.
There are few sommants to be made on tïiis preliminary disouss- 
ion of the aesthetic attitude. As a minor point, I think Dufrenne 
makes too much use of the idea of a demand. For instanoe, he says, 
"Ainsi l'objet esthétique est là, tout simplement, et n'attend de mol 
l'hommage d'une perception" (p.135). Though not exaotly the same as 
the idea of the work as a demand qua 'exigenoe' prior to its oreation,9  
or of the performance as a move from demand qua 'exigenoe', to 
1 . see Bullough op.oit. re Othello, and a further disouasion in 
Seotion V of this ohapter, with referenoe to Bullough and aesthetic 
distance.
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accomplishment, it has the same connotation. This makes for 
Confusion over the status of the work of art.
Xn the same seetlon (VoX.I, Part I, ohap IV, p.133-5) Dufrenne'a 
distinotion of the ordinary and the aeuthetio objeot is oonsistent 
with his dissooiation of art and life, though not with current views 
maintaining that art is a key to greater knowledge and understanding 
of life, and widens our outlook and sensibility.!-«.
Altogether this section seems to be free from any particularly 
controversial points. To its oredit, the seoond assertion on cont­
emplation shows a good deal of psyohologioal insight on Oufrenne's 
part. Xt is perfectly oorreot to say that the most obvious and prob­
ably the normal reaction to an objeot is to question its purpose or 
utility rather than to contemplate it. This is one good reason why 
art is not immediately 'available' or comprehensible to its audienoe. 
Xt may or may net be the o&sc that certain works are beyond the 
comprehension of many (X should hesitate to claim that I understood 
fully uny art work, no matter how simple it appeared), but it is 
certainly the ease that they remain inaccessible until one adopts a 
non-normal, possibly oontemplative, attitude to them. The fact that 
people often fail to understand a work of art is good evidence for 
the claim that there is a particular attitude which one needs to take 
to a work before one can understand it. X.e., the laok of compreh­
ension of any sort indicates that the observer is looking at/listexdng 
to, the work, in the wrong way. (This is to be distinguished from a 
partial comprehension, where the observer may have adopted the
correct attitude and st>ll failed ,tg ftBpfieoiaH the work fifllyt----
¿. See also Aristotle on Catharsis (P90jj,qg,esp .vl.g.d Politics esp.
v.(viii)7 1342a ii),where Catharsis is understood as purification of 
our ideas,sumh that art oan inorease our sensibility. On this, see die 
Butehen y-lstotle's theory of poetry and fine.art.Chap.VI.eap.pp.252- 
6. "The Katharsls implies not only an emotional relief, but a refin­
ing er olarifying of emotion" (pjcxxiii).Dover, 1931. When Dufrenne 
dissociates art end lifo he does not mean he thinks art is not a part
189 .
o:o,;
since adopting the "aesthetio attitude" does not entail a subsequent 
appreciation of the work.)
o
Having seen that Dufrenne regards the aesthetio attitude (or as 
he often terms it, perception) as contemplative, it remains to dis-
Dufrenne does not state that he is here working out a definition of 
aesthetio eontemplation, but sinee he regards the aesthetio attitude 
as contemplative, and he is here analysing the nature of the aesth-
etio attitude, or aesthetic perception, one deduoea that the result 
will be his definition of the oontemplative, aesthetio attitude.
ion and feeling. Nor is it easy to draw one oonolusion from what he 
says. One oan take his discussion as the assertion of three differ­
ent positions sinoe what he soys at the beginning is not the same as 
his final statements, but it seems fairer on Dufrenne to regard it as
Ihe differenoe lies mainly in the degree of analytioal reflect­
ion which Dufrenne is prepared to allow in aesthetio oontemplation. 
At first, he draws a sharp distinotlon between analysis and feeling 
(sentiment) and preoludes the former to a largo degree) but as the 
Phenomenologle progresses, considerably more analysis is inoluded. 
The espetltlCB la divided into three stages, with a preliminary
-- -------- -eotion. ---------------------------------------------
from previous page, 188) of life, but that he wishes te
to the extent of preoluding art's giving a greater
Life,etc. (of.Chapter 2, sect.Ill, on autonomy.)
earned in ohapters III—IT. Vol.II. Part IIZ.
oover what exaotly he means by aesthstio eontemplation.
Seotloa_lIl.
Aesthetic rcflootlon and feeling.in the aesthetic s_ttittt-4d.
-ICO
His opinion has been disoerned from a number of fairly wide­
spread referanees,!.*and it is a dialectic between analytio refleot'
a gradual development and alteration of his view as he realises the 
implications of what he asserts.
sinoe adopting the "aesthetio attitude" does not entail a subsequent 
appreciation of the work.)
Having seen that Dufrenne regards the aesthetic attitude (or as 
he often terms it, perception) as contemplative, it remains to dis- 
oover what exaotly he means by aesthetio contemplation.
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Seotion III.
Aft»V>etia XtilClM.ttffft til*. .ft»athotiq a t t i ^ A i .
Dufrenne does not state that he is here working out a definition of 
aesthetio contemplation, but sinoe he regards the aesthetio attitude 
as contemplative, and he is here analysing the nature of the aesth­
etio attitude, or aesthetio peroeption, one deduoes that the result 
will be his definition of the oontemplative, aesthetio attitude.
His opinion has b^en disoerned from a number of fairly wide­
spread references,!.*and it is a dialeotio between analytio reflect­
ion and feeling. Nor is it easy to draw one oonolusion from what he 
says. One oan take his discussion as the assertion of three differ­
ent positions alnoe what he says at the beginning is not the same as 
his final statements, but it seems fairer on Dufrenne to regard it as 
a gradual development and alteration of his view as he realises the 
implications of what he asserts.
The difference lies mainly in the degree of analytical reflect­
ion which Dufrenne is prepared to allow in aesthetio contemplation.
At first, he draws a sharp distinction between analysis and feeling 
(sentiment) and precludes the former to a large degree) but as the 
Phenomenologle progresses, considerably more analysis is inoludad.
The exfetltlCB. is divided into three stages, with a preliminary
explanatory seotion.---- --------------------------------------------
1. (continued from previous page, 188) of life, but that he wishes te
separate them to the extent of preoluding art's giving a greater
knowledge of life,etc. (of.Chapter 2, sect.Ill, on autonomy.)
1. Mainly concerned in ohapters III-IV. Vol.II. Part III.
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I^ree tarai require an initial definition - representation, percept­
ion and feeling. Dufrenne disoueses the first two in ohapter I of 
the seoond volume of the Phénoménologie, He regarda representation 
as both a useful and dangerous notion - it implies for him a fair 
degree of conceptualisation and mental prooessing. He takes it in 
the sense of re-presenting. This implies that there is a soreen 
between the peroeiver and the objeot in question, a soreen whioh 
olothes the objeot in notions of memory or the unoonsoious, etc., 
biasing our perception - as if it were theory-laden by the time it 
is 'presented' to the peroeiver. (This is obviously anathema to any 
phenomenologist, sinoe phenomenology alms to grasp things immediately, 
as they are, braoketing off all theory as far as possible.) The 
objeot is 're-presented', it does not oome to us direot. This is 
dangerous, aooording to Dufrenne, for he thinks one peroeives things
directly. In peroeption, objects are present to us, not 're-p re sente: d 
(of. Vol.ZZ, P«rt ZZZ, ohap.Z p.423). At the basis of representat­
ion, he sees a separation and subsequent rejoining (presumably an 
unoalled for interruption in peroeption), and quotes llaroel in his 
support, (of.Vol.ZZ, Part ZZZ, ohap.ZZ, pp.468-9.)
Psreeption veers towards the idea of experienoe, because it is 
based in direot experienoe - experienoe of presenoe (ibid). Tp 
perceive is not just passively to register meaningless appearanses, 
it always has some meaning.
Feeling (sentiment) and perception are related terms, and are
both direotly connected with experienoe. Feeling is not a simple
eoneept in Dufrenne's voeabulary, it is not Just presence, l.e., not
Just direst experience, although it is generally immediate (unmedLsted)
(d p.4 6 8 -4 7 2 op.sit.). Mor is it to bo . rc&aMçd as pur*________
{.I assume one would normally aooept that peroeption is meaningful
since it is always pereeption of something whioh oan be given a mean­
ing. Dufrenne would go further, to say that objeots are meaningful in 
themselves, rather than requiring to be given meaning. Cf. Chapter 2 
on immediate meaningfulness.
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•motion.JL* Foaling is scan as a kind of knowledge, involving under­
standing of something. Although Dufrenne allows sono ambiguity 
between feeling as senae-experienoe (re. sentir), emotion (re. sent­
iment), and meaning + "having a sense of. • ." (xe.sens), it is poss­
ible to extrget the way he intends to use the term. It is principally 
in the latter mode,i.e., "having a sense of", or a feeling for, 
which derives from the term "sens" in conjunction with "sentiment" 
deprived of much of its emotive eonnoetion. One other difficulty in 
explaining feeling oomes from the faot that there is no exact English 
parallel for "sentiment" - for whioh Dufrenne can hardly be flamed.
X shall attempt to explain this notion of feeling in more detail, 
Dufrenne'a assertions are not entirely descriptive of ordinary lang­
uage usage, i.e., they involve his own theoretical assertions. He 
desorlbes feeling in terms of perception, emotion, knowledge and 
aesthetic experience; firstly explaining that the sense of feeling 
with whioh he is concerned is that whioh is rdated to perception.
This sort of feeling is knowledge rather than emotion.For example, 
the emotion of fear is a oertain wqy of reaoting to something - he 
suggests the 'horrible' - and gaiety is the way one penetrates the 
world of the comic.<1* However, it is only one type of knowledge.
The understanding involved in knowledge enters when one sees feeling 
in aesthetic experience, as immediate, i.e., the subject's immediate 
understanding of the object of feeling - as "having a sense of the 
traglo". One is engaged in the world in terns of feeling rather 12
1. He spells out emotion in behavioural terme.
2. Though of oourse an emotion always Involves some knowledge or 
belief (which, e.g., oauses the emotion), and it is not Dufrenne's 
intention to exclude knowledge, but rather to emphasise another 
aspect of emotion.
X do not think he means to suggest that emotion is purely behav­
ioural, but that those behavioural properties of emotion do not bel- 
ong to feeling in aesthetic appreciation, and are therefore a meons 
of distinguishing the two.
1 9 2 .
than thought. It entails a oertaln nay of being, or attitude,of the 
subject, which oan be soon cost dearly In the artist. Dufrsnne 
gives the example of Raolne hawing a sense of the tragie, haunter of 
the grotosquo, eto. feeling thus reveals a world (that of the tragic 
grotesque, eto.), whereas emotion is a reaction to a world whioh Is 
already given (a frightening world, causing fear, eto.) (of. pp«b71~2 
Ibid).
Aesthetic experlenoe preserves the purity of this sense of feel­
ing, By this he means that aesthetic experlenoe Is not feeling oomb- 
ined wlth emotion. He gives the example of seeing anguish and fear 
in 1 he psndu. by Rouault, and experiencing feelings, but not resp­
onding as one would to seeing these In ordinary experience* He 
suggests that laughing at a oomedy doss not mean that one is gay, 
but that one has a feeling of the oomio.JL« The feeling is a sensib­
ility to a certain world (ibid.). Without this sense, the speotator 
oannot have a complete aesthetio experiences
"lorsque le speotateur an eat radioalemont depourvu , oonmo 
oertains individus sont insenaibles a telle valeur .......
1 'experlenoe esthetlque eat manqueo, et l'objet eisthetique 
nicest pas vraiment oonnu." (p.472 ibid).
It soems prima facie that hufrenne is being rather radioal in 
suggesting that feeling is knowledge.But this has the advantage of 
distinguishing it olearly from simple emotion, and of allowing him 
to involve intuition, l.e., feeling now booones a form of intuitive 
knowledge, which provides a sounder basis for using a feeling for 
something as evidence of being oorreot about it, and gives a oertaln 
oonereteness to the idea of "having s sense of • •
1 » Dufrenne is rather oareless here and is using his terminology 
loosely. Ho Aould not use 'gay* and • oomlo' as if they were lnter- 
ehangeable. To be more soourate, he oould say, "laughing at a oom- 
4y does not mean that one is happy, but that one understands the 
eoneept of happiness whioh is expressed.
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Sins* he Intends to use the idee of feeling to show that 
one has eertain •apaoities to understand art, rather than to show 
that one knows something about it, it is slightly dubious as to 
how useful it is to invoke knowledge. But he is probably Just» 
ified, sines knowledge involves understanding, as does this sense 
of feeling) end, "having a sense of, . , implies both
(a) "having a oapaoity to understand art", and
(b) more positively, actually knowing something about art.
Although we now have an ideA of what Dufrenne means by 
'feeling' • in his own speoial sense • he should make it plain 
that in ordinary usage, feeling is distinct from knowledge, whereas 
emotion is not, (for instance, our emotion of fear oeases when we 
are not, for example, confronted by a bull, as we had thought, but 
the physiologioal feelings may oontinue, sinoe they are not under 
our oontrol.)
Once more, we find Dufrenne presenting us with a valid 
oonoept, but marring it slightly by the obseurity with which he 
presents it, and the ambiguities to which its interpretation is 
open. One has to heps that one's interpretation is oorreet - 
■inse this thesis is intended to centre upon Dufrenne's theories, 
and not (at least prinarlly) to present arguments - whether they 
are valid or not - to whiob he would not ally himself. Zn faot,
X think that he would aeoept the Interpretation, and that it 
helps to make sense of the rest of his disoussion on the aesthetic 
attitude. Z think also that it is a worthwhile and sound insight 
into the aesthetic experience and perception of the work of art.
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The only other dubious factor in his disousslon Is his pre- 
supposition that assthetlo experienoe Is a recognition of t.e exp* 
ression of something, and does not inolude an eaotlonal reaction to, 
or sharing of, whatever Is expressed. Leaving aside the question of 
whether art Is expressive, it is by no sesns oertein that one does 
not beeome involved in the emotions expressed (supposing for example 
that the emotion of fear is expressed in a work). Of oourse one may 
do bbth - i.e., reoognlse the emotion and experienee it. for the 
sake of the purity of the feeling, Dufrenne asserts that one reoog- 
nises rather than experiences .JL* What he says implies a rather 
extreme theory of aesthetic distance, as will be seen when the 
thesis of psychical distance is disoussed.£*
-(JUk). jiefls.otl.qA.and fccUflg.
In Part III, ohapter XV (Vol.ZX. pp.481 ff), Dufrenne moves on 
to disoussing the role of oritioal analysis in the aesthetio exp» 
erienoe, and X think that the faot that he discusses the nature of 
aesthetio analysis and regards it as necessary to the understanding 
of art, shows that he does not at any stage wish to exolude the
orlt.iqal frqja tae, ae^thetjo. jttJJ._t_u.dj».._______________________________
J,. This will be dealt with further in Seotion VI. However, it 
should be noted here that (a), recognising is an experienoe, and 
Dufrenne would not deny this, but (b), what Dufrenne means is that, 
for example, in watching a tragedy, one has the experienoe of 
reoognising the fear expressed, rather than (having the experience 
of) experiencing the fear. Onoe more, one has a feeling of frust- 
ration at Dufrenne's tendency to put obsourely what oould be said 
in more simple terms.
2. See, Bullough op.olt., and Seotion V of this ohapter. Dufrenne's 
oase is extreme, sinoe Bullough (the originator of the theory) 
regards the ideal aesthetio attitude to be that involving the 
minimum of 'Distanoe'.
M ' *
H« disousses the subjeot in tirai of reflection, «hloh be 
regarda »■ the next mental stage to pereeption (this being a non» 
reflective activity according to him). The struoture and meaning 
of the work of art are revealed by meana of refleotion.JL* Thera 
are two forms of this (1), that on the structure of the aesthetio 
objeot, e.g., oompoaition, syntax, form, modes of expression, 
and (ii) that on the meaning of the represented objeot, e.g., the 
climate of the work!
" 1 1 y a une reflexion sur la struoture de l'objet 
esthétique, et uns réflexion sur le sens de l'objet 
représente." (p .4 8 2 Ibid.)
The former is seen as having four advantaged:
(a) deflection on the struoture of the aesthetio objeot is a 
neoeasary condition of ol arifying the objeot, turning it from a 
confused totality, by an analytio perception.
(b) hefleotion on form leads to an understanding of meaning. For 
example, a certain rusioal modulation indicates a particular 
feeling in the work, to understand whioh is to understand at least 
p»rt of the work.
(o) deflection on the oreative activity of the artist indicates 
what he is attempting to express. Dufrenne give the example of 
the individuality of Van Oogh's brush strokes oonveying part of 
the meaning of his work.
j.. Hereafter • l.e., in the subsequent parts of this seotion, 
and following sections of this ohaptor - 'reflection' will be 
taken os referring to critiool analysis as opposed to feeling 
(sentiment). That is, to the first mode of refleotion given here. 
At present, Sufrenno is using the term to refer to both aspeots 
of the aosthetio attitude.
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(d) Henoe raflaotion on the atruoture leads eventually to an under­
standing of the aestnetio objeot. (pp.403-4 ibid.) i-a
However, aooording to Dufrenne, this refleotion means submitting 
the objeot to a oritioal analysis whioh oreates a barrier between one­
self and the work, "elle dofinit l'objet en le detaehant de moi pour 
le aoumettre a un examen oritique .." (p.483 ibid.) This means that 
one inspeots the way it is oonstruoted rather than investigating the 
objeot as sueh. It is taking it apart rather than penetrating the 
objeot as a whole, and having a sense of its affmotive qualityi
"oette reflexion • • • tend a perdre son objetdana la meaure 
nemo ou elle estfldele a son propos, qui est de passer de l'app- 
arenoe a la ehose . . ., et par oonaequent, de trauaorire dans 
le langage de la prose oe quo l'ceuvre dit dans son propre 
langagei entreprise finalement Vaine. . . " (pp.485-6 ibid.) 
Thus, the oritioal refleotion nay orush our ability freely to 
appreoiate the meaning of the work as a wholo. It has the added disad­
vantage that it may be over-indulged. One oan go into too great detail 
of the work, in effeot taking it to pieoes, or lose it in what Dufrenne 
refers to as an 'explaining reflection' - details about the author, 
milieu, tradition, history, genesis, eto. (pp.406-7 ibid.) For Dufrenne
J,. In fact, 1 do not thin». theso oon be seen as four separate fuotors. 
The first (a) is en overall speoifioation of the advantage of a consid­
eration of form or struoture) (b) and (o) ore hypothetical examples of 
refleotion on speo-ifio structural aspeots of a given work; and (d) is 
the oonolusion wfiioh Dufrenne draws. But this is a minor point of div­
ision, and does not affeot any subsequent or final arguments 
2. The phrase, "penetrating the objeot as a whole", does not aeon taking 
it to pieoes analytioally, but something more like "gaining a general 
impression of the objoot in to to".
this latter ia worn than losing the work by going into too great 
detail about it, and of oourse distinot from it, I.E., by an 'exp­
laining reflection' Dufrenne means an analysis of faotors surrourding 
and external to, the work. One oan argue that euoh elements are nec­
essary to a full appreciation of the aesthetic objeot, but 1 think one 
would agree that they arqhot part of the aesthetio attitude, sinoe 
this is the attitude one takes while listening to, watohing, etc., and 
it is in any oase empirically impossible to go into suoh details and 
listen, watoh, etc. (assume the aesthetio attitude) concurrently.
Prior investigation of the eiroumstanoes of the oreation of the work 
may enhance the aesthetic attitude - but it is another question as to 
whethsr or not this is so.
Dufrenne olalrns that if we stop at the level of analysis, we 
have not understood the aesthetio object. The proper aesthetio attit­
ude is not that which makes it submit to the critic, but one in whioh 
1, as peroeiver, submit myself to the work. In effeot he is saying 
that rather than forcing an explanation on the work, I allow it to 
explain itself to me.J.* A sympathetic reflection oulminates in 
feelings
"Hais il y a une autre forme de reflexion qui nous ramènera 
au oontaot de l'objet esthétique , . . on peut distinguer 
une reflexion qui séparé et une feflexlon qui ah&ere . . .
N NPar la reflexion qui adhere, je me soumets a l'oeuvre au lieu
de la soumettre à moi, je la laisse déposer son sens en mol."
_________________________________________________________________ (P.407-8 Ibid.)
1. Phenomenologists, including Dufrenne, rather inoline to think that
objects of all kinds arc self-explanatory. It may appear to be the case
that, e.g., an abstraot painting 'explains itself' - but in faot one
usually has a wealth of background knowledge of this type of art if one
truly understands the work immediately. As this whole section shows,
Dufrenne does not make this supposition. X am grateful to Cyril Barrett
for this example of works whioh appear to be, but are not, self-
explanatory.
1 9 7 .
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One sees the work as direotly meaningful:
"fit o'est paroe qu'elle se r'efore ainsi en sous-main a l'expression 
que nous verrons la reflexion sympathise oulminer dans le 
sentiment." (P.488 ibid.)
Dufrenne dieeusses feeling in greater detail as part of the 
aeethetio attitude when diseussing the profundity of the work (Vol.II, 
Part 111, Chap.IV, seetion 2 pp.501-3). Here he states that aesthetio 
feeling inplies a total presenoe of the subject to the work. One beo- 
ones deeply involved in it - Dufrenne regards it as partioipating in 
the work. A merely superficial perception usually results in misunder­
standing. This is contrasted to the attitude whioh exercises Judgment 
on something and is detaehed and impersonal. One must be invelved in 
the sense of being eonpletely absorbed by the work and it alone .^ * A 
oapaoity to read the expreesion of the aesthetio objeot (i.e., under­
stand it) is a guarantee of the profundity of the feeling.
However, Dufrenne does not wish to olaim that analysis is not 
neoessary, and therefore adopts a middle oourse by saying that ultimate 
aooess to the work is via feeling, but one oan only engage onself fully 
in this after the use of the first mode of refleotion (CP. pp.484-5 
ibid). 1
1. Although the idea of letting a work explain itself has just been 
noted to be untenable on the whole, there is one interpretation whioh 
Justifies it - though it turns it into a rather shallow assertion.
That is, although one does need the foreknowledge previously noted, one 
shoifld not impose preoonooived theories on a work, but approaoh it from 
an unbiased standpoint, in order to see it on its own merits, rather 
than through coloured glasses.
2. A further explanation of participation, and the way in whioh one 
identifies with the work, aooording to Dufrenne, is given in the final 
part of the following seotlon (IV), on distanoo.
di'tuC
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In this first disoussion, Dufrenne over-separates the two faotors I 
involved in the aesthetic attitude - the oritioal and t e intuitive. 
I.e., his explanation appears to require that the audienoe see or hear 
any work twiee. It ia the strangeness of the order of these two whieh I 
ia most questionable, for one has to see or hear firstly in order to I 
make a oritioal appraisal, and secondly in order to sain a true I 
aesthetic perception via feeling, Dufrenne does not spell out how I 
these two attitudes relate to one another. It is diffioult to see how I
• . t/ f i w
• a tí- 4Ía
one «an assume the latter attitude of submitting oneself to the work. 1 
and gain an understanding of it via feeling (having a sense of the wcodc) 1 
if the oritioal analysis has to be performed prior to this. The know- I
i ti-' J O L UJ ledge one gains by means of the latter analysis must bear upon one's ]
oano:; -„.U ultimate attitude to. and understanding of, the work) a) beoause it | 
would be empirioally dmost impossible to bloek it from one's mind, 1
í ’ •
. ,*i _ ; ü 0 i? ¿3
and b) beoause otherwise there would be no point in performing the 9 
analysis in the first place (i.e., at all). 1 
£ Dufrenne's position subsequently alters somewhat. On this oooasion, 1 
(Vol.IX, Part III, Chap.IV, seotion 4, pp.514-5). be is wavering Ç
- -i. £ x¿ x between oritioal reflection and feeling. The reason for the wavering ] 
is that an external/obJeotive knowledge of the objeotive being of the | 
aesthetie object is needed, as well as an internal knowledge - via the f 
sensible. Sinoc the oritioal attitude is the means to the former, and ;| 
the feeling attitude a means to the latter, the aesthetio attitude |
¿ o l‘U  j a u f. osoillates between the twos «
t <á X 3~ jU i
:. i i. tf ¿ ¿ u a s
"St o'est pourquoi l'attitude esthétique n'est pas simple, elle ‘1 
ne peut exolure le Jugement au profit du sentiment, elle est 1 
une sorte d'ossilation perpétuelle entre oe qu'on pourrait f
•íiv UtifiJ appeler l'attitude «ri.tique et l'attitude sentimentale, "(p.514lb^ d) j 
Some part of the aesthetio objeet always esoapes the reflective attit- 1  
ude, beoause reflection oonslders the objeet from a distanee - "La r
3 *tü $1 réflexion . . .  eonsldére l'objet du dehors, . . .  elle le tient à 1 
dietanoe . . . . " (p.515). 1s ««
Feeling is also limited, but in the opposite way, beoauae it is likely 
to get lost, or lose itself, in the aesthetio object.
Thus, aspects of both attitudes appear to be required in the 
aesthetio attitude. Dufrenne feels that the use of the idea of reflect 
ion signifies that the aesthetio object has to be known in order to be 
felt - but he also feels that one is tempted to say that the expression 
of the object leaps to the eye (or that the feeling of a work leaps to 
one's eye) - is immediate and spontaneous. Then the inolination is to 
go further and ask whether a knowledge of, for example, harmony, oount- 
erpoint, etc., is neoessary to the understanding of Baoh, and then 
oonolude that refleotionperalyaes feeling rather than enoouraging it. 
But he realises that this would be to reaoh a oonoluslon with indeoent 
and unoonsidered haste.
So, at the moment, Dufrenne wishes to retain both oritioal 
reflection and feeling, as neither is totally satisfaotory on its own. 
Refleotion appears to remove one from direot oontaot with the work,and 
this is unsatisfactory, but he will not go to the other extreme either, 
and say that one immediately grasps the work through feeling.
I think that Dufrenne is still working on the same lines as 
previously, sinoe he does not wish to rejeot either refleotion or 
feeling, but now thinks that the aesthetio attitude oscillates between 
the two. Being strict on Dufrenne, one might say he has realised that 
the two are not properly oompatlble • at least in the way he has out» 
lined them - and saying that the aesthetio attitude osoillates only 
amounts to saying that he has so far failed to work out the exaot
I
nature of the relationship between the two.
He goes on to discuss the aesthetio attitude in terms of under­
standing, and while X think one would usually agree that it is the mode 
most likely to afford an understanding of a work of art, I do not think 
one would olala that understanding followed neoecsarily from one's 
adopting it. That is, one can only properly understand a work if one's 
attitude to it is synpathetic and one takes it as an object of
;
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aesthetio interest (thaaa ara precondition» of* an aeatbatio attitude), 
and if one adopt» whatever ia involved in the aaathatio attitude - 
for lnatanaa a oritloal approach whioh both 'dlataneaa' and partio- 
lpatea or involvea itaalf in the work, possibly with a oartaln 
Intuitive appraiaal. (These aapeota of the aaathetio attitude will 
be appralaod fully by the end of thia ohapter.) Given thia attitude 
of taking the work in the oorreat oontext ao to speak, one will be 
in the poaitlon froa whioh a proper understanding of the work oan 
result. It is not only the position froa whioh one is moat likely 
to be able to understand a work of art, but also the position one 
would adopt in order to understand it. That is, the aoathetio attit­
ude is that whioh one assumes so aa to be »lile to appreoiate, eval­
uate and generally understand (a neoeesary oondition of understand!
But 1 do not think that it is a sufficient oo&dition - it may be 
sufficient in oertain oases, but one oannot assume that it holds 
'aoross the board'. Given the oorreot attitude to a work, it is 
still perfeotly possible to misinterpret, or else to gain an incomp­
lete understanding - through some laok in one's own oapaoity to 
oomprehend. (Any number of emotional or psychological determinants 
may 'bloek* one's understanding - but then this amounts to an 
incapacity to adopt the assthetlo attitude proper.) And I would not 
suggest that the aesthetic attitude was always (if at all) all one 
needed to understand a work. It does not inolude a knowledge of the 
artist, hi» milieu, genre, intentions, the progressive or regressive 
nature of his work, eto. • and any of these may, I think, be needed 
for comprehension. Dufrenne goes on (ef.b) below) to allow a nec­
essity for knowledge of external faotora in order to understand a 
work. This is quite eorreot, but as I have said, everything involved 
in understanding is not nseessarily attributable to the aesthetic
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attitude - although Dufrenne would have It so • and alnoa hs la still 
dubious as to tha legitimacy of external faotors, it remains unoertain 
as to how for ho would allow them to be part of the aesthetic attitude^ 
or undorstending, or both, and his position remains frustratingly 
ambiguous.
Nevertheless, for Dufrenne, the aesthetio attitude provides the 
true perception of the work, and if one attains this, one will under- 
stand the work. He seems to assume a relation of entailment exists 
between the aesthetio attitude and oomprehension. As I have suggested, 
1 think that this reasoning is faulty (i), because of the possibility 
of misinterpretation, and (ii) because the aesthetic attitude itself 
may easily be insuffloient. There seems to be a wide gap between the 
two states where Dufrenne assumes entailment.
However, Dafrenne has two main points (and it is hero that he is 
most in line with oonvention)i a) that the part of the aesthetic 
attitude whloh is feeling, is not grasped immediately! it requires 
experience (?.517)j b), that we oan grasp the aesthetic object by
means of oertain scholarly aotlvities of analysis (presumably this is 
not intend#! to cut out feeling).
Regarding a): feeling arises at first oontaet with the object, but 
this does not mean that it is immediately intelligible. We have the 
eapaoity to understand the expression of a work of art via feeling, 
but we require a familiarity with means of expression, and what can 
be expressed, before we oan recognise what the work expresses (even 
though, from epreljmlnaiy perception of the work, one may very well 
gain a feeling/sense, of the predominant affeotive quality).
Regarding b)i in order to grasp the aesthetic objeot, one should 
have much information about the structure of it, the way that the 
themes of a pices of muslo are put together (gained from a study of 
the work) i
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"Pour que le corps «'habitue a l'objet, pour qu'il «'y 
reconnaisse, 11 faut bien lui en ouvrir les avenues: 
decomposer oet objet, y oheroher les points de repère, en 
distinguer les thèmes et les articulations ... en d'autre
e
termos, ontrer comment l'oeuvre est faite.” (p.519 Ibid.)
All this gives us easier aooess to the work (of. also p.520 Ibid). 
Also, anyone who oan understand a work immediately has a whole back­
ground of cultural knowledge and experience:
"Il y a un oommenoement de la peroeption, un premier oontaot 
aVeo 1 'objet, et tel que parfois l'objet semble se livrer du 
premier ooup. Unis oe oommenoement n'est pas absolu: nous
\ Z'  ^ y/allons a l'objet aveo tout un equipment d'experienoes passées 
qui sont proprement notre oulturej” (p.517 Ibid).
So Bufrenne is saying that normally one either has need of a 
direot knowledge of the apeoifio work with which one is dealing, or 
a knowledge of the genre and oulture in general (or both), in order 
to understand a work.i* But he rejeots what one might call 'hard­
line • oritioal analysis:
"par exemple lors qu'elle fait l'histoire de l'oeuvre, de sa
genèse, des influences qui oe sont exeroèes sur elle ou qu'elle OL
à son tour exeroèes • * . . . "  (p.510).
l.ft WAa ,oi a», the criticism is not aimed at an aesthetic analysis.^» 
kemembering that here understanding follows from the sesthetio stt
itude, the appropriate combination of oritioal analysis and feeling. 
But this perfectly oorreot assumption of the necessity for back­
ground oultural knowledge in order to understand the work, is really 
only oonfusing the issue of what is involved in the aesthetic attit­
ude - since these are preconditions rather than characteristics ofit.
Presumably he regards hard-line criticism as aimed at historical 
rather than aesthetic analysis, though 1 see no reason why hiatoriodl 
information whilst being by definition historical, oannot also be 
aesthetlosily relevant.
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Thar* appaars to ba another turn in Dufrenne's position hara. For it 
saems now that this oritioal analysis is in tha aervioe of feeling, 
rather than being something quite separate, as he previously hald it 
to ba. As a natter of faot, what ha says is ambiguous, and it nay ba 
that Dufrenne is using feeling to naan "having a sense of" and thus, 
"having an understanding of", and simply not differentiating between 
eritioal analysis and feeling, in the aesth etio attitude. I.a., the 
very ambiguous nature of the term 'feeling* is mainly at fault.
Because of the obvious necessity of cone analysis, Dufrenne's 
position has moved in the direotion of regarding both oritioal ref- 
leotion and feeding as directly aesthetio. However, this intermed­
iate stage leaves the relationship of the two unexplained - unless 
one does interpret him as meaning that analysis is in the service of 
feeling.
£. Dufrenne's final remarks on the relationship of the feeling and 
the oritioal attitudes indicate a further development in his position. 
He continues to explain the meaning of the terms (although in a 
slightly different oontext), and their relationship the way he sees 
it now, and funotion. In faot, these last remarks mark a less radical 
change from his initial to his second positions.
Dufrenne now moves into a discussion in the oontext of the express 
ive nature of a work, its uniqueness and meaning (our understanding o 
it), and our attention to the work. The main points are:
i) Kefleotion takes a further turn in seeking less to explain what is 
expressed, than to nane it (p.522).
ii) Kefleotion is subordinated to feeling and understanding a work
(a* 5 2 2-3 ).
iii) If reflection manifests itself through the attention of the 
audienoe, it is an attention turned towards feeling, and the aesth­
etic object in so far as it arouses feeling (p.5 2 5).
1* Vol.XI, Part III, Chap. IV, pp 522-5
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I t ) There is a transition from the oritioal to the fooling attitude, 
v) Reflection prepares and olarifies feeling, and therefore should
not be suppressed (p.5 2 4).
▼i) The aesthetio object demands both reflection and feeling at the 
same time (p.525).
Reflection and feeling now become interwoven in the aesthetic 
attitude. Paying attention to the work - by which he moans adopting 
the aesthetio attitude-is noting more than reflection upon itj an 
attentive reflection allows the audienoe to derive the meaning of 
the aesthetio object. Attention is not purely intellectual, i.e, not 
purely critioal. It involves a familiarity with its objeot which will 
result in the audience feeling at ease with the work.
However, Dul'renne does now seem to be presupposing that there 
will be a lot of olarifioatory work (i.e., oritioal analysis) going 
into the understanding of the aesthetio objeot. He says:
"ha presence de l'objet au oorps presuppose parfois une 
representation lucide, de la meme façon que le libre jeu 
des habitudes présuppose pour leur acquisition un effort 
méthodique et oonsoient . . .  nous ne peroevons bien que 
oe que nous connaissons déjà de quelque façon. Ht o'est 
ainsi que la reflexion peut préparer la perception. . . "
(p.521 ibid).
Obviously, one can distinguish between making some sort of oritioul
analysis on a work of art prior to peroeiving it in the frame of
mind referred to as the aesthetio attitude, and taking that analysis
to be part of the aesthetio attitude; but sinoe Sufrenne regards the
aesthetio attitude as one of paying attention, and paying attention
as involving the oritionl attitude, it follows that he is allowing
some degree of critioal analyses to be part of the aesthetio attt.tuda.-l» 
JL.Of course, the distinction remains between, 1) oritioal analysis «A
aesthetic knowledge and familiarity prior to experiencing a work, and
11) oritieal analysis as a part of the aesthetio experienee/attitude.
Nevertheless, it does seem that Dufrenne is becoming more reconciled
to accepting the latter.
This représenta a deoided advanoe on his initial, rather oonfused sep» 
aration of 'oritieal' and 'feeling* attitudes.
Dufrenne now mores his diseussion into a slightly different sphere 
in saying that refleotion seeks further - to name rather than to explain 
what is expressed (ef.i^ above). I.e.. naming the expression of the 
world of the work, rather than explaining the work itself, for example, 
onee one has eluoidated the affeetive quality of the world of Mallarmé, 
one returns to the knowledge gained from the eritieal refleotion. but 
this knowledge will be clarified by the feeling which reveals the aff- 
eotive quality.
He seems to be advocating a policy ofi
a) critical analysis to gain a general understanding of the work in 
question.
b) gaining a sense of the particular unique affeotive qualities of the 
work via the feeling attitude.
#) a eomgination of the two. resulting in an understanding of both the 
work and the world created by the artist.A* (of. p .5 2 2 ibid):.
The position is one of involving oritioal refleotion but subordinating 
it in importance to feeling (of* ii above)]
"Tout ce que If attitude oritique avait découvert reste valable, 
mais est affeotid'un changement de signe. La reflexion est 
désormais aux ordres du sentiment et inspirée par lui . . . ”
______________________________________________(p.523 ibid)._____________
1. Dufrenne invariably presupposes that there is one 'world* of each 
artist, Mallarmé, Mosart, Debussy, etc., os if the oreations of any 
artist invariably expressed or refleoted oertaln unohanging qualities, 
unique to him. Although one often identifies a work as being 'in ths 
style of X*. or says 'that sounds like, e.g>., Mosart', it is also true 
that the methods and style of an artist may ohange completely in the 
course of his creative lifetime, so that it is premature to say that 
any artist has one particular'world' - if one means something like £ 
recognisable style, or use of oertain unohanging expressive methods.
2 0 6.
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The true aesthetio reflection is bound up with the other more inport- 
ant attitude, whioh is one of feeling, not oritioal analysis of the 
aesthetio object (of.iii) above):
"Si la réflexion se manifeste enoore par l'attention, ce n'est
plus une attention tournee vers l'objet........ , o'est une
attention tournee vers le sentiment . . . . " (p.523 ibid).
The last three points (l.e., iv)-vi) ) illustrate strongly 
Dufrenne's inclination to inoorporate analytic reflection and feeling 
in the aesthetio attitude, and the view that he has now discovered 
their relationship. He says:
"On voit dono que le passage de l'attitude oritique a l'attitude 
sentimentale n'est pas simplement une oscillation: la réflexion 
prépare le sentiment, puis elle 1 'solairej et inversement le 
sentiment en appelle d'abord a la réflexion, puis la dirige. 
L'alternance de la reflexion et du sentiment dessine un progrès 
dialeotique vers une oomprehenrfon de plus en plus pleine de 
l'objet esthétique." (jp.523“4 Ibid.)
The objeot itself necessitates both (a) reflection - because it 
appears ooherent enough to warrant objective knowledge, end (b) 
feeling - heoause this objective knowledge does not explain it 
oompletely, and it requires this further, more intimate relation 
(of feeling), finally:
"I«'experience esthétique oulmine donc dans le sentiment sans 
pouvoir se passer de la reflexion; elle se situe a 1 'interfer­
ence dos deux.” (525 ibid.)
•
Before concluding this section, some oomment is neoessary on 
all three parts. In the first (¿) the advantages of oritioal 
reflection which Dufrenne proposes are all variations on one theme - 
that it leads to an understanding of the work, by studying the formal.
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aspeots (of. a) & b)), and the expressive aspects (of.o) ). Ha thua 
makes out a good oaaa for the necessity of oritioaL reflection. Hia 
problem ia that he believes that auoh minute attention aa this 
requires, prevents one from aeeing the work as a whole, and thua 
understanding it by gaining a senae of the work. He therefore att- 
empta to separate this attitude from what he regards as the aesthetio 
attitude proper.
One thing whioh seems to enoourage Dufrenne in regarding oritio- 
al analyaia aa aidetraoking one froa the work of art, is the faot 
that he inoludes an examination of the teohnioal aapeots, or sooial 
and material conditions surrounding the work, a^part of the oritioal 
analysis. Certainly this sort of enquiry is not contemplation of 
the aotual work of art. However, he is now confusing an analysis of 
the work's environment, and teohnioal analysis of the work as an 
ordinary sbjeot (auoh as the pigments used in making up some oolour, 
or the type of brush the artist used) with an analysis of the work as 
a work of art. (of.p.484.) While the former is undoubtedly not part 
of aesthetio contemplation, there is no obvious reason why the latter 
should not be.
Also, hufrenne fallaciously makes it appear that there is a
distinction between oritioal analysis and aesthetio contemplation, by
referring to the former as reflection on the structure of the work,
as if this were not reflection about the work. However, to take
an example outside art, an analysis of the brioks and mortar, slates
and glass (i.e., struoture) of a house, is also an analysis of the
house. It would be a oategory mistake to say - "those are the oomp-
1 -onents of this house, but this is not the house, where is the house?"
The main problem whioh the first analysis leaves is the question 
of the relation of the analytical refleotion to the refleotion of 
feeling and subsitting oneself to the work. It seems that his pos- 
ition here is thoroughly indeterminate, sinoe the aesthetio attitude
1 .  c f . R y l e :  The c o n c e p t  o f  m i n d . P e r e g r i n e .
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appears to require first a oritioal analysing attitude and then a non 
judging attitude of feeling which involves submitting oneself to the 
work without any preconceptions. These two are obviously not jointly 
compatible.
Dufrenne seems to have put the previous analysis slightly more 
into perspective, in Section (B). Although he is still unolear as to 
the relationship of reflection and feeling, he does seem to be stying 
one thing which is fairly simple, at tortuous length. Namely that 
the sort of knowledge derived from analysing a work is necessary to 
our understanding of it, and thus to the aesthetic attitude.
In this part, Dufrenne is obviously more inolined to inolude 
analysis of the work as part of the aesthetio attitude. He also 
acknowledges the necessity for a good deal of oultural background 
knowledge and experience, and familiarity with the techniques of art 
as a pre-requisite to appreciating the work before one - though thi3 
actually serves to oonfuse the issue, since this is not part of the 
aesthetio attitude.
In the final seotion, Dufrenne makes out a perfectly plausible 
Oase for analysis in the aesthetio attitude, sinoe he now sees it as 
required by feeling (whioh he regards as the more important aspeot of 
the aesthetio attitude). Sinoe he has made out a good oase for the 
necessity of analysis, and provided no real barriers to its accept­
ance, I see no reason to exolude it from the aesthetio attitude. As 
will be seen in the final seotion, it does in fact seem to be neoeis- 
ary in order to give oontent to the whole oonoept of the aesthetio 
attitude. Nor do I see any reason for rejecting this theory of 
aesthetic contemplation.
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Conclusion.
At no stage in his disousslon does Dufrenne suggest that soma fora 
of oritioal analysis of tha aesthatio objeot oan be onittad from an 
understanding of it. However, it is not really obvious until the 
third sot of remarks on the aesthatio attitude, that rafloetion 
(oritioal analysis) and foaling, are to be regarded as parts of the 
whole. They remain distinct parts, but together with a certain 
distancing (which will be dealt with in Seotion V), they go to make 
up tne contemplative aesthetio attitude as Dufrenne sees it.
He is unfortunately handioapped from the outset by two oonn- 
eoted aspects of phenomenology (i); the distaste for an analytical 
attitude to any study, and (ii) the inolination to regard under­
standing as immediately intuited. Thus, throughout his discussion 
there is an obvious oonflidt between the ideas (a), that oritioal 
dialysis is neoessary to understanding the work of art, and (b) that 
the affective quality ic immediately known via our oapaoity for 
feeling, or having a sense of what is expressed. And he has the 
further problem of knowing what the aesthetio attitude comprises, 
i.e., whether oritioal reflection is admissable in the first plaoe.
He reaohes what he regards as a satisfactory oonolusion by 
incorporating reflection and feeling, and regarding them as insep­
arable. Reflection beoomes a neoessary preliminary step towards 
feeling. He thus avoids the previous oonolusions (a); that orltioaL 
analysis neutralises the aesthetio experience, &nd (b) that there is 
an oscillation between reflection and feeling (a oonoluaion whioh 
left one totally ignorant of the relationship between the two, and 
the degree to whioh oritioal analysis might be regarded as part of 
the aesthetio attitude).
It is also possible to overcome the problem of immediacy by 
delaying immediate comprehension of the aesthetio objeot until after 
the oritioal reflection. Immediate intuition does not preolude some
* . ,  y m
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form of preliminary analysis, i.e., one does not hare to understand 
the objeot as soon as one first perseires it, in order for one's 
understanding to be immediate/intuitive (of. p.53,1 ibid).
I think it is olear that the diseussion of reflection and feel­
ing does not form one ooherent whole, and that it is more satisfact­
ory to divide the analysis into three seetions, as I have done.
There is a continuous lack of olarity in what Dufrenne says, and at 
the oonolusion, he has still not given a oompletely luoid aooount of 
the aesthetic attitude. However, he does eradioate the sharp dist­
inction between refleotion and feeling, and with it the apparent 
neoessity to peroeive any work of art twice - onoe by means of a 
oritioal attitude and onoe by means of feeling - although in doing 
so he seems to involve himself in holding that the aesthetio attit­
ude whioh results in the true aesthetio experience is aohieved through 
a third perception whioh combines refleotion and feeling.
But one cannot condemn his tnesis simply beoause it seems 
unconventional. It is neither irrational nor illogical to olaim 
that three perosptions of a work are necessary to complete the 
aesthetio attitude. As a matter of foot, one can probably eradicate 
tfee idea of two preliminary perceptions and see the theory as 
involving only one - an attitude to the work whioh uses oritioal 
analysis as one of the means of gaining a sense of, or feeling for, 
the work.
The final aspeot of Dufrenne's theory of the aesthetio attitude 
is distanoe, to whioh I shall now turn. 'Distancing' may be held to 
be that part of contemplation where t e subject is to some degree 
detaohed from the objoot of his study, and frim the ordinary world. 
Dufrenne does not ddeouss the latter form in his diooussion of
distanoe
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At one stage, Dufrenne makes a distinotion between knowledge and 
feeling In the aeathetio attitude (Vol.II, Part 111, Chap.V. pp.530“2)J 
He states that (a), aesthetio feeling oannot survive the disappear­
ance of its objeot, whereas, by implication, knowledge oan,
(b) knowledge is anonymous whereas the aesthetio objeot is not, 
it 'reaohes one1.
Whilst both these points may be oorreot,!- they would appear to make 
little difference to the question of the aesthetio attitude. X there­
fore note what Dufrenne says, for the sake of completeness, and 
beoause he has asserted that feeling is a form of knowledge.
Section XV.
■aesthetic distance. 1
The final part of Dufre ne•s notion of the aesthetio attitude 
diaousses the psyohologioal aspect of the attitude in terms of the 
oonoept of distanoe.£* Beoause of Jidnard Bullough's influential work, 
aosthetios - in particular that section on ’Psychical Distance' - 
this has often been aocepted as an important aspeot of the aesthetio 
attitude, in twentieth oentury philosophy of art. As it happens, 
Dufrenne does not acknowledge Bullough, and may never have read his 
theory. However, his own idea of distanoe is not entirely dissimilar 
from that of Bullough, although it is by no means so thoroughly exp­
lained or defined.
1, Though the idea that aesthetio feeling oannot survive tfee disapp­
earance of its objeot is probably inoorroot, sinoe there is no reason 
to suppose that whatever feelings one has throughout the duration of
a piooe of muaio will cease as soon as the work oeases.
2. Dufrenne does not use the upper oase for 'distance', whereas
Bullough does. I snail follow the usage of eaoh, whioh ^
imply that I think Dufrenne neoessarily means something
this tens.
y i
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though jufranno doss not disouss distanoe systematically, one 
oan take what ne says in four stages :
i) Tne world of art is non-reul/different from that of the ordin­
ary objeot.
ii) The aeathetio attitude is distanoed.
ili) His illustration of the way distance operates.
iv) Two final ideas that should not be taken as oontradioting the
theory - on paying attention, and identifioation with the work,
firstly, concerning i), Oufronne regards the world of aesthet­
ics as different from that of tne ordinary objeot. ITe states this 
oooaaionally - for example when he is disoussing the prosenoe of the 
work to its audienoe, he says that aesthetioq takes us into a non­
work world - whioh is one of the reasons that one is not suspioious 
or wary of art, wnereas one is wary of people or objects of the 
ordinary world. (Voi.IX, Part III, Chap.X. pp42b-7.)
A similar view is expressed when he is disoussing the profund­
ity of art (of.Voi.IX, Part III, Chap.IV, pp.iiOp-b). According to 
Dufrenne, there is a oertain strangeness in the profundity of the 
work of art, deriving from tne faot that art oonfronts us with a now 
attitude (regard). If we treat the work as an ordinury objeot, we 
finish with it when we have fitted it into the oontext of ordinary 
aotion. by implication, he is saying that this is the wrong att­
itude.
Sufrenne desoribes really the way the aesthetio objoot oan be 
both real and unreal:
"Si l'objet esthetique en tnnt que chose est bien dans le 
monde - tel tableau exposé dans tollo galerie, telle pieoo 
jouee dans tel theatre - nous aavons qu'il tend a o'on
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severer pour constituer comme un ilôt, et que oe qui l'isole 
est précisément le fait qu'il désigné un autre monde. • • . "
(Vol.II, Part III, Chap.II, p.449). 1»
If the work of art is different from the ordinary objeot, we may 
tahe a different attitude to it (regarding 11) ). This is not only 
contemplative (in the combination of analysis and feeling Just 
doaoribed), it is also distanced:
"L'objet esthétique, lui aussi, lui surtout, doit etre perçu 
a. distance d'objet . . . . . . "  (p.447 ibid).
îi'e do nét respond to a work of art as we do to other objeots, for 
instance, one sees emotions depicted but does not respond as one 
would to seeing them in ordinary experience:
"le monde de l'art est un monde inoffensif que nous n'avons 
pas a prendre entièrement au sérieux, la participation n'y 
▼a point Jusqu'a 1'emotion. Devant Le Pendu de Kouault,
y  \  SJ'eprouve la misere du monde sans éprouver l'angoisse ou la 
crainte qui, dans le monde réel, amorcerait une entreprise 
pour fuir ou conjurer cette misere. A la oomsdie, il n'est 
pas néoessaire que. le speotateur soit gai comme s'il était en 
situation aans le monde représente . . . ." (Chap.Ill,p.47? opoit)« 
1 . Ke also says (pr.426-7) that the passions work themselves out on 
the unreal forms of art, i.e., t at art has a cathartio effect. This 
is somewhat strange in viuw of the faot that he maintains that elthoigh 
art oan express emotions, it is not necessary to feel any emotion in 
order to understand the work - one should rather recognise it. Sinoe 
Dufrenne's idea of the aesthetic attitude seems to be a fairly 
disciplined one - and oertainly not that art is a safety valve for 
our emotions - I take this to be a strange inoonsiotenoy on his part.
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Dufrenne elaborates only sli$itly on the bare statement of dist“ 
ance. He says (regarding ill)), that oertain aotlvities in the aesth» 
etio experience both oo-ordinate us with the aesthetio object and 
aetaoh us from itj that ne both contemplate and participate in the 
aesthetio objeot, sufficiently involved to follow the work but not to 
be deceived by it; and that the principle for our oapaoity for det- 
aohment derives from what he oalls the transcendental imagination:!^ 
"mesurer, nonbrer, qualifier le temps en ordonnant l'espace, 
ces aotivit.es . . . nous embrayent sur oet objet (1 •esthétique) 
et nous mettent en quelque sorte en synohronisme aveo lui, et en 
même temps nous detaohent de lui . . . "  (p.448 op.cit).
"nous oontemplons, et nous participons, mais oetie participation, 
qui d'ailleurs se comprendre mieux au plan du sentiment, n'est 
jam ais totale . "
✓ /"Ht partout la perception esthétique requiert un oertain detaoh- 
ment . . .  donc le prinoipe est sans doute dans l'imagination en 
tant que pou voir transcendantal de prendre ses distances." (p.448) 
I think that Dufrenne is using 'transcendental' in order to forestall 
ideas that ordinary imagination is required in aesthetic perception, 
in order to oomplete it, i.e., that we need to imagine something 
further than is given. He is using imagination to mean the ability 
to reoognise the aesthetio objeot as in the world, but separated in 
oertain ways (e.g., in drama by pretenoe) - i.e., as distanced. It is 
an activity required by the aesthetio attitude, bpt not by ordinary 
attitudos to objects.
He also makes on interesting and apt comparison of the aesthetio
1 . Transcendental and empirical imagination are, for present purposes, 
distinguished only by the nature of their object » for the former, 
the aesthetic, and for the latter, the ordinary objeot.
(of. p.446.)
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attitude with the ounce t attitude to someone one loves. 1* This is in 
the short chapter aotua.ly entitled 'The aesthetio attitude', but wh^ oh 
is mainly a comparison of the aesthetio and other attitudes (Vol.II, 
Part 111, Chap.V, esp. pp.532-6). Similarities lie in the recognition 
of the aeBthetio objeot as something we should not attempt to alter, 
and the loved one as someone with whom we should not intorfero. They 
both have rights in their own way. One should not regard either as to 
be used or to be abused. If one does think principally of oneself, 
then one misses both the aesthetio and the loving experienoe - by 
mistakenly using the other thing/person for one's own ends (p.532 ibid) 
One of the differences between the loving and the aesthetio att­
itude, however, is that love requires a union which the aesthetio 
object does not. The reciprocity and involvement of love are notably 
absent from the aesthetio attitude, whioh holds one at a distance 
(, p,533-4-.i. The latter is also a happier relationship between s ubjeot 
and object, because it naturally maintains a distance between the two, 
whereas love involves on insoluble antinomy between u desire for union,
1« It snould be made clear that Dufrenne is making a comparison between 
the aesthetic attitude, and the ideal loving attitude. There is a dbf_ 
orenoe in that there are degrees within the letter and not within the 
former. One oun love someone without assuming the ideal stance whioh 
Dufrenne pre-suppo&es. Elements of the non-ideal love oreep in when 
he mentions, "Is desir d'une possession qu'il faudr&it ensulte repria- 
er." (p.536.) involved in love, he it is, he oonoludo3 by thinking 
there is an insoluble antinomy in love, between tho wish to be united 
with the other, and the recognition of their freedom. (The idea that 
one is free is espooially involved in existentialism.) Tho two are 
incompatible, sinoe the former involves imposing a restriction on the 
freedom of the other.
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and a recognition of the rights of the othei as a distinot being 
(»•535-6):
"l'amour requiert une union que l'objet esthetique ne demand# 
point paroe que, tout en agiasant sur mol, il me tient a 
distanoe . . . "  (p.533).
Two olauses in what Dufrenne has so far said about distanoe 
imply something of what he feels is involved in the notion. As it is, 
he only aotually explains it by comparisons.
A. Of partioipation; "Cette participation, qul d'ailleurs se comp» 
rendre mieux au plan du sentiment" (p.4AB op.oit.), indicates that 
it. is on the level of feeling that one 'participates in' the aesth­
etic objeot. feeling, as 1 have described it is different from
emotion - it involves a form of knowledge, 'having a sense o f  the 
work of art. It is olear therefore, that Cufrenne dees not regard 
our involvement as any kind of emotional or dose attachment. We are 
by no means 'carried away' by the expressive properties of the work.£ 
So he is consistently maintaining that the audienoe is psychologic­
ally distanced.
h. Further to the psyohologioal state of the audienoe (cf.p.53& op.oiti 
when comparing the loving and aesthetic attitudes, hufrenne says that 
the subjeot maintains a distanoe from the objeot. This indicates 
onoe more that the audienoe is not emotionally involved and does not 
identify with the work,
he does not mention at any stage in his account of the aesthetlo 
attitude, that the audienoe should be distanced from himself, or from 
the ordinary affairs of everyday life. All the same, this idea implies
1>. See Section II, present chapter.
£. By contrast one might consider the 'method' sohool of drama, in 
whioh the aotors attempt to identify completely with their roles.
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that one anould perceive the work of art as contextually diatinot
from tho rest of the world, and since ha regards art aa eelf-euffiota 
I think it is safe to assume that he would regard this foia of dist­
ancing as part of the distanced aesthetic a t t i t u d e . O n e  has to be 
careful here, however. If one olaims that the aesthetio attitude is 
totally dissociated from the ordinary world, all ideas of the relev- 
anoe of art to life, all ideas of a reciprocal mode of understanding 
between life and art, and art and life, are automatically denied. X 
have already expressed my disinclination to aooept this kind of
dxssociut-cn, and even Cufrenne - though he regurds the work of art
as self-sufficient • does not olaim that it exists in a void.
Admittedly what he says has a grudging ring to it, as if he would
very muoh prefer to exclude the world outside the aesthetic object, 
but finds that he cannot. He says:
"il ns peut nous engager dans son ironde qu'on detournant du 
Luxe, meme si nous ne le quittons paa tout a fait at si 
1 ' environment est toujoura •mitgeireint’ j oar, d'un part, il 
no fout pas que la perception sombre dans le rere, et il 
n'y a de perception que si noua acumea au monde.”
(Vol.I, part I, Chap.V, p224.)
ns will be soon in the following section, Diokie — * has said 
that r:h&t&ullough calls the aesthetic attitude is not:ing more than 
1 . Seo Chapter 2, Section XII, on autonomy.
p. 'ibis element of distance will ba further explained in the follow­
ing section, when bullough's theory is disoussed.
5. £oo Chapter 2, Section III, on autonomy.
4. Cf. fieor go DiOAie: Xhe myth of the aeothqti.o attitude. AP.Q , 
January, 19 6 4. Also, Ceorge Dickie; Psychical distance. B.J.A.
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p a y i n g  a t t e n t i o n  to the work. D ufrenne a l s o  m e n t i o n s  attention,If 
b u t  not i n  o r d e r  to s u b s t i t u t e  it f o r  d i s t a n o e .  F o r  him, a t t e n t i o n  
is a p e r i p h e r a l  b u t  not a d d i t i o n a l  o o n o e p t  i n  the a e s t h e t i o  a t t i t u d e .  
It means m ore or less exa o t l y  what one w o u l d  expeot, and is quite 
u n o o n t r o v e r s i a l . It is nothing more t h a n  r e f l e c t i o n  o n  the work, 
and the r e s u l t  of an a t t entive r e f l e c t i o n  is that one u n d e r s t a n d s  
the m e a n i n g  of the work. P a y i n g  a t t e n t i o n  is more or less e q u a t e d  
w i t h  a d o p t i n g  the aesthetio att i t u d e  as he sees it ( o f . V o l . I Z ,  P a r t  
111, Chap. IV, p p . 520-1 asp).
F i n a l l y  ( r e g a r d i n g  iv) ), D u f r e n n e  s o m e t i m e s  r e f e r s  to the i d e a  
of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  the work, w h i o h  m i g h t  be c o n s t r u e d  as c o n t r a ­
d i c t i n g  the o o n o e p t  of the a udienoe as d i s t a n c e d .  Two e x a m p l e s  will 
be s u f f i c i e n t  to s h o w  that i t  does not.
4 . (Vol.l, Part 1, Chap.Ill, pp.91-6.) The s p e c t a t o r  is b o t h  ins i d e 
a n d  o u t s i d e  the w o r k  w i t h  regard to the s e n s i b l e  a speots, a n d  its 
me a n i n g .  In the case of the first, one is both, f o r  e x ample, b o t h  
in the m u s i c  as w ell as f a c i n g  the o r o h e s t r a :
"au o o n o e r t  Je suis e n  faoe de l ' o r o h e s t r a ,  m ais Je auis 
dans le s y m p h o n i c ,  . . la a y m phonie e s t  en moi . . . "
( p .92 ibid).
A n d  w ith p a i n t i n g ,  one pe n e t r a t e s  the s p a o e  of the w o r k  as w ell as 
j ust v i e w i n g  it. In the oase of the s e o o n d  (meani n g ) ,  it is p o s s ­
ible f o r  the s p e c t a t o r  to get to the m e a n i n g  of a w ork by a l l o w i n g  
h i m s e l f  to be taken o ver by the sensible ( p . 9 4  ibid). The a u d i e n o e  
is e n g a g e d  in the work:
"le temuin n ' e s t  pas un s p e o t a t e u r  p u r ,  mais un 
s p e o t a t e u r  engage - dans l ’oeuvre m e m e . "  (p.93.)
B u t  this is hardly a threat to d i s t a n o e .  F o r  one thing, Duf­
renne is p r i n c i p a l l y  co n t r a s t i n g  tuephysj.oal and the p s y c h o l o g i c a l
J.. See a l s o  p r e v i o u s  seotion, p art 1).
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p e r s p e c t i v e  of the a u d i e n o e .  B e i n g  b o t h  in the m u s i o  and f e o i n g  the 
o r o h e e t r a  is an a s s e r t i o n  that w h i l s t  the a u d i e n o e  is p h y s i o a l l y  
d i s t a n c e d  f r o *  the musio, they are n e v e r t h e l e s s  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  
e n g a g e d  b y  it. A n d  to be e n g a g e d  i n  the work is to be p r o p e r l y  
a t t e n t i v e  to it, not to be u n d i s t a n o e d .  F o r  a n o t h e r  t h i n g ,  s a y i n g  
as he d oes that the b o d y  s u b m i t s  to the o b j e o t  and l ets i t s e l f  be 
m o v e d  b y  it, amo u n t s  m o r e  to a n  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  it is w r o n g  f o r  the 
a u d i e n o e  e i t h e r  to d o m i n a t e  the w o rk, i.e., impo s e  its own t h e o r i e s  
on it, o r  to give it a s u p e r f i c i a l  'external' r eading, t h a n  to a 
d e n i a l  of d i s t a n o e .
B. ( V ol.II, P a r t  III, C hap.IV, p p A 9 0 - 1 .) H ere again, D u f renne s h o w s  
t h a t  he is d i s i n c l i n e d  to allow t hat one o a n  u n d e r s t a n d  a w o r k  o f  
art w i t h o u t  i d e n t i f y i n g  w i t h  it in s ome way. He says t hat q u e s t i o n s  
a b o u t  a work, s u o h  as, " w h y  this m e l o d i o  lin e ? ,  this trait?", e t o., 
are a n s w e r e d  b y  a f e e l i n g  of n e o e s s i t y  i n t e r i o r  to the work. The 
s y m p a t h e t i c  r e f l e c t i o n  w h i o h  r e a c h e s  this answer, is h e l d  to be v e r y  
s i m i l a r  to fe e l i n g .  This s y m p a t h e t i c  reflec t i o n :
"n'est r i e n  qu'une a t t e n t i o n  f i d è l e  et p a s s i o n è e ,  p a r  
quoi je m ' i m p r é g n é  de l ' o b j e t  e n  me f a i s a n t  o o n s u b s t a n t -
iel à lui, . . . .  et ma c o n n a i s s a n c e  s ' a p p r o f o n d i t  p a r o e
\qu'elle s ' i n c o r p o r e  p lus p r o f o n d é m e n t  a moi. Les q u e s t i o n s  
que nous p o s i o n s :  p o u r q u o i  ce t r a i t  . . .  elles r e ç o i v e n t  
m a i n t e m e n t  une r é p o n s e  . . .  p a r  le s e n t i m e n t  d ' u n e  n é c e s s ­
ité i n t é r i e u r e  a l ' o e u v r e . "  (p. 4 9 0 . )
T his is a o t u a l l y  more h e l p f u l  than h i n d e r i n g .  F o r  it p r o v i d e s  a n  
i n s i g h t  i nto the way D u f r e n n e 's n o t i o n  of f e e l i n g  works. It is 
i n d e e d  a f o r m  of i n t u i t i o n .  B e o o m i n g  o o n s u b s t a n t i a l  with the w o r k  
m a y  be t a k e n  as one w a y  of saying one takes the work on its own 
l e v e l ,  or in its own f r a m e w o r k .  JS.g., in l i s t e n i n g  to S o h o e n b e r g
V J
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I do not o r i t i o i s e  it in the way I s h o u l d  o r i t i o i s e  B e e t h o v e n .  I 
l i s t e n  wit h o u t  p r e o o n o e p t i o n s  of perfec t i o n ,  a n d  I l i s t e n  to the work 
and allow its mood, tem p o ,  eto., to sur r o u n d  m e .  1 i d e n t i f y  w i t h  the
w ork to an u n s p e c i f i e d  extant. This does not m e a n  t h a t  1 am o a r r i e d
a w a y  by it, and l ose di s t a n o e . If this were the oase, I s h o u l d  not
m a i n  in the f r ame of mind in which 1 q u e s t i o n  a s p e o t s  of the work -
a n d  Duf r e n n e  is s p e c i f i c a l l y  usi n g  this as an e x a m p l e  of an a t t i t u d e  
w h ioh asks qu e s t i o n s  a n d  gets answers. This is the r e f l e c t i o n  s i m i ­
l a r  to f e e l i n g  w h e r e b y  1 gain a sense of the w o r k  by b e o o m i n g  i n o o r p -
o r a t e d  i n  it, o r  it i n  me, and am able to say;
" P o urquoi oette i r r u p t i o n du m a j e u r  dans le d e r n i e r
m o u v e m e n t  de l a  s y m phonie ae F r a n c k ?  P o u r  nous intr o -
' . . 4d u i r e  dans la l u m i e r e . "  (p.4f>1 . )—
By ' e n tering into the work' I am able to i n t u i t  the r e a s o n s  w h y  
o e r t a i n  aspeots are as they are.
D u f r e n n e  adds t h a t  toe a e s thetic r e f l e c t i o n  can n o t  go o n  ind-
e f i n i t e l y  asking q u e s t i o n s  - in the end it m u s t  aoo e p t  the
n e c e s s i t y  i n t e r i o r  to the work,, To u n d e r s t a n d  is to be a s s u r e d  that
it c a n n o t  be o t h e r  t h a n  it is: " C o m p rendre l ' o e u v r e ,  s ' est s ' a s s u r o r
qu'elle ne p eut 'ître autre qu'elle est . . .  "(p.491). This is i n t e n d ­
ed as an a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  the idea of asking q u e stions a b o u t  the w o r k  
does not m e a n  that t h e r e  is no end to the r e f l e c t i o n ,  and t hat at
1 . I think that it w o u l d  be false to say t h a t  D u f r e n n e ' s  a r g u m e n t  
was w r o n g  if one h a p p e n e d  to disagree with t h e  ans w e r s  he g i v e s  to 
his own q u e s t i o n s  h e r e .  The ans w e r  m a y  be w r o n g  but this d oes not 
f a l s i f y  the m e t h o d  - of i n t u i t i o n  and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  His i n t u i t i o n  
m a y  be i n o o r r e o t .
- * 3
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sons stage one oan say that one u n d e r s t a n d s , i *
The q u e s t i o n  of u n d e r s t a n d i n g  does not o o n f l i o t  w i t h  a n y t h i n g  
D u f r e n n e  says a b o u t  d i s tance, and it s e e m s  d e a r  t h a t  i d e a s  of 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  the work do not e i t h e r ,  as l o n g  as one d o e s  not 
a l l o w  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  to red u o e  into d e e p  p e r s o n a l  i n v o l v e m e n t .  
H o w e v e r ,  I shall c o m m e n t  on b o t h  of thes e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  
sin o e  t hat has a r i s e n  on t h e  d i s o u s s i o n  o n  the m e a n i n g  of c o n t e m p ­
l a t i o n .  P r i o r  to this, it is n e c e s s a r y  to provide a b r i e f  e x p l a n ­
a t o r y  n o t e  on a), the n o n - r e a l i t y  of the work, and b), w h a t  e x a o t l y  
the a e s t h e t i o  o b j e c t  r e q u i r e s  of its a u d i e n o e  in t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
(a) The i d e a  of the work of art as non-real sou n d s  p r i m a  f a o i e  like 
a n o t h e r  a s s e r t i o n  of a u t o n o m y .  B u t  one d o e s  not have to a o o e p t  the 
s e l f - s u f f i o i e n t ,  q u a s i - s u b j e c t  nat u r e  of art, i n  a c c e p t i n g  this mode 
o f  n o n - r e a l i t y ,  f o r  the simple r e a s o n  that the l a t t e r  entails only  
t h a t  the a e s t h e t i o  o b j e c t  is d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  the o r d i n a r y  obj e o t ,  n o t  
t hat it is not r e l a t e d  to it. One oan a l l o w  that the a e s t h e t i o  
o b j e o t  r e q u i r e s  a d i f f e r e n t  a t t itude, e t o . ,  and s t ill d eny t h a t  it 
is a c o m p l e t e l y  s e l f - s u f f i o i e n t ,  a u t o n o m o u s  objeot, i.e., m a i n t a i n  
that it is r e l a t e d  to o r d i n a r y  o bjects a n d  even t s  of the world.
(b) In his illustration of the w a y  d i s t a n o e  o p e r a t e s ,  D u f r e n n e  
o o m p a r e s  the l o v i n g  and a e s t h e t i o  a t t i t u d e s .  Here, he r e g a r d s  the 
a e s t h e t i o  o b j e o t  as not a f f e o t e d  by the a e s t h e t i o  a t t itude, al t h o u g h  
the a e s t h e t i c  a t t i t u d e  r e q u i r e s  that the a u d i e n o e  be a f f e o t e d  in so 
f a r  as b e i n g  i n f l u e n c e d  by the a e s t h e t i o  o bjeot. He says also that
1. Cf. W i t t g e n s t e i n ,  op.oit. n o . 217 (& 4 8 5 )  - who says that one m ust 
o e a s e  j u s t i f y i n g  and q u e s t i o n i n g  at s o m e  stage; "If I have e x h a u s t e d  
the J u s t i f i c a t i o n s  1 have r e a o h e d  b e d r o o k ,  und my spa d e  is turned. 
T h e n  I am i n o l i n e d  to say 'this is s i m p l y  what 1 do" ".
2. Cf. pr e v i o u s  s e o t i o n ,  p r e s e n t  o n apter.
3. This is also d i s c u s s e d  in t h e  f i n a l  p a r t  of s e o t i o n  VI.
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it does not req u i r e  the h o m a g e  of the a u d i e n o e :
" d e v a n t  le beau, Je m a  fais dooile a son i n f l u e n o e  sans 
qulil en soit e n  l u i - m e m e  affecte , . , il n ' a  pas b e s o i n  
do m o n  h o m m a g e . "  ( p . i > 3 4  op.oit.)
He is p o s s i b l y  at f a u l t  in not maki n g  cle a r  e x a o t l y  w h a t  ho 
thinks the a e s t h e t i o  o b j e c t  does require of its a u d i e n o e .  F o r  the 
idea., that the work of a r t  qua aesthetio objeot n e c e s s i t a t e s  that 1 
p e r c e i v e  it as a n  a e s t h e t i o  objeot, is not s t r i c t l y  in line with the 
i d e a  that it is i n d e p e n d e n t  of me i n  not r e q u i r i n g  my h o m a g e .  The 
s o l u t i o n  to this lies in the fact that while it i s  n e c e s s a r y  to 
p e r c e i v e  an a e s t h e t i o  o b j e o t  in ord e r  for it to b e  one, it is not 
p a r t  of the d e f i n i t i o n  of p e r o e p t i o n  that one p a y s  homage to the 
w o r k . 1*
Alt h o u g h  it does not make any formal d i f f e r e n c e  to l u f r e n n e ' s  
the o r y  on the a e s t h e t i o  a t t itude, 1 think one s h o u l d  take note of 
the idea that u n d e r s t a n d i n g  the work is being s a t i s f i e d  that it 
oan n o t  be o t h e r  t an it is - if only b ecause t nis is r e l e v a n t  to the 
q u e s t i o n  of what it m e ans to u n d e rstand a work, w h i c h  ent e r s  into 
the d i s o u s s i o n  on r e f l e c t i o n  and feeling. In so f a r  as he is saying 
that, for example, one m a y  u n d e r s t a n d  a work w h e n  one sees that phxaae 
B i 3 f o r mally, m a t e r i a l l y ,  or e x p r e s s i v e l y  a c o h e r e n t  part of the 
p a s s a g e  c o m p r i s i n g  A - D , t h e n  he is oorreot. One o f  the ways in 
w h i o h  one comes to o o m p r e h e n d  a work is by seeing the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
of e a c h  of its parts to the whole.
1 . As it happens, what he says about the work's b e i n g  d i s s o c i a t e d  
f r o m  the a u d i e n o e  is not c o n s i s t e n t  with what he has said p r e v i o u s l y  
about the aud i e n o e  as p e r f o r m i n g  the work. Cf. C h a p t e r  2', S e o t i o n
I ]
I■
i i .
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H o w e v e r ,  that is not to say that the work oould not be s t r u o t u r e d  
( not o n l y  w.th r e g a r d  to form, but e x p r e s s i o n  and s u b j o o t  m a t t e r  also) 
o t h e r  t h a n  it is. J u s t  in the w a y  t hat in ethios, a l t h o u g h  a o t i o n  
X  is good, a c t i o n s  Y a n d  Z w o u l d  h ave b e e n  s q u a l l y  good or b e t t e r ,  
u n d e r  the same o i r o u m a t a n o e s ; so i n  art the ( a e s t h e t i c a l l y  good) 
p h r a s e  B  may be r e p l a c e a b l e  b y  a n o t h e r  p h r a s e  as g o o d  or better. To 
o i t e  a n  ex a m p l e ,  V a u g h a n  W i l l i a m s  r e p l a o e d  a whole m o v e m e n t  of one 
s y m p h o n y  w i t h o u t  d e t r i m e n t  to the w o r k ,  just to s h o w  the o r i t i o s  who 
s a i d  it o o u l d  not be o t h e r  than it was, that it o o u l d  be a l t e r e d  and 
r e m a i n  as good. ( W h e t h e r  it r e m a i n e d  the same w o r k  is a n o t h e r  
q u e s t i o n . )
Also, t h e r e  are m i n o r  w o rks w h i o h  oould have b e e n  g r e a t e r  h a d  a 
g r e a t e r  a r t i s t  u n d e r t a k e n  them.1* f o r  example, M o z a r t  o o u l d  no 
d o u b t  have i m p r o v e d  a c o m p o s i t i o n  b y  S p o h r  - w h i o h  shows t hat a 
w o r k  o a n  be o t h e r  t h a n  it is. But one o a n  s t ill u n d e r s t a n d  the
9
o r i g i n a l ,  and p o s s i b l y  m ore e a s i l y  sinoe it will be less o o m p l e x . 13
f u r t h e r m o r e ,  the i d e a  that to u n d e r s t a n d  a work is to see it as 
u n a l t e r a b l e ,  o o n f l i o t s  w ith D u f r e n n e ' s  s t a t e m e n t  (Vol.I, P a r t  I, 
o h a p . X I ,  seot. 2) t h a t  there are w o r k s  of art w h i o h  are l ess t h a n  
p e r f e o t ,  a n d  that there is a p o s s i b l e  p e r f e o t  f o r m  f o r  all w o r k s  of 
art. While I see no j u s t i f i o a t i o n  f o r  the lat t e r ,  it is true that 
t h e r e  are w o r k s  w h ioh are l e s s  than p e r f e o t .  A n d  if it w ere true that 
t h e s e  oould alw a y s  be m ade per f e o t ,  t h e n  they w o u l d  not be u n a l t e r a b l  
j_. T h i s  does n o t  m e a n  t hat all m i n o r  w o rks can be improved, sinoe 
t h e r e  is not n e c e s s a r i l y  any way of p e r f e o t i n g  w h a t  is l ess t h a n  p e r ­
f e o t .  All 1 wish to o l a i m  is that some works w o u l d  be imp r o v e d ,  and 
t h e r e f o r e  be o t h e r  t h a n  t hey are.
This l a t t e r  remark o o u l d  be questi o n e d ,  sinoe a minor w o r k  m a y  be 
m o r e  t o r t u o u s l y  or l o o s e l y  o o n s t r u o t e d  than a g r e a t  one, thus b e i n g 
m o r e  d i f f i o u l t  to f o l l o w .
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Therefor* it oannot be the oase that to understand, a work of art 
is to realise that it oannot be other than it is. The idea oan also 
be made absurd. For someone oould see the national anthem as nec­
essarily as it is, and thus understand it, aooording to Dufrenne.
But Beethoven would see the same pieoe as capable of alteration for 
the better - whioh he did, writing variations whioh are indubit­
ably musically better ti.an the original - and on Dufrenne's criterion, 
he would not have understood the national anthem. This is obviously 
an implausible conclusion.
Dufrenne's assertion is only tenable if one restricts oneself 
to taking the idea that one understands a work when one sees that it 
oannot be other than it is, as meaning that one understands the work 
in that form, when one sees the ooherenoe of its parts (of. the first 
example). Though this is oorreot, as I have indioated, it does not 
seem to be what Dufrenne means.
Finally, there is a slight problem regarding identification 
with the work. As 1 have interpreted it, Dufrenne does not regard 
this as entailing personal emotional involvement, but if one is not 
oareful, it oan reduoe to this. For example, Dufrenne says:
"Pourquoi Isee se dresse-t-elle devant liesa: Je suis Isoe ...?" 
(p.490).
It is essential not to regard this simpJ.istioal.ly. Otherwise one may 
beoome totally involved with some one character in any work, and 
beoome insensible to the feelings of the others. One is oarried 
away. What is required is that one sees how it would be if one were 
in the same position as, for example, Isee, and understand how she 
sots, as a result. This iu a perfectly plausible distanced attitude 
(though it will be seen in the final seotion that I do not regard 
this degree of detaohment as necessary), and in view of what Dufrenne
!
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■ ays about not needing to feel «that is expressed, it muat be his 
position if he ia to remain consistent.
This completes a fairly comprehensive study of Dufrenne's theory 
of the eeethetio attitude. In brief, it is that one assumes a 
contemplative attitude, which does not mean taking a superficial 
view of works of art, but a 'reflective' (analytio) and 'feeling* 
attitude, and also involves a oertain psychological stance, i.e., 
distanced. Dufrenne's ohief stumbling blooka in this have been seen 
to be the relationship of analysis and feeling, and the degree of 
analysis permissable. There have also been seen not to be 
insuperable.
There are various other views of the aesthetio attitude, some of 
which I shall compare with those of Dufrenne. by far the most comp­
rehensive is that of Edward Bullough. Nevertheless, there are 
other's to be considered, in order to show the diversification of 
ideas even amongst theories whioh claim to be contemplative.
V...
bufrenne's theory in comparison.
There are both contemplative and non-oontemplative ideas of the 
aesthetio attitude. 1 Shall confine myself mainly to those whioh 
are contemplative and relevant to Dufrenne. This oonfines the field 
to two essentially relevant views - those of D. W, Prelll* and 
Bullough - and some peripheral oases, for example, ¡mousse and Bell.
(i) D. Prall. There is an interesting similarity in the termin­
ology and thought of Prall - a prominent American philosopher of the 
1930's - and Dufronne. bike Dufrenne, he does not regard the work of 
art as serving some end. The work is an end in itBelf. He also 
agrees that it is expressive (of. p.176 op.alt.), and that works of
art :,nva an offeotlve oontont. Hia view that, "aesthetio experience jI
1 . See D.W.Prall: Aesthetic Judgment. (First pub. New York Crowell, 1929.)
Rep. New York Apollo editions,1 967.
D.W.Prall: Aesthetic Analysis. New York Crowell. (First pub. 1936.)
Rep. 1967.
rests upon what immediately appears" (p.6 op.oit.), and that aesth­
etic surface i* is what one directly experiences, has tv.o points of 
similarity witn Dufrenne (l), on the basic level of phenomenology 
- phenomenologists regard the oorreot way of understanding objeota 
as being gained from a direct'apprehension of the objoot in question 
and the qualities it presents. Dufrenne would start from this stand­
point. (ii) on the level of the aesthetio attitude - that one cont­
emplates, or takes notice of, that nhioh one immediately experiences 
in a work, and understands it on this level. (Shis is analogous to 
Dufrenne's idea of 'feeling' in contemplation.)
The parallel also extends to Dufrenne's further requirement of 
analysis. Prall believes that although the aesthetio surfaoe - that 
whioh is immediately felt - is the important factor in aesthetios, 
we ounnot immediately understand the surfuoe. What is required is 
a thorough analysis, ana thus knowledge of, the factors immediately 
felt, before one understands the work, lie adds, whioh Dufrenne does 
not, that one analyses each olass of art separately before one can be 
said to understand any work (of. Chap.VI, op.oit.). Analysis assists 
one in a better apprehension of the surface.
(ii) Bullough.This is, 1 think one of the most important, original 
and valuable theories of the aesthetic attitude which has been prod­
uced. Bullough believes that one is detached to a certain extant, 
from both the aesthetio object and from one's personal context.
But thi3 does not mean either that the attitude is impersonal or 
that it goes to tne other extreme of being totally involved - 
indulging oneself in the emotions of the work.
J_. Aesthetio surface is not intended to oonnote anything superficial 
or just the outer surfaoe of a work. It is what is diredtly and 
immediately experienced.
2 . See Bullough, op.oit. Chapter 2, on peyohioal distanoe. 
j. Bullough also thinks that distanoe makes the oharaoters in a 
drama seem fiotitious, not vice versa, as normally supposed.
22 7.
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Distance arises whan one puts oneself out of context with persoi 
el needs and ends, ana looks only at the so-called 'objective* feat­
ures of the objeot/experienoe. This applies also to experience of 
things not ordinarily seen as works of art, for example, a fog:
"Thereby the contemplation of the objeot beoomes alone poss­
ible. But it does not mean that the relation between the 3elf 
and the subject is broken to the extent of besoming ’impersonal'? 
(p.96 op.oit.)
l.e., the relation is by no means purely intellaetual, but it is non
— ordinary in that tne thoughts, moods, eto., of the spectator - his
■ -—_ *
ordinary historical oontext has been 'f i l t e r e d ' no* 
irable tnat the auaienoe snould feel himself dissociated from the
work, any more than it is absolutely nsoessary, to allow for appred- 
iation:
"V.hat is ti.erefore, both in appreciation and production, most 
desirable is the utmost decrease of Distance without its dis­
appear anoe. " (p.100 ibia. my underlining, italloised by lkilloughji 
This is what ue oalls the 'antinomy of Distanoe'. He regarus dist­
ance as a useful term because it admits of degrees, and individuals 
differ in their capacity for maidaining it:
"Distance mjiy be saia to be variable both according to the 
distunoing-power of tne individual, and according to the 
character of the objeot." (p.100 ibid.)
Builough regards it as a payohologioal characteristic of man 
that oertain people can become very involved in a work and still 
remain sufficiently detaohcd to appreciate its qualities. Others 
must maintain a greater degree of non-involvement, otherwise they 
lose any sense of distanoe at all, and beoome so involved as to be
* f o r  no te  ¿J. s e e  p re v io u s  page ( p . 2 2 7 , • numbered ).
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unable to appreciate it as aesthetic - or even distinguish it from 
reality qua an event now occurring (perhaps their neighbour at a 
play rustling a programme). An example of this is someone rushing 
to save besdemona.
There are two ways of losing distance a), by under-distancing 
and b), by over-distanoing. If one is under-distanced one is too 
involved to appreciate, and if one is over-distanced, one is too 
dstaohed to appreciate, the work. Different art forms encourage 
different degrees of distance. for example, painting enoourages 
greater distance than soulpture because of framing, the fact that 
its spaoe and lighting does not ooinoide with our own, etc. Also, 
different styles create different degrees. For example, Uussii'an 
Bikon work is highly distanced. Form - i.e., symmetry, opposition, 
balanee, rhythm, eto., aid one to distanoe. Bullough also believes 
that most people fail to distance oolours beoause they so3 them as 
personal effeots - soothing, Oold, eto., instead of seeing them as 
having their own personality, being energetic, serious, pensive, 
etc.
In conclusion, he says:
"distanoe represents in uesthetio appreciation as woll us 
artistic production, a quality inherent in the . . .  relation 
which the human being entertains with art.” (p.129 ibid.)
and it;
"benders questions of origin, of influence or of purpose 
almost as meaningless . . .  even as moral importance, sinoe 
it lifts the work of art out of the realms of praotioal 
systems and ends." (p.1?9 ibid.)
iii) Of other view3 of the aesthetic objeot as contemplative, I
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shall mention only Duo&sse — • and Bell,~*  mainly because »bat 
Buoesse sa„ a hinders the idea of the aesthetio attitude us contemp­
lative rather then furthering it, and Bell's view has a rather 
negative value.
Ducasse believes that the only corroot attitude to art is 
contemplative - any other neither sees, nor rei^ionds to the t-n'.-h 
properties of the work of art. Contemplation is:
"A listening for the fooling impact - for the emotional rev­
erberations - of the object attended to. Aosthetio response 
to a colour, for example, does not consist in recognising or 
classifying it, but in savouring it . . ." *!•
Whatever is ugly and prevents this sort of contemplation, should not 
be seen as art. Bell believes that one sboulu contemplate the ess- 
enoj or significant form, of any object. Through contemplation, we 
shall feel the aesthetic emotion. It is necessary to be oontempibtivo, 
because this is to be detaohod, and one must be detached to appreciate 
everything whioh is expressed:
"The contemplation of pure form leads to a stats of extraordinary 
exaltation and complete detachment from the oonoerns of life." 
(p.tob. )Jt*
Kaon of these views employs its own idea of contemplation in 
the aesthetic attitude. But Frail's theory (i) contains no obvious 
flaws, and 1 have noted already its close similarity to Bufrenne's 
ideas of oontamplstion in terms of analysis ana feeling (feeling,
* ± .  bee Buoasse: Art, the oritios aud vuu. Wow fork, Oskar Fleet,1944.
See Clive Belli art. Arrow Books, 19bl.
Bee Buousse, ..rt. tne oritios and you,(p.73«)
¿t. bee Bell, ¿£&. (p.66.)
* 1.. Bucasse: The philosophy if art. L. Mac Veagh, The Dial Press,
1 9 2 9 .
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and comprehending the aesthetio surface being similar experiences)« 
There is also a similarity in the way they relate the two. Both 
regard analysis as a pre-requisite for the true aesthetic experience— 
attitude - in Dufrenne that of feeling and in Prall that of compreh­
ending the aesthetio surfaoe. Prall omits only the consideration of 
distanoe.
Regarding (i), Bullough's theory requires defence, and clarific­
ation on one point. To olarify, there is an important distinction in 
the idea of 'filtering', whioh it would appear that he does not see. 
Someone can leave behind himself his own 'reality' or personal feelings 
- his moods, eto., - without having to see the work of art as unrelated 
to reality. X.e., the filtering does not preoluae seeing the work as 
informative - psychologically, historically, eto. - even though one 
'braokets off* one's problems and moods, eto. One oan still see a 
Henry James' work as providing insights into degrees of sensibility, 
self-awareness, and the ways in whioh people may subtly influence one 
another.
Possibly Bullough demands total dissociation from one's personal 
afi'eotions, where only a degree of detaohment is required. For it 
seems to me that, given a work depioting an event analogous to one in 
whioh the spectator aotually found himself, the knowledge about that 
aotual situation might enable the spectator better to recognise the 
qualities and insight of the work. For example, given that X ' a  wife 
is unfaithful, he might understand the reactions of Othello, and 
Shakespeare's insight, where they seem implausible to someone not in 
t/is position. Personal knowledge of a situation similar to the 
present artistio situation does not entail that one devolves into a 
melanoholy state, reflecting on one's own problem. Given that one's 
thoughts remain with the work, external non-artistio knowledge may 
assist in appreciation in muoh the same way that external artistio
«
knowledge does. I think that Bullough's final sweeping remark about 
the work being lifted out of the realm of praotioal systems and ends 
by distanoe, show that he does not realise the possibility of 'filt­
ering' and still relating art to reality.
George Diokie — * takes up this question of relevanoe to life.
But he thinks that distanoe preoludes relating the work to life, 
whioh is not entirely surprising sinoe Bullough himself gives this 
impression. Diokie believes oonoern with things external to the 
work is barred beoause distanoe is a speoial mental state so delioate 
that the least external pressure oan destroy it. But just as he 
thinks that relating the work to something external does not neoess- 
arily interfere with appreciation, I think that it does not prevent 
distanoing, and that distanoe is not so delioate as to be easily 
destroyed. (if it were, it seems unlikely that Bullough should 
require, "the utmost deorease of Distanoe without its disappearanoe" 
(p.100 ibid.) with regard to one's attitude to the work.) One oan be 
psyohioally distanoed from the work of art and so not see it as real, 
eto., yet still be oapable of relating it to actual events, sooial, 
moral , psyohologioal , and so on.
I think that Bullough is aotually at fault and does lay himself 
open to the oritioisms levelled at him by Diokie. And in this last 
case, Bullough leaves the oonoept of distanoe open to being inter­
preted as both unrelated to reality, and as a delicate mental state. 
What 1 have suggested is a more disciplined oonoapt where a), one 
discriminates what is to be filtered, and b), distanoe is not suoh 
a delioate mental state.
Nevertheless, whilst I believe that distanoe is not quite so 
easily destroyed as Diokie suggests, I see no reason why it should
1. See, George Diokiet 'The myth of the aesthetio attitude', A.P.q., 
Jan. 1i>64, and espeoially 'Psyohioal distance', B.J.A. Jan. 1973»
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not be fragile to a oertain degree. 1.9., part of an attitude (the 
aesthetic) whioh is not automatically attained when one is confronted 
with a work of art, and not oertain to be sustained. If this were 
not so, and the appropriate attitude to art were guaranteed, one 
would not be annoyed if somebody began rustling sweet paper or 
drumming out the rhythm, at a oonoert, or if one were asked irrel­
evant questions, or oonfronted with oommunist petitioners, Just 
before going into an art gallery. These factors disturb one's 
equilibrium and make it the more difficult to maintain an aeathetio 
attitude - attain the appropriate degree of distanoe - of being at 
one with the musio or pioture, eto. but sufficiently detached to 
appreciate oritioally.
M o r e o v e r ^  think the aesthetic attitude as I see it in toto - not 
just the oonoept of distanoe - is relatively easily disturbed. But 
I do not think that debars it from being oonoerned with things 
external to the work so long as one oan see some relevanoe between 
the latter and the work of art and therefore not be entired away 
from the work of art and the aesthetic attitude.
Apart from this, Dickie presents various other criticisms of 
the idea of distanoe, oil of whioh are perfectly legitimate, but 
whioh can, 1 think, be answered. His mein oritioisms ore (a) that 
there is in fact no psychological aot of distancing performed by 
the audienoe of a work of art (b), that Bullough has to uso a-typioal 
examples to make out any case — e.g., ti.e person in the audienoe 
rushing to save Desdemona (o), the so—oalled aesthotxo attitude is 
really only a matter of paying attention to the work in question, 
and obeying the conventions applicable to whatever type of art it is
with whioh one is oonfronted
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Regarding (a), diatanoe is not (intended to be) an aot one 
performa suddenly - though it ia deliberate - it is the natural state 
of mind for anyone familiar with works of art. Diokie appears to 
think one should notioe it - as one would 'notioe' striking a part­
icular stanoe. But 1 see no reason why this should be so. One does 
not notioe the majority of physioal aots whioh one performs - the 
▼ery routine aots( or nervous habits of biting one's lip - let alone 
one's mental or psyohologioal states. It is a state whioh one 
maintains while one is audienoo to a work of art. And as suoh, one 
oould analyse its symptoms if one wishes - e.g., that one oeases to 
notioe the hun of the fan in the oonoert hall, that one does not 
believe that the oharaoters of a drama are really the oharaoters 
they affeot to bej that one puts from one's mind the things over 
whioh one has been pussling all dty and drifts into the atmosphere 
of the art, but not so deeply as to prevent oritioal appraisal. And 
so on. Bistanoing is not a quiokly performed payohioal aot whioh 
one just switohes on. It is a state of mind attained more or less 
slowly, aooording to one's power of putting oneself at one remove 
from one's everyday affairs - and at a lesser remove from the work 
itself. It is a kind of limbo whioh one endeavours to attain, and 
thus 'distancing' is an aohievement term, not Just the description 
of a simple aot.
So BiOkie is oorreot to object to a sudden psyohologioal aot 
it distanoing, but the faot that Bullough was rather misleading in 
suggesting that distanoing was like this does not in any way harm 
the oonsept itself, as I think the description given above shows.
Regarding (b), Bullough does use a-typipal examples, but these 
really serve more to emphasise his oase than to make out a oase at 
all. A more moderate example of a loss of diatanoe would be of 
someone who identifies with Isolde in*Tristan und Isolde', and
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weeps at her misfortunes, or is gripped bj sexual desire throughout 
the Liebestod - but continues to pay attention (if she were not att- 
ending, nothing would arise to oause her to reaot in this way) and 
does remain in her seat, thus obeying the conventions.
One problem is that the exaot degree of distance whioh has to be 
taken, varies from person to person, as Bullough says (and also from 
work to work). So one might oite a moderate oase of underdiatanoing 
and participation in the work for one person, whioh might be the 
appropriate degree for someone else - i.e., someone who oould maint­
ain the ability to evaluate and appreciate a work whilst being very 
muoh involved in it. Thus, Bullough is safest in using a fairly 
exaggerated example, beoause this would oount as underdistanoing for 
anyone - the involvement whioh mistakes something aoted for reality 
is a truly under-distanoed or undistanoed reaction.
Kegarding (o), 1 tuink that Diokie is again right in saying 
distanoe and the aesthetio attitude involves both paying attention 
and obeying the appropriate conventions, but 1 think that there is 
more to be said, for instanoe, one can do both these things without 
adopting the aesthetio attitude - I can pay attention to a pieoe of 
musio wnioh is atonal, and remsin seated, but hove a prejudice against 
atonal musio and be able to hear it only as a dreadful sound. In this 
oase, Diokie oannot oorreot my fault, but distancing to a lesser 
extent can. Por I have over-distanoed from the work, and thus 
debarred myself from feeling any affinity towards it, or any sympathy 
to its mood or purpose (if any). At the other extreme, 1 might be 
the oosposer and pay attention and obey convention by not shouting 
•hooray*, eto., but be so inwardly moved by what I felt I expressed 
in the musio, or so confident as to believe it the greatest musio 
sinoe the St. Matthew Passion, as to be unable to feel objeotive 
towards it in any way. In suoh a case I would be under-diotanoing.
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and Dickie o&nnot say in either case that I am paying the wrong sort 
of attention because tie has dismissed different types of attention 
(interested versus disinterested, transitive and intransitive). Nor 
oan he say that 1 am paying attention to the wrong thing - I am att­
ending to the objeot es a work of art (in the first ease I hypoth­
esise that I try to hear the work as art, but fail).
Paying attention is really only a precondition of adopting a 
distanoed aesthetio attitude. One oannot have any sort of rational 
attitude to anything unless one pays some attention to it. Moreover, X 
think in the o&se of obeying conventions the conventions are decided 
by the reaction of an audienoe, i.e., the degree to which they dist­
ance} and the convention will oi.ar.ge in accordance with any ohange in 
the degree of distancing considered appropriate. Conversely, one oan 
foil to obey the conventions without failing to distance, for example, 
if one is first in a movement to lessen the uudienoe-work distance.
It night be conventional not to laugh at the amusing incidents in,say, 
Kosort’s Figaro, these conventions having been established by persons 
wno felt a strictly unemotional, respectful, highly distanoed attitude 
was tno only appropriate attitude to a work of ort.^* But there is no 
reason why someone should not maintain less distance, and laugh (thus 
disobeying oonvention) and yet maintain a ati^l-distanoed aosthetio 
attitude. i.o., appreoiato and bo oapable of evaluoting tho worth of 
tha work, not assume that the events depioted are really taking plaoe, 
eto. Such a person might eithor be the forerunner in a move to less­
en the distance felt by the audienoe towards operatio or all art work%
_1_. bee, Dickie, 1964 article.
In fact, this feeling that o high degree of distanoo should be 
maintained is still prevalent. For example, in a reoent letter to the 
Times, it was maintained that Figaro should not be sung in English,as 
the audienoe might aotually understand what was happening, and that 
it was amusing, and the opera might hove its audienoe "rolling in the
aisles
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or someone who was oapable of minimising the degree of distanoe 
he felt, without losing distanoe altogether (the sort of person 
Bullough considers most oapable of art appreoiatlon),
Diokie's attempt to aooount for failure to appreoiate some 
work, seems a little too simplistio. To say, "they did not pay 
attention to the right things", or, "they paid insufficient 
attention, or, "they reacted in the wrong way", is not to say 
▼ery mush. One wants to know what, 'not paying attention to the 
right things' comprises, and what is the mental and psyohologioal 
state of the person who reaots in the wrong way, or pays insuff­
icient attention? It seems to me that the aooount requires 
filling out, and that when this is done, and the various phrases 
are 'oashed cut', the idea of distanoe will probably have 
reappeared under some guise - not least in oases of obeying 
oonvention, as 1 have suggested above,
I think therefore that Bullough's idea of distanoe is 
basically sound, even if it does require a oortain amount of 
tightening up«^ "* (And not only does he describe exaOtly what 
it involves, but ho details its application to art forms, art 
periods, and suoh tilings as form, colour and the lover senses.) 
The view that distanoe varies from person to person is, I think 
empirioelly verifiable. ’’he abilxiy ¿an be developed with a 
fair amount of experienoe of works of art.
Sinoe Dufrenne's aooount of distanoe involves both dotaoh- 
ment and partioipation, I oonolude that he oould largely agree
1 . And bearing In mind that Bullough regards distanoe as aooount- 
ing for the whole of the aesthetio attitude, whloh Dufrenne does 
not (and that 1 oonour with Dufrenne).
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ivith Bullough (exoopt about emotional involvement) - or with 
oono suoh similar theory. Howovor, os 1 have sold (note X* 
nbovo), he also thinks that there is more to the aesthetio att­
itude than distanoe. There is also analysis or fefleotion and 
intuitionlstio feeling of the kind described by D. W, Prall.
■afore going on to the final disoussion of Dufrenne, it is
neoesssry to oomment on the views of Ouo^sso and Bell, wiioh X
sketohed briefly. Rcgaraing (ill), what Duoassc says has 
several flaws and seems to be the very typo of contemplative 
theory which makes one suspicious of the idea of contemplation 
us an aesthetic attitude:
(a) It precludes the use of any sort of oonooptual apparatus,
o.g., recognising anu classifying aspeots of the work. The 
sole reason sooms to be that thiB (classifying, eto.) is an
ordinary response to on object so it cannot bo tae aesthetio one.
But there is no reason why one snould not regard on ’ordinary' 
response as also aesthetio, some sort of analysis ns part of 
the aesthetic attitude.
(b) V.'hat does the idea of 'savouring' toll us, nhioh la of 
az\y importance, or is not ompty? It soems to involvo absorbing 
the nork and thinking how pleasant it is, but this rapt gase 
eooi.13 rather futilo at the end of the day.
(o) Uoroovor, how does one decide what is ugly end to bo 
prooluded? For someone might successfully 'savour*anything which neons 
nothing oan be ruled out. And those things ehioh night ordin­
arily be aooounted ugly, for example, the later works of Coya,
X,» 1 think that this elaboration and dofonoe of Bullough’s aooount
of distanoe is Justifiod sinoe Bufreane implies that ho agrees with 
a theory of this kind, but again fails to elaborate on tho
do tails
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are not as a rule, aes thetioally so called.
Both these points (b) and (o), emphasize the impression that 
the sort of oontemplation involved is a rapt, vaoant gaze, gently 
absorbing the work without any particular ideas and guarded fron 
whatever is unpleasant in the world - being too high-minded 
for it. Duoasse should rule out these ordinary language over­
tones of passivity and gentleness whioh oause one to be nary of 
the idea of oontemplation.
Bell's theory has a somewhat negative value. It says nothing 
to oause one to reject the idea of oontemplation - principally 
booause:
(i) he does not derive the tneory from the controversial ideas 
of Significant form, etc., so that one doos not have to objeot 
to oontomplation oven if one objeots to the former (ii), although 
he rogards "detaohment from the oonosrns of life" (p.68 op.oit.) 
as neoe3sary to aesthetio experience, and detaehment is one part 
of the concept of contaciplation in most theories, one can 
reject Bell's view that one is detached from the oonoerns of 
lifo, without condemning detachment. for example, one oan 
direct it toward the art objeot instead of life, and one oan 
moderate the degree of dctao.'iment from life, whioh it requires.
7/hila the theory of P.-pll introd-rood the concept of 
analysis and immediate feeling into the aesthetio attitudOg 
Bullough and Boll introduce that of detachment. So Dufrenne's 
three features of aosthetio oontemplation have now been proposed 
separately by Prall, Bullough and Bell. Z think that this 
and the previous seotion have shown the value of Dufrenne's 
aocount of the assthetlo attitude (l), by working out
4
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thoroughly what he says on analysis and feeling, and (ii), 
by elaborating a theory of distance whioh one hopes he would 
consider acceptable. And sven if Dufrenne is not original 
in the sense that others have said jointly, what he now says 
singly, he original
(i) in that there is no reason to believe he is plagiar­
ising - one can see the theory worked out as the Phenomen- 
ologie progresses, and, as far as 1 am aware, he always ack­
nowledges any sources) and
(ii) in that his theory has not previously been stated by any 
single person. It is only to be found in a combination of 
views,
Taken as a whole, i think that, while lacking in clarity 
and often in depth of discussion, I think what Dufrenne says 
of the aesthetic attitude is nevertheless valuable.
Appendix.
In order to keep a balance, I should mention that there are
various other views of the aesthetic nttitude which do not regard
it as contemplative. For example, Bergson J[. presents a theory
from the point of view mainly of tne artist rather than the
speotator. This distinguishes it from Dufrenne (and most other
theories) since Dufrenne speaks from the point of view of the
speotator - although ho does not say tliat the artist either cannot
or does not adopt the aesthetio attitude. To state it simply, the
aesthetio attitude according to Bergson is an innate ability in the
artist to see the world as it is. Whereas the ordinary person sees
it in terns of------- --- ------------------------- ----------------
1. Sos, Hsnri Bergsoni The creative mind. H.Y.1946. 2 A 2 . J L 2 X i & ~ &
dreams. IJ.Y.1958. Also) Laughter, an essay on tbe pioanj.Bg a L J h t.
oomio. N.Y. 1911.
f
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stock types anil conventions, there are certain people born with the 
ability to see what is ti.ere. These people are artists, and by an 
original use of language t ey can oommunioate to us Bergson's idea of 
the aesthetic emotion, which T. K. Hulne desoriboi^As:
"a kind o f instinotive fueling which i3 conveyed over to one, 
that the poet is describing something whioh is actually present 
to hxm, whioh he realises visually at first hand," (p.167 op.clt, 
The attitude of the audience is presumably intelligently rooeptive.
In contrast to most theories of an aestl otic attitude (whioh see the 
aestr.etio objoot as if it were non-real, or at least nen-ordinary) 
this reverses the order, so that the aesthetic attitu e 1b something 
rather esotorio, and the artist the only ono in contact with reality, 
while others are removed from it by a ve^ .l of conventionality. Other 
theorios uro i^voi. by play theorists, Lange and &roo3 ,■* -»■ Parker and 
freud,^* and emotionalist theorists, o.g. Tolstoy i t *  and Him. But 
it would be moving too far from Dufrenne to go any farther into 
alternative theories.
* JLs. aeo, T, K. llulme: hi eculations., l outledgo and began Paul, 1949 .
3 . Bee Karl Urooss The play of man, How York, 1901.
K. Lange: art aa idav. reprinted in 4. H. Rader (ed.): A modern 
book of aestnetios, Wev. York, henry Holt & do., 1935«
5 . See. S. Freud: PsyohoantolY-lAttaka. . ^ 40JL ..< b iX ALdAt.unfl
nnd K u n a t . Leipsig Wien, ioh, Internationaler Psyohoanalytisoher 
Vorlag, 1924.
(Also on t.iis: K i o h a r d  Sterba: 'The p r o b l e m  of art in F r o a d ' s  writing' 
Payohounalytio (quarterly ix no.2. April, 1940^)
¿¿i See Tolstoy: op, oit,
• 1*. A1 so T. E. Hukne: Further specuations. Minnesota University
Press, 1955.
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Seotion ïi>.
An evaluation of aesthetio attitudes.
(i) Why an aesthetio attitude and whioh? Introduction
Any theory whioh hopes to make out a oase for the aesthetic attitude 
must show that it has some function in a theory of aesthetios. It is 
not enough to olalm that it must exist beoauae works of art ere diff­
erent from ordinary entities and therefore require a different 
attitude* for there is very little reason to suppose, as a matter 
of fact, that a work of art is intrinsioally very different from, saj^  
a table. A painting seen as sometning simply with which tc fill a 
spaoo on a wall - whioh a set of plaster duoks would do equally 
well - does not seem to put it into the class of'works of art'. On 
the other hand, if ono oan make out a oase for the aesthetio attit­
ude, one may very wall be able to differentiate oertain sets of 
objeots( inoluding in tnis musio) from oertain others, and thus 
have a reason for maintaining the eecthetio attitude. And if one 
emerges o,»ly with the idea that one must study certain aspects of 
some existents, namely those neld to be works of art, in a partic­
ular way, t.ien one is olaiming that an aesthetio attitude exists.
A theory of contemplation seems to provide a way of appreciat­
ing art, and to give oontent to the oonoept of an aesthetio attitude. 
In this oase, one is not upholding the attitude as entirely fundam­
ental - the way one deoidos whether tuore is suoh a thing as art - 
but maintaining that it is the way in whioh one appreciates art 
objeots, and evaluates something asurt. This latter is the more 
usual task ono sets for the aesthetio attitude, ana the way in 
whioh I ha- ve approached it in this oaaptor. This is obviously not 
entirely different from the formor idea, but distinct in that the 
use of the aesthetio attitudo is normally a preliminary to evaluat­
ion - deoiding what is and what is not art (or good art) -
rather than a way in whioh one deoides whether or not there is such 
a thing as a work of art.
As X have already briefly mentioned, <^*Duoasse gives an ordinary 
language aooount of contemplation. This oauses one to reject cont­
emplation as the aesthetio attitude, since it is supposed to be the 
appreciation of a work of art, whioh provides one with sufficient 
knowledge (of its form, oontent, eto.) to be able to make an eval­
uation of it. If it was oorreot simply to savour the work of art,
&3 huouseo suggests, then it would be neuessary already to huve made 
the evaluation as to what was, and what was not, a work of art, in 
order to savour it. The evaluation is presupposed beoause Duocsse 
takes it that one knows the sorts of things to 'savor* prior to 
adopting the aesthetio attitude, or savouring them. But surely the 
aesthetic attitude is not posterior to aesthetio judgment - as this 
makes it?
Nar oan one dismiss disoussion of contemplation in terms of 
enalysis end feeling in favour of an ordinary language view, e.g., 
on the grounds that contemplation is by definition simply looking at/ 
listening to, something, without involving any cenoeptualisatiQn. This 
is merely one of the ordinary uses of the tern, found mainly in 
religious contexts allied to the activity of meditation, when the mind 
is emptied completely of thought. If this were the only meaning one 
eould attach to the oonoept, then it would be completely empty of 
content for aesthecios, It would provide the aesthetio attitude with 
no purpose or useful result.
fortunately, tha.ro. is no inconsistency in maintaining that 
certain ooneepts (here contemplation) may have different meanings 
in different eontexts. As a matter of fact the religious and 
aesthetio oontexts arc not entirely divoroed, since both Involve the
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See Seotion V, my oomments on huoasse
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idea of detachment. In connection with this. Bell has provided a 
good general reason for contemplation os t o aesthetic attitu.e - 
to be contemplative is to be detached, and one must be detached in 
order to be able to appreciate everything about a work of art (though 
Bell takes the idea of detaohment to its extreme).
The remaining question is, "how does contemplation differ from 
other forms of studying which aro not aesthetic?" I think that the 
answer to this has been given at various points in this chapter, and 
one has just to bring these together here.
Both the nature of contemplation, and to some extent, its object, 
distinguish the contemplative aesthetic attituae from a scientific or 
ordinary one. (i), it is a distanced mental state (of. Sections 
IV and V). This involves a curtain ddgroo of psychological detaoh- 
nent from its object and from the world - e.g.,'putting oneS3lf oub 
of gonr', together with an even greater degree of psyoholcgioal 
involvement and participation, e.g., identification wita a char« 
actor in a play. The detachment is partly accomplished by regard­
ing the 'objoct' as not-an-ovont-toking-place-non (if its objuot is 
a work of literature, especially drama, or representational painting 
end nitsio), or 'unreal' in various ways (disconnected from the 
maJl rity of one's everyday affairs or something for which the 
ordinary temporal ooquenoo is irrelevant, etc. <jf• Chapter 2).
(ii) It is also an attitude which maintains and exeroisos the 
ability for critical analysis and evaluation of its objoot - of. 
Section II - looking for particular qualities according to what 
theory of art one holds, e.g., for beauty under somo dosoription, 
and/or formal qualitioB of balance, positioning, counterpoint, eto., 
end/©r expressive qualities of joy, sublimity, anguish, eto.
(ill) Despite being critical the contemplative attitude is also 
sympathetic and sonaitive to its object, approaohing it, as Dufrenne 
claims (of. also SeotionllX) on its own level, 'having a sense of' thi 
the work or an intuitive understanding of it.
(iv) 1 think it is also the oase that when one sees »11 object as 
aosthetio, or contemplates it aesthetically, that one contemplates it 
for its own sake) not seeing it as a useful objeot for some further 
purpose (i.e, as n means to an end), but as an end in itself. One 
has an attitude whioh Osborne ** calls 'disinterested interest'. By 
oontrast, if one were taking a non-oontemplative attitude, one would 
possibly sc.e the objeot as indicative of something or a means to 
an end, or as of some use for a particular purpose.
Thus, this attitude is e decidedly active frame of mind directed 
towards all putative and established works of art, carrying with it 
a certain set of beliefs such that it may dlsoard anything to whioh 
it Oannot maintain its attitude and anything whioh docs not conform 
to its atanuards. 1 think that this is sufficient to distinguish it 
as a non-ordinary attitude.
As a general rule, the aesthetic attitude is either a standard 
for something's being an aesthetic object or work of art or the 
standpoint from whioh one osn Judge something as art. It is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for something's being 
aesthetic. I.e., it is e neoessary condition ofxbeing aesthetic 
that (i) ono oan adopt this attitude to it, and (ii), one does adopt 
it - because the aesthetio attitude is the means to evaluating 
whether the objeot is aesthetio in the first place. But it is not a 
sufficient condition einoe the adoption (or attempted adoption) of 
TT Soo Harold Osborne. The art of appreciation. London O.U.P. (ssp. 
Chapter 2), 1970.
See Osborne op.olt. (p.26) quoting Haosrahi, 'The contemplative 
activity', 1954, who suggests a falling leaf oould bo seen non- 
aesthetloully as an indioaton of rain, or that the tree hod something
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the attitude does not automatically make X oeethetio. If it did, one 
oould never exolude anything as aesthetio - there would always be the 
possibility of someone (possibly with a etrange theoiy of art) adopt­
ing an aesthetio attitude to it. And it seems to me that it Just is 
the oase that some things exolude themselves from being aesthetic 
objects. If it were not so, and everything oould be aesthetio, then 
to say X is an aesthetio objoot would be to sQy very little, and 
distinguish nothing.
Thus, both the oharaoter of the attitude and the nature of its 
object distinguish the oontemplative from other non-aesthetio attit­
udes. I should also add if this is not already obvious, that 1 am 
giving a normative rather than a desoriptive account of oonteaplat- 
ion.
(ii) A summary of Pufrenne»s theory.
This theory has been explained in the first four seotions of this 
ohapter, and I shall summarise it, and then see how defensible it 
oan be. Dufrenne asserts that the attitude of the subjeot is one of 
contemplation, whloh involves both oritioal analysis and feeling, or 
'having a sense of' the work, and a psyohologioally dlstsnoed stanoe.
In the final analysis, oritioism is seen as being in the servioe 
of feeling, where feeling is the ultimate means of understanding or 
appreciating, the work. It is not entirely olear how muoh analysis 
(reflection) Dufrenne wishes to admit in the aesthetio exporienoo.
But he realises that one oannot immediately appreoiate a work via 
feeling. Reflection is neoessary to gain sufficient knowledge of 
the work of art, and familiarity with it, to have a feeling for it 
in our aesthetio perception, " . . . la reflexion peut préparer la 
perception . . . "  (p.521). RefleOtion ia ultimately subordinate to 
feeling as the highest mode of aooess to the work;
"Tout ce que l'attitude oritique avait découvert reste valable, 
mais est affeoiÂ-d'une changement de signe. La réflexion est 
désormais aux ordres du sentiment et inspirée par lui ..."
(p.523 ibid.)
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"On volt dono le passage de l'attitude oritique a l'attitude 
sentinentale n'est pas simplement uno oscillations la reflex­
ion prepare le sentiment, puis ellsl'eolair"(p.523 ibid). 
However, analysis and feeling are regarded as mutually complementary, 
even though one is subordinated to the other,
What Dufrenne says of distanoe is less detailed. Mainly, though^ 
he feels that the subjeot understands and reoognlses the emotions, 
eto., expressed by a work, but t.at he remains detaohed from them.
It is not neoessary to feel the sadness of a tragedy, l.e., to feel 
actually sad, in order to appreoiate it. Rather, one must have a 
sense of, for ezsBple, the tragio. As a rule he does not say that 
it would be wrong to beoome emotionally involved As long as it did 
not prevent appreciation - in faot, he maintain* that one should 
partioipate in the work, he engaged in it (p.93 ibid), and identify 
with it to a oertain degree (p.490 ibid). However, at one point, he 
debars emotional involvement - " . . . la partioipation n'y va point 
Jusqu'a 1'emotion." (p.472).
The problems relating to analysis and feeling have been diao- 
ussed already, and Dufrenne's final position seems to involve no 
major diffioulties. The idea of distanoe, whioh is olosely related 
to Bullough, seems also to be aooeptable. Zt therefore remains only 
to point out oertain advantages in this dootrine of the aesthetie 
attitude, and eluoldate two aspeots of degree in aesthetio distanoe. 
-LilAl A defenoe of the theory of oontemolatlon.
It seems that this sort of theory oomes into its own when one 
asks the very important question whioh arose in the introductory 
part of the seotion - why an aesthetio attitude?, or, what is the 
aim or purpose of the aesthetio attitude? If it has none, it oan 
be rejeoted as a superfluous part of the maohinery. In non-oOntemp- 
lative thoories, it seems to be Just a kind of oorollary, derivative
from t e particular aeoti.eito theory. In a theory of oontemplation, 
s u o u s  that proposed by Duoasse, It beoomes an empty oonoept, and an 
easy target for the oritios to destroy.
However, when one involves oritioal analysis, as does Dufrenne.one 
provides a theory whereby the aesthotio attitude (as well as possess» 
ing a psychological side), leads to appreciating a work of art - thus 
avoiding vacuity and making it a necessary stage in an aesthetio.
The oapaoity for approoiating a work of art seems to be the most 
obvious and useful end of an aesthetio attitude. And. if appreciat­
ion is not immediate, and it is empirically verifiable that it is 
not, then (a) a oertain mental aotivity is roquirod from the observer. 
This mental aotivity is the refleotive/oonoeptualised analysis, as, 
for example proposed by hufrenne.i* It also seems perfectly reason­
able to suppose that the reflective aotivity will provide the means 
for a feeling or sense of,the work, as hufronne further suggests.
This feeling attitude is that on whioh ono is on a level with thowoxk) 
the attitude from whioh one oan suo what qualities the work contains 
by means of a Sympathetic and unbiased awareness,i.e., appreciate it.
However, 1 think Hufrenne is oorroot in thinking that this is not 
tho whole of what is involved in the aesthetic attitude. Xt does not 
yet inolude the oonoept of detcohment whioh, as 1 mentioned at the 
end of the introductory part of this section, is an important reason 
for regarding contemplation as the appropriate aesthetio attltude.The 
oonoopt of distance (as understood by Dufr#nne,and more expansively*^ 
Bullough) satisfactorily completes the aesthetio attitude without neo-
esnitatln,: any break or disjointed transition. for it-SP-oear* .thatms 
Is Nor is it a good idea to sty that tho aosthetlo attitude is a pre­
requisite of oiltiool analysis and appreciation, for this renders it 
an empty moqpt again (until onb inoludss distancing, that is) - singly an
t
open-mindedness to tho work. And sines this, i.e., open-mindedness Is 
s pre-requisite of an unbiased analysis of anything - not Just art. 
one would then bs left with sons attitude, not only rather vsouous.
2 4 8 .
but not exolusivs to ao
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oan link it with the concept of feeling. Though Dufrenne does not 
speoifioally associate the two, one oan see that the dietanoed attitude 
nay be held to be the pfiyohologioal position from whioh one oan put 
one' sense of the work to best advantage. As Bullough points out, 
the degree of distanoe or detaohment will depend on the oapaoity of the 
subjeot to beoome involved without losing his grasp of the work as a 
formally satisfactory whole, or the ability to sea it as art at all. 
Dufrenne notes the neoessity to be engaged in the work and identify to 
a certain extent, but doss not take into aooount this subjective 
psychological trait.
Distanoe also has the advantage of showing that the aesthetio 
attitude is not just 'the attitude one takes to art objeots', whioh 
oould be the same as that taken to any objeot (if just described as 
oritioal and gaining a feeling for the objeot), but that its objeots 
are exclusively aesthetio. For it maintains that one has to be det- 
aohed in some wty - whioh is not the oase with ordinary ob jeots.
£. It remains only to olarify two oopeots of distancing, (i) The 
degree of emotional involvement permissable or neoessary (ii) the 
dissociation of art and life whioh it appeared to entail in Bullough's 
theory.
(i) lYeita JL* criticises Bullough on the grounds that one cannot indulge 
in all the emotions of any one work of art (which he feels that Bull­
ough demands), this oritioism is justified to a oertain extent - 
oertainly we ear.not be overcome by pity/fear/joy/Jealousy, eto. all 
at onoe. Nor oan we apppreoiaie a work if we are overoomo by emotional 
response. However, there is a degree to whioh one oan become involve* 
emotionally without this impairing one's judgment. There are various 
possible emotive responses whioh do not seem in any way harmful. Having 
an emotional involvement does not entail that one takes sides (e.g., of 
one oharaoter against another in a play), and beoauae one reoognises 
the dlatlnotloli between the work of art and events ooourrlng in the 
J.. See, Norris Visitsj Philosophy of the arts. Russell A Russell 1964,
especially Chapter 9
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ordinary world, one has the opportunity of making detached judgments.
There are numerous examples of non-harmful responses in which 
one indulges in the work of art, or in some way identifies with it, 
as Dufrenne suggests. In general, one might have a non-partioular- 
ised unnamed affeotive response of exoitenent towards a work. In 
this oaso, the feeling may well induce one to pay greater attention 
than would a purely detaohed attitude. Thus, the attitude encour­
ages the aesthetio response, rather than hindering it.
Or, in the oase of more oonoeptualised responses, one may feel 
a sense of strife or finality, or futility, or that one ultimately 
aspires to something unattainable, when listening to a Mahler symph­
ony; or feel a sense of power, or that the great oan achieve great­
ness,!.* in listening to Beéthoven's Kmperor oonoerto. What evidenoe 
is there to show that participation to this extent - namely that of 
experienoing what is expressed - interferes with one's oapaoity 
to appreoiate?
1 think that the oase is rather the reverse, i.e., that emot­
ional involvement (possibly to the extent of the utmost deorease of 
distance without its loss, as. Bullough advocates) in the aesthetio 
attitude will enhanoe aesthetio appreciation by giving a sense of
oontinuity with the work anu a sympathy with what is expressed.
1. I.e., Great persons can perform great or supreme aots - aotions
bpyond the capacities of ordinary persons.
2. Which is not neoessarily an emotion.
Although Dufrenne does advuoate participation in the work and
identification (of. pp.471-2 op.oit. and quotation Seotlon IV of this 
ohapter), and having a sense of the work, I do not think that he 
would allow the emotional involvement I am suggesting here, sinoe 
this oould be held to oloud the purity of the feeling. He says,
"la participation n'y va point jusqu'a l'emotion." (p.472.)
251
X advocate this with tho proviso that one does not merely 
experienoe something expressed in the work, and then move on to 
some extra-artistio thought, e.g., of mediating on the oorreotness 
of the ideas expressed or beooaing strioken by feelings of futility, 
thereby moving out of the realm of the work of art and missing the 
rest of what is presented in it,i>* appreciating its formal struoture, 
etc. Those who advooate complete detachment seem to make the 
psyoholegioal error of denying the oapaoity of the audienoe to 
beoome involved without falling into this trap.
(ii) I have already disoussed t is fairly srtisfaotorily, 1 think. 
Only a little remains to be said. As I said^ -' Dufrenne*s assertion 
that the work of art is unreal does not entail that it is unrelated 
to reality, and JL» Builough's assertion that distanoe "lifts the 
work of art out of the realm of practical ayatems and ends" (p. 1 2 9  
op.oit.) does not mean he 3e right in thinking that his theory 
dissooiates art and life.
One oan take a different attitude to the aesthetic from the 
ordinary objeot without involving oneself in maintaining that the 
aesthetio objeot is autonomous or dissociated from life. I.e., one 
oan distanoe oneself from the external world during the perception 
of a work, and still derive information, etc., relevant to one's 
ordinary activities. X think the point is that the aesthetio attit­
ude itself, i.e., the thoughts, etc. of the subjeot through th6 
J.. "Missing the rest" being the operative words. 
j2. See my first oomment on Seotion XV of this ohapter.
5. See my first oomment on Bullough, Section V of this ohapter.
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duration of the work, 'out out' personal feelings and problems, but 
that one oan still take note of the faot that the work makes some 
point about the world in general, or oneself in partioular. These 
points are subsequently utilised.^- Or, as 1 hare previously maint­
ained, personal knowledge of a situation similar to that given in a 
work of art may enhance one's understanding of the psychology in 
the work - and as long as one pays attention to the work rather 
than to oneself, the aesthetic attitude oan be maintained.
This soeL.s to present faidy substantial evidenoe for the existence 
of an aesthetio attitude, and for one of contemplation, in partio­
ular that of Dufrenne, as that whioh gives it most value in a theory 
of aesthetics. As noted, 1 think that Dufrenne would not disagree 
with Bullough's theory of distanoe, though I think he would baulk 
at tho idea of emotional involvement, as failing to preserve the 
purity of feeling in the aesthetio experience. In this, 1 would 
obviously disagree with him, since 1 have suggested that emotional 
involvement may enhance the ability for aesthetio appreciation, 
rather than obsouring the appreciation.
as I pointed out, Dufrenne's theory is very muoh like a 
combination of Prall and Bullough. Though presonted in descriptive 
terms (like Bullough's) as if this wore the attitude one does take 
to a work of art, it is obviously prescriptive - or normative, i.e., 
the model - sinoe it is a ol*|m that this is the oorreot attitude, 
aesthetically, and not Just an assertion that thisia the attitude 
observers will take to art.
,1. for instanee, in one's understanding of ordinary life, • of 
one's own and others' aots.
A
Although 1 have attempted to defend Dufrenne in this chapter, 
and to give oredenoe to hi a theories, 1 think this has highlighted 
the unfortunate faot that Dufrenne never disousses his theories 
fully enough or with sufficient olarity, nor does he provide any- 
thing like suffioient justification for what he says. This is 
especially obvious in his bare statements on contemplation and 
distanoe. And as I have indioated, muoh of what he says is obsoure 
and inoonolusive. So the real oonoluaion to the theory of the 
aesthetio attitude as given by Dufrenne, is that he provides 
implications, statements and indications of a theory which one 
has to fill out and interpret as best one oan. 1 think one oap say 
at least, however, that he provides suffioient guidelines for one 
to feel fairly assured that one is interpreting him oorreotly.
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Appendix.
I would like to add a brief qualification to the idea of the aesth­
etio attitude given here. I do not regard it as statio. Tor ons 
thing, I do not think one neoassarily takes the same attitude to a 
particular work eaoh time one oomes into oontaot with it. One may 
be more or less oritioal — and less oritioism is probably involved 
as one grows more familiar with the work, i.e. , one does not have 
to reappraise a work on eaoh oocasionj and in the case of the 
performed arts one will appraise the performance rather than the 
work, onoe one has established a view of the work's value (though 
this of course is always open to reappraisal). And some people 
will be able to appreoiate a work more than others. Also, the 
intuitive understanding of the work, proposed by Dufrenne, will 
depend entirely on the subjeot. And with works of natural beauty 
one may suspend the oritioal appraisal, since the e is no 
deliberate struoture or meaning in these objeots.
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CHAPTER FIVS. HEANINC AMD EXPRESSION.
n^tro4uo,tA.an.
This final ohaptar is intsnded to ooTtr the other two important 
topioa of the Phénoménologie - expression and its related topio, 
meaning. Expression is not entirely 'another' topio, ainoe it was 
the a priori nature of affeotive/expressive qualities, as the 
essence or being of a work of art, which was in contention in 
Chapter Three. However, in that oase it was the relation of the 
a priori to art, rather than expression per se, which was being 
questioned. Unfortunately, this key point of Dufrenne'a theory - 
that art is a priori - turned out to be not established.
1 therefore do not intend to assume in this chapter that the 
expressive or affeotive qualities of a work are a priori. However, 
as with the previous ohapter, this does not impede discussion of 
the work as expressive. Whether the expressive in art is a priori 
or the essenoe of art, can be taken as a separate issue from 
whether art is expressive, and in what way. The questions pert­
aining to the former have been dealt with, and the latter must now 
be disoussed. In oonjunotion with meaning , it rounds off the out­
standing question on the nature of art as a quasi-subjeot. 
fortunately, this theory - whioh is another important feature of 
Pufrenne's thesis _ fares better than the a priori. And as with 
the aesthetio attitude, Dufrenne disous~es the subject from a new 
point of view - that of the phenomenologist - and makes a worth­
while contribution to the aesthetios of the objective features of 
art. for example, he regards the meaning of art as eventually 
ungraspable - whioh is a different angle from the norm - where 
meaning may be untranalateable into words, but is always eventually 
comprehensible. And while Dufrenne's argument may laok support, 
he is at least breaking from conventional attitudes and testing 
out new ground.
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Dufrenne's theory of the work of art is, as I said, that it is 
a neoessary oondition, its essence, to be expressive, Xhis has been 
seen in the aooount of the affective a prioria of art,—* Th'* effect­
ive qualities (quality) of a work are its expressive qualities - the 
tragio, the sad, eto. And they are its sssenoe. As suoh, the mean­
ing of the work must be derived from these qualities, at least in 
part. Thus, expression and meaning in the theory of Dufrenne, oan 
be studied together. However, Dufrenne adds that there are also 
formal qualities to be oonsidered in giving meaning to the sensible.
But by 'formal qualities', he does not always mean something 
opposed to 'expressive qualities' - in the sense that one might 
oppose formalist and expressionist theories. When Dufrenne refers 
to form one oan subtly take it to mean the sensible formed into 
some expressive/affeotive quality, by the understanding, rather than 
the form taken in ~ purely structural sense - the way parts of a 
work are spatially and temporally oo-ordinated, irrespective of the 
expressive qualities of the work - so as not to separate form and 
expression. For Dufrenne is supposedly an expressionist rather than 
a formalist, and to say that the form alone gives meaning to the 
work, rather than its expressive qualities, would be rather to 
obviate the point of its expressive nature, and to oontrp.diot the 
idea that the expression is the essenoe of the work.^*
To take the formal aspeots of a work as those whioh give it 
meaning, or make it art, is to adopt a formalist approaoh, and
J.. See Chapter Three.
That is, always supposing it is one of the aims of a work of art 
to be meaningful. Meaning must be assumed to be a neoessary oonditioi 
of art (and Dufrenno does assume this). Otherwise, i.e., if it were 
purely contingent that a work was meaningful and it was possible for 
X to be art and not meaningful, then it would not matter if form 
alone gave tne work its meaning.
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surely Dufrenne does not want to do this. It must be admitted, 
however, that Dufrenne does say on oooaslon that the form of a work 
gives it its meaning. But having formalist views is not neoessarily 
incompatible with having expressionist ones.
The possibility which I do not think Dufrenne takes into aocount, 
is that it is quite legitimate to allow that formal properties by 
themselves oan provide for oalling a work art. Although I would not 
like to say at this point that it is a rule that formal properties 
are either necessary or sufficient conditions for o all ling X art, X 
would suggest that in oertain eases - for example, some Bsoh fugues, 
formal properties are sufficient conditions for regarding something 
as art.
Seotion I. Meaning. Part 1.
i. Meaning.
To begin with, one oan point out a few of the things whioh meaning, 
aesthetically,^is not. 7or one thing, to say that a work of art is 
meaningful is not the same thing as saying that it has a message 
(e.g., is symbolio, as one might say a oross was symbolio), or is 
meaningful in the sense one might somebody's look was meaningful.
Nor is it the same as the meaning of a person, where this is his 
intention. These ideas of meaning use it in terms of pointing 
towards, or indicating, something further, beyond the thing whioh is 
given. And this applies to words. Although the meaning of a word 
is not an objeot (as Strawson pointed out, under the impression 
that Russell thought it was), words nevertheless act as indicators 
in some way - they give instructions or desoribe things, or explain, 
and in general are only mediating factors.
1_. I.e., when used in the oontext of art.
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A fairly important faot about tha work of art, is that in being 
meaningful it does net point to something else. Dufrenne notes this 
twiee - firstly (Vol.X, Part I, Chap. IV, p.171), when he dieting» 
uishes the aesthetio object from what he ealls the ordinary meaning­
ful object. For instanoe natural objeets, he says, refer outside 
themselves in spaoe and time, but with aesthetio objects, the sign 
and what is signified are one. Thhs while ordinary perception seeks 
a meaning of the given beyond what is given, perception of the 
aesthetie objeot finds meaning within what is given - the aesthetio 
objeot:
"he rapport du signifié au signifiant dans l'objet esthétique 
n'est pas le meme que pour les objets naturels qui rembient 
toujours hors d'eux-mémea, . . . .  ou pour les objets sign­
ifiants dans lesquels le signe s'effaoe devant la signification 
qu'il apporte . . . .  Alors que la peroeption ordinaire oherohe 
la sens du donné au delà du donné, l'objet esthétique ne livre 
son sens qu'a la oondition qu'au lieu de traverser le donne,
la peroeption s'arrête a lui . .......... " (p.171 ibid.)
Seoondly (Yol.I, Part I, oono. pp.196-7)» he montions it briefly 
again to say that the meaning of the aesthetio objeot is contained 
within it, and it is understoou only by reference to itself:
"il porte en lui son sens, il est a lui-meme son propre 
monde, et nous ne pouvons le oomprendre qu'en demeurant 
auprès de lui, et revenant toujours a lui." (pp.196-7.)
I think this is one of the most important points whioh Bufrenne 
makes here about meaning. Otherwise in this seotion, he disousses 
understanding the meaning, from the point of view both of audienoe 
and author, and the survival of the work under eertain oiroumstanoes.
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The first disoussion is with respeot to a possible subjeot in
art work (Vol.I, Part II,* pp.387 ff). Her* Dufrenne is arguing
1 2against striot formulism as proposed by Bell — * or f r y - ? ' giving 
reasons for the existenoe and usefulness of a subject in works of 
art* Dufrenne sees one rather pragmatio reason for the formalist 
viewpoint. It is that representational art is open to muoh abuse 
and misinterpretation by oonoentrating on the wrong things - namely 
the subjeot. He oites the example of someone thinking they have 
understood a work simply beoause they recognise its subject (for 
instanoe that it depiots a mountain soene). This is as bad as using 
a portrait to evoke some memory, according to him. In these oases 
the eudienoe loses the aesthetio experience and uses the work as a 
means to an end, or like a pussle whioh, when the subjeot is oomp- 
rehonded, is solved. In this oase on« will not oarry on contemp­
lating the work ones the subjeot has been disoovered. Just as one 
does not oarry on 'oontemplating' a crossword puzzle, or oome baok 
to it again, onoe it is finished. It is also a trap for the artist, 
who may find it easier to be realistio than abstraot in his work, 
and may satisfy tastes more easily that way.
However, Dufrenne defends the neoesaity of a subjeot for two 
reasons related to the understanding of the work of art. firstly, 
the subjeot satisfies the tendenoy of perception to see the sensible 
objeot as being ££ something, i.e., to see the objeot as having form 
and order and thus being more readily oomprehenaible. Seoondly, and 
relatedly, the sensible has to attaoh itself to something in order 
for the work to 'get itself notioed* as something in partioular - 
an aesthetio objeot. And, aocording to Dufrenne, the represented 
object gives the sensible the unity ...of meaning .whioh unity hj-----
1. See Clive Bell, op.oit.
2. See Koger fry. Vision and design. Chatto and windus, 1923.
* Chap.IV
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regards as appealing to reflection beoauae it is the unity of a 
eonoept or oonoepta.
Dufrenne adds that a representational subject is also meaning­
ful for the artist - he does not ehoose his subject arbitrarily, but 
because it arouses a oertain emotion in him (pp.393"V)» But this is 
by the wqy, sinoe the artist's reasons for ohoosing some subjeot are 
quite possibly non-aesthetic, I would imagine. And Dufrenne adds 
that the artist does not give any due as to how ire are to under­
stand nhat he creates - so even if the meaning the subjeot has for 
him is particularly relevant, it is not divulged, (p.403 ibid.)
Moving from the idea of a representational subjeot, but again 
on the negative side (pp.401-3), Dufrenne warns ugainst the spectat­
or's talcing any philosophy put forward in a work as a key to that 
work. Indeed he considers that any systematised philosophy in a work 
of art would kill the work, by using it as a means to the expression 
of the system, rather than an end in itself. To make understanding 
more difficult,— *Dufrenne insists on the work of art as being opaque 
and inexhaustible. He considers ordinary objeots to be opaque to a 
oertain extent, but when represented, in art, they are doubly so. Ho 
oites a countryside by Cesanne as being even less easily grasped 
(intellectually), than an aotual piece of oountryside:
"Un paysage de Cesanne est inspuisaoie oomme un paysage du 
monde naturel, et mieux qua lui . . . . . "
"les individus representes par l'art oonservent dans l'oeuvre 
le oharaotere insaisissablc et secret qui est le propre d'une 
liberte." (p.M>3 ibid.)
J.. Though net intentionally so
This is apparently because of the change from the uncertainty of 
ordinary existence to the superior state of art - though Dufrenne 
does not explain why a refinement of existenoe should ma^e for 
greater unintelligibility.
Dufrenne concludes tnis rather brief examination of the under* 
standing of a work of art with an outline of 'bodily' understanding 
of the work (Vol.II, Part 1, Chap.I pp.429-431)• He thinks one oan- 
not understand, e.g., a poem, until one is 'lulled by the rhythm', 
and generally held by its sensuous qualities. And the rhythm oan 
only be grasped in so far as the r/ords are understood) and inversely 
the sense of the words can only be understood through, for example, 
the movement it arouses in us. Thus he holds that the rhythm 
(sensuous oharaoter) of a work, and the meaning, are in a symmetrioal 
relationship.
At a more preliminary stage, Dufrenne asserts that on first 
oontaot of the body with an aesthetic object, the only meaning the 
body oan disoern is a meaning for the body. This is not so far- 
fetohed as it sounds, sinoe Dufrenne is using 'body' to mean 'whole 
self - mind and body', rather than tc differentiate it from mind.
But what he spys still requires some elucidation. It is really a 
fairly simple statement that at first glanoe one oannot find the real 
meaning of a work, but one oan feel or sense its nature, in a simple 
way, and may feel some sort of affinity with the work.^*
Dufronne does give the impression of being about to explain the 
meaning and understanding of moaning in Section IV of the fourth
ohapter (Vol.I, Part I) as it is ontitled 'L'objet esthetique et
ll'objet signifiant'i (which does not mean that he regards the 
aesthetic objeot as distinct from the meaningful objeot; just meaning­
ful in a different way from that of the ordinary objeot). However
JL. See Chapter IV regarding feeling, and 'having a sense of' the
work of art
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although he makes some sort of preliminary distinctions, he does not 
give any straightforward description of aesthetic meaning, huoh of 
his disoussion ooncerne truth (le vrai and la vex'ite) in art, and the 
implicit dissociation between a work's having meaning, and its being 
true or false. T. at is, ho claims that works of literature do not 
purport to present the truth in the way that soisntific works do. 
(p.162 ff. ibid.)
He appears to be led into tnis attitude to meaning by the refleot 
ion that although works of art are not primarily information-giving 
objects, and thus not meaningful because of this aspeot (unlike books 
providing information of some sort ) , if these lattor objeots were lost
4information about cultures would be given by their arts.“ *
After this, he poses two quostions, whioh may be token fs rhetor­
ical (at any rate they are never specifically answered):
"l'objet esthetique n'est-il pas en premier signifiant? i£t par 
consequent n'est-ce pas la leoturo de cstte signification qu'il 
attend de nous en premier?” (p.162 ibid.)
This requires a certain amount of comment. For example, a much simp­
lex' solution seems to exist for aiding the audience to understand the 
meaning of art, whether with or without a subject. That is, to eduo- 
ete the audienoe not to see the qub.isot as supplying the whole of the 
meaning of tut work, euoh that it is comprehended and may be
J.. In the same vein of tho relationship between survival and cieuning, 
hufrenne later (Vol.I, Part X, Chap.VI, p.292) refers to a possible 
society of vandals. In this situation, aesthst.io objects as suoh 
would disappear} the object would survive without its meaning. The 
aesthetic object, Dufrenne asserts, demands perception us an aesthstio 
objeot, by means of waioh it gains cleaning. This implies the belief 
that if anything is an aesthetic objeot it has meaning, by the assert­
ion that it would lose moaning, if and because it ooased to be an 
usathetio object.
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regarded as finished with, oneo the subjuct has boon established.
The solution would therefore be not one of oiroumventing the problem 
by abandoning realism, but of making people ubo the right criteria 
for appreciating art.
Both arguments in favour of a oubjeot are particularly weak. Zt 
is, after all, only a matter of training that causes people to look 
for reoognisable forms in what they see. The existence or otherwise 
of these latter has no real relation to their having mooning. And 
this being so, an inability to find any representation should be no 
bar to finding a meaning in tne objeot, if it aas any.
Nor is it neoessary for a work of art to have a subject as such, 
e.g., represent something - for it to have form anu order. Abstraot
eworks, non-roprasentational music, architecture, etc., do not hove 
'subjects' and still have order if tney are works of art (and necess­
arily have some form). And any entity is of something, just as 
consciousness is always oonsoiouness of something. A work of art 
always has a content, and therefore satisfies the necessity to be of 
something.
iollowing on from this, Dufrenne seems happy to forget the amount 
even of painting, let alone music, which has no subject. He says 
(p.393) that one has to take account of the moaning of the words end 
their subjeot(a) in ordsr to understand - yet even this may not be 
true of 'impressionist' types of work suoh as Beokett's Lessness. I 
think he is mnking use illegitimately, of an ambiguity in the term 
'subject' - between e representational subjeot - whioh all art does 
not have, and oontent-subjeot - nhioh all art does have (for this is 
merely the material of the work and may be as abstruot ond non-rep- 
resentational as the artist ohouaea).
There are two final ciueriea.
(i) As to tuo subjoot having a meaning for the artist, Dufrenne is 
being at least historically innaourate - for the ohoioe of subjeot is 
often out of the hands of the artist und in the hands of the wealthy,
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the patron«.
(11) And the Idea of bodily understanding I find somewhat pointless. 
For instanoe, the first desoription of this is suoh that understand« 
ing would newer get started, sinoe understanding depends on rhjrtjun, 
nnC vios versa. Nor does it in faot seem to ue the oase that under­
standing of the words of a literary work depends on gaining c sense 
of their rhythn (movement) - although this may be true of some poetry. 
The seoond assertion is more simple and less controversial.
Oufrenne is oorz-eot, I think, in saying (a), that art is unlike 
language in the sense that it aoes not point to anything outside 
itself, and (b), that the meaning of a work is to be sought from the 
work and not from external faotors. In both these references one 
aeoB a marked similarity to Hufrenne's (ana others) views on the 
looutiun of tne artist's intentions (<f Chapter Two) i.e., that one 
oan discern the intentions of the author only from his work. Henning 
and intention are in any oeue closely linked - e.g., in the olaims 
that the meaning of a work and the intended meaning of the author 
are, or should be, the same thing.
He now moves on to two related aspects of aesthetic meaning 
(i) its verbal untranslatability, ana (ii) its ultimate ungrospab- 
ility, (Not that the latter is held to derive from the former. It 
is rather tne onso that both are held to derive from the limitless 
oharaoter of tno uesthotio object.)
ii) hoanina and language.
bufrenne status on at least three separate occasions, that what the 
work of art aays (and even this muoh carries the implication that it i 
docs say something meaningful), cannot be said other than by itself. 
Ho m a s  uses musio os his example. On the first occasion (VoU,ihxt^ 
Chap.IV, p.172) he saya that whetover explanation or exposition of
the work one gives, it will always be slightly unfaithful to it,and 
this is most apparent in musio:^ **
"Japuis bien dire, aprea Beethoven lui-meme, que 1'andante du 
XVe Wuator dit la priere a Dieu d'une salads reoonnaissant: ai- 
Je exprime par la oe que disent oes longs etirements d'aooorda 
sur dea tonalites toujours ohangeantes? Ce que dit la musique 
ne peut etre dit que par elle." (p. 1 7 2  ibid.)
Secondly (Vol.II, Part III, Chap. IV, p.486), regarding the aeathstio 
attitude, he saya that the attempt to translate the work into ordin­
ary prose is ultimately vain:
"puiaqug oe que dit l'oeuvre ne peut etre dit autrement 
que par ell*" (p.486 ibid.)
The last statement of this view is implicit rather than explicit. 
This is still in the oontext of the aesthetic attitude (Vol.II, Part 
III, Chap.IV,p.509) and has been mentioned in the previous ohapter. 
Dufrenne asserts that identification and rational comprehension are 
not the proper end of aesthetio perception. We do not ask exactly 
what a literary work means, and should not regard obscurity in a 
work as making it inaooessible to us. The most diffioult texts are 
understood by aooeding to feeling (to a non-definable world). I.e., 
even if it were possible to give an exact aooount (verbalisation) of 
what a work means, that attempt would be misguided.
Having given every indication that he does not regard art as 
really a language (as I think my oommenta on this section will show), 
it is a little disoonoerting to find that Dufrenne launches into a 
disoussion of 'expression in language', in the middle of a ohapter 
on the aesthetio, and the meaningful, objeot. (Vol.I, Part I,Chap.IV, 
PP.173-184.) However, language is one of the major media of artists, 
and a lot of what Dufrenne says oentres on the oapaoity <flanguage 
1_. Nevertheless, whatever he says of musio and our appreoiation of 
art, he preaumably intends to apply to all arts, sinoe he saya 
(p.509) that our attitude to musio is a paradigm oase of our att­
itude to all art. It oontains all the essential qualities.
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to beoomo aesthetic, und the degree to whioh it already is (by being 
already expressive, as well as a rational, ordered, means of signify­
ing). Beoause he is oonoerned with its usage as an art form - and not 
as that into whioh one translates an aesthetio objeot - Dufrenne plays 
down the differenoes between objeota and language. However, there is 
no denying that language and objeots are different, in that language 
uniquely exists in a two term relationship, of sign and thing signif­
ied, where language oooupies the former plaoe. Also, aocording to 
Dufrenne, a word (non-aesthetio) has a definite sense whioh it holds 
by convention, and an objeot, if it has a m e a n i n g c a n  be understood 
in r. whole variety of ways.
There is quite a lot to be said about this, aspeoielly with regird 
to interpretations.
Dufranne cakes no effort to support his supposition that all arts 
are the same in no+ having a possible verbal translation, nor does he 
heva any strong grounds for saying that this is the oase for any art, 
for that matter. All he does is to give examples of the inadequaoy of 
oertain verbal explanations of some works. It is possible that there 
are other and more detailed explanations of, say, Beethoven's fifteenth 
quartet, whioh oould be ai»«n after a fairly long study of the work, 
and whioh would be closer to the real meaning. I.e., an explanation 
the form of each movement, how they were related, the tonal etruot- 
ure, the relation of eaoh expressive quality (in terms of harmony, 
rhythm, melody, etc.) what was expressed and how.
This would certainly explain something about the work. Neverthe­
less, 1 think it would have been more accurate of Dufrenne had he said 
at the outset, that works of art are not exactly language, and there­
fore not the sort of things whioh are open tc translation. JSaoh part
and all phenomenologiats would agree that cbjoota haws meaning.
is not like a word in a foreign language, so it is really making a 
oategory mistake to say that works oannot be translated verbally.
The point is that one would not try. This is more or lass what 
Dufrenne means when he says identification is not the proper end of 
aesthetio perception.
But in saying that 1 do not think (or think Dufrenne thinks) 
that works of art are languages, 1 am not saying that detailed diso- 
ussion and analysis, as suggested above on Beethoven's quartet, are 
no longer required. It is simply that whatever one soys about a work 
is in explanation of it, it is not an attempt to translate it.
This allows for any number of varying explanations, all of wnioh 
may be oorreot in some way, or throw some light on the meaning of the 
work: also if works of art were languages, euoh bit would mean one
thing, and one thing only, and the work of art would be rather like 
a jigsaw pussle. In this oaae one would have finished appreciating 
the work for good onoe tne pussle was finished. But it is generally 
agreed that one oan go on learning about works of art for a very 
long time, and moreover, that they ore not finished with, even if it 
is the oase that one thinks one understands them, a  Shakespeare 
soholar does not wash his hands of Shakespeare onoe he has explained 
tne words to his own satisfaction. Also, one oan take a broad app­
roach (to the work as a whole) or a more dotaohed one, or look at a 
sixteenth oentury painting from the viewpoint of its contemporaries, 
or any successive ere. This makes any number of viewpoints equally 
good, and regards no partioular one as the oorreot one: whereas this 
would not be the oase were art a language. In that oase eaoh work 
would have one translation, from one point of view. The more flex­
ible attitude of allowing various explanations also seems to agree 
with what aotually ooours - that is - for any work of art of import­
ance, there will always be a variety of explanations,, from a 
variety of viewpoints, all of whioh (or many of whloh), have e
2 6 6 .
267
certain Mount in their favour.
Since Dufronnc advocates oritioal analysis as a part of the 
aesthetic attitude,^*I think he would, in the end, agree that anal­
ysis of the work of art eas neoessary for an understanding of it. And 
it is not because it is untranslatable that he considers one oan nenr 
oompletely understand a work, but beoause it has an unlimited or un­
ending nature, whioh oauses it to be ungraspable.
To allow that various interpretations of any work are legitimate 
or neoessary is to take s relativist line - and this is what 1 an now 
attributing to Dufrenne. However, despite the attaoks he makes on 
relativisa, and his avowed absolutist ideas, it is possible to take s 
relativist line on one topic in aesthetios, while disagreeing with 
relativist solutions to other probleas in the same subjeot. for 
instance, one oould maintain this line while disagreeing with the 
view that the existence of an objeot qua work of art is subjeot- 
relativs, without contradiction. I think that this is what Dufrenne 
is doing, without aotually allowing hinself to label anything he says 
as 'relativist'. What is suggested here, - and in relativist ideas of 
the same sort, whioh are apparent in the third seotion - does not d.ash 
with any absolutist principle Dufrenne upholds.
H . B .
Dufrenne does not aid the ides that art is not parallel to a language, 
and should therefore not be open to translation by suoh remarks ast 
"l'artiste est interprets: il fournit un langage a l'objet, 
il l'aide a dire oe qu'il veut dire.” (Vol.I, Part II, Chap IV. 
p . 3 9 5 . )
by whioh he means thst the artist provides a medium (art) for the 
expression of something, some faot about reality, whioh solentiflo 
study omits.
J_- See Chapter four.
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iii) The unxraspability of the meaning of the wp.ric.
Dufrenne puts hie view in a variety of way», but the message ie 
generally the samei one can never totally exhaust the meaning of the 
work of art. He tends to use the term 'inexpressible' to refer to 
the works ability to esoape all attempts to pin it down, and our 
failure in these attempts. I shall mention three plaoes where he 
specifically refers to, and explains, the idea of arts' 'ungrasp- 
ability'.
firstly, while discussing the work and the publio (Vol.l, Parti, 
Chap.Ill, p.102), he says that what a work expresses is inexhaustible 
much in the way a person's meaning might be. Like a human faoe, it 
always^-* appears expressive, and yet what it expressés appears 
ungraspable. And beoause it is inexhaustible, it gains from a number 
of interpretations >
"C'est plutôt à la faoon d'une personne que l'oeuvre s'avère 
inépuisable."
"Ce qu'elle représente ne se livre qu'à travers oe qu'elle 
exprime, l'expression, même immédiatement saisie, est enoore 
insaisissable."
"paroe que le sens de l'oeuvre est inépuisable, l'objet 
esthétique gagne à une pluralité d'interprétations." (p.102 ibid) 
Secondly (Vol.l, Part 11, Chap.IV, pp.398-404), while disoussing 
the general atruoture of the work of art, and in partioular, express­
ion, Dufrenne makes several thematioally similar oomments. These are 
to the effeot that the work of art has a multiplicity of meanings 
and that ultimately it remains undefined. This is not intended to 
suggest that one oannot understand the work at all, but that there 
are always more possible meanings further to those one oan disoover.
1. Aotually, as will be seen, he does not believe the human faoe
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Dufrenne assorts that it is a characteristic of tho work of art 
that it presents a plurality of meanings, which appear to form a sort 
of hiararo hy4-‘ This plurality ia another indication of the profund­
ity of the aesthetic object. The most authentic works have a oertain 
ambiguity - what Dufrenne oalls the ambiguity of exoess, whioh der­
ives from the vast degree of meaning. Contrary to appearanoe, the 
attribution of ambiguity of exoess is a means of praising, not denig­
rating, and this mode of ambiguity is in oontrast to that of confusion 
or obscurity of meaning. In the example he gives of an evangelioaL 
parade, he suggests that the true meaning of a work escapes explic­
ation (p.198 ibid).^*
He goes on to say that all interpretations of a work can seem 
oorreot at the same time, but this is not a flaw, and oocurs also 
with non-aesthetio situations. For inatanoe, one oan describe a war 
as being at the same time, a) a capitalist ruse, b) a conflict of 
oultures, o) an irruption of the natural into the artificial, or 
d) 'man beooming intuition' .** These are all oorreot, they simply 
designate different dimensions of human nature. However, the 
aesthetic objeot is ultimately undefined (p.400 ibid).
He concludes these remarks with a distinction between people 
whom one fails to 'grasp', simply because there was nothing there 
to grasp, and objects (works of art), where this mystery does not
J,. Kxaotly what he means by a 'hierarchy' is not olear, and not 
explained.
Incidentally, in the example, he uses the notion of the aesthetie 
attitude previously elaborated - of distancing, and use of analysis 
to a certain extent.
These are all Dufrenne's examples.
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derive from vaouity, but "the expression of a freedom whioh refuses 
ail determination"
"expression d'une liberté qui refuse toute determination: 
leur réalité débordante élude nos prises par excès plutôt 
que par defaut.” (p.404 ibid.)
The third point serbes mainly to emphasise the idea of profund­
ity in the inexhaustibility of meaning (Vol.II, Part 111, Chap.IV, 
Pp.A-91-4)« The gist of this is that the inexpressibility of the 
aesthetic objeot does not derive from inoompleteness (a laok of 
imagination), nor an inexpressibility of the erdinary en-soi objeot 
(the ontio). It is a third, exoessive inexpressibility, of the sort 
whioh demonstrates the object's profundity, and the aeséhetio objeot 
is inexpressible (i.e., ungraspable in its entirety) because of its 
profundity. For it is not like an objeot whose every aspeot oan be 
assimilated at a glanoe, but like £ consciousness whose essence one 
oannot reaoh. (The aesthetio objeot is profound because it obliges 
us to transform it in order to grasp it.)
There may be a due as to why art's meaning should necessarily 
be ungraspable - not only beoause of its profundity, eto., in what 
Dufrenne says of the souroes the artist uses (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, 
p.394), and that he is interested in the "ungraspable dimension of
Dufrenne does not mention the possibility of people whom one oan­
not 'grasp' beoause of their very complex and profound nature (though 
he does mention an ungraspable dimension of reality), or of works of 
art where there is very little to grasp - possibilities suggested by 
Cyril Barrett. As a matter of faot, I do not see any great parallel 
in Dufrenne's system, between man’s 'ungraspability' and that of art. 
For art is held to be logioally ungraspable for some reason, whereas 
oertain men are held only to be empirically so. Moreover, he would 
not aooept the possibility of there being very little to grasp in 
any work of art.
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reality which only shows itself to affactivity ", i.e., ihe expressive 
properties of art.
"Au vrai, ce qui intéresse et stimule l'artiste, . . .  c'est
l'affeotivite, at qua l'art seul peut fixer et oommuniquer."
(p.394 ibid.)
This, then, is Dufrenne's idea of meaning in art. However, it is 
not without its problems, and firstly requires some disoussion on the 
same topic whioh took up much of the disoussion of the previous part 
of thia seotion, i.e., on interpretation.
In two out of three remarks on tne inexhaustibility of the mean­
ing of a work of art, Dufrenne suggests that more than one interpret­
ation is pretty well inesoapable because of the depth of meaning of 
any worthwhile work of art. 1 have said previously^* that Dufrenne 
allows this. What is noteworthy is the fact that he is being relativ­
ist - in f^ot he is adopting the line I suggested above that he would 
aooept.^* As I pointed out however, the relativist approach does not 
neoessarily dash with other absolutist ideas in aesthetics.
What Dufrenne says is, on the whole, inconclusive. He makes 
various distinctions - between types of ambiguity, between obsourity 
and profundity, ungraspability because of vacuity, and beoause of 
freedom - but fails to draw the strings together. What one would 
probably oonduae from what is said is that tue work of art has an 
infinite number of meanings which derive from, a) ambiguity of exoess, 
b), profundity (not obsourity), and o) freedom (not vaoulty). Because 
of the infinity of meanings the work is ultimately undefinable or 
inexhaustible. That is, it oan be defined within limits - one oan
J.. See Chapter 3, on the a priori affective qualities.
See oomments on the previous seotion of this ohapter.
cette insaisissable dimension du réel qui ne se manifeste qu'à
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provide a-n interpretations, and go on providing than, but one will 
never provide auffioient interpretations wholly to encompass tbs 
meaning of the work.
Nevertheless, when one investigates this, tnere are at least two 
difficulties t i) relating to tne idea of a variety of interpretations 
and ii) relating to the oonolusion - that the work of art is never 
wholly defined.
i) The idea that one may allow a variety of interpretations of any 
work is in itself quite sound (as 1 have already indioated in this 
ohapter). Different theories may all be able to bring sux'fiolent 
evidenoe from one work, to merit oredenoe.
It is worth bearing in mind though, that wnilst different people 
may proffer various theories on any one work of art, toe normal praot- 
ioe of eritios is to regard these as alternatives - not as all bsing 
a part of the meaning of the work as s whole, whioh is what Dufrenne 
advooates, and with whioh 1 agree. The usual praotioe is to say 
works are differently interpreted but the interpreters fall into 
disagreeing oampa, determined that only ons theory (their own) is 
oorreot. Or one oan say, with Kantr^ * that the oorreot interpretation 
will be understood by anyone adopting the right aosthetio attitude, 
and there oan be no real argument over interpretation. As 1 have 
said, 1 prefer to allow merit to more than one tneory.
There is, though, an important diffioulty with regard to incomp­
atible views - i.o., intarpretstions whioh disagree radioally. There 
are two ways round the problem, but the first is not espeoielly strong. 
The question arises in his analogy with descriptions of a war, and 
when he says all interpretations may seat oorreot at one time. I do 
not tnink that the analogy is quite parallel with what he is saying 
about art. for the interpretations of one work night be incompatibly 
whereas one oould say these different views of war were either» (a) 
intentionally different but oompatlble ways of seeing one objeotlve
±. See Kent» Crltloue of Judgment, pub. Hsfner, New York, 1972
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phenomenon, or (b) not all oorreot w that la different inter” 
pretations of whioh one is oorreot (this would be spying that one 
should look at things like war in what 1 have called the oritio'a 
•ay of looking at art).
This brings up the question of whether, in the event of 
incompatible theories of art, one is to allow that all theories 
are oorreot at the same time. It may appear obvious that i£ 
there are two conflicting theories, one cannot say both are 
correot at the same time - but I do not think this is so obvious. 
For one theory ( a )^ might say Hamlet aoted as he did beoause he 
loved his mother, while another (B), says it is beoause he hated 
her - and both bring passages of the play, interpreted in their 
way, as evidenoe. In this hypothetical oaae, 1 am inolined to 
say that neither rules out the other, and both are equally 
acceptable, each supposedly having as muoh in his favour as the 
other. Of course, it would be difficult to olaim that one oould 
believe both at onoe, but 1 think that it might be a fairly 
arbitrary deoision as to whioh one did aocept.
The problem with this hypothetioal case is that each theory 
may well bo taking different passages of the play to prove its 
case. If so, the interpretation is incomplete, and one is not 
getting an overall pioture. However, many works of art oan be 
differently and incompatibly interpreted as a whole, and this is 
where the seoond answer to the problem comes in. That is, one 
should not use the language of truth-funotionality, i.e., refer 
to the oorreotness of an interpretation and whether it is right 
or wrong, but to its admissablllty as a plausible view, on the 
grounds of a number of examples taken from the work. One oan 
then say without any inconsistency that incompatible interp­
retations X and T are both aooeptable — and it will rest with
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the audienoe as to whioh he agrees with, from the reasons given, or 
his own preference.
As it is, in practise, new acceptable views about any wort will 
probably inolude at least something of previous acceptable interpret­
ations. To take an example from the performed arts, if Tosoanini 
took Uosart's 41st symphony in one way, it would not be neoessary for 
Beeoham to take every phrase or passage of the same work differently, 
in order for the interpretation to be different. Tosoanini might, in 
all probability, have taken certain passages at a quioker tempo, with 
different phrasing from Beeoham's. But even suoh conductors as these 
would probably have agreed about muoh of the interpretation. This 
incidentally reinforoes the claim that incompatible and disagreeing 
views can be perfectly aooeptable and that truth-functional terms are 
misoategorisations. 1 for one would not wish to dismiss an interpret­
ation by Toaoanmi beoause it disagreed with, or differed from, one 
by Beeoham, or say that oat must be inoorreot.
N.B. It is also true that new views may become increasingly trivial
in their novelty. One might think this of a reoent up-dated staging
1» *•of A midsummer night's dream, involving the use of swings (though 1 
am not saying one should). The trap is to avoid novelty for its own 
sake
11) The seoond difficulty is very simple - why should the meaning of 
the work be inexhaustible? Why should it be ultimately undefined? 
Certainly there may be a number of possible interpretations, and 
for example, at time t-) all interpretations of X may not have been 
given, in whioh case it is not fully defined. But at t2 all
1. I am grateful to Cyril Barrett for the suggestion that novelty 
oan introduce triviality.
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Interpretations nay be available, in whioh oaae X ia fully defined. 
It nay not neoessarily be the oaae that we know that the meaning 
of the work has been exhauated, but that doea not gean that it haa 
not been, nor that it oannot be. Oufrenne'a atipulation that works 
of art are necessarily undefinable seens far too radioal. Even 
saying they are like nan - with too many faoets ever to be wholly 
defined, i.e., that they are empirically inexhaustible, seens too 
radioal. I think that granted that it may take oentuxfes to give 
all possible interpretations of a major work, e.g., Hamlet, and 
granted that we may not even know when the task is oomplete, desp­
ite the work of art's profundity and abundance of meaning, it renalns 
the oaBe that works of art are definable, and sometimes fully drfliMd.
There are two final points. (A) hufrenne is not oompletely 
oonsistent in what he says about meaning. He asserts both that 
there are an innumerable number of meanings, not all of whioh oan 
be grasped, and that tiiere is only one meaning (by asserting that 
the true meaning of a work eao&pes explication (p.398 ibid.) ).
Since the emphasis in the latter is on explication (l.e. that mean­
ing is grasped by feeling rather than analysis) rather than on the 
one-ness of meaning, 1 think one oan take it that he really bel­
ieves there ere any number of meanings - especially sinoe he 
emphasises this latter point.
(B) Dufrenne elaborates at length on the notion of profundity.
It is not the plaoe to go into it at length here, but some idea is 
required as to what he means by the idea, firstly, aesthetio feel­
ing is held to be profound if one lives within the world of the 
work, so to speak, i.e., oontrivee to see things from the point of 
view of the work. In other words, the profundity of aesthetio 
feeling lies in its power to oontrive to put the subjeot in a 
position to understand the work - what it means, what it expresses, 
eto. (of. pp.502-4).
I
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On the other hand, profundity in the aeathetio objeot derives 
from various thinga. for one thing, the aeethetio objeot arouses 
aesthetio feeling, whioh is itself profound. In this oontext Duf- 
renne refers (p.511) bo the neoeasity of the aesthetio objeot to be 
peroeived and thjts related to oonsoiousness. The sea also has a 
oertain profundity;
"Mais il faut oheroher ailleurs le réalité de la profondeurs 
o'est aveo le vivant et la oonsoiençe qu'il faudrait ioi oon- 
fronter l'objet esthétique." (p.511 ibid.)
Here the profundity of the .aesthetio objeot derives: (a) from being 
related to oonsoiousness (whioh he holds to be profound in being 
vastly oomplex and not immediately oomprehensible, etc.) by its 
necessity to be peroeived) and (b) from being similar to the 
oonsoious being or pour sod, in being a quasi-pour-aoi. That is, it 
has the oomplexity of the pour-soi without itself being oonsoious.
For another it is not part of the everyday world and not some­
thing with whioh we oan be vary familiar (of. an awesome parson).
It is 'strange' to use Dufrenne's term (p.507-8). For another, 
there is a lot to be discovered in the aesthetio objeot, and it 
provokes and demands thorough refleotion. It has an infinite fund 
of meaning, a oomplex internal nature, whioh one never finishes 
divining: there is always something now to be understood (its 
opposite would be a simple objeot whose whole meaning or signifio- 
anoe oan be grasped at a glanoe - a superficial or shallow entity) s 
"Il est eesentiel a l'objet esthétique d'avoir déjà ... 
oette densité d'etre par laquelle il est nature.” (p.511 ibid.) 
And it has an ability to oommunioate with us (or power of expression 
whioh, "apparait toujours comme un miraole" (p.511.) Moreover, its 
means of expression are normally regarded as profound in themselves—
277
sublimity, beauty, sagacity eto. The world of the aeethetio object 
la that In whloh It expresses the depth of meaning (i.e., profundity) 
whioh makes the objeot inexhaustible (p.512)^#
1 think that this selection of points provides a general pioture 
of what Oufrenne naans by profundity. And in some waya 1 think one 
would agree with him. We do not treat art with too great familiar* 
ity,^* and with most works of art a good deal of tine has to be spent 
in understanding them, and they possess many feasts, all of whieh 
eannot be seem at a glance. Many works of art are profound - some 
seen like bottomless pits whloh one fools one will newer fully comp­
rehend. One has only to look at, say, Beethoven's opus 132 (string 
qu§rtet) or any da Vinol work, to see examples of profundity, and see 
the depth and penetration of vision of the artist.
Nevertheless, although we may agree with the basio thesis, and 
and see how Oufrenne highlights the objective quality of profundity 
in art, it is impossible to let his oleims pass without oritieism. 
Firstly - and this is not apparent from the precis 1 have given, it 
has to be admitted that Oufrenne's disoussion is loose, obsoure and 
rather florid. The whole of Chapter IV (Vol.II, Part 111) is dev­
oted to profundity and oannot really be regarded as very good phil­
osophy as it wanders off at a tangent so often. Seoondly, the rel­
ation of profundity to oonsoiousness makes the profundity of art at 
best vicarious, and ah worst non-existent, unless one is willing to 
assume that art inherits profundity as a quasi-pour-soi - whioh I sn 
not, and whioh reverses the oorreot order of things, 1 think. (I.e., 
the notion of the quasi-pour-soi requires a good deal of evidenoe, 
and if one aould prove art to be profound independently of the use 
of that notion, this would be useful. But i^expeoting rather a 
lot to ask the quasi—pour sol—oonoept to aot as evidenoe for art's 
profundity.)
See fo llo w in g  page (2 7 8 )  f o r  notes and
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Thirdly, the so-oalled •strangeness' of art is no evidence of 
profundity. The Yeti (if it exists) is not part of everyday life,it 
is 'strange' and awesome - but one would hardly see that as a reasonfoz 
regarding it as profound. Finally Dufrenns thoroughly confuses any 
argument that the aesthetlo object is inexhaustible because It is pro­
found, by saying (a) (pjt5l0-1l) that the aesthetio object has (a)"dens- 
ite d'etre", whioh always oauses there to be something left to be 
understood (implying an inexhaustibility of meaning), and using this 
as proof of its profundity, and then (b) that the great meaningful­
ness or profundity of the work is what makes it inexhaustible - the 
world of the aesthetio object expresses, "Is suroroit do sens qui fait 
l'objet esthetique inepuisable." (p.512.) So, although he does not say 
it in so many words, he more than implies that inexhaustibility is a 
contributory factor to profundity, and profundity is what makes the 
work inexhaustible. This would present us with the logioally imposs­
ible situation of A oausing effeot B, and B causing effect A.
This raises the question as to what it is in any work of art 
whioh is meaningful. What is it whioh cannot be said other than by 
the work, and whioh oan never be grasped in its entirety? Dufrenne's 
answer is, the expressive (or affective) qualities in any work. It is 
the function of art to express - sublimity, tragedy, beauty, melan- 
oholy, eto. And, to a lesser extent, the meaning of the work is 
derived from its form.
However, before expression and meaning are disousaed, it is 
necessary to eluoidate the idea of expression per se.
Motes and ¿. from preceding page (277).
J,. It is clear, I think, that 1 would ohsllenge any assertion of the un- 
fathomibility or inexhaustibility cf the aesthetio objeot - of my 
comments on this, above.
¿.Though one wonders whether a more familiar and less conventionally 
aweatruok treatment might be more appropriate and more helpful in 
getting to terms with the work.
2 7 9
Seotion II. Expression, part 1.
Introduction.
The oonoept of expression In art is probably one of the most regul­
arly taokled problems in aeathetios (along with truth and meaning).
1 shall restriot myself to the types of theories with which Dufranne 
oonoerns himself*. But it is worth mentioning the different oamps, 
and their proponents, (a ) Those who regard works of art as literally 
expressive - including Wittgenstein, Tomas, and Bouwsma. (B) Those 
who are just as certain it oannot be, and that the use of expressive 
terminology is probably metaphorioal - such as Reid. (C) Those who 
regard 'expression' as referring to self-expression on the part of 
the author - suoh as Dewey and Carritt. (D) Those who think on rather 
anthropomorphic lines, subdividing into i) the idea that expressive 
properties are attributable by means of associations of moods and 
ideas, eto. - suoh as Santayana and John Hoopers; il) Empathy theo­
rists suoh as Vernon Lee and Lipps. ( K) Those who presuppose the 
literal nature of expression, and either, l) think the expressive 
properties are inherent - like Deryok Cooke and Arnheim, or ii) think 
they are oontext dependent, like Eduard Hansliok. finally (P) Those 
who regard expression aa the emotive response of the audienoe to the 
emotion of the artist oomnunioated via the work - suoh as Tolstoy.
These different views are not all incompatible - for instanoe 
the artist maji express himself in a work (C), whioh is nevertheless 
itself expressive (E), and whioh, by oommunioation of feeling, oauses 
an emotive response in the audienoe (P) - and furthermore these lit­
erally held expressive properties may be Inherent (Ei), or oontext 
dependent (Ell). As it happens, Dufrenne holds a view whioh is some­
thing of this order, with the exoeption of (Bi).
Before embarking on an anlysis of this theory, however, I prop­
ose to deal with the proposition that art is expressive, and Ofrenneb 
oonoept of the relationship of expression to man, representation and
language
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"Si je ne sais point que le Vei-Be-Chei implore dans le oorpa 
du malade l'esprit du mal qui y siège, Je me gens pourtant 
associe par ses pas et ses oris étranges a quelque tragédie 
secrète où m'entrouvent les portes de la mort." (p.171 ibid.) 
Thirdly, in the introduction to the final part of the Phénoménologie 
(Vol.II, Part IV, pp.539-41), Dufrenne again attributes expressive­
ness direotly to art objeots. He says the 3ort of feeling (sentim­
ent) required in the uesthetio experienoe is that which is given 
over to an expressive function - which otturs naturally in man, but 
only with the aid of art, in objects.^* It is the vooation of aesth- 
objeota to be expressive, and even man is not always as expressive
j[. The general assertion is that imagination is insufficient to 
inspire an understanding of the work and its expressive qualities, 
and that feeling (sentiment) is required. Imagination oan open up 
the world of the aesthetio object to us, but it is not speoifio, and 
leads one away from the aesthetio objeot, "et si l'imagination 
s'exeroe enoore aur eux o'estlorsque le sentiment l'a declenohee,et 
par réaliser le sens de l'expression." (p.5U0 ibid.)
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as the aesthetio objeot (i.e., profound enough for the expression to 
develop into a world)i
"Tout objet n'est dono pas expressif, oomme l'est par vooatlon 
l'objet e sthetique. Nous pourrions ajouter: l'homme meme n'est 
pas toujours expressif, du moins a la façon de l'objet esthét­
ique, o'est-à-dire asses profondément pour que l'expression 
se dilate en un monde." (p.54-0 ibid.)
Man's mode of expression is more immediate, and he is most expressive 
when he is most himself, (p.5A-0-1 ibid.)
In referring to expression developed into a world as the full­
est state of expressiveness, Dufrenne is referring to the idea of the 
work of art as being a world - a oommon notion of his, whioh has 
arisen previously. The premises are that the work of art is exp­
ressive, and when most fully a work of art, its expression is its 
total being, i.e., its whole world. Its expressiveness is so perv­
asive as to oonstitute its whole being, its world. Thus when any­
thing, for example, man, is most expressive, this quality pervades 
his being, and he is simply expression.
There is not muoh in this whioh is particularly oontroversial. 
The first statement of art as expressive links it with Dufrenne's 
previously given view of the aesthetio attitude - that feeling is 
the highest form of aesthetio peroeption, and the highest form of 
feeling is that whioh reveals what is expressed. The oonolusion 
that it is to be found in a theatre audienoe rather presupposes 
that the audienoe will be taking the oorreot attitude. (N.B. when ho 
refers to emotion, he does not mean that the audienoe will be over- 
oome by emotion.)
Only the last mentioned statement of art as expressive oould 
really be oonstrued as oontroversial. for Dufrenne is not only 
mdcing the statement that a work of art is expressive (i.e., not 
that the audienae or author performs the expressive funotion, but 
the work itself), whioh is really the basioally arguable point - but
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asserting that art is more expressive, and more consistently express­
ive, than man. And, as it happens, man is normally regarded as the 
paradigm, if not ths only, example of expression.
However, I think that this statement about man is true (leaving 
aside the oomparison of man and the aesthetio objeot, for the moment) 
- and fairly evidently so. for although man is capable of any range 
of expression possible, he is also oapable of change - unlike a work 
of art which, if it is expressive at all, is always expressive (so 
long as it remains a work of art). But man can beoome statio - he 
oan at will remove all symptoms of expression from his behaviour. Or 
it may ooour without an aot of will - for example people who do not 
possess or use their mental oapaoities, deoline towards an expression­
less state. Thus man is least expressive when least 'himself - or , 
when least man.
Z shall deal with the basio assumption in this - that the work 
of art is expressive - in the course of considering all the aspects 
of Oufrenne's thesis on expression. And I snail discuss the question 
in ti.e light of other similar and dissimilar doctrines which go into 
the question of exaotly how a work oan be expressive; if it is, or 
alternatively, what else expression refers to.
ii) Elaboration on tne nation of expression.
Before launching into any detailed analysis of the nature of express­
ion, there are certain ideas of the relation of expression to other 
aesthetio features, to be dealt with. Some of these are oontAned in 
the last aeotion of part XI, volume I,of the Phenomenologie, on the 
general structure of the work of art - of which expression is obv­
iously an important part for Dufrenne. There is firstly a general 
oomment on expressiveness, w..ioh would apply to any possible express- 
lee entity; tuat the eloquenoe (expressiveness) of a work of art is 
not in direct relation to the intensity of its pathetio quality, »or 
example, a discreet, cold, or delioate work oan be Just as expressive 
as a violent one. (p.495.) This is, I think, fairly unoontroversial,
A
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Then, in the same section (pp.407-9), Dufrenne discusses the 
work of art and its expressive powers in comparison with human aotiv- 
ity (he wishes to emphasise the quasi-subjeot nature of the work of 
art, as well as its expression). What he says is that true expression 
cannot be pretended or even wished, in the way that the waiter in 
Sartre's example of mauvais foi**is not a true waiter because he is 
acting. l.iS., expression must always be genuine, not artificial or 
foroed. And it is extremely important, according to Dufrenne, for two 
reasons in particular (a), beoause the aesthetio objeot finds its 
highest form of being in its expressive qualities and (b), beoauss 
the ability to express confers a quasi-subjectivity on the work, fin­
ally in this section, he asserts that the work is endowed with a sort 
of interiority, beoause of which it is oapable of expression.
The last of these minor - though informative - references, rel­
ates again to profundity (Vol.II, Part m,Chap.IVp.51Q-1 ). Having 
deoided that profundity in art is not to be discovered in the idea of 
distanoe (lointain) or obsourity, he decides it is to be found in the 
ability of art to express - an ability which it has, he repeats - by 
virtue of its interiority. The relation is therefore a) interiority, 
which gives b) the power to express, whioh aooounts for o),pr<ftmdity. 
This moreover relates expression and meaning, in Cufrenne's doctrine - 
for the work whioh is profound is that whioh has meaning, and it 
gains its profundity from the power to express.
Interiority is a notion whioh requires explanation. Dufrenne 
uses it in a comparison of art and man. Aooording to him, not all man 
have an 'interior' existence - some oan be read totally from their 
outward appearance. Others, however, have a oertain depth by ueansof 
whioh they have some meaning (or their existenoe does). The same 
applies to objeots, but amongst these, art does have an interior 
existenoe. Works of art are more than merely paint on canvas, or a 
suooession of sounds, sto.| they have a meaningful form, amongst
i. See Being and nothingness; trans. Hasel Barnes, pub. Methuen, 
eap. pp.59-61.
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other things, and certain rules governing their oonposition (whereas 
superficial things, "ne rspondent a auoun besoin, elles n’appellent 
aucun geste, elles ne sollicitent pas meme la ouriosite."(p,510.)), 
and are therefore not superficial. This is their interiority, and by- 
virtue of this, they have the ability to express, aooording to Duf- 
renne:
"les schemes qui president a sa composition, en meme temps 
qu'ils informent le sensible et lui donnent un poids de nature 
suscitent en lui un invincible mouvement qui se déploie dans 
une temporalité seorète; et c'est paroe qu'il est ainsi doue 
d'une sorte d'intériorité qu'il est oapablo d'expression,"
(pp.408-9 ibid.)
There are one or two dubious points in this. For one thing, the 
idea of art's 'pretending' to express something does not make sense 
really. There is no comparison with man here, beoause there is no 
question of art's either pretending or not pretending to express 
something. One does not say "X looks as if it expresses sadness,but 
maybe it does not mean it." The ability to pretend is something one 
attributes only to >■ oonsoious being, and even then it does not 
arise as a question about expression — for one oannot pretend to 
express something (one either expresses or does not express,X) ,*• 
Here oufrenne is using the idea of expression to support his 
claim that the work of art is a quasi-pour-soi, and making use of 
comparisons with human aotivity wherever possible, as a matter of 
faot, I think that this oan easily oonfuse rather than olarify the 
issue, for the simple reason that it is by thinking of expressive 
The only way in whioh pretenoe figures in art is in forms of 
drama, suoh as satire of 'send up' oomedy (if one oalls this art) 
where the artist ridioules normally serious situations, eto. In this 
cose he may pretend to take the situation seriously, but make fun of 
it by what he says or does (e.g., by 'overplaying' a part) or by 
the oontext in whioh it is plaoed.
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properties t.a instontiatou in all p m d i g s  oases by nan, that one is 
at a loss when ana attempts to apply them to art. One takes the def­
inition of 'expression' bodily from the meoning it has when applied to 
human expression, finds it involvos mental activxty and feeling» 
and deoides that art cannot possibly express literally, because it 
cannot fool, ihe mistuko lies in supposing that the meaning of a 
term is in no way influenced by its objeot. 1 shell illustrate thi3 
slightly further in the final port of this section,
Thi3 is not to say that I think Dufrenne is wrong to relate art
ond man via expression. for I would accept provisionally that cons­
cious beings (including animals) and aesthetic objects (in the broad
sense which includes sunsets as well as man-made works of art) were
the primary candidates for expressiveness. It may soom that ;jiy thing 
is capable of expression for the simple re.son that one can sometimes 
use the same terminology in predicating somothxng potentially express«! 
ive, of man, ao3thetio objeots and 01 do-nury objuots, and thus give 
the improssion that ahe same relationship holds bot.veon all three, 
for example (i) 'John lookc 3ad' (ii) 'lunch's "Vhe ccroau" looks 
horror-struck', and (ill) 'that sofa looks comfortablo•. But the 
form of words merely disguises what is actually being said and is 
meant. X think the following expansion ond elucidation of the throe 
statements would be generally aooepted.
(i) is literally true. If John looks sad, then John expresses 
sadness; and (ii)"’i’he sorenm" similarly expresses horror; ond in 
aaying, as in (iii), 'that sofa looks comfortablo', one is stating an 
opinion that it gives on impression of being comfortable if sitting
on it - not tfhat It expresses comfortable nos: .— * 10 ■iobi.,,Jht -‘C 
1 . however, 1 am not saying that if A expresses X then A .is. X-this
will be explained sirsrtly in the distinction between tsx presaion' andtexpiesalve '; nor
does it entail that the audience willbe oifocted by what is oppressed (though sane
t loorios on expression hold that e description of a work as expressive is a rutbrenee
to the oudicnoBb response). Thu3 lunch's work may express horror but is not
necessarily horrifying,.
285
properties as instantiated in all paradigm oases by man, that one is
.at a loss when one attempts to apply them to art. One takes the def­
inition of 'expression* bodily from the meaning it has when applied to 
human expression, finds it involves mental activity and feelings, 
and deoides that art cannot possibly express literally, because it 
cannot feel. The mistake lies in supposing that the meaning of a 
term is in no way influenced by its object. 1 shall illustrate this 
slightly further in the final part of this section.
This is not to say that I think Dufrenne is wrong to relate art
and man via expression. For I would aooept provisionally that cons­
cious beings (including animals) and aesthetic objects (in the bnoad
sense whioh includes sunsets as well as man-made works of art) were
the primary candidates for expressiveness. It may soom that anything 
is oapable of expression for the simple reason that one can sometimes 
use the same terminology in predicating something potentially express 
ive, of man, aesthetio objects and ordinary objects, and thus give 
the Impression that the sume relationship holds between all three.
For example (i) 'John looks sad' (ii) 'lunch's "The scream” looks 
horror-struok', and (iii) 'that sofa looks comfortable'. But the 
form of words merely disguises what is aotuully being said and is 
meant. I think the following expansion and elucidation of the three 
statements would be generally aooepted.
(i) is literally true. If John looks sad, then John expresses
sadnessj and (ii)"The soream" similarly expresses horror; and in
saying, as in (iii), 'that sofa looks oomfortablo•, one is stating an
opinion that it gives an impression of being oorafortable if sitting
_ 1. To highlight thegfl It - flgt that it f.«jreajj.?A-SH"f°rtableness.- --- ---- — ----
1. However, I am not saying that if A expresses X then A i£ X-this
will be explained shortly In the diatlno tton between fcx preadon' and %xpjftcatre no
does it entail that the auttsnoe will be affected by vfcat is acpnsaed (though seme
theories on ex pro» ion U d  that a desoilptton Of a work as nepra salve Is s reftnenoe
to the eudimoefc response). Thus hunohvork may express horror but is not
neoessarily horrifying.
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distinction on* could give further example« in the third category.
For example, 'that objeot looks square' means that it has the appear- 
anoe of something square, or of being square - not that it expresses, 
squareness.
So it seems that the form of words oan obseure the fsot that 
persons - or oonsoious beings - and aesthetio objects are expressive, 
whilst ordinary objeots are not. And to saj%C looks X' does not 
entail that expresses X. If the former contention is oorroot, then 
we are another step nearer to aooepting Dufrenne'a assertion that art 
is a quasi-pour-sol, sinoe he used the expressiveness of art as one 
Justifioation for the olain (of. Chapter I, Seotion IV). The final 
decision on this must wait until the end of the ohapter, however.
The idea of interiority also relates art to man, but one has to 
be oareful not to take the parallel too far. The work of art is oap- 
able of being expressive (according to Dufrenne) beoause it has an 
'interior being' in the may indicated (of. above). And likewise man 
is not Just a physical objeot, a superficial entity. But this is 
about as far as one oan safely take the comparison - if indeed one 
oan even take it as far as this, since according to Dufrenne, some 
persons are merely auperfioial and do not have any worthwhile interior 
being.
i n )  t m a i u m  jmuI m m t n W I g * »
Dufre ne briefly disoussea the connection between expression and rep» 
assentation (Vol.l.Part I, Chap.V, pp.224-7). There is an ambiguity 
in Dufrenne's use of the term representation; for he uses it both to 
refer to ell art, as he did with 'subjeot' (i.e., all art is repres­
entational in the same way that all art has some oontent - it repres­
ents something), and he uses it to distingul* different arts la the 
normal way (l.e., painting as representational as ¿gainst painting as 
abstract).
287
The gist of Dufrenne's discussion is that ths represented world 
has no need of, and is seoondary to, the expressed. He oalls the 
represented the reality of the expressed, i.e. , the material being of 
the expressive qualities. In representational arts (in the seoond 
sense), what is represented expresses the world of the author. The 
representative features have more or less the role of a part of the 
whole expressive world of the work. The representation needs the 
expressive world in order to supply it with a unity, aooording to 
Dufrenne.
The reasoning behind this is presumably that any work of art is 
given unity and meaning mainly by its expresslve/affeotive qualities, 
and without 'th ess qualities any representation laoks signlfioanoe.
Ha then adds that in non-representational arts, as for example, 
musio, we understand the atmosphere by means of a oertaln representat­
ional quality to which the expression gives rise, whereas in represent­
ational arts, as for example, drama, we understand the represented 
objeot by means of the atmosphere and oertain expressive qualities 
aroused in us by the work. So expression in part gives rise to the 
represented world — in oonjuring up objeots from reality. It is also 
primary because it gives meaning to what is represented.^**
The rest of what Dufrenne has to say about representation and exp­
ression is on much the same lines. For example (Vol.X,Part II,Chap.IV, 
pp.392-5), he says that sxpression and representation are related, and 
the former goes beyond the latter. However, he does male one or two 
Dufrenne also oarries on to give a comparison between expression 
and Dasein, i.e., a further assooigtlon of art and man. He asserts 
that the transoendent quality of Dasein makes it possible for Being 
to realise itself in the world, and something parallel happens to die 
represented objeot to give the aesthetio objeot something of the 
transoendent quality of Dasein. (p.247 ibid.)
new pointa, for example about the variety of expression aa against 
the unity (singularity) of roproaontation. An instanoo ho givoa of 
this is that tha sans thing oan bo represented in a variety of diff­
erent paintings, yet the expression will be totally different, aoo- 
ording to the artist's teohnlque, or that whioh he wishes to express. 
For example (Dufrenne's example) a Bysantine oruoifixion has a diff­
erent expression from a Rubens - the latter being sumptuous and 
theatrioal, and the former, austere. (Here he is using 'represent­
ation' in the usual sense.)
From this Dufrenne moves on to more treaoherous ground - using 
the terms 'subject' and 'representation'. As I have said, both are 
used ambiguously. He now asserts that most arts, with the exoeption 
of musio, are representational and have a subjeot—*- that the artist 
expresses himself through a subjeot whioh is representational. Even 
supposedly abstraot paintings admit that they have a subjeot beoause 
they bear a title. The artist always represents his objeott "il le 
représente toujours. . .” (p.395 ibid).
On the other hand, nuslo should not attempt to be representat­
ional. A title or a programme is an indioation of the motives insp­
iring the musio, or the image presented to the artist by the piece of 
musio. The danger of suoh things is that they may lead us to think 
of representations totally unoonneoted with the musio.
Finally, Dufrenne repeats the previous assertion that the 
objeots represented in a work servo and are subordinate to, the 
expression of thd work (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, p.W5) i
"Ainsi les objets représentés, mis au servioe de l'expression 
totale, s'immolent à un sens qui les dopasse . . . ils peuvent 
servir l'expression.”
The disoussion of representation may seem a little digreasionary.
J.. He ought also to inolude arohiteoture as non-representationax.
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but It la neotasary beoauae Dufrenne dlsouaaes it In oonnaotion »1th 
expression. It la unfortunate that what ha says la rather amblguoua. 
To atart with, ha la again making an unwarrantad aasumption of oonat- 
anoy. Previously ha aaaunad that tha world of tha artlat ramalnad tha 
aama (ahowlng all tha aama traits), and hara ha supposes that tha at­
mosphere ramalna tha aama. Thla la not ao - thara may not ba ona 
atmosphara whloh parvadaa tha whola work, thua feeling an atmoaphara 
at tha baginning of a work la not a suffioiant guida to tha work aa a 
whola.
That diffarant rapraaantatlona of tha aama thing ahould ba exp- 
raaaiva of wary dlffarant things la quite unoontroveraialj and that 
what is rapraaantad la of laaa importance than what la axpraasad la 
alao raaaonable enough - a.g., a rapraaantational aubjaot suoh aa a 
landscape, may Just bo the maana to a oartain axpraaaion (and repres- 
antation oould in no way ba regarded as*neoesaary oondition of art, 
aimply beoauaa there la muoh which art and whioh la not represent­
ational in the normal aanaa). But it ia mialeading to aay that what 
ia represented needs tha expressive qualities to give unity, ainoa it 
implies that the two are distinct, wharaaa in faot what ia rapraaantad 
will be one of tha madia for expression, i.e., part of it.
Than, whan Dufranna says that art has a aubjaot and ia rapraaant­
ational, with tha exception of musio, on the whola, ha is moving into 
ambiguity. Thara are two baaio orltioisms - (i) giving a work a title 
in no way admits that it represents something. For example, calling 
a painting ’Study in gray and white' does not prove that what it ent­
itles represents something. Nor does an abstract work repraaant 
(qua 'look like') a dormouse Juat beoause it ia oallad, 'The dormouse' 
(although it may oharaoterise some dormouse-like aspeota).^*
it eould only represent if ona used tha term to mean 'symbolise 
or 'stand in plaoe of'.
290
(ii) Why should the means of expression of a work be representational? 
Dufrenne allows that musio Is better off if it is not, so why should 
this oapaoity for non-representation not be extended? As a natter of 
fact there is something to be said for representation in that it nay 
very well help one to identify what it is which is expressive, and of 
what, i.e., it gives speoifioity. This is not to say that the means of 
expression should always be representational.
Moreover, Dufrenne is an anti-naturalist, and not in favour of 
the sort of representationaliaa Bell and fry attaoked. Thus one has 
to make some sort of distinction within what he means when he oleins 
that so muoh is representational. The only reasoncble suggestion is 
to say that he means there is always sons kind of subject qua deso- 
ribable oontent - n» natter how abstract it may be. However, this 
makes the claim about representation somewhat vaouous - since few 
people would dispute the latter suggestion. Also, it means that when 
Dufrenne is talking about representation qua the visual arts, he is 
using it in its widest moaning, and when he is talking about it resp­
ecting musio, he is using the normal, narrower sense. Sinoe the two 
are different, it is a fault in Dufrenne that he should not make the 
distinction.
nlao, Dufrenne (a) makes incompatible assertions about musio and 
representation, and (b) is unreasonably oritioal of representation in 
musio. Regarding (a) he firstly states that what musio expresses 
give3 rise to a certain representational quality, whioh implies that 
it is permissable to think of objeots related to a pieoe of musio 
when listening to it. Then he denounoes musio whioh is representat­
ional, i.o., where the oomposer intends one to imagine incidents or 
objeots .
Regarding (b) Dufrenne is quite dogmatio in his opinion that 
programme and/or representational musio does not exist as an art form 
(of.Vol.lZ, Part IV, Chap.Ill,esp.pp.631-8 for the developnent of his 
view^ Musio should be 'pure* - free from any oonoeptualisation.
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A lengthy diaouaaion on Programme mualo la not in plaoa here, but It 
la neoessary to naka aomt oritiolaa. For one thing, Dufrenne la 
illegitimately txying to avoid the question of repreaentation in mualo 
by simply denying ita exiatenoe. But theae oatrioh-like taotloa will 
not do. However difficult it may be to aaaeaa the relationahlp of 
what ia repreaented, to the mualo, auoh muaio doea axlat. Lisat, 
Biehfrd Strausa, Haydn, Handel, Dubuaay, eto. all wrote mualo reprea- 
anting eventa or plaoea. Nor doea the title, programme or anything 
elae indioate what the oompoaer felt. Ita funotion la to further our 
underatandlng of the muaio and what it expreaaea - in Strauaa'a 
Don Juan or Debuaay'a Cathedrale engloutie. One would not know 
nearly ao auoh about the muaio if one did not have the title or pro­
gramme.
There are three oritioiaaa regarding the idea that a title or a 
programme diatraota one from the muaio.
(1) If a title ia aeen aa indicating what the oompoaer felt, it 
would be far more diatraoting from the aotual muaio than if it were 
aeen aa an integral part of the muaio, intended to enlighten the 
liatener aa to the meaning of the work (in whioh oaae it logioally 
cannot be regarded aa diatraoting one from the work, ainoe it ia a 
part of that work).
(il) Moreover moat people (though unfortunately not Dufrenne) would 
aooept that the worda in opera were important in underatandlng it, 
and an integral part of it. And if one oan mix muaio with drama 
without ruining the mualo and without oeaalng to pay attention to it. 
At ie not a long etep to aooepting repreaentationa.
<4«) There ia no more reaaon to auppoae that giving a programme or 
title to muelo will take one'a mind off the work than there ia to 
auppoae the title of a painting will oauae one to think of other 
ideas unoonneeted with the work. Obviously it ia quite easy to 
•How one'a mind to wander from the point with any work of art - 
and it is muoh more likely that a painting, a ay, of the plsee of
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one's ohildhood, would «voice non-aaath«tio associations than that 
what is represented in a piece of ausio will distraot one froe the 
work. And the possibility of dlatraotion only mdees the task for 
the audience greater rather than caking the work inferior.
1t) Expression and language.
As 1 have already mentioned, in the first seotlon of this chapter, 
Dufrenne disousses the degree of expressiveness in language, in the 
first volune (Part X, Chap.IV, pp.173-184), of the Phenomenologle.
He asserts that language lies between being expressive and being 
rational (p.174) - signifyingi
MLe not est a la fols signifiant at expreasif, signifiant 
en oe qu'il reoele une signifioation objeotive qui est en 
quelque sorte exterieure a lul et requiert l'usage le l'ent- 
endemant, expressif en oe qu'il port« en lui une signific­
ation innanente et qui depaase le sens objeotif saisi par 
1 'entondnent. " (pp.174-5 ibid.)
He does not state what this Immediate meaningfulness is whioh 
makes language expressive. However, he holds it to be meaning whioh 
the language oarries with it, and the same as that whioh Uerleau-Ponty 
oalls 'originary speeoh'.^* He presumably thinks that language ean 
have some degree of inherent or 'natural* meaning. The only kind of 
examples I oan think of are onomatopoeio words, l.e., words whioh 
sound like the thing or aotion they signify - though there qre others.
Dufrenne suggest other ways in whioh language is expressive. 
Pirstly, and I think quite rightly, he points out the idlosynoratlo 
ways individuals use language, both in speeoh and in writing - ways 
whioh are expressive of the person speaking or writing. Seoondly, 
he ineludes Intonation and gesture as part of a language - both of
1. See Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of perception
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whioh oertainly are expressive, but only part of/language if It is 
taken In a broader sense than the verbal, (pp.177-179.)
In beooming aesthetio, Dufrenne deolares, language undergoes a 
radioal ohange - but he does not say in what way. Presumably It is 
in an emphasis of the expressive as against the conventionally 
signifying, "ainsi le verbs poetlque est dote de oette puissanoe 
inoantatoire qua les poetes ont salute." (p.177 ibid.)
What Dufrenne eventually leads up to, in a very veiled manner, 
is the opinion that whatever expresses something, some sense, as a 
rule expresses olearly. If it is not understood this is beoause the 
audienoe is unfamiliar with the means of expression, or is perceiving 
oonfusedly, rather than that the expression is oonfused. And this 
applies both to language and to art.^* In order for the artist to be 
understood, the observer must be familiar with his means of express« 
ion - his 'world'.
Expression is thus an extremely important feature in Dufrenne's 
aesthetios, entering into most artistio questions. So far, however, 
we have net seen if, and in what way, art is expressive, or affeotive. 
As a matter of faot, Dufrenne does not expand upon some of this as 
mu oh as one might hope. Nevertheless, there are four points to diso-
USS I
i) whether expression is literal,
11) the idea of self-expression by the author (the point on whioh 
Dufrenne says most).
Hi) the different possible expressive affeots, of the same aesthetio 
material,
lv) what affeot Dufrenne supposes an affeotive property has on its
______________ __ ___________________________________________ _
J_. By which Z mean that unless one is familiar with the language and
possibly the oontext, one will not understand what is being said at
any one time - not that language is naturally expressive.
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S+9tipB 3JJ.__g»rinlQB. part 2.
i) literal »»artulon.
As I mentioned at tha baginning of tha aaoond seotion, It ia not 
impossible to oonbina different viewa of expression - and thla ia 
what Dufrenne does, to a oartaln axtant. Although, on thla point - 
of whathar tha expraaaion ia lltaral or not - ha never atataa plainly 
that ha believes it to ba lltaral rathar than aataphorloal, or att« 
ributad by aaaooiation, or Bmpathio. It aaaaa rathar to ba tha undex^ 
lying assumption. X think that tha oloaaat he oomes to atating hia 
position is in what is almost an aside (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV,p. 177)« 
Hara ha aays that tha artist's materials (odours, sounds, words,sto.) 
aotually produce that whioh they signify i
"la son du poena symphonique n'est plus la bruit da la mar, 
il ast la mar mtme . . . .  Si 1'objet esthetique semble 
oonjurer la ohosa qu'il dasigna, o'ast qua la ohosa aat 
presents an lui, . . . .  aveeoa qu'il y a an alia da plus 
profond, d'invisible, avao oette assanoa qutf-l'art saul 
peut saisir at axprimar . . . ." (p.177 ibid.)
Though this is somewhat strangely put, I taka it to ba an 
assertion that whatever art expresses, it expresses literally. It 
is neither metaphorioal nor via oonventional means of representing 
something (as someone might shake a sheet of metal to represent the 
noise of thunder). That is, it is not that the work, (A) uses means 
A, T, Z, to represent mood oc , rather that ' (a ) expresses ' • 
a direot and literal oase of expression. (Or'v, is expressed in 
(A)' as Bouwsma would prefer it, as will ba seen shortly.)
I think that Dufrenne is oorreot in not making an issue out of 
this. I have already mentioned one of tha reasons why aesthetioians
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are unhappy about the use of expressive terminology.— * It is bseause 
one thinks of 'expressive' as only properly instantiated by man, and 
therefore involving mental aotivity and feelings as well as behavloui^* 
I have said that the meaning of many terms is not determined by their 
objeot. Probably 1 should say that the meaning is not determined by 
one of the uses of any term. The oonnotations of some oonoept oan 
be very different in one use, from another, without either being reg­
arded as metaphorical. A further example of a term whose objeot has 
a bearing on its meaning would be saying, a) "the olimber fell down 
the mountain", and b) "the stone fell down the mountain". In the 
former instanoe there is an implication (or, legally, an entailment) 
of inadvertanoy, in "fell", and in the latter, none - in faot it 
would be nonsense to say that the stone did not mean to fall. In both 
oases the use of "fell" is quite literal.^* The fact that the intent­
ion not to aot in the way mentioned is not involved in the latter 
meaning does not make it any less literal. In the same nay there is 
no reason to involve all that is meant in one use of 'expressive* 
(aesthetic) in another (human).
I think that this is a oase where the use of a term has a olose 
bearing on its meaning, but does not fully determine it - and I think 
this is what was meant by Wittgenstein when he talked about use and 
meaning (and not the simple idea that the use of a word ¿a its mean­
ing - full stop). I think my point is also emphasised by Tdttgenstein 
when he compares language to a tool ohest, saying that its parts are
JL. See present ohapter, seotion IX, i) and II).
Incidentally, it is aL so often the oase that someone is inoorreotly 
referred to as expressing a eertain emotion when one should say that 
they are discharging or giving vent to, this feeling. This has the 
advantage of making the term 'express' all the more available to art, 
for art oannot disoharge emotions; and making one wary of using it too 
frsely to refer to persons.
Unloss the term is used metaphorioelly to imply that the stone lost 
its balanoe, as a person might.
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vary different and used in a variety of ways. Also "There is a 
oonstant surprise at the new trioks language plays on us when we get 
into a new field.“ *
A further example of how art oan be expressive may be found in 
the faot that one ean learn the meaning of expressive terms primar­
ily from the study of certain works of art, and apply them seoond- 
arily non-aeathetioally. for example, anguish and horror are exp­
ressed in Muasoh's 'the aoream', sensitivity in a Henry James' novel 
(e.g., a bleak loneliness in 'The altar of the dead'), the pain of 
unrequited love in Mozart's aria 'Porgi amor' (Figaro), deep serenity 
in seotions of Beethoven's final piano sonatas, sublimity in the 
seoond movement of Sohubert's 'Death and the maiden' quartet - and 
so on. The meaning of all these qualities may be learnt by someone 
who has never seen them expressed by any person, and never felt them 
themselves, to know what they are. Yet if one grasps what is exp­
ressed by these works, one is oapable of using the terms non-aesth- 
etioally, subsequently. X think this implies that whatever is exp­
ressed in a work is expressed literally. One does have to be care­
ful as to the use of the two terms 'expressive* and 'expression', 
for the former is used literally and the latter metapherioally. To 
say, ’This musio is peaceful', is to use 'peaoeful' metaphorically, 
because in a literal sense or ordinary usage of the term, 'peaoeful• 
means being at ease, not agitated, oalm, in addition to possible out­
ward signs of the mood. And as a work of art oannot feel, think or 
aet,^these qualities are not appropriate to it. It oannot liters! ly
JL. See Wittgenstein, Leotures and conversations on aesthetios (| )
trans. G-. B. M. Ansoombe, pub.Basil Blaokwell, Oxford. Also Phllos- 
ophloal investigations.
An expressive quality may be aoted out in, e.g., a play, but this 
is distinct from its soting peacefully, for example.
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either ba at ease or not at ease, calm or reatlasa. It oan only 
repeal tha outward signs.
Using a term of sxprsssion by saying, for example, •X is happy', 
is implying both more and lass than that X is expreaive of happiness* 
Mora, in that it entails that X is in a partioular frame of mind, his 
oonsoiousness is involved. And this is beyond the capacity of a work 
of art. bass, in that X does not need to behave happily or sound 
happy for it to ba the oase that 'X is happy'. For example, if X had 
won £200,000, wa should probably believe that he was happy (if wa 
knew for instanoa that this was tha kind of thing which would please 
him - make him happy), without requiring him to express happiness - 
behave happily or give some outward indication.^** This is not true of 
a work of art. The behaviouristio characteristics, or more accurate­
ly, outward signs, are Just what are required for it to be expressive 
of e.g. happiness. The outward indications, i.e., what is not ent­
ail sd in the literal meaning of, 'This person is happy', are what 
make the statement, 'this work is happy', true. (Indeed, behaving 
happily is not always a sufficient condition for the statement to be 
true of a person - he may be pretending. But the outward signs are 
both neoessary and sufficient conditions of its being true of a work.)
On the other hand, one oan literally say, 'this music sounds 
peaceful', sinoe this is saying that it is expressive of peaoefulness 
- and one oan gain a knowledge of the meaning of 'peaoeful' through 
listening to the musio, etc. And one oan still say quite legitim­
ately, 'these works are anguished/serene/sensitive/sad . . but
what one means is not that they literally are any of these things, 
rather that they are literally expressive of them.
In all this I am not denying the faot that terms predicated of
art oan have a slightly different meaning from when they are predio-
ated of people. For example, aesthetio sadness la revealed through 
1. Though saying 'X is happy' inoludes the possibility that ho oan
and may express this feeling outwardly. His saying that he is happy
is an expression of it, if he is telling the truth.
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formal and/or expriisirt qualities, and subjeot matter (if aqy), 
whereas human sadness is revealed through feelings and possibly 
behaviour. If one says a pioture looks sad, one does not expeot to 
be able to say it feels sad, nor does one sympathise with it or try 
to oomfort it. Yet one still means that it literally looks sad. 
Indeed it is really beoause of the difference in meaning,that one 
use is said to bs literal and the other metaphorioaL
When one has olarified the issue, it beoomes far less aonvinoing 
when other theorists suoh as Reid,~*say that obviously works of art 
oannot be literally expressive. Briefly, his theory is that express» 
ive terms, whioh he ealls 'values', are imputed to the work of art 
and are qualities whioh they inherently appear to express (of.pp60-3 
op.oit.). We mistakenly see works of art as expressing values,rather 
than being "oauses of the ooourrenoe in us of values" (p.79 ibid.), 
whioh we put there by imagination. The qualities of the work are 
divided into sense and forms, both of whioh Reid supposes to be 
expressive, and both always expressing particular things, by imput­
ation.^*
However, even if we dismiss this theory as being too timid and 
confused, there are others whioh, while believing that the work ofart 
is expressive, still puszle over exactly how it is expressive.
0. K. Bouwsma^'is a good example - thinking it Insufficient Just to 
say that art is expressive in a different way from man. His contusion 
JL. 1 as» grateful to Cyril Barrett for clarification of this distinction.
See L.A.Reidj A study in aesthetics, Sreenwood Press 1973.(1st 
pub.1954, esp. Chapter 2.)
The idea of inherent expression is given its fallest exposition in 
Deryok Cooke; The language of music. O.U.P. 1968 (see also farther on in 
this seotion), and is h^d ty Rudolph Arnheim; Art and viaial peroeptioj. 
Faber and Faber, London, 1969 (1st pub. in Sngland 1956).
4 . See O.K.Bouwsaa; 'The expression theory of art', pub.in the ooll- 
eotion Aesthetips and Language. ed.Blton,pub.Basil Blaokwell, Oxford,
1967
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la that man axpraaaaa emotions whioh are desoribable as distinot from 
the person, and sentenoes express meanings whioh are also distinot 
from the sentenoes, but works of art are simply expressive, i.e. 
there is no set of features in the work whioh are desoribable as what 
is expressed, distinot from the work Itself. Art is expressive in 
the sense that something has oharaoter, and the oharaoter is not 
translatable, though one may be able to give a description of the work 
of art in terms of expression. What one should not do is say 'X exp» 
reBBSs Y', beoause this implies that Y is detachable from X - whereas 
the expressiveness is like the redness of an apple.
Although 1 have indicated that it seems a little over-o§utious 
to query literal expression, and whether art can express, 1 think 
Bouwsma makes a worthwhile contribution to understanding the nature 
of aesthetic expression.^* It would be to Dufrenne's advantage were 
he to have given some suoh account of the nature of expression per sc. 
As It is, he devotes more time to the idea of self-expression of the 
artist. Coincidentally, Bouwsma also believes that the artist exp­
resses himself in his work.
11) Self-expression of the artist.
Dufranne several times asserts that, as well as being itself exp­
ressive, and affeotive (whioh would seem to oonnote an emotive response 
in the audienoe), the work of art is the self-expression of the art­
ist. However, this is disoussed mainly in tarns of the world of the 
artist and the world of the work as being one, rather than the assert­
ion that the artist translates his owh emotions into the work. This is 
most readily seen as the idea that in the composition of a work, ths 
1 . Vinoent Tomas holds a view very similar to Bouwsma - believing in 
the literal expression of the work of art, and the identity of 'the 
expressive thing' A), and 'the thing expressed' B). Cf. Bouwsma, the 
apple Ai), and the redness of the apple Bi). See V.Tomas, 'The 
oonoept of expression in art', ooll. ed. Uargolis, Philosophy looks at 
the arts. Pub. Charles Scribner's sons, N.Y. 1962.
ü JOXiJ-
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artist and the work are fused. Thus whatever is expressed in the 
work may be seen as expressing the author as well. This is very 
different from saying that the artist uses a work as a means to 
express his own thoughts, eto.
> j
In at least seven places Dufrenne says roughly the same thing, 
for instanoe (Vol.I, Part 1, Chap.IV, p.159), he says that the artist 
ohooses a subjeotive existence in the work rather than in the world
and history:
"la vérité de l'auteur n'est point la vérité historique de
t : s,J
0 ■ ; i ' J"
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l'individu réel qui est l'objet de le biographie, elle est 
la vérité de l'homme présent a l'oeuvre et que je ne connais 
que par l'oeuvre." (p. 159 ibid.)
This idea that work and author are one is repeated when Dufrenne disc­
usses expression and representation as combining to form the world of 
the work (Vol.I, Part 1, Chap.V. p.248-9). For instanoe, the worlds
1 i 3.. of Balsao or Cesanne are the worlds - or types of material - with
j 2 j 'ï '. whioh they work. And these materials express a oertain V.el tansohauung. 
Thus Dufrenne appears to be saying that whatever the artist feels, 
shows itself through the way he produces his work.
Again (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, p.405), work and artist are
L:V L mi identified - of the work:
"On la nomme le plus souvent du nom de l'auteur de l'oeuvre,
y ^ /Nparce que oette qualité oharaoteristique de l'oeuvre parait en 
même temps désigner l'auteur; elle est oommune a l'oeuvre #t à 
l'auteur, et oomme leur lien vivant;" (p.405 ibid.)
This is slightly developed upon in terms of expression both of 
the work and the author - not surprisingly, sinoe all disoussion of 
the world of the work and artist is given in the oontext of the
 ^ .¡G DU JO
aesthetio objeot as expressive. The world of the author is expressed 
(p.223 op.oit.). He also modifies the idea of a world of the author 
to that of an atmosphere of a world - but goes on to say that the 
atmosphere only refers baok to the aesthetio objeot (in whioh ease he 
is not making any significant alteration to what has been said). _
»
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Dufrenne also makes an aotual assertion that the author express­
es himself in this world. Thus he moves on from saying that the author 
identifies with the work and thus that the work is self-expressive of 
the author in that he is consubstantial with it. However, he main­
tains the terminology of a world of work or artist.
For instance (Vol.X, Part I, Chap.IV, pp.182-3), in the first 
main discussion of expression, he says that the aesthetio objeot is 
expressive beoause the author expresses himself there, and brings 
about a world of his own:
"L'objet esthétique est expressif paroe que l'auteur s'y
exprime. Non qu'il s'exhibe ou se prostitue, mais il s'exprime
\a sa tour en exprimant . . .  il fait surgir un monde . . . ,
qui est le sien." (p. 1 8 2 ibid.)
The same idea is lmplloit in the diaoussion of the subject and of 
expression (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, p.393-4 and 399), in the general 
structure of the work of art, when Cufrenne says that the artist 
ohooses a particular subjeot for a reason:
"L'artiste choisit tel sujet paroe qu'il lui est oonsubstant- 
ial, paroe que oe sujet éveille en lui une oertain émotion. . ." 
(p. 393 ibid.)
And: "Rouault ne peint pas un Christ, mais à travers le Christ 
un equivalent piotural de oe que le Christ signifie pour 
lui." (p.394 ibid.)
And finally:
"La vérité du oonte, o'est le témoignage qu'il porte. Sur 
quoi? Sur l'homme qui, en le raoontant, se raconte, exprime 
ses angoisses, ses désirs, ses joies, les travaux et les 
Jours........ " (P.399 ibid.)
These quotations show that Lufrenne retains the idea of a 'world' 
and that of ooneubstantislity with the work. Only in the final quote 
is there any implication that he thinks the artist expresses his 
emotions, self, etc. in the work of art. And I think this is a
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continuation of the assertion that the world of the artiat ia the 
same as that of his works - with the addition of something of what 
this means - i.e., that the artist is not unbiased towards his 
oreations, that they have a oertain signifioanoe for him, and their 
oonstruotion is unique and individuating of the artist.“ * Dufrenne 
feels, I think, that oertain methods of working, or subjeots upon 
whioh to work, are more oongenial for the artist than others, and 
provide more soope. 1 do not think that ha wishes to over-involve 
the artist - especially in view of the faot that he has said at one 
stage that suoh things as the expression of an ideology of the art­
ist will distraot from the work itself.
The idea that the world of author and work are one has a oertain 
justification. 1 think, for example, that it is true to sa_. that the 
artist is engaged in his work, and at least mentally, not involved 
with the world during the oreative periods. The work oan be ident­
ified with the author in that it derives its expression, form, eto. 
totally from the author. Therefore, to the extent that a work of art 
oan be seen as an extension of its oreator and belonging to the 
'world' of objeots whioh are made by, or belong to, the author, it 
may be oalled the self-expression of the artist.
Nevertheless, as I have said, it is unwise to think of a 'world' 
of author or works of art, because the oreative style of an author 
oan ohange to suoh an extent that there may be nothing about his esxty 
works to oonneot them with his later ones. Also, this type of self- 
expression fairly obviously has little to do with the meaning it 
usually has - i.e., that of expressing or passing on, emotions or 
thoughts of the artist.
Therefore, although he wishes to make a oerbain identifioation
i refer to their mode of oonstruotion rather than the thing act­
ually oonstruoted, sinoe, as I said previously (of.present ohapter), 
the ohoioe of subjeot is not always left to the artist.
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between the artist and his work, and to involve the artist in teras 
of oonoern and feeling for what he oreates; 1 think he has no int­
ention of olaining that the work of art is the expression of the 
moods, thoughts, beliefs, eto. of the artist, and not expressive of 
itself) nor that it is expressive itself, but that what it expresses 
is restricted to what the author is oapable of feeling, thinking, 
believing, eto. and translating into the work.
There are other, more positive, theories of self-expression. 
Tolstoy^* and Wordsworth^'are olassio examples, and Dewey‘S* and 
Carritt^'aore modern philosophic ones.
For example, Dewey's theory is much more directly oonneoted with 
the emotions of the artist and the audienoe (as with many theorists, 
he restricts expression to that of emotions). He seems to think that 
the indirect expression of emotion in any oiroucis tanoes, is aesthetio, 
and to be indireot in the demonstration of one's emotion is to express, 
whereas to be direot would be to discharge. He gives the example of 
an irritated person tidying his room (and thus expressing, instead of 
raging, and thus discharging).^* He makes a great deal of this dist­
inction, and art of course presents itself as an ideal means of 
1,. Tolstoy, op.oit.
see Wordsworth; Prelude i , Hoe try ia"eBOtion reeolleoted in tranquillity." 
jj. See John Dewsj) Art as experience, pub.Capricorn books N.r. 1958 
(1st pub. 193*t)> ssp. ohaps. IV and V.
¿.See K.F. Carrltt, What la beauty? pub. Oxford Oarwodai rtwes,1932 (csp.oiwp VI). 
¿.Although I think the distinction between discharging and expressing 
enotlon oertainly exists, 1 do not think too much oan be said to hang 
on it. The rather arbitrary faotor of the degree of intensity of aot- 
lvity seems to determine the distinction betweon one and the other.
And if the person who tidies his room would not have done it had ho 
not been irritated, then the notion is as muoh the discharge of his 
emotion as raging, only less obviously so. Also, does a person rum. 
lng from an angry bull express or discharge fear? (Dewey gives little 
support for this olein about the person tidying his room.)
expressing an «notion - bacauaa it involves deliberate, thought-out, 
intentional activity on the part of the subject.^*
Aooording to Daway, a good work of art la tha controlled express 
ion of emotion, and although, for example, a poem ia not Just the 
oooasion for the expression of some emotion:^*
"The emotion of the artist and that aroused in us are oooesioned 
by soenes in the world and they blend with subjeot natter.”
(p.68 ibid.)
"AjaotAon ip essential to that apt of expression which produoes 
a work of art." (p.69 ibid. My underlining.)
"insufficient «notion shows itself in a acidly ’correct• 
produot. Kxoessive emotion obstructs the necessary 
elaboration and definition of parts." (p.70 ibid.)
"In formal definition, oaotion is esthetic when it adheres 
to an objeot forced by an expressive aot." (p.76 ibid.)-i*
It is partly a presupposition of Dewey's that expression in art is a 
proporty of the artist (and, on the receptive side, of the audienoe) 
and he takes it as accepted that a work of art is a means of express­
ion rather than the possessor of expressive powers. for example, he 
says, "only where material is employed as media is there expression 
and art." (p.63 ibid.) Carritt makes much the same presupposition - 
that the work of art is the solf-expreesion of the artist.
As I have already said, the idea that art is the expression of 
the artist's moode, thoughts, eta. is not incompatible with that of 
art as being itself expressive. However, it has certain disadvant­
ages. (a ) It oonfuaes the loootion of what ia expressed - if the 
artist is expressing i  then the position regarding art is: "A (the 
artist) feels A, an^ B (the work) is the m e d i u m  _of_,its oxp.rf gslpn".
1 . op.oit. pp.76-7*
£. The quotation givan aaoond should ooms first p o s s i b l y .
It oen be seen from what I an saying of Daway, that ha regards the 
audisnoe aa participating in tha aot of expreeelon.
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and B has a relation to X only via A. As Dewey points out» any purp­
osive aot may be the means of expressing X, whereas if art is itself 
expressive then the proposition is more simple: "X is in B", or "B is 
expressive”- and X is aooepted as an inseparable part of B and not a 
faotor with the aooidental or arbitrary oonneotion with B, of being 
the intentional object of A to express.
(B) It also has the aonsequenoe that the artist must have person­
al experience of whatever is expressed by the work - and I see no 
reason for the claim that, for example, Wagner experienced everything 
he expressed in his musio, or Henry James in his novels. It is perf­
ectly logioal and more eoonomioal to suppose that an artist may be 
simply a sensitive and imaginative person, without this welter of 
experienoe.
iii) The inherent nature of expression.
Dufrenne makes only one reference to the question of whether express­
ive qualities inherently express what they do (Vol.l, Part II, Chap.IV, 
p.407), end I think what he says is perfectly oorreot. Uuoh discuss­
ion has oentred around this, but I think it will be sufficient to oite 
Dufrenne's oase and to say that Eduard hansliok“ * said very muoh the 
same in the late nineteenth oentury, and by doing so effectively 
refuted Deryok Cooke-^ * and John Dewey^* some fifty years later.
Dufrenne foresees the danger that in looking at particular works 
of art it may seem that oertain shapes, patterns, rhythms, eto. 
inherently possess oertain expressive properties. But he oombats 
the temptation by saying that partioular expressive traits may be 
seen to express X or Y beoauae we have already discovered the general
j_. See E. Hansliok, The beautiful in musio. trans. Gustav Cohen, pub. 
Bobbs Iterill, The Liberal Arts Prsso (1st pub. 1854), 1957.
See Cooke, op.alt.
See Dewey op.olt. I am Indebted to Cyril Barrett for this 
partioular point.
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expression of the total work. Parts are expressive in relation to 
the whole. In a different context the same thing may express some­
thing entirely different.(Of expressive traits):
"Ils ne sont pas expressifs que par leur rapport à l'ensemble 
isoles, le seraient-ils enoore et de la meme façon? Ou bien 
s'ils étaient insérés dans un autre contexte? Un développe­
ment peut moduler du mineur en majeur sans produire l'effet 
que dégagé le ohoral de Franok, une syntaxe musicale peut 'être 
décousue, au moins apparement relaohee, sans produire l'effet 
des Preludes de Debussy. Un meme trait d'écriture peut avoir 
des expressions bien différentes, en sorte qu'auoun trait 
n'est vraiment expressif à soi seul; et inversement, tous
/  /  /  Nles elements de l'oeuvre peuvent indifferement concourir a 
l'expression. Cela signifie que c'est l'oeuvre qui porte 
l'expression." (p.J*.07 ibid.)
I think a little study of one's own proves Dufrenne oorreot, 
although it is also perfectly true to say that there are partioular 
aesthetic 'moves' which conventionally express some one thing, and 
whioh are used by artists, expecting the audienoe to reoognise the 
convention. For instanoe, G minor was kosart’s 'tragio' key, but 
tnis does not mean that tnere is any thing inherently tragio about 
G minor.
1v) The affeot of expressive Qualities.
There remains the question of the affeot of these expressive qualities 
on their audienoe. Considering that Dufrenne calls them affeotive 
qualities, one might suppose he thought they would have some speoiflo 
affeot - in the way Tolstoy thought that whatever is expressed should 
be oommunioated, and that this would be the • primary funotion of a 
work of art. However, this is not the oase. To be affeotive is to
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be expressive, for Dufrei.ne, and In his disoussion of the 
aesthetio attitude— * he speoifioally warns against too full a 
partiolpation in the expressive qualities of the work. One should 
participate and Identify to the extent that one may understand, 
for oomplete isolation would result in a lack of comprehension.
But this does not mean that one should attempt to be affeoted by
2every emotion or thought expressed by a work.-** And more positive­
ly Dufrenne nowhere suggests or intends, that the primary fanotion 
of expression in art is to bring about an emotional response on 
the part of the audience.
Appendix.
What are the expressive qualities of a work, and what do they 
express?
It is useful to be clear on the fact that Dufrenne does not regard 
expression as restricted to feelings - on whioh point 1 think he 
is oorreot. Unfortunately, many aesthetioians restriot their 
examples to emotive terms, for example Bouwsma. Dufrenne, on the 
other hand, involves the 'spiritual', the 'beautiful', the 'lyrio', 
the'pyrrhio', eto. using the example of Souriau (Vol.ll, Part IV, 
Chap.II, p.575). These are certainly not emotions, but are still 
possible expressive qualities of a work of art.
Dufrenne wishes to go furtner than Souriau and to find other 
things whioh are expressive, though he is uncertain as to how to
1. See ohapter four.
As I have said in ohapter four, and above, this would in 
any oase be impossible in many instances.
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continue. In this desire I think that he is oorreot. Keid,^**for 
example, provides the suggestion that the form of a work is expressive 
ho do Cook#** and Hansliok“** when describing the expressive power of 
musical form (harmonies and rhythms - inoluding especially intervale).
However, I think that the formal qualities of a work possess • 
double function. That is to say, in musio, a partioular phrase may 
express nothing, but be a purely arohioteotural form, and in visual 
art a oirole may express nothing - it may simply possess a formal 
relationship to other forms in the same work, unless one wishes to 
say that it expresses oiroularity. in whioh oase I would argue that 
there is really nothing expressed in oiroularity beyond being a 
oirole, and that this is merely a rather misleading form of works - 
and less plausible if one thought of trying to say a polygon expressed 
polygon-mess.
Or (seoond funotion), a musical phrase i-ay express joy, power, 
eto., just as a visual form suoh as a oirole might be considered to 
express completeness or fulfilment, held agrees with this to the 
extent of saying that forms do not express their form, but some 
•value' - e.g., a circle, completeness (of. pp. 83-5, op.oit.) - but 
he moves out of line with r..y viewpoint beoeua* he thinks foms are 
always expressive of something*
Thus tnere are forms and thare are expressive qualities, and 
they are not mutually exclusive. A form may or may not be an exp­
ressive quality, dependent upon its context. A Beoh fugue, for 
example, is more likely to bs regarded as a study in the inter­
relation of forms than in the expressiveness of tnese forms. So I
oan agree with neither SantayanaAvho says forms ar. ft&L • xj2re*ki.Tk 
op. oit.
op. eit. _
op. oit.
jk. See C. Santayana, The sense of beauty, pub. Saribnar's N.t. 1896.
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btotuat they only exprose their own form, whioh ia not expression, 
nor Held, who thinks that all forma are exprossive of something 
other than their own form.
I hesitate to go further, at this stage. But I believe that 
thia view should be perffeotly aooeptable, and that at this basio 
level at least, it upholds the claim whioh Reid makes for his own 
position - that there is "no antithesis between •formalism* and 
'expressionism* as theories” (p. 6 7 op.oit.). It will be seen in 
in the next seoticn that Dufrenne does allow for forms to have a 
oertain value in their own right.
N.B. As to the question of what non-formal expressive qualities 
express, 1 think that the answer is themselves, i.e., the spirit­
ual exemplifies spirituality, the beautiful, beautyj the* lyrio, 
lyrioism, eto.
vonolusioj.
This discussion of expression is, Of necessity, somewhat abbrev­
iated. This is mainly for the sake of relevanoo to Dufrenne, to 
enable me to relate it to meaning, and for laak of space. 1 think 
it is fairly obvious that my sympathies lie with Dufrenne, that the 
work of art is literally expressive. It is nov» necessary to bring 
the discussion back to meaning ana its relation to expression.
heotion IV.__
i) leaning and form.
In the final part of the previous seotion 1 suggested that the 
formal qualities of a work of art were on oooaeions expressive - 
depending upon thoir context. I.e. that they oan be either purely 
formal, or expreesive - form expreesing a oertein quality. And in 
the introduction to thie diopter, X indioated that Dufrenne takes 
up the latter view of the formal qualitiea of a work of art - that 
they have value ea expressive properties, in giving meaning to the
work. However« be also gives space to tea aforementioned view that 
formal properties per se oan have value (be meaningful). In fact, 
much of what he says about fora and meaning omits the value of 
expressive properties as meaningful.
This seotion will be devoted to the value attached to form - or 
&3 bufrenne usually terms it« the formal properties of the sensible - 
and its function. She terms are fairly uniformly ordered, for 
example, the sensible qualities of & work of art are not dirootly 
expressive, rather, they possess a certain form whloh provides order 
and unity and thus, meaning. Unfortunately then, Dufronne becomes 
somewhat non-committal. One of the main things he means by form, is 
an underlying faotor of the sensible. It is also, sometimes, form in 
its ordinary meaning, - i.e., spatial or temporal outline and struct­
ure of entities. But whether he means that form gives a wcrk its 
meaning (irrespective of expression being the essence of the work of 
art), or more simply that it gives oohsrence.(and that it is the 
essential propeities formed by the unification of the sensible, idiici). 
provide meaning through being expressive), is left ambivalent. This 
latter lues speoifioally plaoes form in second place to expression, 
whioh is in any case its position in Dufrenne's theory, expression 
always being the prinoipal faotor in art.
What is notably absent from Dufrsnno's discussion as yet, is 
a dear indication of the relationship between moaning und egression.! 
One oan interpret what he aays of form, os meaning (in three parts},
a) the sensible qualities of a work of art are unified by their form,
b) having form is one way of having meaning,
o) the form of the sensible is that whioh provides expressive qual­
ities. form is really a means of giving tho sensible qualities 
expressive power, and ia entirely subordinateto expression. But 
ono oan also interpret him as saying that a work of art has both 
formal and expressive jproperti*«,, and it is thaao (along with
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representational subjeot matter, if any) whioh go together to 
provide the work with a meaning. However, this gives meaning a 
priority it does not in faot possess.
1 think it is wisest to try to elucidate in terms of necessary 
conditions. bufrenne has said that the affeotive a prioris are the 
eosenoe of art and therefore they ure necessary conditions of it.
He has not indicated that form is a necessary condition of art, 
therefore expression must be assumed to take primacy. And even if 
form ^ ’is the major factor in giving meaning to art, it must be 
given a lesser position as it has not been assigned the status of 
a necessary condition. (That is, in bufrenne's theory.) All work# 
of art may be assumed to be expressive - and here meaning makes up 
some ground, because although bufrenne does not regard it as the 
essence of art, he must in some way wegard it as essential - and 
therefore a necessary condition, because he has asserted that works 
of art are meaningful (of. aaotion i). Of course, all art will have 
some form - but tnie is Just a necessary condition of any objeot, 
not in any way confined to art - and whether the form is a part of 
making the work art^*is another question.
bufrenne is basically an expressionist, but he adopts both a 
formalist and expresslohist line in disoussing the moaning of a 
work of art. There is, however, nothing inconsistent about this. 
Form is involved both in discussions of expression and of meaning, 
and is here restricted to its relevance to meaning (although exp­
ression somehow inevitably appears in the end).
This brings us finally to what bufrenne aotually says. Firstly 
(Vol.I, Part I, Chap.1, pp.41-4), he asserts that the eenslbls 
elements, i.e., sound colour etc., of a work of art sre not
grasped as disorder beoause it is given a meaning whioh is_______
Where form ie form per se and not formally expreesive qualities. 
¿. I.e., whether it gives it unity.
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its organisation - the aounda are not Just noises, the sppeohea not 
Juat oris», the ooloura not juat patches of sense. (And the work 
itself presents the meaning, not anything external suoh as programme 
notes, eto.) There is unity of deoor, aoene, eto. There is also a 
unity of the whole work from an alliance of all its parts. The work 
as a whole is meaningful in four ways, aocording to Dufrenne,
1) by what it represents,
il) by the rigour of its development,
lil) by the way it is arranged in the representation (if representative), 
iv) by what it expresses, (p.44 ibid.)
This is notably the only oooasion on whioh, in Dufrenne's diso- 
usslon of fora and meaning, he gives more than a formal aooount of 
meaning. X interpret it as dividing meaning into three sections - 
re, i) subjeot matter, re ii)and iii) form, and re iv) expression.
He then oonoentratea on form.
Seoondly (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV, pp.131“3), after some slight 
digression, he olaima that there is always a meaning in the sensible 
and this is primarily the form. The meaning oomes in identifying 
the form of the sensible:
"Mais en identifiant ioi la forme du sensible a la signif­
ication . . .  nous gagnerons peut-etre de oomprendre qu'en 
retour la signifioation oomme sens (explioit ou presenti, 
intelligible ou affeotif) puisse etre forme . . (PP. 131-2 
ibid.)
Meaning now appears to have been definitely looated in form (l.e., 
restrioted from the previous assertions, above).
Thirdly (Vol.X, Part I, Chap.IV, oono.pp.108-200), he turns to 
form as the unifying faotor.^-* Dufrenne asserts (p.188) that the 
This is not the same as meaning, sinoe something oan be unified 
or a unity, without being meaningful. For instanoe, a tree or house 
may be s»ld to have unity, or to be well-struotured, without being 
meaningful. However, in art meaning is olosely related to unity.
both formal and expressive
3 1 3
high*»t slgnifioanoe of th* aesthetic objeot is Its tru* forms 
"I»e plus haut de la signifioation deviant ioi la forme 
veritable, l'ame d* l'objet enfin oernee." (p.188 Ibid.)
This derives from th» view that it is our p»ro»ption of the work of 
art as e totality, a completely unified whole, whioh is the most imp­
ortant peroeption - barring presumably, that of its expressive qual­
ities. He then elaborates on the idea of form as form of the sens lb lew 
The aesthetio objeot is unified by its forms (p.189 ibid.), and in 
representative arts at least, the form is of central importance.
Only in representative arts should th* form be defined in terms of 
th* outline - but the outline is not of primary importanoe - and 
obviously in many types of art suoh as impressionist painting or 
musio, it is simply not present. In effeot the form is always th* 
form of the sensible:
"£t en effet la form* eat toujours forme du sensible: par quo! 
elle s'engage dans la matiere dont le sensible est 1*effet; la 
forme du ballet, o'est d'abord le mouvement . . . . de la 
peinture, o'est oet aooord des oouleurs . . . .  Cette forme 
est deja sens.” (pp.191-2.)
Here Dufrenne moves on to inolude expression in the idaa of form, 
stating that Gulllaume^-*has reoognised the faot that a theory of 
form admits of expressive qualities (the strange, the frightening, 
th* oalm, the graoious, etc.)» Sinoe Dufrenne regards expression as 
giving unity to the sensible, he presumably regards expression and 
fora as performing the same funotions on occasions - that of prov­
iding unity and possibly meaning (of. first assertion of Dufrenne, 
previous page).
Finally (p.199-200), in discussing the aesthetio objeot and the 
he talks of sign and meaning. The sign (th* aesthetio objeot) is.
±. See Guillaume, La psvohologle de la forme, p.190
and is ths bearer of, moaning. This gives it s status of its own, 
but this is not ths point hsra. Ths point is that Dufronns is laying 
olaim to msaningfulnsss in ths work of art - apparsntly without 
exception.
From what hs says, it would appsar that Dufrenne doss not wish 
to maks any striot distinction bstwssn formal and smnsibls qualities 
in ths work of art. But however slight ths distinotion, hs doss 
stress that ths form is meaningful, indeed ths highest form of 
meaning. Ho indioatos as 1 mentioned at the beginning of the work, 
that form may be expressive (of. his refersnoe to Guillaume) of graoe, 
fear eto., though he seems to have no opinion as to whether forms 
may be expressive of themselves.
Some of what he says is problematic, especially the question of 
meaning and ths idsa that ths sign is a meaning. One assumes that 
an objeot oannot be a meaning - therefore either the sign, l.e., the 
aesthetio object, must be non-physioal and Dufrenne does not make 
this olaim - or else the relationship of sign and meaning must be 
differently explained. This oould possibly be by saying that 
meaning here, is the idea that the work is self-contained, and 
therefore does not point to anything else as that signified by the 
sign. That is to say, meaning and the sign which meant', are jointly 
in the work, l.e., the meaning of art does not point to anything 
outside itself, unlike lsnguage, where the words are signs signify­
ing beyond the language.
That is to say, we learn that words are used to refer to some­
thing, and, e.g., give orders, state some proposition eto. To 
explain the meaning of an order, Wittgenstein suggests:
»ws translate it at one time into a proposition, at another 
into a demonstration, and at another into an aotlon. "(P.I.§459.) 
The sense does not go beyond an understanding of the words, explain­
able in various ways. However, the words also refer and in this way
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they are eigne. For they do not refer to themselves. For instanoe, 
"I shall have the Jewe exterminated to-morrow", refera (i) to a 
person, (ii) to a proposed state of affairs, (iii) to another set of 
people and (iv), to a future date.
All meaning - aesthetio as well as linguistio-is learnt, but 
non-aesthetio meaning is less yielding than aesthetio and less 
intuitable. As Dufrenne has said (of. Chapter Four), one oan 
intuitively 'have a sense of' at least part of the meaning of a work 
of art. With laaguage and other symbols this is not the oase, as 
Wittgenstein saysj
"The arrow points only in the application that a living
being makes of it." (P.I.^ 454.)
Without human intervention the arrow shape does not point.
And, as 1 said, aesthetio meaning is not like linguistio meaning. 
The true statement that the meaning of a word is not an objeot does 
not apply so readily to aesthetios. The meaning of an aeathetio 
objeot may not aotually k* an objeot, i.e., itself, but it may be 
said to be oontained in the objeot. And the totality whioh sigdflss 
is the aesthetio objeot. The faotors whioh signify are presumably,
(i) the unity and partioular struoture of forms,
(ii) whatever the work expresses, and
(iii) the way the subjeot matter is used formally and expressively - 
i.e., the faotors mentioned previously as Dufrenne*s idea of how the 
work is meaningful. Thus, meaning in art is introspective, or self- 
referring. So when one sees the aesthetio objeot - qua sign - one 
stays with it to find its referenoe in (i), (ii) and (iii) aspeots 
of that objeot. So I think Dufrenne is oorreot to state that the 
sign both is, and is the bearer of, meaning. For where else oan an 
aesthetio objeot find its meaning ¿a an aesthetio objeot (not, for 
example, as a part of history), except from within itself?
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Thia ia another example of Dufrenne'a making a reasonably 
Important assertion about art, and then making no attempt to baok it 
up. In this oase it is about the looation of an objeotive property 
of art - l.e., meaning and what ia meant. As I haws said before, 
Dufrenne has the merit of pointing out suoh aesthetic properties - 
and I think this, and the previous ohapter especially, bear this out. 
However, although Dufrenne did disouss the aesthetio attitude in the 
previous ohapter, and work out a oase for it, oertain lapses - as 
for example any argumentation for the oonoept of distunoe - re-emph­
asised the tendency to assume the truth of what is asserted rather 
than argue for it. The present ohapter confirms the tendency. For, 
all along, Dufrenne assumes that art has the objective properties of 
being (a) expressive, and (b) meaningful.^»*
To oonolude the subject at present under dlsoussion, there is 
the faot that Dufrenne hardly mentions the idea of expression in its 
own right, as bsLng the looation of meaning. Surely he would 
believe that the essenoe of the work - what it expresses - was its 
meaning? If the essenoe of the work is its expression of, say, 
grace, than I would assume that the formal properties and their 
relations were either of minor importanoe, or more probably, 
oontributed to the oapaoity of the work to express grace. One may 
put this down to the faot that the subjeot under disaussion is form 
and its funotlon, rather than moaning. However, sinoe it is the 
oase that he regards all art as meaningful, then I think that he 
most certainly should assign the highest form of meaning to the 
expressiveness of the work,
I shall now deal finally with the question of expression and
meaning. ______________________ _
The former is exousable to a oertain extent sinoe Dufrenne would 
assume that the expressive nature of art was proved in the discussion 
of the a priori in art (of. Chapter Three) - though as a matter of 
faot thia provided insufficient proof.
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il) Sxprossion and meaning.
Contrarily enough, Bufrenna a) says very little «bout the relation» 
ship of meaning and expression, and b) oontradiots his previous ass­
ertion that form is the highest mode of meaning. However, we are in 
the position of knowing that both meaning and expression are neoess- 
ary auditions of art - although it would appear that Dufrenne wishes 
to retain the prlmaoy of expression, and to say that even if it is a 
naoessary oondition of art that it be meaningful, it is of its 
essenoe to be expressive. If pressed, 1 think he woultl say it was an 
aooident of art that it was meaningful, but the essenoe of art, and 
the means of dlsoovering whether something was art, was expression.
Or: the proposition, "Art is expressive" is analytio, and the prop­
osition, "Art is meaningful”, is synthetlo.
What Dufrenne says is based mainly on the expressive nature of 
the sensible qualities of a work. Immediately prior to the olaim 
that the true form has the highest signifioanoe (Vol.I, Part I,Chap.JV, 
p.188), he asserts (as a part of a olaim for form) that the sensible 
has a meaning to whioh it gives its own order, and whioh becomes 
expression:
"Si le sensible est ainsi porteur d'uno signification a laquelle 
il donne un tour propre et qui devient expression . . . "(p.188SaLdJ 
This implies that the expressive qualities of the sensible properties 
of a work of art, explain it, or are its meaning.
He then says, more moderately (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, pp38^8), 
that the meaning of a work of art is divided into that of the subject 
and that of the expression:
"dans oe sens, il faut distinguer entre la signification 
enonoee par le ‘sujet*, et l'expression qui émané de l'oeuvre 
en tant que totalité." (p.3s7 ibid.)
And of the sensible qualities of a work, they are, a) expressive, 
and b) have their own meaning:
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"Le sensible eat assn solidement structure par 1'operation 
esthetique pour avoir par lui-meme une oonsistanoe d'objet et, 
partant, etre doue d'expression. £n sorts qu'a la rigeur 11 
psut se s»iffire a lui-meme, porter en lui son proprs sens . . " 
(p.387 ibid.)
This simply moves the pieoes round a little, reaffirming the mean- 
ingfulness of expressive qualities (sinoe the sensible is, Dufrenne 
says, meaningful).
As regards the means of understanding what is expressed, Duf­
renne says (Vol.Z, Part 1, Chap.IV, pp.178-82), that expression 
gives its sense direotly onoe we understand the oontext - the term­
inology, eto., of the worl( of art. The meaning is there - waiting 
our finding the 'oode' to the work of art. This is in oontrast to a 
person's expression of something - whioh oan be either intentionally 
or unintentionally deoeptive. Works of art do not have the oapaoity 
to try to deoeive the audienoe as to what they express.
Finally (Vol.Z. Part II, Chap.IV, p.406), Dufrenne gives the 
oonflioting opinion that expression gives the objeot its highest 
meaning:
"C'est elle (expression) qui oonfere a l'objet sa forme la 
plus haute paroe qu'elle eat sa plus haute signification." 
(p.406 ibid.)
The work has a oertain quality (expression) whioh animates it.
Prom what Dufrenne says of form and expression and their 
relation to meaning, one oan only reasonably oonolude that both 
oontribute to the meaning, and that sinoe expression is the essenoe
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of * work of art it takoa prinaoy. In neither part of this 
seotion does he mention that the meaning of the work is, in the 
end, ungraspable. This may be taken as an assumed part of his 
thesis.
I do not think that Dufrenne allows the formal qualities of a 
work of art the position they hold in relation to art. He 
subordinates form to expression, and nowhere oonsiders the time 
whioh those oontemplating*art, devote to the formal relations of 
parts of a work, and to eaoh formal property itself (irrespective 
of the possibly expressive powers of form). And 1 think it is 
undoubtedly the oaae that the form of a work in many oases just­
ifies as muoh oonsideration as its expression, and in some oases, 
more, dependent on the type of art under oonsideration.
Conolusion.
As regards meaning, 1 have already disoussed everything whioh I 
find dubious about Dufrenne’s theory - which is basically, that 
the meaning of a work of art is inexhaustible, untranslatable and 
ungraspable, though more aooessible if it has a subjeot. There is 
never any doubt that he regards art as meaningful.
However, 1 do not see why a work of art should neoessarily be 
expressive, despite Dufrenne'a absolute oertainty that the affeot- 
ive a priori's are the esaenoe of a work ef art. The only way in 
which I would aooept this would be if one used the term in an 
extremely broad sense, to inolude both the representational and 
•presentative' - whioh I will explain. If a work gives the imp­
ression of moving water (e.g. Schubert, Die Sohone Hullerin), it 
represents the movement of water. And if a work is purely formal 
(e.g., oertain Baoh fugues, some Stravinsky), then it presents'
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oertein forma.
However, although tha former saema acceptablethe latter ia,
1 think, only a vain attempt to inoluda form In axpraaaion. Present­
ing a form haa little if anything to do with expressing. Beaidea, 
there ia really no neoeaaity to inolude (purely) formal qualitiea 
in the aot of expreaaion (unless one is presented with a formal work 
whioh does not express, and one's theais ia that it ia a necessary 
oondition of art that it is expressive - as is Dufrenne's thesis, 
in whioh oase one ought to recant one's view). I fail to see why 
Dufrenne maintains the necessity of expression when it is perfectly 
dear that there are works of art which are purely formal, and when 
he has admitted the existence of formal qualities in a work of art,
JL. I regard this as aooeptable because representation and expression 
oan I think be used to mean much the same thing. They may be two 
ends of a soale, where one is related to emotions, feelings, thoughts, 
etc. (expression), and the other to forms and activities (represent­
ation). On occasions they would seem to ooinoide - for example, 
one oould say that the piano part of a Sohubert song either repres­
ented, or expressed, the movement of water; and there seems to be 
no difference in the meaning of the two terms here.
N.B. 1 use 'represent' here without the connotation that there is 
something else to whioh the representation points (i.e., acts as a 
sign). Certainly what is represented is not literally in the work, 
but the representation itself is - Just as 1 hold that the express­
ion of a work is literally in it. It must also be admitted that 
there is another meaning of representation where it is completely 
different from expression. For example, if one represents the 
Sohonbrun, then there would be a difference if one substituted 
'represented' by 'expressed'.
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as distlnot from expressive qualities, and as possibls contributory 
faotors to the meanlngfulness of a work. It is also requisite to 
■aintsin s distinction of form and expression hers, in order not 
to oonfuse the distinction within form - i.e., forn as purely 
formal, and form as expressive.
finally, with regard to possible typos of expressive theory, 1 
have indicated that Z agree with Oufrenns that works of art are 
literally expressive. 1 do not find oonvinoing, arguments for self- 
expression of the type whioh olain that the artist expresses only 
that whioh he has experienced or is experiencing. 1 have pointed 
out two disadvantages to this^*- that it oonfuses or makes for 
ambiguity, and that it is restrictive. Moreover it appears to have 
no particular advantages exoept that the knowledge whether or not 
artist has experienoed what he desoribes, will very probably make a 
difference to our aesthetio appreoiation. However, this being so, 
it is not logioally neoeasary for the artist to experience what he 
expresses. Therefore the only thing one might stipulate is that if 
the work is expressive of something experienced by tne artist, then 
it would be informative for the audienoe to know this - for the 
aesthetio attitude.
rvS for the idea that expressive properties are inherently 
expressive of oertsin qualities, 1 think that what hufrenne says is 
sufficient argwaent against this. (liansliok adds a good deal nore, 
if one wishes to substantiate the argument.) I have already dealt 
with ûufrenne'a view of audienoe reaction and found his opinion 
oonvinoing enough to plsoe audienoe participation at a fairly 
noderats level .■*** To say a work is expressive is not to say it
1. See Section III, ii) present chapter.
See Chapter Four, Seotion IV. - audience participation nay vary 
aooording to the oapaoity of the subjeot to dlstanoe successfully - 
of. sane seetlon and fcullough.
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causes a oertain emotive response in the audienoe, although 
obviously it requires the audienoe, in order for it to be said to 
be expressive. For it is they who attribute the expressive qualit­
ies to art, and without them it oould not be said to be expressive.
One of the main omissions which Dufrenne makes, however, is to 
make it olear whether he thinks a work has one affeotive/expressive 
quality, or many equally powerful ones, or one predominant quality 
whioh oharaoterises the 'mood' of the work. He gives no indioat- 
ion of what he thinks. As it happens, I do not think one oan 
generalise about the whole area of art, i.e., all its types or 
olasses and all objeots belonging to that type or class - espec­
ially in view of the fact that art is a developing subject and what 
applies now may not apply in a few years' time. Nevertheless, 1 
think Dufrenne oould commit himslf to the idea for example, that 
works of art usually have more than one affective quality. An 
instance of this is opera - Die Zauberfl'Ate is expressive of a 
variety of things, from Papageno's aria, 'Der Vogelfänger*, full 
cf gaiety, to the sublimity of Tamino's 'Dies Bildnis' aria, to the 
reverenoe of Sarastro's aria, '0 Isis und Osiris', and so on. (An 
exception might be the very oompressed works of Webern, whioh have 
little time to express anything.) Also, in most woxks there will 
be one predominant expressive quality whioh oan be regarded as the 
'mood', whioh does not have to be expressed explioitly anywhere, 
but whioh is set by the artist. I.e., by shape for a sculptor; 
shade and oolour and formation by a painterj the main key, tempi, 
rhythm, harmony and melody by a oomposer; setting, period, style of 
speeoh eto., in literature.
It is very remiss of Dufrenne not to make his position olear 
in view of the faot that he is disoussing his oentral, supposedly 
a priori subjeot. Thus there is a large blank spot in the theory, 
relating to how the affeotive a priori works. If he oould have
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attempted some examples of how the expressive qualities function, 
and how being a priori is valuable to their functioning (if it 
were), then he might oonoeivably convert one towards his point of 
view. As it stands, one may very well agree that art is express­
ive - either sometimes or neoessarily - in the way Dufrenne thinks 
it is. without in the least oommitting oneself to agreeing that 
these affeotive/expressive qualities are a priori, or that the work 
of art as a whole is a priori.
Sinoe I have emphasised the value of Dufrenne's pointing out 
oertain objective aesthetic features, 1 shall oonolude by mention­
ing the most notable of these which have arisen in this chapter, 
and whioh 1 have not so far pointed out. For instanoe (a) the
untransltability of the work of art - whioh is not universally
artreoognised. Some people would regard'as nebulous and treacherous 
if they thought for instanoe, they could not take a pioture to 
pieoes (mentally) and explain why eaoh piece had to be as it was 
and what it meant or symbolised, etc., that is, translate it 
oompletely into ordinary language. (This is not to say that 1 
agree with hui'renne’s idea that the work is neeessarily ungrasp- 
able, but that it emerges in the oourse of the discussion, that 
literal translation of art is not possible.) This particular 
question is still debated, and therefore Dufrenne is not pointing 
out any indisputable faot; but in reminding us of the number of 
facets and possible interpretations with which any work presents 
its audienoe, he is indicating how difficult it would be to give 
a complete verbal translation of any work, - end it also seems as 
if this is not the sort of aotivity one ought to attempt (os X 
said in the first seotion).
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Also (b) a representational subject Is not a necessary part 
of any of the arts, and where it occurs Its funotion la to further 
the expressive powers of the work. One oan give Dufrenne little 
oredit for the former assertion, sinoe his disoussion has been 
seen to be highly ambiguous - but the latter gives one a possible 
means of distinguishing a representational painting from say, a 
photograph.Aooording to Dufrenne then, a photograph of a oow 
would presumably do exaotly what it was intended to do, that is, 
to represent a oow. But the painting of a oow goes further than 
this - the oow is the medium for expressing something - sadness, 
beauty, plaoidity, melancholia, eto. Others might wish to go 
further and assert, for example, that the form was as important 
as the expression, eto. But this still aooepts Dufrenne's point - 
that there is something further in representing in art than Just 
depicting the subjeot (and thus presenting us with the distinction 
between art and photography in oases of representation),— *
Apart from these, there are the two major and general prop­
erties of art, expression and meaning, whioh Dufrenne disousses 
from numerous angles, as .has been seen. And even if his olaims 
require substantiation, it oannot bo said that Dufrenne fails to 
bring the problems of their existence in art to our attention.
1 am referring here to a straightforward 'snapshot* -like photo­
graph , for example, of a oow - one whioh makes no claim to bo 
aesthetioj for quite a lot of photography oan, with justification, 
olaim to bo art.
¿. In thoso two oases I have elaborated somewhat on what Dufronno 
says, sinoe he only gives the bare assertion - e.g., that repres­
entation is scoondary to expression, and leaves us to olafiry the 
point and assess its value.
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Appendix.
I stated In Chapter One (p.42) that the final decision as to 
whether the work of art was a quasi-subJeot must wait until I 
had Alsoussed self-suffioienoy, expression and meaning in the 
work - as Dufrenne regards these qualities as going towards making 
the work a quasi-pour-soi. In Chapter Two, 1 disagreed with the 
idea of the work as self-sufficient, but in the present ohapter I 
have allowed that it is meaningful and as a rule, expressive, 
though not necessarily so.— *
In the absence of any suggestion by Dufrenne as to whloh of 
the qualities he mentions should be regarded as either neoessary 
or sufficient or both, we are still without any firm conclusion. 
However, in favour of art as qu^si-pour-soi, there is (from 
Chapter One) (i), temporality (ii), proximity to consciousness 
and (iii), having a relationship with the audience. (I think 
Chapter Four provided the substantiation needed, of affeotivity 
and audience participation, which shows the relationship of the 
work to its audience to be stronger than a simple passive one of 
perceived to peroeiver.) There is also (iv) expression and (v)
The qualification that art is not necessarily expressive is 
not a significant problem. It ia not a neoessary condition of nan 
that he iB expressive of anything at some stage in his existence. 
Obviously, it is very unlikely that he will never express a 
thought or emotion, but it is conceivable that suoh a person should 
exist - and still be regarded as a person.
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meaning (from the present ohapter).^* This leaves only (vi) unity, 
as dubious, and therefore not exactly antagonistio to the theory, 
and (vil) autonomy or self-suffioienoy as inoorreotly applied to 
art (and therefore antipathetic to Dufrenne's theory).
I think, on balance, that this provides enough of the qual­
ities Dufrenne specifies as giving the work a quasi-pour-sol being, 
to allow that hie theory is oorreot. All the same, one has to be 
satisfied with the properties whloh make an objeot a quasi-pour-sol. 
In one sense one oannot dispute the notion as suoh. sinoe Dufrenne 
originated it and his definition is the only one there is, that is, 
what 'quasi-pour-soi' means is what Dufrenne means by it. But one 
must oonslder whether its properties are those whioh one could reg­
ard as sufficient conditions for saying the work of art resembles, 
or is analogous to, man - whioh is after all, what Dufrenne wants 
to show when he olaims that it is quasi-pour-soi. I have already 
suggested that Dufrenne does not present these properties as neo- 
sssary and sufficient conditions of art, whioh together make art 
an a priori concept. The present question regards the former 
consideration.
Fortunately, I think Dufronne has succeeded here. Regarding 
(i), temporality, only man and art share the distinction of having 
their own temporal structure. Of oourse, man imposes his idea of 
time upon the whole world of objeots, including art, and art's 
temporality within the objective time-structure uses the same
t. There is *l*e %h» oonoept of profundity. However (a), Dufrenne's 
discussion of this has been seen to be unconvincing (of. present 
chapter. Section I, ill); (b) he uses the idea of the quasi-pour- 
soi to olaim profundity for the work, and therefore oannot also use 
profundity as a oriterlon for being quasi-pour-soij and (o) the 
oonoept is in any oase subsumed under the question of meaning, and 
as suoh need not be dealt with separately.
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concept of time as its audienoe - but it oould not very well do 
otherwise sinoe it is an artefact. (Natural objeots function in 
the same way as ordinary works of art with regard to their internal 
tine-structure.)
This seems to be the essenoe of all the properties of the 
quasi-pour-aoi, i.e,, they approximate to human properties whioh 
are not possessed by non-oonsoious entities. (ii) 'Proximity to 
consciousness' speaks for itself and is similar both to the idea of 
'having a relationship with the audienoe' (iii), and being express­
ive (ir), - both of whioh are outwardly human properties aotually 
relating to oonsoiousness. Meaning (v), in art also approximates 
to meaning in man though it does not bear any specific relation­
ship to oonsoiousness. Thus the work of art qua quasl-pour-soi 
seems to possess sufficient conditions for being analogous to man 
(in a way other objeots are not).
N.B. Autonomy, the antipathetio property, has been temporarily 
shelved, but it is in any oase not of great importance in this 
oontext. It would not make the work more nearly a pour-soi, sinoe 
the pour-soi itself is not unaffeoted by, or independent of, other 
beings. Its oonsoiousness both oreates and uses the ordinary spatio- 
temporal struoture, and man is more than historically looatable and 
related to aotual events - he determines the oourse of the majority. 
(At least, one will aooept this if one does not presoribe to a 
theory of determinism.) This exoludes events whioh are termed'Mots 
of God', e.g.( earthquakes. Art and man dfl have it in oommon how- 
#T#r> that eaoh is an end in itself - an attribute whioh Uufrenne 
uses to maintain the self-suffioienoy of art (of. Chapter One).
I stated in the introduction to this work that although I do 
not agree with Dufrenne's basio thesis of art as a priori, 1 did 
think that he made a valuable contribution to aesthetios in his
32 7.
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discussions of the objective properties of art. The idea of art 
as quasi-pour-soi seems to me to be one of the most original 
theories (as I said in the oonoluaion to Chapter One). And having 
scrutinised it thoroughly, and found it apparently correct, it 
beoomes all the more valuable. Individually of oourse, the assert­
ions of expression and meaning, eto. have been made by others and 
therefore are not unique to Dufrenne, But this faotor seems to be 
unimportant for two reasons, (a) No one has put these partiouler 
properties together in this way previously - nor has anyone stressed 
the first three points as Dufrenne does, and (b) most signifioantly, 
no one has drown a significant oonolusion. It is one thing to be 
aware of the premises of a syllogism. It is another to be able to 
draw the oonolusion. Physioists may have had all the necessary data 
for splitting the atom, in some random sequenoe along with other 
data - but it required someone to take the appropriate data and 
realise that with x, y and s processes one arrived at the method 
for splitting the atom.
I air. not saying that Dufrenne has done anything comparable in 
significance to splitting the atom, but he has gone one step 
further than most theories, and categorized art. By putting tog­
ether properties belonging to the aesthetic objeot he has oaused 
it to assume an ontological status only below that of man. This 
is a reasonably significant conclusion. Art is thus not just to 
be seen as a dependent of man oreated by him, but as a olass in 
its own right. (The natural objeot aesthetioized (sunsets, eto.) 
seems capable of being categorized with art qua man-made objeot, 
on the same ontologioal level.)
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Cpngluglofl.
A brief summary of the oonolusions drawn in this thesis and the 
value of Uufrenne's most oertainly inspired work is now required. 
And as anyone who reads his later works will see, the Phénoménol­
ogie does not oonsist of oasual assertions about art - that is, 
without oonviotion or whioh he might abandon lightly. For he 
ofton reaffirms points whioh are made in the Phénoménologie in 
later works, for example, Le poétique, dsthetiuue et philosophie 
and La notion de l'a priori. I pointed out in the introduotion 
that on the whole Dufrenne's work has been accepted too unoritio- 
ally, and that it needed to be brought into perspective and 
evaluated on its own merits. however, having examined and appraised 
his thesis in the Phénoménologie, I think one must emphasise that 
his work is of positive value - otherwise one is merely looking at 
the ai3advantages, and probably weighting the scales unfairly 
against Lufrenne. And this is not what is oalled for, nor is it 
what 1 have attempted in this thesis. What I have aimed to do is 
to present a balanced picture, with both the advantages and disad­
vantages of Dufranne’s thesis.
Ono of the basic contributions whioh Dufronne mokes to art, 
and union becomes immediately upparent on reading the Phénoménol­
ogie, consists in tne new angle from whioh he approaches his subject 
matter - for example the world of the artist and the work, or ths 
ungraapability of the aesthetic object. Also, many of the quest­
ions to whioh his work gives rise - for example, whether all art 
has a subject or is representational - have not been taken up 
previously.
1 think it has been shown that bufrenne is mistaken about muoh 
of what he says. As I indioeted at the beginning, my intention has 
been to reotify many false beliefs about his work, including the 
one that his assertions are merely good and oorreot, yet represent
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an extremely important contribution to aesthetics; rather than that 
they are more interestingly contentious, difficult and often wrong. 
All the sane, falsehood does not render a work of philosophy irrel­
evant. If it did, Descartes would not be studied as Ite is - yet 
ho is considered invaluable in terms of his contribution to the 
development of philosophy. In nuoh the same way (without suggest­
ing that Dufrenne's contribution to philosophy is comparable to 
that of Descartes), the lack of proof and often straightforward 
incorrectness of some of Dufrenne's work does not make it irrelevant.
To give an example of tnis, 1 have ooncluded that Dufrenne's 
central thesis of art as a priori is not proven, but from this 
whole thesis and the above, one may gather that I do not oonsider 
this renders it valueless. The question itself of the & priori 
related to art had not been dealt with before in anything like the 
depth that Dufrenno doals with it. Yet this is a perfectly reason­
able and ingenious angle and one to whioA I have therefore aooorded 
serious and lengthy discussion.
-l3 claimed, tho Phonomenologjie is t. a puradigm onao of a phen­
omenological aesthetic, and this and the originality of approach 
which it presents give it an important place in aesthetics. In 
investigating modern philosophy of art, one finds bufrenno's work 
invaluable if only for its uniqueness and the fact that it prosonts 
a refreshing phenomenological angle on the mass of Anglo-American 
analytic aesthetics of recent years. However, as will have been 
clear throughout this work from the amount of oriticlsa I have 
levelled at bufronno, one hae to accept that Dufrenne makes a 
limited contribution in terme of answering current questions in 
aesthetios. And tho foot that one must treat his work with respeot 
does not mean that it is to be automatically aooepted os oorreot, 
ooherent and oonvinolng.
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Sinoe this thesis _is a thesis and not a commentary, I have 
taken it from the angle of disousaing important aspeots of 
aesthetics whioh are dealt with in some way at various stages 
throughout the Ph£nomenologie - rather than taking the work apart 
ohapter by ohapter. And 1 think this method best reveals all the 
important aspeots and basio thesis of Dufrenne - that is, the notion 
of the a priori in art. It seems preferable to take an overall view 
rather than risk losing the import of the whole by taking a mioro- 
soope to each ohapter.
Those themes whioh 1 have disoussed do not by any means exhaust 
the possibilities of the Phenomenologie. It is remarkably full of 
possible topios of disoussion. for instanoe, there is the idea of 
truth in art, and speoifio themes, e.g., musio and painting. In 
this oontext one should point out that one of Bufrenne'a merits is 
that he is prepared to discuss individual art types as well as 
making olaims for 'the work of art' in general. Most works on 
aesthetics restriot themselves to one or the other - possibly in 
ease the theory will not work out in praotioe.
This thesis does not set out to oover every aspeot of the 
Phenomenologie, being as I said, a thesis not a commentary. But 
one may note that what Dufrenne says of musio, and the method he 
employs, supports the view expressed in this work, that Dufrenne 
i3 forced to pleoe too much relianoe on Kant. This relianoe on 
Kant has beer, seen to put Dufrenne's theory in doubt, sinoe it 
provides an example of the need for his phenomenologioal theory 
to make use of non—phenomenology — and his turning to Kantian 
notions of schemas to explain musio reaffirms the doubt.
This latter point brings us to a more speoifio notation of 
the areas of Dufrenne's theBis whioh are unaooeptable or unproven.
of these is the idea that art has some form of a prioriThe prinoiple
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nature or 'is an a priori', or has an unspeoified number of 
a priori affective categories. As presented by Dufrenne, this 
theory emerged as almost wholly untenable. It tore the Kantian 
notion of the a priori to ribbons, only to replace it with an 
unsatisfactory oonoept including an existential and a material 
a priori. The attempt to broaden the a priori to inolude art 
only destroyed the notion itself by presenting it as something 
quite unacceptable - as 1 think the arguments of Chapter Three 
show (and to a lesser extent the two preceding ohapters). The 
theory also suffered from the malaise of most phenomenologioal 
philosophies - a laok of argumentation.
The failure of a oentral topio also has the inevitable 
unfortunate oonsequence of giving rise to further error, and in 
this oase the primary example is of the invocation of Kant (and 
certain quasi-Kantian ideas). And the adoption of Kantian theory 
is obvious from the start in the attempt to show that art has 
a priori affeotive categories. The somewhat ironic result is that 
Dufrenne is making use of the worst of two worlds,— * i.e., the 
obscure Kantian principles of categories and 30heraas made no 
less obsoure by Dufrenne, and some of the less attractive aspeots 
of phenomenology - for example its disinclination to present 
arguments and inclination to rely on self-evidenoe.
apart from this it is not possible, from a purely internal 
angle, that is, not consequently upon the failure of the basio 
theory, to aooept oertain arguments. The more important of those 
are the distinction between the work of art und the aesthetio 
object as Dufrenne sees it; and his olaims for the status of art, 
in particular its independence or autonomy. _____________________
1_. At least the worst in terms of helping him to oomo to grips with 
the problems of aesthetios.
I
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On the other hand Dufrenne responds positively to suoh 
aesthetic challenges as providing a definition of the nature of 
art, its objective features and the nature of the aesthetio exper­
ience. With regard to the latter he links analysis, intuition and 
distanoe to provide a contemplative theory of the aesthetio attit­
ude, thus presenting a new if not individually original oonoept of 
contemplation, and one which allows plenty of scope for discussion. 
It is true that Dufrenne is himself often confused about the nature 
of the aesthetio attitude, but this does not make the view I have 
attributed to him any loss valuable.
The former two can be taken together as one, and his oonoept 
of the quasi-pour-soi is, on balance, an extremely good summary of 
the nature of the work, and of many of the features it possesses 
objectively. And ultimately one sees that it unobtrusively demands 
and receives a good deal of discussion, in two separate ways. 
Firstly in terras of the oonoept as a whole - the quasi-pour-soi and 
tae relationship of the en-spi and pour-nous to the work of art, 
and secondly in terms of its component parts, especially expression 
and meaning, as well as temporality, duration and structure 
(qualities appropriate to consciousness or approximating to those 
of u oonaoious being).
Thus, although there is unaoubtedly a good deal which may be 
queried in the Phenomonologi©, there is also much which is attract­
ive, positive and thought—provoking• And whilst X have been 
oonoerned with revealing the faults within Dufrenne•s thesis, and 
thereby dispelling over-enthusiastio attitudes, X hope that I have 
also been successful in pointing out where oredit is due to him. 
Finally, I trust that I have not appeared to be biased either 
aguinst Dufrenne or phenomenology as a whole - in fuot I have a 
greut de-'-l of sympathy for both.
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